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## CONFLICT AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM


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KURT LEWIN MEMORIAL  
AWARD 1966

DANIEL KATZ



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The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues is a group of over two thousand psychologists and allied social scientists who share a concern with research on the psychological aspects of important social issues. SPSSI is governed by Kurt Lewin's dictum that "there is nothing so practical as a good theory." In various ways, the Society seeks to bring theory and practice into focus on human problems of the group, the community, and the nation as well as the increasingly important ones that have no national boundaries. This Journal has as its goal the communication of scientific findings and interpretations in a non-technical manner but without the sacrifice of professional standards.

The Journal typically publishes a whole number on a single topic. Proposals for new issues should be sent to the General Editor.

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
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

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# The Journal of **SOCIAL ISSUES**



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## JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES WILL ACCEPT "SINGLES"

The JSI Editorial Board plans to depart somewhat from the current policy of organizing *each* number of the Journal of Social Issues around an integrating theme or topic. In the future, some *JSI* issues will consist of "singles", i.e., of *separate articles that bear no necessary relationship to each other*. The single-theme-per-issue policy will still predominate since it provides for comprehensive coverage of the vital social concerns addressed by the Journal. However, there are matters of broad public concern to which social scientists have contributed relatively little theory or research—certainly not enough to fill an entire *JSI* number. The Editorial Board feels that if the topic is important enough, and a single paper written on it is compelling enough, some future *JSI* issues ought to be designed to accommodate such "singles". (Continued on next page)

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### **Comments and Rejoinders**

Readers wishing to discuss or comment upon any of the articles in this or subsequent issues of *JSI* may submit their reactions or criticisms to Dr. Joshua A. Fishman, General Editor, *J.S.I.*, Yeshiva University, 55 Fifth Ave., N.Y. N.Y. 10003. Criticisms or observations of general interest will be published in the *Comments and Rejoinders* Section of *JSI*.

*SSPSI members and their friends and colleagues in the social sciences are therefore invited to submit manuscripts for review and possible inclusion in forthcoming "singles" issues. The editors suggest the following guidelines for preparing "singles".*

(1) In keeping with the *JSI* tradition, a "single" should deal with a broadly conceived critical issue. The titles of past *JSI* numbers suggest that the *Journal* has always addressed itself to topics that have breadth and scope rather than those that are conceptually circumscribed, even if their implications are vast. "Singles" submitted for consideration by the *JSI Editorial Board* ought to follow in that spirit.

(2) As in the case of *JSI* numbers planned around one topic, a "single" article should be a contribution growing out of the professional work of the social scientist and should, therefore, reflect theory or research in his field. It should not be simply a personal essay that would be more suitable for a journal on public affairs.

There is no way of determining as yet how frequently a "singles" issue of *JSI* appear. Wherever possible, a paper that is acceptable to the editors will be published along with other papers on the same topic in order to preserve the current format of topical issues. The "singles" format will appear only when there is not enough social scientific material that can be assembled on the topic to fill an entire Journal number.

Please address all contributions to Dr. Abraham J. Tannenbaum, "Singles" Editor, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027.



DANIEL KATZ  
PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY

## KURT LEWIN MEMORIAL AWARD ADDRESS-1966

### Introduction: Gordon Allport

Harvard University

For forty productive years his researches have ranged over a broad spectrum. Before the age of thirty-five he had examined the cultural adjustment of Polish people in Buffalo, all of the attitudes of all of the undergraduates at Syracuse, and both the stereotypes and the eye-movements of students at Princeton. Yet with few exceptions his published investigations have had a single focus. Realizing, as he does, that sound procedures must underlie useful research he has pointed his studies consistently toward the strengthening of methods appropriate to social and political psychology. Never does he fall into the trap of hasty or ill-considered application of behavioral science. Yet close to his heart lies the improvement of human relationships—within organizations large and small, and within the family of nations. Like Kurt Lewin himself Dan Katz is a pioneer, a creative scientist, and a warm friend to his fellowmen.

## KURT LEWIN MEMORIAL AWARD ADDRESS—1966

### Group Process and Social Integration: A System Analysis of Two Movements of Social Protest

Daniel Katz

The University of Michigan

Social psychology as the area which lies between individual psychology and the social sciences has in the past been polarized toward psychology. The focus has been upon an understanding of the individual as he functions in social settings with limited investigation of those social settings. The study of small groups has pushed beyond this framework but not very far. Group process is generally examined as personal interaction divorced from social context. In fact, the major advances in social psychology since its gradual emergence as a discipline of its own in the late twenties and early thirties have been the growth of an experimental or laboratory social psychology and the accumulation of findings about the nature of small groups. Both types of contributions have been of such substantial character that social psychologists are no longer marginal men in departments of psychology. Indeed the introductory text in psychology which does not utilize fairly heavily the findings of social psychological research is the exception. And the success of these approaches will reinforce continued

work along similar lines with potentially valuable outcomes. Nonetheless, it is my thesis that the significant area for the social psychology of the future lies not in a continuation of these main streams of research directed at the individual and small group isolated from social context. Rather, it lies in a social psychological analysis of social structure and the study of societal process. This is the area which led to the creation of SPSSI when psychologists became concerned with economic justice, industrial conflict, social cleavages based upon economic and racial differentials and war and peace. And it was to these problems which Kenneth Clark (1965) addressed himself in a discussion of social power just a year ago in his Lewin Memorial talk.

The overriding concern of social psychology with the individual and the small group can be seen in the conventional accounts of its historical development. These accounts trace its origins in the United States to the work of McDougall representing the individual approach of the biological evolutionists and to the work of E. A. Ross reflecting the social interaction doctrines of French sociologists. This is correct but it ignores a persisting though minor stream of influence, namely the theorists concerned with social structure and social change, such as Durkheim, Marx and Weber. The French sociological contributions of Tarde and LeBon which were the basis of Ross' approach were not as much sociological as applications of concepts of French abnormal psychology to social problems. The true societal doctrines coming from Durkheim and Weber were much slower in affecting social psychology and even today are fragmented in their impact. Thus, we have seen the utilization of such concepts as norms and roles, social stratification, anomie, legitimacy, power, norms of reciprocity and interdependence—but generally as fairly isolated concepts.

## Societal Process

The social psychology of the future, moreover, can well devote itself to the problems of societal process as well as group process, to the patterning of individuals which make up social structure as well as the cognitive structures of the individual. In the larger sense we have won the fight at the small group level. We know a great deal about how individuals are tied into the small group through processes of participation, of socio-metric attraction, of mutual social reinforcement, of shared objectives. This has been the thrust of the group dynamics movement for the past twenty-five years. The work of the Tavistock researchers has demonstrated, moreover, that some of the individual processes of participation in a meaningful work cycle hold for the small group as well as for the personality under given conditions (Rice, 1958; Trist, 1963), a finding foreshadowed by the earlier work of Lewis and Franklin (1944) and Horwitz (1954) on the group

Zeigarnik and more recently extended to the level of aspiration concept by Zander and Medow (1963). Much of course remains to be done in mopping up operations at the small group level and even more in applying these findings in many appropriate group settings. But there has been little major advance in the work on group process in recent years save for the move toward its use in therapeutic fashion for working through problems of defensive reactions of group members toward one another.

The major problems we face, however, need new approaches, new concepts and new research. We have too long neglected the nature of social systems and the dynamics of their functioning. We have made little progress in studying the role relationships which constitute social systems and with the relationships of subgroups to the larger societal framework. We have been remiss in applying ourselves to an understanding of social movements and conflicts between organized groups. The general reason given is that these problems belong to the other social sciences. But since social systems exist only as patterns of human behavior, they are an appropriate field of study for social psychologists. Artifacts or products of a society can be studied at a super-organic level, but the actual production of such artifacts in the complex actions of people can be studied at the social psychological level. Our constructs for such a study need to be social system concepts so that we are directed toward the relevant aspects of collective and reciprocal behaviors. The variables to be observed and measured are still psychological. The conceptualizations we use, however, should be such as to guide us to the appropriate interdependent behavior. Otherwise we are likely to employ a direct and misleading equivalent of a group outcome in searching for individual patterns of belief and action. Wars are made in the minds of men but this statement can be deceptive if it equates the declaration or prosecution of a war with the aggressive impulses of the members of the warring nation. The nation is not an aggregate of similarly-minded aggressive individuals acting in parallel but a complex organization of many criss-crossing cycles of social behavior (Allport, 1962).

## Two Movements of Social Protest

Let us look at two movements of social protest in our society as examples of the relevance of social structure and system forces for an understanding of social phenomena—the civil rights movement and the protests against the war in Vietnam. From the conventional approach of individual psychology, they seem very similar. They have both been led by much the same type of people, largely those outside the basic power structure of the society: small groups of student activists, part of the academic and intellectual world, some Church

groups and some members of the Negro community. The power groups of industry and business, organized labor and the organizations representing the professions of law, medicine and education have not been conspicuously arrayed in support of either of these movements. In addition to the overlapping personnel and overlapping group membership behind the two trends, there has been a similarity in their dedication to values of egalitarianism, humanitarianism, democracy and nonviolence. They are alike in their appeals to the American public and in their tactics for achieving their objectives.

They have one other major similarity which is more at the system than at the individual level. They both have the advantage that the values which justify their thrust are part of the value system of the larger society. In other words, they have legitimacy in the broader sense of the term in that they are sanctioned by the accepted ideology of society. The opposition in contrast has had great difficulty in finding a rationale to justify its position. The doctrine of racism furnishes little support for the opposition to Civil Rights in a political democracy of a multiethnic character recently involved in an all out war against Nazi Germany. Such a racist ideology appeals only to very limited sectors of the society. The legal doctrine of interposition in its absurd legalism was merely a delaying tactic. The plea for nongovernment intervention on issues of civil rights makes little sense in a bureaucratic society committed to legislation as a means of solving problems. In brief, the discriminatory practices of our society had going for them some local laws, much internalized prejudice and specific economic advantage to certain subgroups, but no ideological legitimacy. In passing, it might be mentioned that there are those who see some danger in the slogan of black power in that it opens an ideological door to the rightists which had been slammed shut in their faces.

In similar fashion the protestors against the Vietnam war had the legitimizing values of the society on their side. Democracy demands the right of self determination of small as well as large nations. It does not justify the intervention of large powers in small nations merely because of their power. Our societal values are not consistent with the support of a military junta whose leaders fought on the side of the French rather than their own people in expelling colonial rule. Nor do they countenance the killing and wounding of women and children in an undeclared war. The United States, as Kenneth Boulding has commented, has all the advantages in the conflict in economic might, technological strength, military weapons and fire power, everything in short but legitimacy. This is one reason why American intervention in Vietnam has been so unpopular abroad even among our allies and so unenthusiastically received at home. There is, of course, the ideological justification of combatting communism but why communism has to be

combatted in this particular way has not been clear either to American or to world opinion. The legitimacy for the conflict that does exist is more at the pragmatic level growing out of the dynamics of the conflict itself.

I have distinguished between legitimizing values at the societal level as a system force as against the individual values of the members of a protest movement. Individual values are internalized in the personality. System ideology is the set of values accepted as appropriate general guides for the behavior of members of the system. These values may or may not be internalized by a majority of system members and certainly are not internalized in their entirety. When a social system collapses, its ideology often collapses which would not be true if there were a one-to-one correspondence between personal and system values.

### System Level Differences

Though the Civil Rights movement and the antiwar cause resemble one another in personnel, in individual motivation, in group tactics and in the system values utilized, the similarities of the two movements pretty well ends there. Their differences at the system level are great. The Civil Rights movement is basically consistent with the forces in our societal structure and is moving in the same direction as these forces. The antiwar movement opposes some of the dominant trends in the national system. Though the same individual motivations and sometimes the same individuals are found in the two movements, their progress and their effectiveness are radically different. It is necessary, then to consider the nature of the social system which affect these outcomes.

American society is basically an organizational, or bureaucratic, technological society in which role systems based upon rules and functional requirements have replaced traditional authority and absolutistic standards. Three characteristics of bureaucratic structure are relevant to our discussion: its growth or maximization dynamic, its conflict-reducing mechanisms to achieve an integrated system and the functional nature of its legitimizing values.

The dynamic of a bureaucratic system, once it is established, is to maximize its input-output ratio of energy to place it in a more powerful position with respect to other systems and to its environment (Yuchtman, 1966). It will ingest resources outside its boundaries, it will seek to control its external environment, it will grow until checked by outside forces (Katz and Kahn, 1966). With all our attempts to control monopolistic growth, our industrial enterprises have grown bigger and bigger. With all our talk about curbing the size of the federal government, its payroll and its activities, it continues to grow

in size and in function. It is much more difficult in a bureaucratic structure to eliminate a subsystem once established than to add two new ones.

The dynamic of maximization is related to the second characteristic of bureaucratic systems, the development of mechanisms for reducing internal conflict. Cleavages within the system impair its effectiveness in competition with other systems. Conflicts about interests, privileges and ideas are met basically by compromises and mutual concessions and by not permitting all of the dissident voices representation in decision making. The general pattern for conflict reduction is the narrowing of channels for their expression so that many divergent views are reconciled or silenced at lower levels in the structure. A small unit has to resolve differences among members so that it speaks with one voice in its own subsystem and not with a multitude of opinions. Within the subsystem the unit differences have to be compromised so that the subsystem represents but one position to the higher levels in the structure. This pattern means that many conflicts are handled at lower levels. Though the final position of a large subsystem has the power of the entire subsystem behind it, this position is already a compromise of generalities which has blunted the sharpness of the conflicting interests and factions. The example par excellence of this pattern is the two-party system. By the time the wishes of the many interest and factional groups have been filtered up through the hierarchical structure, the party line is not far from dead center. The many competing groups are not represented directly and formally in the Congress, the top decision-making political body. Many conflicts have thus been compromised and Congress has an easier task of reaching decisions. A multi-party system with proportional representation, on the other hand, gives more adequate representation to divergent interest and ideological factions but it has the disadvantage of making it more difficult to achieve national unity (Valen and Katz, 1964). The general trend in bureaucratic structures is toward the pattern achieved by the two-party system in getting agreement at various levels so that many sharp conflicts are absorbed along the line.

### **Restricted Communication—A Necessity**

Ashby (1952) in his brilliant system analysis gives some of the reasons why this is so. Stability of the system would take infinitely long to achieve if all the elements in the system were in full contact and communication. All the variables of all the subsystems would have to be satisfied at once—a highly unlikely event. If, however, communication is restricted among subsystems, or they are temporarily isolated, then each subsystem can achieve its own stability. With restricted communication, success can accumulate from successive trials

whereas in the single suprasystem success is all-or-none. An overall system can move toward equilibrium through sufficient connectedness of its subsystems so that the operation of one can activate another and enough separation so that each can reach agreement within itself. Equilibrium can be approached in the system as a whole, but no complex suprasystem would ever have equilibrium in all its subsystems at the same time.

To the general Ashby description of subsystem and suprasystem we should add the concept of hierarchical levels. The need to reach some agreement at each succeeding level further structures and restricts the full interplay of communication and conflicting forces.

One reason why group process is inadequate for the study of social systems is that it deals with genuine group consensus through group discussion and decision-making. This can only be realistically applied at the very lowest level in social structures, for the moment the decision of the local group is carried by its representatives to a higher level, we are dealing with a political process of compromise and majority rule. At the next higher level, the representatives are no longer free to work through to a full agreement as individuals. They are role representatives of their local groups as well as members of the higher group in the structure. They must take back something to their constituents and hence they bargain and trade and finally reach some compromise rather than the integrated solution of group process. The dynamics differ from small group process and the outcomes differ.

### Bureaucratic System—A Process of Progressive Agreement

In brief, the bureaucratic system handles conflict by a process of progressive agreement among subunits at each level of the structure. Many dissident voices are lost long before the final decision-making circles are reached. The structure is built to accommodate conflict, to mute its expression and to redefine clashing positions on clear-cut issues as moderate stands on ambiguous generalities.

There are also more direct mechanisms of repression as in the denial of the franchise to certain groups or the use of complex machinery to make difficult the participation of many people even at the local level.

Another device for slowing down change within a bureaucratic system comes from the character of the managerial and administrative roles. These roles are built around procedures for getting things done and not around the analysis of substantive issues. The administrator's major task is to keep things moving, to seek enough compromise to prevent the machinery from breaking down, in short to be an expert on procedure not on content. Thus the head of the poverty program

was selected because of his administrative skills not because of his understanding of the poverty problem. In his administrative role the official takes his cues about general policy from those above him in the structure. Basic changes in the system, however, require issue-oriented rather than procedure-oriented managers, i.e. men with genuine knowledge and understanding of the change objectives.

A third characteristic of bureaucratic structures is the functional nature of their legitimizing values. The system is unified not only through devices for handling internal conflict but also through the values which reflect the functional interdependence of the people in the system. These values, moreover, do not represent transcendental principles based upon divine revelation or an absolutistic morality. They have to relate to the functioning of the system to supply both cognitive structure and ideological justification for its activities. The essential justification for the assumption of roles is not that the role itself is morally correct, but that it is necessary for the operation of the system.

The process of building a social structure begins in early socialization and it takes on specification with adult socialization into given social systems. Individuals begin early to learn that family, school and social groupings all have expectations, rewards and sanctions for many specific roles in which the justification of the required behavior is not necessarily carried by the nature of the activity itself. There is a divorce from the meaning of the activities as desirable in and of themselves, and the goals which they are expected to accomplish. To be a good group member means that the individual accepts his role assignments as part of the rules of the game.

The justification for the assumption of roles lies in the rewards to the individual for being a member of the system. The system values then must be capable of translation into pragmatic programs. This is further emphasized by the technological character of our organizational society in which the criterion is constantly employed: Does it work? Finally, this system has the congruent property of a democratic ideology. Since people are required to assume many roles, since they are to be interchangeable for many purposes save where there is a high degree of specificity for an important role, their essential equality with respect to system demands and opportunities for participation becomes important. To utilize manpower resources effectively implies that surplus meanings of such characteristics as ethnic group membership, sex or hair color are irrelevant. And, as we move away from transcendental and traditional principles as the source of morality, an egalitarian democratic philosophy geared to the privileges and rights of all individuals becomes the common ground for the commitment of all citizens to their society.

## The Civil Rights Movement—Extending Preexisting Trends

To return, then, to a consideration of the two liberal movements, I would call attention to some of the system forces which have been working to accord a different reception to the Civil Rights issue than to the antiwar cause. The racial cleavage in our society, deepened by economic stratification, has been under attack by liberals for more than a century. But it was not until World War II that the problem of racial integration was seriously considered in the perspective of national unity. Negroes were needed in defense industry, in governmental services and in the armed forces. It was no accident that some of the first moves toward integration were made in the armed forces and, moreover, in combat units at the front. And at home wartime agencies were directed to give employment to all qualified personnel. Shortly after the war President Truman issued the order authorizing integration throughout the armed forces. The realization grew, moreover, that in a world where the majority of the people were nonwhite and where millions of people in the areas uncommitted in the conflict between the United States and Russia were nonwhite, assigning third-class citizenship to American Negroes was not a wise policy. Nor was it a wise policy in an economy with little need for unskilled labor to deprive citizens of education and training for the economic needs of the nation.

Against this background, the Civil Rights movement utilized two other system forces to achieve some of its initial successes. It obtained legitimacy in the narrow sense of legal sanctions by pushing for new interpretations and enforcement of existing laws of the land. The discriminatory practices of generations were clearly inconsistent with the legal basis of our political system. The precedent had been set by President Truman in his executive order making discrimination in the armed services illegal. Mention already has been made of the larger legitimacy of the movement in gearing into the values of a democratic society. The economics of the system in effectively using its manpower was thus not the sole cause of the changes brought about, but when economics, law and ideology are all on the same side, something is going to give.

Why, then, has the Negro revolution been so slow in achieving its objectives if the changes involved are so consistent with the general trends in the national system? The reason is that in addition to change forces pushing the system to maximizing its character there are also built-in maintenance forces representative of the older equilibrium. There are defenses in depth which slow down the change process. Subsystems with some power of their own operate in any large structure and can be resistant for limited periods to changes initiated in

other parts of the system. We had an interesting example of the problem of change and the steady state of a system last semester when Selective Service put into effect the old device of draft deferment based upon standing in college or in national tests. This policy hit those groups with poorest academic preparation the hardest and can nullify the moves to open up channels for the training of Negroes for professional positions.

In other words, the overall system is not a single homogeneous structure. Subsystems exist such that political democracy does not have a corresponding parallel in economic structures with full equality of opportunity. The political system has been more open to change with the greatest advances occurring in this domain with the enfranchisement of Negroes and growing acquisition of equal legal rights. In the economic and social sectors, however, the built-in defenses in depth have been much more resistant to change.

### Mechanisms for Dealing with Internal Conflict

More specifically, however, we need to take account of the mechanisms of a bureaucratic society for dealing with internal conflict. The most common devices are those of compromise and of indirect ways of meeting the conflict. Compromise has been conspicuous as in the gradualism doctrine, in the concessions made by nationwide employers, and in the agreements reached at the community level. The difficulty with the compromise technique is that its outcome is partially dependent upon the power of the bargaining group. This method places a premium upon the mobilization of threat of economic and political sanctions. As the integration movement has mobilized power to exact concessions, it has had considerable success but progress has not been great. The majority group still has the power of superior numbers, superior resources and an entrenched position in the social hierarchy. Moreover, if the struggle is confined to mobilization of black power rather than generalized to embrace broad values, it produces repercussions in certain sectors of the white population. Nevertheless, such power mobilization is an important if not the most important means for continuing progress with respect to civil rights.

The common mechanism for reducing conflict is the attenuation of its representation in decision-making centers. In a two-party system the Negroes are limited in their influence to the old A. F. of L. technique of rewarding friends and punishing enemies and generally this has to be done within a single party structure. The attempt to secure direct representation through a party of their own in Mississippi achieved some purposes but not the avowed objective. The system is so set up as to accommodate minority groups without integrating

them. There were no institutional channels through which the Civil Rights movement could directly affect decision-making circles, apart from the judicial system. Thus they have taken to the streets and to demonstrations as well as to the use of economic boycotts and voter registration drives. The effectiveness of these tactics has been in part a matter of the power mobilized and in part a matter of making visible to important sectors of the American public the unjustified practices of discrimination.

Another way of damping the fire of an underprivileged group is through the many established blocks to their rise in the various power and prestige structures. Negroes have been successful in law and medicine but more within their own community than within the larger society. They have achieved some break-throughs in the political system. In the world of finance and industry, however, there has been less progress. They have lacked the training, the resources for committing themselves to such careers, the social background, and the personal associations necessary to move into the economic sector in leadership roles.

Integration has been achieved at the political level so that great advances have been made in the citizenship rights of voting and equality before the law. Opportunities for schooling have been opened up in law though not always in practice. One would predict in terms of system forces that the greatest progress will continue to be in the political domain with full enfranchisement of all Negro citizens, with equal legal rights, with equal access to public institutions and with increasing numbers of Negroes achieving positions of importance in the political structure. Where discrimination is reinforced by economic stratification, change will be much slower. Relative to past economic standards there will be improvement but relative to the rising standards of the white population, the improvement will not seem significant. The general economic upgrading of the national population has been proceeding rapidly and the person just entering the race may have great difficulty catching up to the accelerated pace.

In brief, then, the Civil Rights movement has achieved much as it has interacted with other system forces, received their support and helped to give them more adequate definition. It has not revolutionized the social system but has pushed it toward greater consistency. The threatened revolution has been contained within the system.

### The Protest Movement—Opposing Preexisting Trends

The protest movement against the Vietnam war and the peace movement in general have the major difficulty of opposing some of

the dynamic trends in the national system. The maximization dynamic is expressed in the extension of national interests and national power. There is the push to utilize our influence and power, for as we are now reminded, we have to assume our responsibilities in the world. Moreover, the major forces which challenge our international position come from the expansion of communism. And the assumption is that it is better to meet this challenge at distant points from our own shores which means protecting weaker nations less capable of resisting than the U.S.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, has acknowledged our military commitments to 40 nations around the globe. He denied that this represented a policy of *pax Americana* but there are those who interpreted this as diplomatic language. Such language needs to be understood in the context in which it appears. Since World War II we have been engaged in a continuing process of extending our psychological boundaries beyond our geographical borders. Conflict with other expanding systems are bound to occur. These conflicts do not inevitably mean war but the immediate past suggests that we need to do more to take advantage of the degrees of freedom, to seek counter forces in the social situation, for the maintenance of world peace.

The facts are that Vietnam is only one instance of the collisions between the U.S. and other nations in Asia. Before Vietnam there was Laos; before Laos, Korea. After South Vietnam, there may be North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Korea, and even China. In addition to our fighting forces in Vietnam, we have military bases in other parts of east Asia. The other day the press reported that we now have 27,000 troops in Thailand and are presently expanding our four military bases there by a new complex costing almost \$100,000,000. Nor does the present conflict seem to be a function of the warlike personalities of our national leaders. Recall that in 1964 the American people chose between two slates of candidates, the trigger-happy Goldwater and his equally belligerent running-mate, Miller, and the consensus-seeking Johnson and the liberal Humphrey. Remember, too, it was supposed to be a choice not an echo. I am contending, then, that the decisions in national leadership roles are in good measure determined by system forces and that the conventional interpretation of these requirements in the Asian situation was an escalation of warlike measures. I am also arguing that such decisions were not inevitable and that there was enough range of interpretation of the situation and of appropriate national policy, for an *unusual* national leadership to have followed a different course. National interests, national prestige, national honor as well as the struggle against communism could have been defined in other ways. Though the dice were loaded, the players could have discarded them.

## National Leaders—What Degree of Freedom?

The degree of freedom of movement for national leaders is greater at an early stage in international relations. Once, however, the decisions are made to utilize the military power of the nation, then it is extremely difficult at later stages to reverse the policy. At the early stage the problem is one of progressive commitment, i.e., what look like small steps in the beginning become binding decisions for more complete involvement. The decision to furnish aid to an anti-Communist government, the use of American military as advisers rather than as participants, the partial involvement of limited forces, and then greater and greater escalation were not necessarily thought through in advance as the desirable policy. One step led to another. To break out of this pattern of progressive commitment requires unusual qualities of statesmanship at the national level. The present and the preceding three administrations were all involved in this pattern though there are indications that the Kennedy administration if it had continued might have been more resourceful in arresting the trend. A statesmanlike leadership would have to rise above some of the relevant central subsystems in the national structure specifically the Department of State, the CIA, the Defense Department, the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These subgroupings concerned with problems of national interest, prestige and power develop narrow conceptions of their goals and the means for achieving them. There are doves as well as hawks in these groups but the system tends to select more hawks than doves and to damp dovelike voices. Moreover, these agencies are already locked into a limited set of strategy alternatives dictated in part by their own responses to the moves of the international opponent and the subsequent reactions of the opposition.

The protest movement against our involvement in Vietnam was not effective in influencing the policy of the Administration as it moved from one critical decision to another. The protestors lacked organized power. The academic community did not speak with a single voice. Moreover, the voices were those of individuals not of organized groups of strength. There were no easily identifiable blocks of voters like Negroes or labor union members to support the movement. The pacifist organizations were courageous but tiny. The members of Congress who furnished the one source of leverage and who gave additional legitimacy to the movement received little support from the mass media. They were not able to contend with the strong executive-legislative combination of forces arrayed against them. Nor was there a peace lobby in Washington to compete with the lobbies representing business and industry interested in defense expenditures.

Once embarked upon the policy of military intervention and

limited escalation, the system forces are even stronger in resisting a change toward peaceful alternatives. Even without a formal declaration of war, the use of American armed forces and the resulting casualty lists produce a situation in which the national membership character of the people becomes salient. The nation state becomes more than ever the dominant social structure. The state is the formal organized system to which all other structures are legally subservient. It functions as the final arbiter of decisions within the society when conflicts cannot be resolved at other levels. It has a monopoly on physical force for implementing these decisions.

### The Arousal of National Roles

This is the formal description at the level of political science. What does it mean psychologically? It means that when national roles are aroused they take precedence over any other social role the individual can play as a member of his family, his church, his profession, his work organization, etc. National sovereignty also means that every organized group in the society must function as an arm of the state in times of national emergency if so ordered. This is most obvious when industries are nationalized in wartime but there are less thorough manifestations as when organizations cooperate with the government in not employing citizens whose loyalty is under suspicion. In times of peace, national roles are latent roles so that the average citizen spends most of his time in activities of making a living, being a member of his family, engaging in leisure time activities, etc. Apart from observing laws and voting, he gives little time or thought to his citizenship rights and obligations. The national state and his membership as an American citizen are remote considerations. But when the emergency of possible war or actual international conflict arises, national roles take priority over other roles. The basic institutional pattern that has been built into the members of the society through the socialization process and which has indirectly mediated the relationship of their activities to need satisfaction, now takes over. As a member of the national system the individual must either assume his national roles or leave the system. And there are no places to go save prison or exile.

Even an undeclared war provides the conditions for the arousal of national roles. One aspect of such arousal is the restriction of freedom of movement at all levels in the structure. Other roles are no longer open choices. And the definition of the national role assumes clearer structure with the decisions of national leaders. These leaders themselves lose freedom of movement. Not only are they committed by their previous decisions in their own eyes, but these decisions have activated expectations throughout the structure which further lock them into a given pattern of behavior. And, as leaders guiding the na-

tion in an international conflict, they are more vulnerable to criticism from their political opponents if they do not play their roles in a militant manner ostensibly supportive of national interest. Freedom of movement is also reduced for groups and individuals with respect to actions and words opposing national policy. People not happy about the war and its escalation now take the position that we should get it over with in some fashion rather than complete withdrawal. The function of public opinion in affecting national policy becomes weak and negligible.

The solution to the war in Asia of a complete withdrawal of our armed forces, though logical, is unrealistic. It neglects not only the dynamics of the arousal of national roles but also the expansionist push of the American power system in Asia. We have established military bases in Asian countries other than Vietnam and have committed ourselves to fighting the spread of communism on the Asian continent. The pattern of commitment is not the same, however, for the administration and for the American people. The objectives of the administration go beyond the successful prosecution of the undeclared war. If it were to be won, or if some favorable peace could be negotiated, the conflict could readily flare up again either in Thailand, Laos or Cambodia. The American people, however, at the present time would be satisfied with the settlement of the Vietnam war.

Discouraging as the prospects are for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam and for a permanent peace in Asia, there are factors which conceivably can work toward international stability in this part of the world. For one thing, the American people after Korea and after Vietnam may be more reluctant to support further military intervention so far from our shores. Consistent with the interpretation is the fact that the motivational basis for national involvement has seen some change in the development of our bureaucratic society during the past forty years.

### **Symbolic, Normative or Instrumental Involvement**

Individuals can be tied into a bureaucratic system in one of three ways or some combination of them: symbolic, normative, or instrumental involvement (Katz, 1965). Symbolic attachment refers to emotionally held attitudes in which the symbols represent absolute values and have a life of their own. They are not the means to an end but are ends in themselves. Emotional conditioning in childhood to symbols of the nation such as the flag, the national anthem or national heroes are one basis for symbolic commitment. Normative involvement on the other hand does not imply internationalization of the sanctity of given symbols but rather the acceptance of specific legitimate requirements of the system necessary for system membership. Thus one meets

the demands of one's role because he wants to stay in the system not because he is emotionally attached to signs representing its abstract values. Finally, functional involvement has to do with commitment to the system because its demands are instrumental to his needs. The union member may be committed to his union because it is a group means for dealing with his needs. Such a functional attachment is not limited to bread-and-butter matters. It can also be related to his own values which find meaningful realization in group action which advance his beliefs and attitudes. I am thus trying to differentiate between an ideological commitment of a functional character where values get translated into specific programs of action as against symbolic attachment to nonoperational goals. In the Vietnam war the man who enlists because his heart quickens at the sight of the flag shows symbolic commitment. The man who accepts his call to the service primarily because this is the requirement for the American male of certain ages is demonstrating normative commitment. The underprivileged youth who sees in armed service a way of getting an education and technical training is an example of functional commitment. So, too, would be the man who enters the service because he feels that democratic values are threatened by communism in Asia and armed intervention is necessary to prevent a communist takeover.

With the development of a bureaucratic society there has been a relative decline in symbolic commitment to national roles and a rise in normative and functional commitment. The great majority of the men in our armed forces are there not so much because of the considerations of national honor as because they received the notice from their draft boards. Bureaucratic society, emphasizing as it does the authority of rules rather than of tradition, is carried much more by role readiness and functional interdependence than by the internalization of emotional symbols. This is a relative matter, moreover, and suggests a different emphasis in the mix of motivational patterns in the history of our nation (Katz, Kelman & Flacks, 1963).

### An Implication: More Freedom of Action

What are the implications of this analysis if we still find ourselves in war? What difference does it make if men carry out their military obligations on a different motivational basis than in World War I, as long as the end result is the same? I believe it does make a difference for these reasons: With greater functional and normative involvement there is more freedom of action than with symbolic commitment. Functional and normative nationalism can lead to other than military paths to objectives. It can lead to international negotiation and cooperation in situations in which symbolic patriotism would demand war.

National leaders often operate as if symbolic commitment were

still the dominant way in which people were tied to the nation. Thus they sometimes perceive less freedom for action than they really have. They may assume that a conciliatory series of moves will mean political suicide because people will feel that national honor and interests are imperiled. The political opposition can be depended upon to try to arouse patriotic sentiments to discredit such soft policies. Though there are people who still are readily moved by slogan appeals of a superpatriotic character, they are not as numerous or as powerful as is often assumed. Both public opinion polls and election returns show that flag waving by those out of office does not necessarily defeat the incumbent.

### Eighty-Eight Per Cent of Population for Negotiation

In late February and early March of this year Sidney Verba and a group of social scientists at Stanford University in cooperation with the National Opinion Research Center conducted a nation-wide survey on opinions toward the war in Vietnam (1966). This survey differed from the Gallup Poll in that it dug more deeply into the complex of attitudes toward the war. Its major findings indicated that people have very mixed feelings about the war and that there is more of a potential in American public opinion for *deescalation* than for *escalation*. In the first place, there are very few real hawks or doves. Only six per cent of the national sample take consistent positions in favor of escalation and opposed to deescalation. Fourteen per cent are consistent doves. In the second place, the great majority (some 88%) are willing to negotiate with the Vietcong and would support (some 70%) a UN-negotiated truce in Vietnam. "A 52 per cent majority would be willing to see the Vietcong assume a role in a South Vietnam coalition government and a 54 per cent majority favor holding free elections in South Vietnam, even if the Vietcong might win". In the third place, "the majority of American citizens have reservations about containing the war when faced with its possible costs. The study asked whether people wanted to continue fighting in Vietnam if it meant cutting back various Great Society programs (such as aid to education and medicare), increasing taxes, and imposing economic controls. On every count majorities were registered in opposition".

Though 60 per cent would continue the war if it required calling up the National Guard, only 40 per cent would want to continue if it meant full-scale mobilization. And only 38 per cent would be in favor of a continuation of the conflict if it meant that several hundred American soldiers would be killed each week. Though the people are evenly divided about having a half a million troops in South Vietnam, a majority oppose steps of escalation such as bombing the cities of North

Vietnam, fighting a ground war in China, or the use of atomic weapons. Finally, in spite of press reports, it is not true that the opposition to President Johnson on the war comes mainly from those who are in favor of a more vigorous prosecution of the conflict. The opposition is 2 to 1 from the other side; those who favor deescalation.

It is true, however, that 81 per cent of the people would disapprove of an immediate withdrawal of American troops if the Communists were to take over.

### Vietnam—A Functional Commitment

I have cited these findings at some length because they come from the most thorough study we have had of American public reaction to the war. Moreover, they indicate that there is more freedom for our political leaders to follow other alternatives than escalation of the conflict than political leaders themselves seem to assume. People are concerned about winning the war in Vietnam but they are against continuing the war if it means genuine sacrifice. Thus their commitment is more functional than symbolic, in that a symbolic commitment calls for pursuance of policy no matter what the cost. Symbolic commitment in its absolutistic character emphasizes national sovereignty and opposes internationalism. Functional involvement finds no difficulty in accepting an international arrangement consistent with broadly defined national goals. In a recent Michigan study we found that the functionally committed person wanted to strengthen the UN, the symbolically wanted to withdraw from it; the functionally committed were willing to abide by decisions of the World Court, the symbolically committed were not, and in general the symbolically committed favored a more aggressive stance toward communist countries than did the functionally involved.

The European community was achieved not because nations gave up their identity but because they had a functional basis to their nationalism (Haas, 1958). DeGaulle with his symbolic attachment has set back the clock with respect to furthering European integration.

Clear recognition by national leaders of the functional involvement of the American in the national structure and an application of the same logic would call for a realistic assessment of the gains and costs for alternative strategies in southeast Asia. The U.S. has the weapons and the manpower to conquer South Vietnam and for that matter, North Vietnam. The costs, however, would be huge in the death and devastation visited upon the civilians in those countries, in American lives, in the diversion of funds from the building of the Great Society at home. The extension of the war to North Vietnam and the destruction of that country, moreover, brings us perilously close to the next step, the use of atomic weapons. Even if all of Viet-

nam were conquered, the price of holding it would be high. It would require economic rehabilitation of both countries and a continuing large force of American troops to resist communist infiltration from the surrounding areas. Moreover, the objective of defeating Communism would not necessarily be achieved. To many of the uncommitted people in Asian countries, the escalation of the war would seem to them to validate the communist claims about the nature of American imperialistic might. We are judged not by our final objectives but by means we use to achieve them. The means are the visible proof in the opinion of other countries of what we are trying to do, rather than some idealized statement of what we assert is our objective. Finally, the basic answer to the spread of communism lies only partially in superior fire power. It also lies in superior ideology as that ideology can be implemented in securing a better way of life for the masses of people.

### To Reverse the Spiral of Escalation . . .

Alternatives to our present policy in Vietnam must be considered in terms of a realistic step which would move toward deescalation of the war. The spiral of escalation is difficult but not impossible to reverse. In international conflict it receives two positive types of feedback: one from the counter-moves of the opponent, the other the internal feedback from the aroused nationalism of the people. Both cycles of feedback interact. But the aroused nationalism of the American people about the Vietnam war has not reached the proportions of intensity which means we have passed the point of no return. The majority of people would welcome a cessation or reduction of the war even if it did not mean the unconditional surrender of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. The external cycle is more difficult to predict but since the limited period of the cessation of bombing we have not experimented with specific moves of deescalation. We have increasingly seen the conflict in purely military terms.

I have given considerable emphasis to the role of national leadership and some of the factors affecting decision making at high levels. Another structural aspect of this concerns the information and ideas which the system furnishes for decision making. Here the nation suffers from the lack of an adaptive subsystem concerning foreign policy which would have the functions of research and intelligence to provide an accurate assessment of the world situation, an analysis of the effects of our policies, and a thoughtful consideration of alternative strategies. For the internal economy we have moved in the direction of such a subsystem with the President's Council of Economic Advisers. In the international field, however, we rely upon the State Department and the CIA which are action rather than intelligence agencies. From the  
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point of view of furnishing information and ideas, these agencies are redundant systems. They operate to filter out new information and new ideas. They are closed information loops which receive and process the answers predetermined by their limited questions and their restricted coding sets. They operate in such fashion as to maintain rather than break out of the locked-in patterns of past strategy (Schlesinger, 1965). Exceptional presidents in the past have been able to by-pass these conventional structures in the determination of foreign policy. What is required as a reliable basis for system functioning in international relations is some governmental restructuring to provide an adequate adaptive subsystem available to national leadership. National decision making, then, would not be imprisoned by its own closed information circuits, would not have to repeat past errors, and could consider alternatives to atomic destruction. The apparent success of brinksmanship in the past is a poor guide for the future. Time has a way of running out on us as individuals. It can also run out for social systems.

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# CONFFLICT AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

## Introduction

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The patterns of conflict-generation at the international level are changing as the structure of the international community changes. This necessitates a rethinking of the nature of conflict-generating factors at the international level and some new conceptualization. In this issue of the *Journal of Social Issues* these questions are examined: What new conflict-generating factors can be identified, which traditional sources of conflict are still salient, and what patterns of conflict arise out of the interaction of the new and old sources? Are there at the same time conflict-reducing factors emerging at the international level?

Until recently social scientists tended to polarize on the conflict-integration continuum. They devoted attention exclusively either to the conflict processes which drive nations and groups apart or to the integrative processes which draw them together. Today there is increasing agreement that neither the conflict model nor the integrative model is all-encompassing. Instead they are seen to reflect complementary processes both of which need to be studied with equal care.

The inability of many students of international law to decide whether the "world rule of law" is increasing or decreasing—with arguments on one side pointing to the breach of many old agreements, arguments on the other side pointing to many new areas of consensus

—indicates the complexity of the interrelationship of conflict and community. The papers included in this issue analyze this complexity of relationship. The paper on meaning systems (Tanaka) makes clear how the most basic efforts to communicate, which would seem to be a clearly integrative act, are fraught with conflict potential because of different underlying meanings for apparently similar words. The paper on the war industry (Boulding), on the other hand, points out how parties to a conflict are dependent on each other in a "conflict system." The papers on the population problem (Keyfitz) and the colonial problem (Jacobson) underline how formerly integrative systems of dependency and aid can become bitterly conflictful. In reviewing changing images of international conflict, Deutsch points up the frailty of existing international networks in relation to the escalating conflicts and growing diversity of views of society. The two studies of transnational participation (Angell, Useem) make clear that interaction across cultures is not *per se* integrative.

In addition to the dialectic of conflict and community, the papers reflect another dialectic, that of images versus reality. Each author touches in one way or another on the problem of the underlying reality of the international social system as perceived by the social scientist as over against images of that reality held by different participants in the system. Tanaka confronts us with the impenetrability of the unique meaning structures of every culture; Boulding analyzes what happens when decision-makers base decisions on faulty interpretations of the meaning structures of others. Keyfitz and Jacobson deal with different dimensions of the images of old and new colonialism as perceived by the haves and the have-nots. Deutsch reminds us of how much images of the international system change over time, and how many competing images have to be dealt with today. Angell leaves deliberately problematical what effect transnational participation has on the images of other cultures held by the participants. The Useems present some unexpected findings on the role of islands of home culture for nationals living abroad in improving their reality perceptions both of their own society and of the society in which they are for a time resident.

These twin themes of conflict versus integration and image versus reality, plus a preference for a social systems approach to analysis, characterize the approach of most, though not all, of the participating authors. Their contributions to this issue are both suggestive of their ongoing work and of areas yet to be explored. The papers are in no sense a definitive conceptualization of conflict and accommodation in the world community but rather contributions to a rapidly growing new body of research.

## **Part I**

# **SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT**

# Cross-Cultural Compatibility of the Affective Meaning Systems (Measured by Means of Multilingual Semantic Differentials)

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This paper is an attempt to examine the structure of the affective meaning systems in several different subjective cultures, using multilingual semantic differentials. The semantic differential method, a psychological measuring instrument developed by Osgood *et al.* (1957), constituted the major theoretical approach in this study. Most of the data on which the present article was based were collected during the period from 1959 to 1965 in connection with the research project on Cross-Cultural Generality of Meaning Systems, for which C. E. Osgood is principal investigator. Some of the analyses have been already reported elsewhere. The major interest of the present investigator is to examine to what extent the affective meaning systems of the Japanese conform to, or rather differ from, those which seem to exist in other subjective cultures and to suggest the likely impact of the differences upon intercultural cooperation.

## Some Considerations on Cultural Values in Subjective Cultures

Unfortunately for social science, reputable scholars have not adopted a common terminology in the study of values. In this area they have a tendency to construct definitions peculiar to themselves,

or only applicable within their own branch of social science. The late Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), for example, said "the only general agreement is that values somehow have to do with normative as opposed to existential propositions", and further that "No definition can hope to incorporate or synthesize all aspects of each conception (of values) established in the various fields of learning and yet remain serviceable". But somehow definitions do have to be made.

A value in this study is defined, somewhat after Krech *et al.* (1962), as *an especially important class of beliefs shared by members of one language/culture community, concerning what is "good" or "desirable", or what is "bad" or "undesirable"*. One might also note at this point that this definition of a value is nearly equivalent to what Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) call the *evaluative process*. It is very fundamentally a psychological process, and empirically demonstrable through the actions and attitudes of individuals holding a given value. It can be identified and measured through the manner in which members of a given language/culture community experience, perceive and interpret an event which they confront in life.

There seem to be at least three aspects in which the systematic analysis of such values is crucial in the rational understanding of the interactions among different subjective cultures. First, the cohesion of a cultural community appears to depend very fundamentally upon the compatibility of the values of its members. One might almost say that it is a necessary condition of a cultural community, that the human beings who constitute it share values with each other more uniformly and more consistently than they differ in their personal interests and goals. For cooperation to occur, therefore, among two or more already existing communities, it is required that the major values shared within each community should also be shared across communities; or at least that the region of shared values across the communities should be great enough so that the major differences do not obstruct common action on a common concern.

The second aspect in which values seem to bear significantly upon the problem of intercultural relations is in the shaping of the black-and-white view of the world, which is either conducive or obstructive to intercultural cooperation. The natural tendency of a human being is to project his own values and beliefs upon others and assume that they are shared. When others call white what to him is black, and when they assert to be unjust what to him is obviously just, he will conclude that they are either lying or abnormal. Out-group remoteness or mutual distrust, if not outright hostility, will be the inevitable consequence.

Thirdly, many of the analyses which cultural anthropologists have made of basic values and the influences these exert upon human behavior, are rather static conceptual representations relating only to a

particular period of time and a particular location in space. These analyses fail to account for the variations which occur in a culture's values as well as a lack of analytical measurement tools with which one can describe and account for the variation. The ideas and skills a people borrow or have "forced upon" them by another culture, are more often adapted to the old ways of thinking and acting than they are disruptive of those ways. In the rapidly shrinking world we live in today—socially, politically and psychologically—the people of one culture often become assimilated, however painfully or slowly, into the ways of another culture. Thus, cultures do change in direction—that is, change in their basic values. But how can we investigate such variations of values both within and across different cultures?

### Multilingual Semantic Differentials and the "Semantic Space" Hypothesis

As defined previously, values are considered essentially as a psychological process, concerning what is "good" and what is "bad". We can assume that there are a number of subjective, evaluative criteria by which values are conceptually represented. For example, the average Japanese values "diligence" while the average American holds "cleanliness" to be very desirable. They both may share the two different values. Similarly, the typical lawyer believes in "law-abiding", and the typical professor entertains the notion that intellectual competence is an "ought-to-be". These are only a few, typical examples of evaluative criteria used daily in our subjective cultures.

One may also note that values are either positive or negative, that the positive values are the "goods" and the "desirables", and the negative values are the "bads" and the "undesirables". Each value can be classified according to its unique quality and direction, and two "opposite" values can be verbally transposed into a linear, bipolar scale which is defined by the two "opposite" value-qualities, such as "industrious-lazy", "clean-dirty", "law-abiding-law-breaking", or "ought to be-ought not to be", and the like. If we assume that values can thus be transformed into a bipolar scale, the semantic differential method developed by Osgood *et al.* (1957) for measuring the affective meanings of various objects provides a very useful theoretical approach in the systematic analysis of the evaluative process.

A typical semantic-differential form is displayed in Figure 1. When a group of people judge a set of concepts, such as JAPANESE and AMERICAN, against a set of appropriate semantic-differential scales like ugly-beautiful and thick-thin, a cube of data is generated as shown in Figure 2. The rows are defined by scales, the columns by the concepts being judged and the "slices" from front to back by the people doing the judging. Each cell represents with a single value how

a particular individual judged a particular concept against a particular scale. A logical tool for dealing with such a cube of data is factor analysis. Usually, but not always, the interest is in the correlations among the scales; these correlations may be obtained across subjects or across concepts or across both simultaneously. Separate analyses may be done for single subjects (to examine the cross-subject generality) or for

### JAPANESE

ugly	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	beautiful
thick	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	thin
active	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	passive
unpleasant	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	pleasant
light	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	heavy
slow	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	fast
undemocratic	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	democratic
powerful	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	powerless
industrious	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	lazy
foolish	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	wise
large	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	small
quiet	— : — : — : — : — : — : —	noisy

FIGURE 1  
A 12-SCALE FORM OF SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL

single concepts (to examine the cross-concept generality); or we collapse either the subject dimension (when we are interested in cultural meanings) or the concept dimension (when we are interested in concept-class characteristics). Indeed, there are many alternative ways this data cube can be sliced, and each is appropriate for answering a different kind of question.

During the past decade, Osgood *et al.* (1957, 1963) have analyzed such data cubes collected in more than fifteen different language/culture communities. In this continuing, extensive cross-cultural research, they have found that, despite variations in the rules of sampling scales

and concepts and in the kinds of subjects used, three most salient, orthogonal factors keep appearing: an *Evaluative* factor (represented by scales like good-bad and honest-dishonest), a *Potency* factor (represented by scales like strong-weak and hard-soft) and an *Activity* factor (represented by scales like active-passive and fast-slow). Thus, they have empirically demonstrated that this basic, evaluation-potency-activity framework, or the structure of *semantic spaces* in their terminology, is common to all the people despite differences in language and culture.




FIGURE 2  
THE CUBE OF DATA GENERATED WHEN  $m$  SUBJECTS JUDGE  $n$  CONCEPTS  
AGAINST  $n$  SCALES

(represented by scales like active-passive and fast-slow). Thus, they have empirically demonstrated that this basic, evaluation-potency-activity framework, or the structure of *semantic spaces* in their terminology, is common to all the people despite differences in language and culture.

There seems to be general consensus about the psychological nature of the evaluative process: (a) that it is learned and implicit, (b) that it is a predisposition to respond evaluatively to certain objects,

and (c) that the evaluative predisposition may fall anywhere along a scale from "extremely desirable" through "neutral" to "extremely undesirable". In most of the general factor analyses which Osgood *et al.* (1963) have done, based upon the data collected in different language/culture communities, the first, most salient factor has nearly always been clearly identifiable as *Evaluation*. Furthermore, being a bipolar factor which is graded in intensity and in both directions from a neutral point, the *Evaluative* factor meets the criterion of reflecting predispositions from "extremely desirable" through "neutral" to "extremely undesirable". In the general mediation theory of meanings, of which the semantic-differential measuring operations are part, meanings of concepts are implicit reactions to given signs which are learned. Thus, the *Evaluative* factor in the semantic-differential measuring operations appears to meet the necessary criteria for a measure of the basically psychological, evaluative process. In other words, semantic differentials may tap the general but implicit, evaluative framework in which people experience, perceive and judge various kinds of events.

Very broadly, there seems to be two different kinds of problems involved in the analysis of values via semantic differentials: one is related to the scale composition of an *Evaluative* factor, and another concerns the intensity with which each valued concept is associated to either the "desirable" or the "undesirable" polarity. At this point, many multilingual semantic-differential studies, carried out to date especially in America and Japan, provide a useful pool of information.

### Some Empirical Evidence on the Cross-Cultural Generality of Semantic Spaces

There is indeed an abundance of materials to be cited in this connection. But first, let me present a few specimens of the phenomena to be investigated.

*Specimen 1: The Japanese use two Evaluative factors in their affective meaning system.* Some years ago, Sagara *et al.* (1961) reported an interesting finding of their own semantic-differential study of Japanese language. Based upon the earlier work by Osgood *et al.* (1957), they constructed a 50-scale form of semantic differential in Japanese, and had Japanese college students rate a total of 150 substantive concepts against them. According to ordinary factor analytic routines, they obtained four salient, semantic factors which they called "Moral Correctness", "Magnitude", "Sensory Pleasure" and "Dynamism", which accounted for more than 50% of total variance. The first factor is defined by scales like right-wrong, superior-inferior and good-bad and is clearly identifiable as an *Evaluative* factor if we use Osgood's terminology. On the second factor, scales like large-small and deep-shallow load highly, and this is identifiable as a *Potency* factor. On the third,

scales like pleasurable-painful, cheerful-gloomy and beautiful-ugly load highly, and this factor is identifiable as another kind of *Evaluation*. On the fourth, the loadings of active-inactive, quick-slow and passionate-mild are high and are identifiable as an *Activity* factor. Here we have evidence that the general, *Evaluation-Potency-Activity* framework is present among the Japanese college students who judged the 150 concepts. But note that in this particular case, the evaluation is split into two orthogonal, independent factors, "moral" and "sensory". Whether this is unique only to the Japanese remains to be tested, since no matched experiment has since been done in any other cultural communities. But to the extent that "aesthetic interests were central in the (Japanese) culture and were a main key to understanding it" (Kluckhohn & Strodebeck, 1961), this distinction seems to be quite likely and real.

*Specimen 2: Some evaluative criteria do change as concept classes and cultures are changed.* Results obtained both in America and Japan over the past ten years suggest that scale-factor structure may vary from concept class to concept class. To test this hypothesis, Tanaka, Oyama and Osgood (1963) used three concept classes—colors, abstract words and line forms—as concepts to be rated on a translation-equivalent, 35-scale, semantic-differential form. Two groups of subjects, differing in both language and culture—Japanese and Americans—were chosen to test cross-cultural generality and cross-concept uniqueness. First, with respect to cross-cultural generality, it was found that the first three most salient semantic factors as a group are clearly identifiable as *Evaluation*, *Potency* and *Activity* in all the culture/concept-class combinations. Second, a definitely closer factorial composition was displayed by a mathematical index of factorial similarity for the same concept class and factors considered interculturally than was for intracultural concept-class comparisons. Third, it was also shown that the shifts of scales within the three-factor space tend to be similar across the Japanese and the American groups.

Cross-concept uniqueness was demonstrated both by different orderings of factor salience for the three concept classes and by the different scale compositions of the factors for different concept classes. The 35 scales used could be classified into three general categories: (a) scales that are factorially stable across concept classes; (b) scales that are factorially unstable across concept classes but stable across subject groups; and (c) scales that are both factorially unstable and susceptible to interaction with subject groups. Scales of the first category are "stereotypic" in that they are least susceptible to either concept-class or subject-group change. Three *Evaluative* scales, healthy-unhealthy, clear-muddy and beautiful-ugly were found to correlate very highly with good-bad in every concept-class/subject-group combination, and belong to this category.

Scales of the second category shift meanings from concept class to concept class, but do so similarly across the subject groups. For example, hard-soft is clearly a *Potency* scale, correlating very highly with the standard strong-weak scale when both the Japanese and Americans judge colors and forms, but it shifts the factorial meaning toward *Evaluation* when both subject groups rate abstract words, correlating highly with the good-bad scale in this case. Similarly, excitable-calm and gay-sober are *Activity* scales in the judging of colors and forms, but they become quite consistently *Evaluative* scales in the judging of abstract words for both Japanese and Americans. Gay-sober, however, is found to be a particular case of what might be called "intercultural factorial nuance reversal". It is highly associated with good-bad for both subject groups judging words, but the direction of association is entirely opposite cross-culturally; that is, for the Japanese gay is associated with bad; whereas for Americans it is associated with good. This appears to be a unique case of subject/scale interaction, especially because for both colors and forms the same scale displays a perfect cross-cultural and cross-conceptual stability. No direct, diachronic explanation is possible at this point, but it is generally agreed that the Japanese are more introverted and reserved than Americans. Presumably, this specific scale happens to tap the differences in the subjects' temperament and their criterion of values related to the abstract words.

Scales of the third category seem to vary both with concept class and subject groups, displaying apparent cultural uniqueness. Positive-negative, for example, is always associated with good-bad for Americans judging the three concept classes, whereas it is associated with dynamic-static when the Japanese rated colors, but with strong-weak when they judge words and forms. In summary, the foregoing results demonstrated that the characteristic attribute of a concept class exerts a consistent, selective influence upon semantic judgments by causing rotation of scales within the semantic space and a few exceptional scales display specific cultural uniqueness. This may be taken as evidence that some of our evaluative criteria are susceptible to complex interaction with both concepts and cultures.

*Specimen 3: Some evaluative criteria do change as subjects are changed.* There are at least two cross-cultural studies in which the structure of individual subjects' semantic space was analyzed and compared across subjects. In one of these studies, Tanaka and Osgood (1965) ran an experiment on three different language/cultural groups—American, Finnish and Japanese. A 10 scale semantic differential was constructed in the subjects' own languages. Three scales representing each of the three most salient affective factors—*Evaluation*, *Potency* and *Activity*—were included along with the familiar-unfamiliar scale. The 24 concepts to be judged were what may be called

*perceptual signs*—four colors, four line forms and the 16 color/form combinations, resulting from combining each color with each form. Perceptual signs were used in the experiment, because the possible uncertainty which might accrue from the translation of linguistic signs from one language into another should be minimized by using them.

Then, 10 subjects—5 male and 5 female—were randomly selected from each of the subject groups, to bring this analysis within feasible bounds. For each of these 30 subjects, a  $10 \times 10$  scale-correlation matrix was computed over the 24 concepts, the basic data being 10 scale values for the 24 concepts. Next, each subject's scale-correlation matrix was correlated with every other subject's scale-correlation matrix across corresponding cells, and the resultant  $30 \times 30$  subject-intercorrelation matrix was then factored. The results are impressive in two ways. First, there is one large factor, accounting for 78% of the total variance, on which every subject loads most highly. This is a clear indication that the 30 subjects used the scales very similarly, and this is true despite the fact that differences in culture, language and sex are included. Secondly, however, in spite of this general similarity in the subject spaces, some cross-cultural differences do appear. By rotating the extracted factors, the investigators found that, after rotation, Factor I is predominantly Finnish, every Finn loading high on it. Factor II is predominantly Japanese and Factor III is predominantly American, although a few subjects in each cultural group are less definable because of relatively high loadings on factors other than their own. These results demonstrated that, despite the great extent of overall similarity shown by the unrotated Factor I, with the large amount of total variance removed, there are still significant differences cross-culturally in the structures of individual subject spaces.

One determinant of such cross-cultural differences may be the different affective meanings of a few scales. To test this, the  $10 \times 10$  scale-intercorrelation matrix for each of the 30 subjects was factored, and the extracted factors rotated. In the rotated data, it was first noted that every subject used certain pairs of scales quite consistently: for example, beautiful-ugly and pleasant-unpleasant, hard-soft and strong-weak, hot-cold and excitable-calm, tend to cling together firmly despite the subjects' language/culture distinctions and differences in sexes. However, from inspecting the factor loadings of each scale for individual subjects, seven American subjects were found to use the happy-sad scale in association with the beautiful-ugly scale (*Evaluation*) while two Americans used it in association with the hot-cold scale (*Warmth*). Three Finns used the same scale, associated with the beautiful-ugly scale, and two Finns with the strong-weak scale (*Potency*). On the other hand, for seven Japanese subjects, happy-sad was associated with the *Warmth* factor, while three Japanese used the same scale as an *Evaluative* scale. It is now clear that the use of happy-sad

is somewhat unique cross-culturally with greater consistencies appearing within than between the cultural groups.

In still another cross-cultural study, I (1965) reached basically the same conclusion. In this study, the subjects were Japanese and American college graduates and a 12-scale form of semantic differential, as shown in Figure 1, was constructed in both languages. Scale intercorrelations were computed over 30 national stereotypic concepts like JAPANESE or AMERICAN for each of 36 Japanese and 32 American subjects. A total of 68 scale-intercorrelation matrices were then correlated across corresponding cells, and the resultant  $68 \times 68$  subject-intercorrelation matrix was then factored, and the extracted factors rotated. The results are strikingly similar to those obtained by Tanaka and Osgood (1965). The first unrotated factor was found to account for 77% of the total variance, all Japanese and American subjects loading high on it. On the other hand, however, inspection of rotated data demonstrated that Factor I (23% total variance) can be termed a Japanese factor, a majority of the Japanese and a few Americans loading high on it, while Factor II (21% total variance) can be called an American factor, a majority of the Americans and a few Japanese loading high on this factor—evidence that the consistency of subjects' meaning systems is reasonably high across different cultural groups, but is still higher within than between the subject groups. Then, in the same manner as described above, the  $12 \times 12$  scale-intercorrelation matrix for each of the 68 (36 Japanese and 32 American) subjects was factored, and the extracted factors rotated. Inspection of the rotated data demonstrated again that every subject used pairs of scales quite consistently: for example, pleasant-unpleasant and beautiful-ugly, thick-thin and large-small, and active-passive and fast-slow, tend to cling together in spite of the subjects' language/culture distinctions and differences in sexes. Second, from inspecting the factor loadings of each scale for individual subjects, 60% of the Japanese were found to use the democratic-undemocratic scale in association with fast-slow, and another 20% in association with both pleasant-unpleasant and beautiful-ugly. On the other hand, 30% of the American subjects used the same scale, associated with both pleasant-unpleasant and beautiful-ugly, and another 30% with no association whatsoever with any other scales. For these Americans, the democratic-undemocratic scale seems to be an independent criterion of judgments: it and it alone loading high on a semantic factor. Less than 10% of Americans were found to use this scale in association with fast-slow. It is reasonably clear, therefore, that the use of democratic-undemocratic is somewhat unique cross-culturally, greater consistencies appearing within than across the language/culture boundaries. Here, again, no direct, diachronic explanation is possible, but at least it should be taken into account that the Japanese subjects

used in this study were college graduates with the average age of 29 when the experiment was run in 1959. It is assumed, therefore, that most of them had gone through elementary and junior-high school educations before and during World War II. During those years, "moral" education, or the *shushin*, was strictly directed under government supervision toward the *kokutai* doctrine, or the worshipping of the Emperor as Living God, while democracy was the very objective they were fighting against. In the light of their life experience, therefore, it seems quite reasonable that the Japanese were found to hold somewhat different attitudes toward democracy when compared with the Americans.<sup>1</sup>

### Cross-Cultural Comparisons in the Evaluative Meanings of Various Concepts

It will be recalled that Osgood and associates (1963) have been conducting extensive cross-cultural research in more than 15 language/culture communities. The first phase of their research was to construct multilingual semantic differentials with which one could measure *cultural meanings* of various concepts. For this purpose, qualifiers were first elicited within each community as responses to 100 common, translation-equivalent substantives and transformed into scales by the elicitation of qualifier-opposites. Using 50 such indigenous scales, Osgood *et al.* (1963) reports that the factors obtained from different language/culture communities were found to be truly pan-cultural in the direct, mathematical sense that the scales from these different communities were found to be highly correlated when used in rating the standard 100 substantive concepts. They then took the four scales for each community which load highest and most purely on the pan-cultural, *Evaluative* factor, and used their composite value for each concept, transposed to a +3 to -3 scale, as a semantic-differential-determined attitude score for each concept. Any judged concepts, therefore, can fall anywhere along the composite scale from "extremely desirable" through a neutral point to "extremely undesirable".

Figures 3 and 4 display the *Evaluative*, cultural meanings of several critical concepts, held in the Japanese, American, French, Finnish, Dutch and Kannada-speaking Indian communities reported by Osgood (1965). It can be clearly seen in Figure 3 that "Luck" and

<sup>1</sup> For the details of the national education system in Japan during the pre-war period, and its psychological implications, see, for example, Tanaka (1964). Furthermore, in this connection, the present writer found in a more recent, unpublished study that Japanese college male and female students as groups use the democratic-undemocratic scale in association with an *Evaluative* factor, the correlation being very high with loved-hated and reputable-disreputable (Tanaka, 1965). There may be certain age differences in the use of this particular scale.




FIGURE 3  
SOME COMMON CONCEPTS EVALUATED IN SIX COMMUNITIES




FIGURE 4  
SOME GENERAL KINSHIP CONCEPTS EVALUATED IN SIX COMMUNITIES

"Peace" are highly esteemed by everyone, but the Japanese seem to value them most highly, and Indians the least. "Work", on the other hand, is evaluated most highly by the Indians and the Japanese, while the Americans and the Finns value it much less. The concept of "Wealth" is quite positive in evaluation for Americans, Japanese and Frenchmen, but negative for Finns. Only for the Indian and the American, is "Policeman" a positive concept. Indians seem to appreciate it more highly than "Peace". It is not surprising, on the other hand, that all the derogatory notions like "Thief", "Crime", "Guilt", "Battle" and "Snake" are universally negative concepts. Yet, among these generally undesirable notions, there are some interesting deviations: the Indians, for example, register rather mild disapproval towards them, compared with the intensely negative attitudes of the Japanese. "Snake" seems to be a particularly disliked creature for the Japanese. Finally, it will be noted that "Peace" and "Battle", the conceptual opposites, are nearly equally polarized in opposite directions in every language/culture community.

Figure 4 presents some concepts, referring to human and kin classifications. There appear to be close similarities among the Indo-European language groups, that might also share the same kinship system. Generally, female figures (e.g., "Mother" vis-a-vis "Father", or "Woman" vis-a-vis "Man") are esteemed more highly than male figures everywhere except in Japan. Although these subjects used in Osgood's research were relatively young, high-school males in every community, the traditionally powerful, male-dominance in Japanese culture seems to be very clear even from this single example. For the Japanese, the kin and human universe appears to revolve around the parents and the male; whereas, many Indo-European communities appear to be female-centered. It should be recalled that "filial piety", the supreme respect toward one's parents, has long been one of the utmost moral values in the Japanese cultural tradition, second only to loyalty to the Emperor who is the highest "father-figure" in the nation.

### Evaluative National Images Held by Japanese College Students

Images of nations, like those of "Father" or "Mother", are highly value-laden and can be measured in their *Evaluative* characteristics via the semantic-differential measuring system. In a recent unpublished work (Tanaka, 1965), used a variation of semantic differential in order to study the images of 32 names of nations held by Japanese male and female college students. It was an extension of a special kind of semantic differential, developed by Osgood and Ware and termed a *personality differential* (Osgood, 1962). Previously, Osgood and Ware

had American subjects judge some 40 diverse "personality" concepts against 40 scales, and obtained eight dominant factors. They then found that the American subjects do share essentially the same judgmental frames, or "theory" for describing personality. In constructing a Japanese personality differential, only those scales which were found to load highest and most purely on the respective factors obtained in the American study were selected and translated into Japanese. The 27 scales used in the Japanese experiment included both the representative personality-differential and the ordinary semantic-differential scales.

The Japanese experiment was carried out in Tokyo between May and June, 1965. The data obtained were tabulated separately for males and for females, and an averaged  $27 \text{ (scales)} \times 32 \text{ (concepts)}$  matrix was obtained for each group. These two (male and female) matrices were then combined to make up a new,  $54 \text{ (scales)} \times 32 \text{ (concepts)}$  matrix, on the basis of which scale intercorrelations were computed, the intercorrelation matrix factored and the factors rotated. This is exactly the same procedure, previously used by Osgood and associates (1963) in the pan-cultural factorizations. In this case, however, it was used to test the within-culture consistencies of male and female factors.

There are some interesting results of factorization. First, no male or female factors appear. Dimensions, in other words, cut across both sex groups and are almost equally defined by both. Second, the first five dominant factors, thus defined similarly by both male and female groups, are clearly identifiable as *Evaluation*, *Dynamism*, *Excitability*, *Uniqueness* and *Familiarity* in order of a factor salience. The first factor is defined by scales like loved-hated, reputable-disreputable and tender-tough; the second factor by active-passive, fast-slow and strong-weak; the third factor by excitable-calm, emotional-unemotional and intuitive-logical; the fourth by unique-typical, unusual-usual and individualistic-regular; and the fifth by familiar-unfamiliar. There are some apparent deviations from the earlier Osgood-Ware study: for example, *Excitability* and *Rationality*, previously found to be orthogonal factors independent of each other, now appear to coalesce into one large *Excitability* factor in the present case. Third, in terms of the amount of variance removed by each factor, the first two factors, each accounting for more than 30% of variance, followed by the third accounting for only 17%, appear to be most important in the judging of national concepts. In other words, the Japanese used two major criteria when they judged 32 national concepts—namely, whether they are both tender and loved, or both tough and hated, and whether they are both active and strong, or both passive and weak.

Figure 5 presents the positions of several selected, national con-

cepts along the evaluative and dynamism dimensions, based upon the mean score for each national concept, the averaging done across the male and female groups over the six scales which load highest and most purely either on the *Evaluative* or the *Dynamism* factors, common to both groups. First, along the *Evaluative* dimension, Holland, France and Sweden are found to be most highly esteemed by the




FIGURE 5  
ALLOCATION OF 16 NATIONAL CONCEPTS ALONG THE EVALUATIVE AND THE DYNAMISM DIMENSIONS

Japanese, whereas both South and North Viet-Nam, North Korea and Communist China are among those most disliked. Holland and Sweden are very highly esteemed, presumably because of a recent visit of a Dutch Princess to Japan, and advanced social welfare in Sweden. Generally, the Japanese appear to view Communist nations negatively. It is also interesting to note that they maintain much more unfavorable attitudes toward their Asian neighbors, than toward geographically remote Western nations. It has long been said that the Japanese as a whole have a powerful, affective adoration toward more advanced Western cultures, and the above result would also appear to indicate that such traditional adoration of the West has been still remarkably inherited by the present generations as well. Finally, there is no indication that the Japanese college students are "blindly" nationalistic, for they ranked Japan favorably but relatively low in evaluation.

Second, along the dynamism dimension, the United States is found to be exceptionally high-ranked, followed by France, Soviet Union, Communist China and West Germany. Note that the Japanese rate Japan as a passive-slow-weak nation. India is found to be the least dynamic. Cuba and North Viet-Nam are judged as dynamic, presumably because they are fighting against the most dynamic nation, the United States, and are unwilling to accept defeat. Finally, between Japan and Communist China there is approximately one scale-unit difference. Since Osgood *et al.* (1957) have found that composite-score differences as small as half a scale unit are statistically significant at the .05 level, based upon the American data, this difference between Japan and Communist China will certainly be a significant one. Despite the beliefs among some Americans that the Japanese underestimate the power and threat of Communist China, the Japanese college males and females appear to view Communist China as a quite active-fast-strong nation, vis-a-vis the more dynamic United States and the less dynamic Japan, even though they evaluate Communist China quite negatively.

Figure 6 presents a two dimensional, semantic space for the Japanese, wherein the 16 national concepts are allocated along the evaluative and the dynamism dimensions. It will be noted that the unsolicited classifications of the 16 national concepts are possible in the four spaces, which are cut across by the two factor axes, as follows: France, United States, Italy and West Germany in the *positive-dynamism-positive-evaluation* space; Holland, Sweden, Japan and India in the *negative-dynamism-positive-evaluation* space; Cuba, Soviet Union, North Viet-Nam and Communist China in the *positive-dynamism-negative-evaluation*; and Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea and South Viet-Nam in the *negative-dynamism-negative-evaluation*. All this represents a small part of the cognitive map of the Japanese




FIGURE 6  
ALLOCATION OF 16 NATIONAL CONCEPTS IN A TWO-DIMENSIONAL SEMANTIC SPACE

college students, and the matched data collected from the United States and elsewhere should enable us to compare the cognitive map of one cultural community with that of another.

### Incompatible Meaning Systems as a Possible Obstacle for Intercultural Cooperation

There is at least one great, commonly recognized natural obstacle to cooperation across language/culture boundaries: namely, the language barrier. But the foregoing analyses of various semantic spaces would appear to suggest that the incompatible semantic systems could also become another critical obstacle for cooperation, reducing the

opportunities of mutual understanding, or even producing high emotional hostilities among different language/culture communities.

For example, one of the cross-cultural studies show that the affective meanings of democratic-undemocratic somewhat differ between the Japanese and the American subjects. The scale is associated with activity for the Japanese, while it is associated with evaluation for the Americans. When Americans assert, for example, that a certain nation, X, is undemocratic while another nation, Y, is democratic, they are affectively asserting that X is bad while Y is good, or that X is definitely more unpleasant than Y, and they may be more hostile to X than to Y. The Japanese, on the other hand, may hold that both X and Y are democratic and X is even more democratic than Y, when they perceive that both X and Y are active and X is more active than Y. To the extent that the language is the major vehicle of human thought and beliefs, both Americans and Japanese will soon find that they differ in their beliefs: Americans will find that what they assert to be better is worse (but, in fact, *more inactive*) to the Japanese and that what they are very much excited about and wish to back up is flatly turned down by the Japanese, and they will conclude that either the Japanese are abnormal or "brainwashed" in some way. Similarly, the Japanese will reach their own conclusion that it is the Americans who are abnormal and "fanatic" in some way.

There are in our meaning systems some other scales like gay-sober and happy-sad, which display unique interaction with cultures. Certainly, both the Japanese and the Americans will be equally annoyed when the Americans assert to be gay and therefore to admire what to the Japanese is also gay but therefore to be condemned. Under these conditions, mutual irritations and distrust will be the inevitable result, and when these bits are sufficiently accumulated, a sudden, outright burst of hostility may be the outcome.

Today, much remains to be done in future research. It should be remembered, for example, that the experiments to date have been administered in the sample language/culture communities to those subjects who by no means were representative of the respective communities. Furthermore, very little research has been done concerning age differences, which might affect the meaning systems in a rapidly changing, modern society, especially with respect to sex mores, for example, or kin relations. With all this limitation, however, it is hoped that the exploration into various semantic spaces via multilingual semantic differentials has proved to have validity as well as utility as a general scientific approach which might give additional dimensions to cross-cultural studies of human attitudes, beliefs and values, and that the results of these studies will serve for formulating a better hypothesis in this area.

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## The Role of the War Industry in International Conflict

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President Eisenhower, in his famous farewell address, made a classical allusion to the "military-industrial complex". The expression "the war industry" has also been used to describe the same phenomenon, and as this is somewhat more in line with the general terminology of economics, I propose to use it. What I mean, then, by the war industry is that segment of the economy which produces whatever is bought by the defense budget. This includes, then, the armed forces themselves and all those segments of the economy, such as the armament industry, which supply goods and services to the armed forces. There are some tricky problems here of measurement which arise mainly because a considerable part of the labor force of the war industry are conscripts, not free labor. If we were to reckon the cost of the war industry at shadow prices equal to the market price of the labor involved, it would almost certainly be considerably larger. Conscription, however, like any other form of involuntary servitude, distorts the price system and leads to some false accounting of human capital. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the income of members of the armed forces is to a considerable extent in kind, that is, they are fed, housed and clothed at government expense and without much personal freedom of choice.

The question at issue in this paper is that of the reciprocal relations between the war industry on the one hand and the other elements of the international system on the other. It may be objected

that the war industry is such a large part of the international system that this relationship is almost too one-sided to discuss. Nonetheless, even though the war industry is quantitatively by far the largest sector of the international system, if we look at it for instance in terms of the total labor force devoted to it or the total product imputed to it, it is frequently in a somewhat dependent relationship to other elements in the system. At the decision-making level it is frequently the tail (that is, the civilian politicians, legislatures, opinion makers and diplomats) that wags the dog of the war industry. On the other hand, there have been sufficient cases in which the dog wagged his own tail, or perhaps we should reverse the metaphor and say has run his own head into a wall, that the problem of the reciprocal interaction between the war industry on the one hand and the rest of the international system on the other becomes enormously important.

### The Threat System

The war industry differs from the rest of the economy mainly because it is a component of a threat system rather than of an exchange system. In an exchange system goods are produced and exchanged one against the other. The farmer produces food and exchanges this with the industrial sector for industrial goods. In the threat system threat capabilities are produced, that is, the ability to produce "bads", a bad being the destruction of somebody else's good (Boulding, 1963, 424-34). Even though there are certain parallels between the exchange system and the threat system, the differences are highly significant. Thus if a bandit says, "Your money or your life", we give him our money, he gives us our life, and this looks superficially like exchange. What he is giving us, however, is not a good but an abstention from doing bad, that is, a negative bad; and for society at large at any rate, a negative bad is by no means the same thing as a positive good. Furthermore, if the threat system is to be capable of achieving a stable and recurrent change in the social system, it must be legitimated. A bandit can take away your money once; if he wants to do it every year, however, he has to turn himself into a tax collector, who is a sort of legitimated bandit. Legitimation, of course, is done in all sorts of ways, through the pomp of princes, the blessing of religion or the rituals of democracy.

The problem of the legitimization of the threat system in the international arena is particularly complex. The national armed force is neither quite a bandit nor is it a policeman. It occupies an uneasy limbo between these two extremes. It has a great deal more legitimacy, of course, in its own country than it does outside. On the other hand, armed forces cannot really even fight each other unless there is some kind of overriding legitimacy given to the general procedure. There

is a curious paradox here, that the various armed forces, and especially the armed forces of countries which threaten each other, are in a symbiotic relationship in the sense that each depends on the other for its own justification. One notices a somewhat parallel symbiotic relationship between the police and the criminals, though here perhaps it is truer to say that the police are parasitic upon criminals (the more criminals, the more police; the more police, the fewer criminals; the more dogs, the more fleas, the more fleas, the fewer dogs). The relationship of armed forces, somewhat by contrast, is more like that of two mutually cooperative species: the bigger the Russian armed forces, the bigger will be the American; the bigger the American armed force, the bigger will be the Russian.

The symbiotic nature of the system makes its equilibrium, if it exists at all, highly sensitive to changes in the parameters of the system. Let us suppose, for the sake of simplicity, two countries A and B, and suppose that the decision of each about the size of its defense budget depends only on the defense budget of the other. If  $D_a$  and  $D_b$  are the defense budgets of the two countries respectively, we then have two equations, assumed for the moment to be linear:

$$D_a = K_a + m_a D_b \quad (1)$$

$$D_b = K_b + m_b D_a \quad (2)$$

Solving these two equations, we get:

$$D_a = \frac{K_a + m_a K_b}{1 - m_a m_b} \quad (3)$$

$$D_b = \frac{K_b + m_b K_a}{1 - m_a m_b} \quad (4)$$

The parameters of these equations can be given fairly simple meanings.  $K_a$  and  $K_b$  might be called the *absolute militarism* of the two countries, these representing the expenditures on the armed forces even in the absence of any external threat. The parameters  $m_a$ ,  $m_b$  may be called the *reactivity coefficients* of the two countries, and measure how much each country will increase its own defense budget for each unit increase of the defense budget of the other. Thus if  $m_a$  is small, it means that country A is unreactive to a change either up or down in the defense budget of country B. Equations (3) and (4) indicate that the equilibrium level of the defense budget is highly sensitive to the reactivity coefficient of the countries concerned. If  $m_a m_b$  is greater than 1, no equilibrium is possible, and the system is explosive. Defense budgets will expand continually as each country reacts to the other until finally some boundary is reached, at which the system changes. Usually this boundary is war.

If we think of a reactivity coefficient of unity as in some sense "normal" (if he increases his budget by a million dollars, I'll do the same), it is clear that if the reactivities are normal, there is no equilibrium. If the reactivities of both countries are below normal, there is an equilibrium; if one is below normal, the other may be correspondingly above and there still might be an equilibrium. The geometric mean of the reactivities of the two countries must, however, be below normal if there is to be an equilibrium. It is not surprising, therefore, that this system is so rarely stable, and that systems of deterrence (which is what this is) in the past have almost inevitably led to war.<sup>1</sup> If nonlinearity is allowed, it is clear that if the reactivity coefficients diminish with increased defense budgets, the possibility of equilibrium is enhanced. On the other hand, if high defense budgets lead to higher reactivity coefficients, the probability of an equilibrium position is diminished. The above model I have elsewhere called the Richardson model, as it was first developed in a somewhat different form by Lewis Richardson (1960).

The introduction of a third country into the model, as always, increases its complexity enormously; and the n-country model is very difficult indeed. As soon as we get three parties, we have to consider the possibility of coalitions; and if these are unstable, the probability of achieving equilibrium in a system of this kind declines very sharply. Let us take, for instance, the 3-country case without coalitions. Using the notations as before where  $D_a$ ,  $D_b$  and  $D_c$  represent the defense expenditures of the three countries, we postulate three equilibrium conditions, as in equations, (5,a), (5,b) and (5,c), signifying that the defense expenditure of each one depends on the defense expenditures of the other two. The reaction coefficients, such as  $a_b$ , show how much the defense expenditure of one country, (A), will increase for each dollar increase in the defense expenditure of another, (B). The solution of these three equations for  $D_a$  is shown in equation (6).

$$D_a = K_a + a_b D_b + a_c D_c \quad (5)(a)$$

$$D_b = K_b + b_a D_a + b_c D_c \quad (b)$$

$$D_c = K_c + c_a D_a + c_b D_b \quad (c)$$

$$D_a = \frac{K_a(1 - b_c c_b) + K_b(a_b + a_c c_b) + K_c(a_b b_c + a_c)}{1 - a_c c_a - b_c c_b - a_b b_a - a_b b_c c_a - a_c b_a c_b} \quad (6)$$

The solutions for the other countries, of course, are similar, with proper substitution of coefficients. The denominator in each case is

<sup>1</sup> A more extended graphical analysis of systems of this kind, extending to nonlinear functions, will be found in K. E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), Chapter 2.

the same. If then there is to be a finite solution, the coefficients must conform to the inequality (7):

$$S = a_c c_a + b_c c_b + a_b b_a + a_b b_c c_a + a_c b_a c_b < 1 \quad (7)$$

If there is to be an equilibrium solution, the expression on the left hand side of the inequality, which we call the *solution coefficient*,  $S$ , must be less than 1. If there is mutual hostility among all three countries, all six reaction coefficients will be positive, and they must, therefore, be quite low if  $S$  is to be less than 1. Even if we suppose that there is normal reactivity, so that each of the coefficients is 1, we then have  $S = 5$ , and there is no solution. If all the coefficients are equal and equal to  $m$ , then we have equation (8):

$$S = 3m^2 + 2m^3 \quad (8)$$

Then if  $S = 1$ ,  $m = \frac{1}{2}$ ; and the condition therefore for any stable equilibrium is that the reaction coefficients should be less than  $\frac{1}{2}$ , which means a pretty low reactivity. The more countries we include in the system, the lower must the coefficients of reactivity be in order to achieve any equilibrium at all.

### Alliances and Coalitions

The situation is further complicated, of course, if there are alliances or coalitions. Suppose, for instance, that in the situation of equation (5), countries (A) and (B) are allied against country (C). We can then suppose that the coefficients  $a_b$  and  $b_a$  will be negative; that is, if either (A) or (B) increases its defense budget, the other country will diminish its budget, as the defense is regarded in some sense as mutual. This would involve a very close alliance. If the allies are rather suspicious of each other,  $a_b$  and  $b_a$  may still be positive, though they may be small. If  $a_b = b_a = 0$ , which is the case we might call a neutral alliance, we still have:

$$S = a_c c_a + b_c c_b \quad (9)$$

and even under these circumstances, if we have the normal reaction coefficients of 1,  $S = 2$  and the system will have no equilibrium. In this case, if we suppose that the remaining reaction coefficients are all equal and again equal to  $m$ , we have:

$$S = 2m^2 \quad (10)$$

and in order to obtain an equilibrium position, we must have:

$$m < \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} = 0.7 \quad (11)$$

We need not pursue these complexities further at this point, for it is clear that the more nations there are in the system, even if they have alliances, the less chance is there of any equilibrium of unilateral national defense.

### Formation of Military Budgets

Up to this point, I have not made any distinction in the model between the nation and its armed forces. I have assumed that a single decision-making process applies to both. When we look at what determines the coefficients, however, which are so crucial in determining whether there will be an equilibrium or not, the organizational structure and the decision-making process within the nation is of enormous importance. Decisions as to the amount of the defense budgets in any nation emerge as a result of a long and complex process of political compromise, proposals and counter-proposals, rising up through the hierarchy of decision making until some final decision is made at the top. The checks and balances involved in this process are of enormous significance. By and large it is fair to assume that as in any budget-making process, those who are the principal and immediate beneficiaries of budget increases will press for them, and those who are concerned with large issues and larger agendas will tend to cut them down. This seems to be a practically universal principle of budget formation; and as the size of the war industry, unlike that of industries serving consumers, is determined almost entirely by a budget process and not by a market process, budget formation is obviously the key to the overall dynamics of the situation.

There is great need for empirical study of the process of budget formation in military budgets, for as far as I know there has been practically no work, at least of an objective character, in this field. The most one can do is to suggest some hypotheses which might be tested by such studies. One such hypothesis is that there are two large constellations of forces affecting a total budget. One consists of the forces of the internal environment, which almost continuously make for budget increase. Every department within any organization always feels that it could do a much better job if it had a somewhat larger budget. Hence the first step in budget making, which is the collection of proposals from departments and units of an organization, always results in a total budget proposal which will almost certainly be larger than that finally arrived at; and it will almost always result in an increase in budgets over last year, or whatever is the budget period. As these budget proposals move up through the hierarchy of the organization, they are met by another set of forces representing the external environment. At the lower levels of the organization and in its smaller units, these external forces are likely to be weak, though there may be

some exceptions to this, in the case of units which are specialized in contact with the external environment, such as, for instance, staff units. Even where the external environment is perceived, however, at these lower levels, there is likely to be distortion of perception which gives a bias towards budget increases rather than budget decreases. As the budget moves up through the hierarchy of the organization from departments to divisions to larger and larger units and aggregates, the external environment becomes more important, and in the final decision the external environment may dominate.

Thus in the case of a state university, the external environment of the legislature is remote at the level of the department, highly salient to the level of the President. Similarly in the case of the defense budget, the external environment may not be very important at the lower levels but becomes extremely important at the top. Generally speaking, therefore, we can suppose that there is an upward bias in budget formation in all organizations, including defense organizations, and that it takes rather an unusual perception of the external environment to bring about budget cuts. In the case of defense establishments, this happens, for instance, at the end of a war, particularly a victorious war, when the international system is suddenly perceived as being much less threatening; decisions to reduce the establishment drastically are made at the top, perhaps in response also to a perception of the internal domestic environment of the country (the "bring the boys home" mood); and the lower echelons of the organization are quite defenseless against the overall budget reduction. Circumstances of this kind, however, are unusual, and in normal circumstances the structure of budget formation, in defense as in other organizations, tends to give an upward bias towards a constant increase.

In terms of our equations, this means that the coefficients of militarism,  $K_a$ ,  $K_b$ , etc., under ordinary circumstances tend to rise year after year, which leads further to diminishing the chances of stability in the system. The one factor which tends to counteract this is stinginess on the part of civilian government, in response either to the personal prejudices of the decision makers or in response to political pressures from the civilian population. An increase in military budgets must result either in increased taxation, in inflation or in reduction of civilian budgets. There will be political pressures against all these three reactions, and if the ultimate decision-maker is highly sensitive to these pressures, the forces making for increase in military budgets will be correspondingly damped. A study of the Eisenhower period, 1952-1960, for instance, indicates that one of the major factors in damping the arms race in this period was the "stinginess" in President Eisenhower, who had strong personal prejudices against increasing public expenditures in general, and who therefore held down military budgets out of sheer parsimony. This substantially increased the sta-

bility of the international system, and almost certainly gave us a kind of equilibrium which a more spendthrift, energetic President could easily have destroyed. It is an indescribably tragic commentary on the nature of a system of unilateral national defense that almost the only way in which it can be workable is through the major decision makers being rather stingy, insensitive and unreactive.

One of the crucial factors in the decision-making and the budget-making process here is the extent to which the defense establishment is under civilian political control or the extent to which the defense establishment itself makes the final decisions about the government budget. By and large, the hypothesis may be put forward that civilian control strengthens the damping forces on budget formation and is likely to result in smaller coefficients and to increase the possibility of an equilibrium of the unilateral defense system; whereas under military control of final budgets, we are likely to see a much greater sensitivity to increase in the budgets of other countries, that is, high reaction coefficients, and we are also likely to see an insensitivity to civilian demands on the budget, which is likely to result in high coefficients of militarism.

### Industrial-Military Complex

The role in a society of what might be called the private sector of the war industry, that is, the industrial part of the industrial-military complex, may also be relevant to the fundamental coefficients of the international system. In the 1930's, the view that war was mainly a product of the armament manufacturers was very popular. One recalls, for instance, the Nye investigations and the Johnson Acts. This, however, seems now to be a gross oversimplification. It is certainly true that armaments manufacturers represent, as it were, an upward pressure in the formation of military budgets. Under most circumstances, however, this pressure is fairly small compared with the enormous pressures imposed by the external military and political environment and the rest of the internal political environment, as represented by the competing claims on the overall budget. There is, indeed, a dangerous change in this respect in the United States, as we have become a relatively militarized nation. Before the Second World War there was really nothing that could be called a specialized armaments industry. Most of the suppliers of the Department of Defense, such as Dupont, General Motors, and so on, were primarily engaged in the production and sale of consumer goods, and were what might be called consumer-oriented organizations. Since the end of the Second World War, we have seen the rise of firms like General Dynamics and most of the airframe companies, which are not consumer-oriented at all, and which make almost their entire sales to the Department of

Defense. There is a recognition among these firms that the defense industry is an unstable customer and that in the interest of their own survival, it would be advisable for them to diversify their activities into civilian markets. Many of them, however, have had some unfortunate experiences with this activity, simply because the kind of organization which is well adapted at selling things to government, which is, shall we say, an understanding and sympathetic customer, is not well adapted to selling things on the hard cold world of the civilian market. Even so, there is not much evidence that as a political pressure group, especially in Congress, the private sector of the war industry in any way dominates defense decisions.

### Defense Industry and Depressions

There is a more subtle problem in this connection, which may be of more importance. In the economic folklore of the United States especially, there is a widespread belief that it is only the defense industry which saves us from depression. We were half grateful to Hitler and the Japanese for getting us out of the Great Depression of the '30's, and this memory is still strong in the minds of the generation of powerful decision-makers today. The association of peace with unemployment is particularly strong in the labor movement, which accounts at least in part for its almost total loss of idealism, and the fact that it is the principal drum-beater for the Cold War. The problem of economic adjustments to disarmament, or even to changes within the war industry, is a real one. Nevertheless, with the resources which we now have, it is soluble, given reasonably sensible economic policy.<sup>2</sup> Indeed the American economy is quite astonishingly flexible and adjustable, provided it does not run into deflation; and as deflation can very easily be avoided by monetary and fiscal policy, the association of war with prosperity has now been broken. A good example of this adjustability can be seen in the experience of Michigan. In 1958 the war industry largely moved out of Michigan to California. Temporarily, the results were almost catastrophic. Unemployment in Michigan, for instance, rose from about 5% of the labor force in the summer of 1957 to 16% of the labor force in the summer of '58. By the late summer of '59, however, it had recovered almost to its 1957 level, and after a secondary recession in 1961, under the stimulus of the tax cut it fell to around 3% by the summer of 1965, in spite of the fact that the overall size of the defense industry was fairly stable.

I am not suggesting, of course, that this problem is unimportant. If, for instance, there was a drastic reduction of defense expenditure in the United States, there would be serious local depressions, especially

<sup>2</sup> See the Report of the Committee on the Economic Impact of Defense and Disarmament, U.S. Government Printing Office, July, 1965.

on the West Coast. Unless the reduction in defense expenditure was accompanied by a substantial budget deficit and an easy monetary policy, these local depressions might easily cumulate into an overall deflation. If the overall level of demand, however, is taken care of, the evidence suggests that local adjustments, even without much in the way of government assistance, can be made in about the period of a year. The extraordinary ease with which economic adjustment was made to the great disarmament of 1945-46, which was by far the greatest disarmament in history, is further evidence of the extraordinary flexibility of the American economy.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, it is not the reality but the image which dominates behavior, and as long as there is a prevailing folk image of the war industry as a source of prosperity, this is an important factor operating to resist a reduction in military budgets. Furthermore, in order to justify military budgets, we almost have to be reactive, and we have to interpret the messages which come from abroad as hostile. All this increases both the coefficients of militarism and the coefficients of reactivity, and even if it leads to an equilibrium position, the equilibrium has large military budgets.

When one looks at the long run and takes a perspective which may extend over decades or even centuries, the relations of economic power to military power and the equilibrium of the war industry become subtle but enormously interesting. One might attempt to sum up the situation in the aphorism that wealth creates power, and power destroys wealth. Like all aphorisms, this is a half-truth; but it is at least a place to start. The first half of it will generally be accepted without much question. If we want to get a rough measure of the relative power of nations, their gross national product is at least a place to start. The absolute magnitude of the war industry of any nation is, of course, equal to its gross national product multiplied by the proportion of gross national product devoted to the armed force; this is simply a truism. As the variance, however, in the proportion devoted to the armed force is much less than the variance in the gross national product itself, the gross national product is the dominant variable in this equation. The proportion of the gross national product devoted to the war industry does not, with one or two exceptions, exceed 10% (the only exceptions according to Bruce Russett are Jordan, 25.70 and Taiwan, 12.30), and there is a very heavy concentration between about 2% and 7%. The gross national product, on the other hand, varies from well under a billion for the smaller countries to five or six hundred billion for the United States. The conclusion of this is that as we look at the long run dynamics of the system, the relative position of nations on the power scale is going to depend on their sustained rates of economic growth, in terms of overall gross national

<sup>3</sup> In a single calendar year National Defense purchases fell from 35.5% of the GNP in 1945 to 8.9% in 1946, and then to 4.9% in 1947.

product. A critical stage in the international system occurs when one nation overtakes another in its economic growth as measured, say, by the GNP; for even though this may not represent an immediate reversal of power positions, at some point, if this process continues, the power positions will soon be reversed. If there is, as indeed there usually is at this point, a serious lag in the image of the world of the decision makers, unrealistic decisions can be made which easily lead into war, even unintended war. The First World War was probably an example of this, in which France and Britain underestimated the growth in the power of Germany and Germany underestimated the growth in the power of the United States.

### Power Destroys Wealth

The second proposition, that power destroys wealth, is likely to be received with more skepticism, though the rise, fall and succession of empires may be adduced as rough evidence. As further evidence, I adduce the following table. It will be noticed here that in the period

TABLE 1  
RATE OF GROWTH OF OUTPUT PER HEAD OF POPULATION

	1870-1913	1913-50	1950-60
Belgium	1.7	0.7	2.3
Denmark	2.1	1.1	2.8
France	1.4	0.7	3.5
Germany	1.8 <sup>a</sup>	0.4	6.5
Italy	0.7	0.6	5.3
Netherlands	0.8 <sup>b</sup>	0.7	3.8
Norway	1.4 <sup>a</sup>	1.9	2.6
Sweden	2.3	1.6	2.6
Switzerland	1.3 <sup>c</sup>	1.5	3.7
United Kingdom	1.3	1.3	2.2
Canada	2.0	1.3	1.2
United States	2.2 <sup>a</sup>	1.7	1.6
Average	1.8	1.1	3.1

Source: Angus Maddison, *Economic Growth in the West*, page 30.

<sup>a</sup> 1871-1913.

<sup>b</sup> 1900-13.

<sup>c</sup> 1890-1913.

from 1870-1913, the imperial powers, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, developed at a slower rate than the nonimperial powers such as Denmark, Sweden, Canada and the United States, even in terms of rate of growth of output per head of the population. It is true that Italy, which was not a particularly imperial power in this period, did not do very well; neither did Switzerland. Nevertheless, the relationship is a striking one, and the inference

would seem to be that the road to rapid economic development is to stay home and mind one's own business well. Italy, presumably, stayed home and minded it badly. The cost of war involvement is clearly seen in the period 1913-50; and the period 1950-60 shows the remarkable results of getting rid of empire, becoming minor powers, and concentrating on getting rich rather than on being powerful.

There certainly seems to be a good deal of evidence that the obsession with being a world power, following the Second World War, has seriously hampered the economic growth of the United States. In the 1950's, for instance, there were actually 45 countries with a higher rate of growth of per capita income than the United States. By way of dramatizing this situation, I have calculated, in Table 2, what would

TABLE 2

PROJECTED "OVERTAKE DATES" AT WHICH VARIOUS COUNTRIES WOULD OVERTAKE THE U.S. IN PER CAPITA GNP

Country	Per Capita GNP, 1957 \$ U.S.	Rate of Growth, 1950-1960 %	Year in Which Country Overtakes U.S. in Per Capita GNP
United States	2577	1.6	
West Germany	927	6.5	1979
Switzerland	1428	3.7	1986
Japan	308	8.0	1992
Italy	516	5.2	1999
France	943	3.5	2011
Netherlands	838	3.6	2014
Sweden	1380	2.6	2020
Norway	1130	2.6	2040
Denmark	1057	2.6	2047
Belgium	1196	2.3	2069
United Kingdom	1189	2.2	2086
Canada	1947	1.2	Never

Sources: Bruce M. Russett, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, page 155; Angus Maddison, *Economic Growth in the West*, page 30.

be the "overtake dates" at which various countries would overtake the United States in per capita GNP if we start at 1950 and project growth at the rate which these countries followed from 1950 to 1960. It will be seen that these dates are surprisingly close to the present. A table such as this, of course, is in no sense a prediction; indeed it is no more than an arithmetical exercise, and it is already obsolete, for in the '60's, the rates of growth of the United States have increased substantially and of many other countries have declined. It is an illustration, however, of the rapidity with which change in the relative structure of the international system can take place under rather divergent rates of economic growth.

The gross national product itself, of course, is a product of two variables, the gross national product per capita and the total population. As it is the overall gross national product which is the dominant variable in determining the position of a nation in the relative power structure, we have to look both at increase in productivity, which is reflected in the per capita GNP, and increase in the population itself. Thus the rise of the United States to the position of the dominant power in the world is associated not only with its economic development, but also with its enormous population increase in the last hundred and fifty years, as it expanded into a virtually empty continent. There are now, however, no empty continents to expand into, and population increase in many parts of the world can easily result in an offsetting diminution in the per capita GNP. Actually, the differences in per capita GNP are sufficient to offset quite wide divergences in population. Thus Japan still probably has a larger gross national product than the People's Republic of China, in spite of the fact that it only has a seventh of the population.

These considerations actually give rise to a modest optimism about the stability of the international system in, say, the next fifty years. Assuming that the United States has emerged from the doldrums of the '50's, and assuming also that the socialist countries, because of their failures in agriculture, are going to find their overall rates of development slowing down, the prospects for any radical revisions in the order of national power are unlikely for at least a couple of generations. If Chinese development is successful, of course, China may be in a position to challenge the United States in the 21st century. This will certainly not happen, however, for fifty or perhaps a hundred years. The current detente between the United States and the Soviet Union is probably connected with a perhaps unconscious recognition on the part of the Russians that they are going to be second fiddle for a long time, and that if they accept this position, the second fiddle is an instrument on which a lot of beautiful music can be played. A nuclear war, of course, would change the whole world picture quite unpredictably, and would probably lead to the reduction of the present great powers to minor status.

### Arms Race and Poor Countries

A danger which seems very real at the moment is the development of arms races among the poorer countries, to the point, indeed, where it can seriously hamper their development or even prevent it altogether. This can happen partly because the arms races themselves absorb resources which are desperately needed for development, which is the case, for instance, in most of South and Southeast Asia; but there is a secondary consequence, that unstable military govern-

ments do not produce the kind of economic policies which are favorable to development. One has to be careful of generalizing here; there are military leaders who have succeeded in acquiring what might be called a political personality, once they have achieved national power as head of a government. Ataturk in Turkey, Nasser in Egypt, and, one might even add, Eisenhower in the United States, are perhaps cases in point, though even the record of these men in terms of development is by no means encouraging. The fact that the military are accustomed to a threat system, are accustomed to command rather than influence, and usually have very poor feedback from their decisions, generally unfits them for the leadership of a development program. In this sense an ideology of power can easily result in a failure to develop wealth, and from the point of view of the poor countries this could easily be an unspeakable tragedy. There is real danger at the moment, for instance, that Africa, which stands roughly today where Latin America did, shall we say, in 1820, will pursue a path of military dictatorships, local arms races, expropriations with subsequent destruction of credit ratings, and hence will be a developmental failure. The evidence at this point, however, is somewhat conflicting, and there is an enormous need for better information.

## Future of International System

One can only permit oneself a modest optimism regarding the future of the international system, for the forces which make for catastrophe are very strong. Nevertheless, a modest optimism is perhaps better than no optimism at all, and there are certain elements in the present situation which can at least save one from total despair. There is undoubtedly a growth in the strength of the world integrative system, as reflected in Dr. Angell's paper in this issue, which should lessen the coefficients of militarism and reactivity, and hence make for a more stable international equilibrium and a lower level of the war industry. The demographic crisis is unfortunately likely to raise these coefficients, especially in the poorer countries, which increases the danger for the whole world. Certainly within the next hundred years, and perhaps much sooner, effective control of population growth must be achieved or no stable international system can be expected. The international corporations may play an important role in holding the world together, if they can solve the problem of their own legitimacy. One would like to see them explore the possibility of United Nations charters, for the United Nations is the only official source of world legitimation at the moment, and even this is pretty inadequate.

Finally, it may be possible to develop what might be called a "national image policy" deliberately directed towards changing national images in directions which are consistent with a stable inter-

national order at a low level of the war industry. The nations are beginning to try these integrative policies, through such things as cultural exchange, and efforts of this kind might reduce the reactivity coefficients very substantially and have enormous payoffs in terms of a reduction in the size of the world war industry. Perhaps the most important contribution to this end, finally, will be the increased awareness that the world war industry does constitute a total system, and that every national act must be judged by its effect on the total. The more realistic the image of the world which the decision makers in the international system have, the better chance we have of reducing the enormous burden which the operation of this system now places on the human race.

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## National Populations and the Technological Watershed

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That capital produces men incidentally to its production of goods is the initial proposition which this paper will examine. The first and grossest evidence of a relation between these two kinds of production is the fact that during recent centuries the upward curve of the one has been paralleled by an upward curve of the other. If the world population at the beginning of the Christian era was between 200 and 300 millions, and if the number was 545,000,000 by 1650 (United Nations, 1953, 11), then roughly a thousand years were required for doubling. If the next doubling took a thousand years, the 1950 world population would have been less than 700,000,000 as against the 2,406,000,000 which actually were present. In order to estimate how much increase of population accompanied capitalism, it seems better to adopt a more recent base. World population grew from 545,000,000 in 1650 to 906,000,000 in 1800. This was a relatively favorable period of history, but still for the most part prior to the industrial revolution. If for some reason the industrial revolution had not occurred, the 1950 world population would have been in the same ratio to 1800 as 1800 was to 1650. This would have resulted in 1,506,000,000 people in 1950 against the 2,406,000,000 actually present. The calculation can be made in many different ways, and no two will give the same number, however, the results of the several ways of arranging the calculation show a range of from  $\frac{1}{2}$  billion to  $1\frac{3}{4}$  billion in excess of the population that would have existed in 1950 if pre-1800 trends had continued. It is

on this kind of argument that one billion people will be spoken of as the unintended result of capitalism.

## Population and Capital

An increase in population occurring simultaneously with the spread of capitalism does not suffice as evidence for an inference of causation. Therefore, an examination of whether the increase occurred in the same places where the action of capitalism was exerted is necessary. Between 1650 and 1950 the population of the area of European settlement grew from 113,000,000 to 935,000,000, while Africa grew only from about 100,000,000 to 199,000,000. Asia showed an increase intermediate between these two figures. The consequence was that whereas those in the area of European settlement were 24% of world population in 1650, they were 35% in 1900 and 39% in 1950. Therefore, the great increase of population in territories occupied by Europeans coincided with the industrial expansion of those territories.

An even better example can be cited by showing the comparisons which can be made within Europe. These suggest the same relationship between capital and people. France had been far and away the most populous country of Europe in the time of its political greatness. In 1801 England and Wales counted 8,893,000 people against France's 27,000,000 (*The Statesman's Yearbook, 1964-5*). By 1921 England and Wales had grown to 38 million (*Ibid., 64*) and France to 39 million (*Ibid.*). Associated with Britain's industrial growth was a population impulse that brought her numbers to equality with her more static rival. The relatively greater growth of industrializing England is even more prominent if one takes account of descendants of Englishmen and Frenchmen living across the oceans.

The comparison of England with industrially stationary Ireland is especially striking. In 1961 Ireland showed 4,253,000 (adding the 26 counties and Northern Ireland), against 6,529,000 in 1841 (*Ibid., 1140*). Her population declined by one third, while that of England trebled.

The early 19th century rise of population in Ireland was related to the increased market for food provided by advancing England.

By the 1780's changed marketing conditions made a grain-growing tenantry more profitable to the landlords than the pasture farmers who then occupied so much of their land. To acquire a tilling tenantry smaller holdings were necessary; their provision led almost inescapably to an increase in numbers. The peasants could and did marry as soon as they pleased. . . . By the 1820's the landlords realized the incompatibility of endless parcellation and the maximization of rents. They saw that subdivision was accompanied by such rapid multiplication of the people that the subsistence segment of the peasant's land threatened the rent-pro-

ducing segment. The landlords strove to halt the process (Connell, 1965, 433).

The peasants resisted them violently and successfully until the fateful potato crop failures of the 1840's (*Ibid.*).

Adam Smith, witnessing the early stages of the relation between industrialization and population, gave it a general formulation: the demand for labor is what makes population grow. For Smith the demand for labor was the capital which could give employment, and this in turn enabled the laborer to marry younger and his children to survive the hazards of childhood. Such a mechanism, in an age of high natural mortality, produced the supply of people just as surely as the demand for shoes produces shoes (Smith, 1921, 82). Smith gives us the optimistic harmony of the 18th century as Malthus gives us modern pessimism.

### The European Market and Asia

The influence of the European market was felt in South and Southeast Asia. There it was not the amenities bought with industrial wages but the abolition of local warfare by the Dutch after they had established their own hegemony that was decisive. An especially destructive form of warfare had been attacks on irrigation works and the breaching of dams on which populations depended, to which the ancient chronicles of Ceylon and elsewhere testify. The population of Java increased from the 5 million counted by Raffles in 1815 to 40,891,000 in the 1930 census. The demand for sugar and coffee in Europe was the demand for labor in Java; to meet this demand the Dutch imposed their administrative machine, which eliminated local warfare, and a transport network that prevented local famines.

If the European pattern of industrialization with urbanization had been followed in Java the checks on family size brought by the changed style of life would have offset the decline in the death rate brought by increased incomes and civil order. But in fact births remained high and "the sector of the economy in which new investments were being made was totally incapable of absorbing the increase in population which it generated . . . The increased numbers inevitably led to a return flow in peasant agriculture and small cottage industries", (Geertz, 1963, xii). Moreover, because the sense of private landholding never became firmly rooted—redivision of the land in accord with need was always the ideal—and because wage-employment for unskilled labor on the sugar plantations provided cash, the notion of children as a source of income and security in one's old age became proverbial (Geertz, 1961, 83). By a kind of ideological lag, government employees in Java pressed by today's inflation vacantly continue

repeating the statement that children are old-age security. The contrast with postrevolutionary France, where the division of the lands had given each peasant just so much, and his security consisted in his having no more than one or two sons, brings out an aspect of the relation between institutions—especially property—and family size.

When the British began to administer the delta of the Irrawaddy, its inhabitants were few. The capital and effective center of the kingdom of Burma was 400 miles to the north, a valley running east and west that was the national granary. The delta was the same rich land that it now is; the few peasants in it grew what rice they needed; and when the harvest was good they allowed most of it to rot in the fields. Between the 1870's and 1930 the combination of British administration, Tamil finance, and Burmese labor brought the exportable surplus from zero to over 3,000,000 tons per year. The demand started in Europe, for Bengali jute, Ceylon tea and Malayan rubber and tin; the organization of production of these commodities caused the populations of Bengal, Ceylon and Malaya to outstrip their subsistence agriculture, and this need for sustenance was translated into a demand for Burmese rice. The political as well as the productive center of Burma moved down to the delta at the same time as the population center.

C. A. Fisher (1964, 706) speaks of the wide range of population densities in the Philippines as the aftermath of colonialism: "This very great unevenness is only partially a reflection of differences in innate agricultural potentiality, for while prolonged and substantial growth of population has occurred in the focal areas of Spanish colonization, the increase has been much less striking in the Muslim and pagan areas which remained outside the range of effective administration until recent times". Like Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon, the Philippines came to be most heavily populated at the center of colonial administration.

Though the European commercial presence in Asia goes back to the closing years of the 15th century, South and Southeast Asia did not become the principal sources of tropical goods before the mid-nineteenth century. Asia had suffered in competition with the Caribbean and northeastern Brazil, and the early supply to Europe of sugar, coffee, cocoa, indigo and tobacco was principally from these nearer sources. Not only was the cost of transport from Asia high in the days of sail, but before the telegraph, communication was uncertain enough to make control over their servants difficult; therefore the interests of British, Dutch and French companies were subordinated to the private interests of their employees. The corruption which occurred was eliminated with development of better communication. The effective distance of Southeast Asia was diminished by the advent of steam in the 1840's and particularly by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. The limited possibilities for sugar plantations in the Caribbean because

of the small area of the islands at that point displaced to Asia the further expansion of the plantation economy.

The shortage of suitable indigenous labor in the Caribbean had been met by the import of slaves from Africa. A circuit of trade was established whereby west European cloth, firearms and trinkets were carried to Africa and exchanged for slaves who were taken to the West Indies in the same vessels, and there used to pay for luxuries and raw materials which the ships brought back to Britain and other countries. The termination of the slave trade by the British, French and Danish in the 1830's sharply raised labor costs in the sugar and cotton plantations.

The technical conditions of transport and the state of European industry were such that imperialism—a matter of territorial administration quite different from slave-running—reached its high point between the 1870's and the 1920's. In fact this half-century seems to contain the whole history of European imperialism; prior to it "even a Disraeli advocated the liquidation of the West African possessions; the Orange State vainly offered to join the Empire . . . . The East India Company had been dissolved at the insistence of eager Lancashire exporters" (Polanyi, 1957, 212-213).

## Disappearing Colonialism

Until the 1930's Europeans remained in charge of the world's affairs. They directly administered vast populations in India and Indonesia, bought and sold governments in Latin America, transported thousands of boat-loads of slaves from Africa to till plantations in Brazil and the United States, and broke into China with the attractiveness of their cotton goods and their opium. During the 20th century, and especially since World War II, these practices have ceased. Colonialism is disappearing, says Ayres (1961, 205), "because the Western peoples are learning that they are not the Lord's anointed". On the side of the ex-colonies the explanation is quite different: the white man has been successfully fought off by the formerly colonized peoples who have now come into their own. Their heroic struggle for independence has brought about the expulsion of the intruders.

It may be that those of European descent are more humane, and Asians and Africans more stalwart in defense of their territories, than was the case fifty years ago. It is not my purpose to judge the mildness of the one nor the firmness of the other. Such sentiments have their uses, but these uses do not include explanation of the historical movement of our time: the confrontation of industrialized and nonindustrialized peoples on a basis of formal equality. Kenneth Boulding's explanation of the end of colonialism is the one I shall follow:

In the latter part of the nineteenth century and especially in the twentieth

eth century it became crystal-clear that colonialism in the old sense did not pay the imperial power and that its cost greatly exceeded any returns. . . . By the twentieth century it was obvious that the way to get rich was to stay home and mind one's own business well. In Europe, for instance, the Scandinavian countries and the Swiss, who did not engage in colonial adventures, did better economically than the British, the French, the Belgians, and the Dutch, and much better of course than the Portuguese. The significance of the technological revolution is that it makes the exploitation of nature so profitable that the exploitation of man becomes obsolete (Boulding, 1965, 113).

With jet travel and the United Nations the apparent union of the world has increased. Diplomacy has expanded from a few English and French ex-public school boys in the capitals of a few feudal or industrial countries to missions, large or small, of each of a hundred and twenty countries in each of a hundred and twenty-one capitals—at least this is the contemporary ideal. Probably affecting more people than diplomatic services is the International Postal Union, through the worldwide mail delivery which it organizes. But like the diplomatic service the mail has a shallow penetration among the people of the nonindustrialized countries. The world *looks* to be united, nonetheless.

I shall argue that the relations between those of European descent and the rest of the world have gone through a full cycle during the past two centuries: from economic separateness, though a considerable dependence of the west on colonial produce, and back to separateness. During the time when colonial indigo, cotton and rubber were essential for the western machine, there was naturally much talk of colonial markets for western goods and colonial opportunities for western investment. Once the tropical produce has been replaced, the 'need' of the west for markets and outlets for investment funds is just as naturally forgotten.

The western industrial machine, the internal strains of whose remarkable advances since World War II are sometimes discussed under the heading 'automation', has even more drastic consequences for the non-western world than it has for the west. The American who is automated out of the automobile factory is a very present problem; every effort is being made to train him—or his son—for a reentry into the apparatus of production at a higher technological level. The authorities worry about him, since he is at the very least a voter. The trade unions worry about him, for they need his dues. But they do not have similar cause to worry about the individual Indonesian who is no less surely automated out of the rubber plantation by the construction of synthetic rubber factories in the United States, Europe and Japan.

Now that the western industrial machine is coming to a new stage of perfection we can look back and see that it was primitive European

industry that needed the dyestuffs of the East and planted hundreds of square miles to indigo. And when Britain was at the very height of the (one-sided) glory and usefulness of imperialism, Germany, shut out from colonies, developed chemical science, and in 1879 Liebig synthesized aniline. Within a decade those indigo plantations were worthless. Somewhat before this the use of iron had reduced the need for teak and other woods in ship-building, but far more spectacular instances of synthetic replacement were to come. In fact, each raw product emerged into importance, and then in due course a substitute was found for it, all in a kind of natural cycle. The expansion of the automobile industry in the first half of the twentieth century brought a huge demand for rubber, and fabulous wealth to the plantation owners of Malaya and Sumatra; a synthetic perfected in Germany and the United States, under the necessities of World War II, has checked the expansion of the plantations, all within less than half a century. The copra cycle lasted longer, for only now are detergents replacing soap made from coconut oil. Cinchona bark, an important export of Indonesia for the quinine that was extracted from it, is replaced by synthetic drugs for the treatment of the small amount of malaria which has survived the use of DDT. The nitrates of Chile rose to importance in the nineteenth century shipping and agriculture configuration, then declined with the fixing of atmospheric nitrogen.

Demand is reduced or prevented from increasing even where synthetics are not available. There is no synthetic coffee, but cheaper coffees from Africa are perfectly suitable for the soluble "instant" forms; these not only diminish the demand for higher grade Brazilian and Columbian output but require less of the raw product than does home brewing. There is no synthetic tin, but the makers of tinplate have learned how to make a thinner coating on iron serve the same purpose.

Oil is the one product for which there has been as yet no commercially successful substitute. But intense exploration by new and more effective methods has led to some oversupply. Offshore sources in the Atlantic and the North Sea are coming into production. So are methods of extracting oil which is not under natural pressure (Landsberg, 1964, 177-184). Moreover, the impending atomic substitutes are probably having the effect of draining out reserves at lower market prices than crude would sell at if there were no atomic engines in prospect.

### Feeding the Poor Nations—A Dilemma

At the same time as the market claims of the underdeveloped countries (by virtue of the raw materials which they sell) become less proportionately and even absolutely, their ability to furnish their own

foodstuffs diminishes (United Nations, 1965, 127). In 1955-6 there was a surplus worth \$110 millions; in 1958-9 a deficit of \$380 millions; in 1961-2 the deficit had grown to \$620 millions, among the underdeveloped countries as a whole. This series can be supplemented with the United States PL 480 exports of grains and other foods to developing countries by which the deficit was in considerable part covered (*Ibid.*, 136). The value (excluding shipments to Europe) rose from \$369 millions per year in 1955-59 to \$1,133 millions by 1964. In each year of the 1960's an increase occurred, and the increases were of almost uniform amount. The volume went from 5.0 million tons per year in 1955-9 to 13.4 million tons in 1964. The number of individuals who can be supported by a unit of cereal depends both on the cereal—rice is more nutritious than wheat, ton for ton—and on the age and physical stature of the people. If we take as a round average five persons to the ton, then it can be said that by 1964 over 60 million persons were dependent on American food gifts. The number is rising rapidly. The ecological base of large Asian populations has become the American wheat lands, or rather the surplus from those lands held on government account.

The upward trend in PL 480 shipments, combined with the pending exhaustion of U.S. grain surpluses (*Chicago Daily News*, 1965), suggests that we are entering a new phase of population and agricultural history. Any rise in prices will complicate the finances of the developing countries, whose need for food competes with their purchase of industrial equipment. It will also present new financial, political and moral problems to the Administration of the United States. If by preventing earlier starvation, U.S. wheat and other surplus crops have maintained these populations and perhaps even brought them into existence, the question arises as to whether supplies can now be cut off, thereby causing a reduction in population to the level which would have been, had there been no PL 480. The Canadian wheat which went to China, not as a gift but for cash payment, raises no such problems. The Chinese understand that it will keep coming as long as they keep paying. They have no false expectations. For those new countries in which industry is advancing rapidly the receipt of food from the United States is a clear boon. It is not charity but a loan, for it is creating the conditions under which such loans can be dispensed with. What of the countries which are receiving food and not developing? The profound difference between a loan and charity is that the former generates the capacity on the part of the borrower to repay, while the latter leaves the borrower where he was. In the worst case, charity increases the expectations and standard of living of the recipient over what they would be without it, and does nothing to enable him to maintain himself by his own exertions. The provision of food to a stagnant economy has one thing in common with individual

charity. It increases dependency, and all the arguments of Malthus become applicable. The point to be made is that it matters little whether the shipment is called a loan or a gift investment or charity; the real distinction is whether it increases or diminishes helplessness. The complex devices of hard and soft payment which modern ingenuity has invented may obscure, but they cannot ultimately evade the distinction which is here being made.

## Holland and the Dutch East Indies

That distinction is applicable in all times and places. In the 18th and 19th centuries loans and gifts were in the other direction. The Dutch East Indies was supporting Holland in the same sense as the United States is supporting India today. Shipments of sugar and of coffee exacted by the Netherland Indies Administration mostly did not go to the kitchens of Holland but were exchanged for British and American capital goods. If the Dutch had merely consumed the revenue of the Indies rather than investing it in their own development, they would have been in a crisis with the loss of their colony. The determination to make themselves independent, which caused them to invest the profits of the Indies trade is testimony to and has been the condition of their subsequent prosperity. This is borne out by the record of Indonesian and of Dutch income since the two separated politically in 1945-49, and more definitively with the seizure in 1958 of the Dutch plantations by the Indonesian military.

The indexes relating to Dutch national income typically show a tripling between 1950 and 1964. For instance, Gross National Product at Market Prices went up from 18.90 billion guilders to 58.19 billion. Disposable wage income went from 7.93 billion guilders to 29.04 billion. It is true that there was a rise in prices of about 50% per decade, and it is true also that the population went up by about 25% per decade, but fully half of the increase was a pure rise in welfare. (Centraal Planbureau, 1984). Thus on a direct estimate, Dutch real national income per capita at 1958 prices went from 237 pounds sterling in 1948 to 391 pounds in 1964 (*The Economist*, March 1965). The curves show a slight hesitation in 1958, the year of seizure of the plantations, and then surge upwards again.

The *Economist* describes four Dutch industrial empires—Shell, Unilever, Phillips and *Algemene Kunstzijde Unie*. The last-named and the smallest of these is an artificial-fibre producer, perhaps the most representative of the future, who produces rayon and nylon in clean factories, with high-paid, skilled help, to take the place of the cotton, sisal and jute which came from colonial territories. Any two or three of these corporations employ more Dutchmen than did the colonial empire when it was at its height, and pays more than the colonial gov-

ernment paid its colonial officials. During the same period since World War II, central Java has moved from bearable poverty to downright starvation. That food production has not moved up as fast as population is shown by the increasing imports needed to maintain an ever poorer diet. What figures there are (United Nations, 1965, 126) show a percentage decline in food production per capita of 1.1% per year over the period 1955 to 1963.

### For Some—A Growing Disparity

The suggestion that life has not become better for the individual citizen of the underdeveloped world is clearly given by consumption figures (*Ibid.*, 124). For 1934-38, in Latin America, Africa and Asia, some 2110 calories per head per day were consumed. This compares with 1960 in 1948-52, and 2150 in 1957-9. Subsequent figures show little further improvement. A real worsening is suggested by the series for animal protein, which averaged 10 grams in 1934-38, 8 in 1948-52, and 9 in 1957-59. At the same time the wealthy countries—North America, Europe, Oceania, and Argentina, increased their animal protein from 34 grams per person per day in 1934-8 to 37 in 1948-52 to 44 in 1957-59. The relative welfare is understated in these figures, since they take no account of the more or less luxurious form in which the protein can be secured. Thus (*Meier*, 1965, 40) the cost of protein from soya beans is \$0.50 per pound, while that from lamb chops is \$4.75 per pound. If we bear in mind that food constitutes anything up to 70% of the income of the underdeveloped world, these figures tell a good deal about the change of welfare over the past generation.

Statistically, there is no improvement in tropical diet during the past 30 years. Observers report a visible deterioration in parts of Java, for instance, as people shift from rice to corn to cassava, and there was little improvement in the 30 years before that. There has been some levelling of incomes in the new countries, but the proportion of their citizens who are poor has remained about the same from the beginning of this century.

### For Others—Prosperity

Compare this to the lowering poverty level in the developed countries. The work of Seebohm Rowntree shows how many people in the developed world were poor in 1899, 1936, and 1950 in the city of York, England. The poverty line he used would cost about \$35 per month of 1936 U.S. dollars to maintain. He found the proportion of the population below the line (which was fixed in real terms) to be 33% in 1899, and only 4% in 1950. Britain was not the fastest growing of western countries during that period, and indeed her post-imperial

history gives some grounds for the assertion that she had been living on colonial income rather than investing all of it. Nonetheless, she had practically eliminated poverty according to Rowntree's measure by 1950. Taking a richer country, the United States, and using the much higher level of \$3000 present-day dollars, gives 18% of households below the poverty line (Orshansky, 1965, 3-31), and the percentage seems to be dropping year by year.

In arguing that the statistical trends are toward uniform affluence in the developed world, and uniform poverty in the undeveloped, one is in danger of seeming to suggest that the rich countries have reached their goal and can now rest. In fact there is little room for complacency. This is documented by Michael Harrington (1963) and others, and no one counsels abandoning the effort to remove the last vestiges of poverty. That this may prove difficult through the existence of disadvantaged castes is seen as all the more reason for intensifying the effort (U.S. Department of Labor, 1965). The association of poverty with mental illness (Hollingshead, 1958) reveals another aspect of the difficulty of eliminating it; however, the declining residual poverty in the rich countries is not our subject here.

If agriculture and hence living standards have lagged in poor countries, development in the form of industry is making clear advances. Taking all the underdeveloped countries together, heavy manufacturing went up 33% from 1960 to 1964, which is about 8% per year (United Nations, 1953). In most of these countries a small modern sector is expanding at a rate far greater than population. Between 1963 and 1964 the developed market economies with 7%, the centrally planned economies with 8%, and the developing countries with 7%, were just about identical in their rates of increase (United Nations, 1953, 5). While the poor nations are not catching up with the rich, at least in heavy industry they are holding to the same ratio to the rich that they had in the 1950's. The position is tenuous in the face of disruption. We do not yet have statistics on the effect of the India-Pakistan mobilizations in the summer of 1965, but they may show a pause in industrial growth in both countries. We also do not know whether the lessened intensity of cold war competition in aid giving or the worsening food situation will affect the capacity of the poor countries to maintain themselves, in respect of industrial growth, in the same relative position to the rich ones.

The populations whose growing numbers and economic difficulties have been commented on in the foregoing are gathered into states, each of the 120 or so now existing in the world with the conception of itself as some kind of recognizable entity. Each includes a government with a monopoly of the use of legitimate violence over the area concerned. It has or aims to have a national language in which standards of "correctness" will apply, imposed on pre-existing less formal

means of oral communication for which the notion of correctness is irrelevant. The standard language (Garvin, 1964, 522) will not develop except in association with a process of upward mobility, for it becomes standard by being the means of communication of a class which the remainder of the population would like to join. In most states there has been enough weakening of traditional subordinations that some process of mobility is under way. Karl Deutsch (1953) shows in what degree the nation is a communication system, and the tremendous emphasis on education in the underdeveloped world has as much to do with making citizens able to receive communication as it has to do with making technicians. The existence of the language and other national elements constitutes a form of tariff protection to an intellectual elite, behind which thought can develop that may later be strong enough to compete in the outside world. It is paralleled by an attempt to establish industry under customs tariffs which have the same purpose of shielding infant industries from the full blast of international competition. In the name of the People, the State can do much that would be intolerable with any lesser legitimation.

The observations above are concerned with three propositions:

(a) The rudimentary capitalism of the nineteenth century reached out for raw materials to feed its machine and, with no one's intention, increased the population of the world by a billion people, many of them in the tropics.

(b) By World War II industrial technology had become capable of turning back to the production of its own raw materials and, again with no one's intention, rendered functionless in relation to its further self-enrichment almost all the populations of the tropics.

(c) In disregard of this change in their status, the tropical populations formed themselves into sovereign states and, benefitting from modern medicine, especially insecticides, further accelerated their increase in numbers.

I do not contend that all of the evidence for and against these assertions has been assembled in the few pages of this paper. Much remains to be investigated, not only in the examination of past history, but also in the study of present trends in technology and automation. I believe that with further advances of western technology now in prospect, mere numbers of people become even less an asset and more a handicap to a developing country than has so far been established on the static considerations of shortage of land and capital.

This point would be made if one could show declining costs of capital-intensive production of textiles, simple metal castings, and other products of incipient industry, relative to the cost of their production by hand. My examination of (a) automated textile factories, (b) the computer operation of lathes and drilling machines known as numerical control NC in the trade, (c) the substitution of computers

for clerical operations, and (d) cheaper methods of molding synthetic plastics, suggests that costs in the United States and Western Europe of making many of the products of incipient industry will continue to go down rapidly despite rising wages. The limit placed on the foreign exchange earnings of the poor country by the synthesis of the raw materials which it once lived by exporting is a mere beginning of the troubles to come, arising from the power of the advanced industrial machine.

### Technological Watershed

What I call the technological watershed is the point at which the rich country, even with high wages, can produce more cheaply than the poor country, even when the latter's wages are so low that they just provide for the physiological needs of its workers. World market prices, determined by the productivity of the rich countries, come to be such that the marginal human machine of the tropics cannot earn the fuel—say one pound of rice per day—needed to stoke it.

The undercutting of tropical populations which began with the synthesis of raw materials, and continues into the cheapening of textiles and other products of incipient industry in this last third of the twentieth century, was planned by no one. All the actors in the process were going about their business, thinking and talking of quite different things like decolonization or holding back communism which in relation to this are mere epiphenomena. Competition in the intense struggle of the internal American market has developed the technology whose effect on the underdeveloped world is beginning to be seen. The final irony is that the surge of nationalism and independence in the underdeveloped countries coincides perfectly with the interest of the rich, always the beneficiaries of the freedom of the poor. If India were an American colony much larger portions of aid than now suffice would be required to quiet those hunger riots. An Indian government can deal far more effectively with a desperate population than could an American police force. A hundred years from now it will appear strange that it was the poor who wanted independence.

The undercutting of tropical manpower by western technology in the economic field is complemented by undercutting in the military field. The atomic bomb was one in a long sequence of inventions which reduced the significance of unequipped men. Now that atomic weapons are proliferating, anti-missile missiles are being developed.

### Foreign Aid for The Distant Poor

To offset the effective damage done to the distant poor by our synthetics and our technology, we provide foreign aid. Few writers have cared to examine what the effect of foreign aid is—as distinct

from the subjective intention of the giver. When food is given to a poor and overpopulated country, it may merely increase its population; it may actually hurt its agriculture by helping its government to maintain a lower internal price for food than would otherwise prevail. When an industrial plant is given it may be merely a substitute for another and more appropriate plant which would come into existence without aid if internal competitive forces were allowed to operate. There are a hundred ways of discouraging production by acts which appear philanthropic both to donor and receiver.

Since at present nearly all aid is given to central governments, it strengthens these governments, whatever else it may do. Whether this advances production would have to be examined for each national receiver of aid.

Visualize a different kind of aid whereby the United States would not only admit all products of the poor country without duty, and without customs formalities, but would spend its aid budget to subsidize these. The subsidy could be provided to American shipping concerns engaged in the trade with tropical countries, for example, or it might be direct to the producer, say of textiles in Indonesia. To spend the foreign aid budget of the United States in this way could encourage and liberate the genuinely productive forces of the underdeveloped countries.

It will be objected that the United States textile industry would not tolerate the free admission—let alone the subsidy—of tropical cloth. To promote this kind of aid would demand too high an internal political price for any government of the United States, who could much more easily afford to raise the \$3 billions in taxes that are given away annually than to hurt the textile industry.

Such an answer at least shows where the U.S. stands. It seems easier to offer alms to the foreign poor, just as alms were offered the poor in the days when it seemed hopeless to try to bring them into effective production. Today the domestic poor do not accept alms; they demand incorporation into the productive apparatus—jobs and earned incomes.

## Incorporation Not Aid

The corresponding incorporation of the foreign poor into the productive apparatus is through foreign investment and trade. There is little indication that this will be done on a scale adequate to the expanding populations of the underdeveloped world. The U.S. seems unwilling to reduce the volume of its industry in those fields—for instance textiles—and to put the equivalent of the resources released to making those things—machine tools, for instance—that the new countries need. Such a move away from autarchy to the benefit of the poor

countries implies some restructuring of the U.S. productive system to make it complementary to theirs. This is less in evidence today than the stepping up of trade with the other rich countries.

These lines of change are only slowly coming into view. The sooner they can be clearly described and analysed the sooner they may be taken under conscious control. Suppose they exist and are not controlled; what will be the outcome in the next decade of population growth on the side of the poor countries, and on the side of the rich a dynamic technology that every year lowers production costs and so devalues the hands of the foreign poor? The poor may isolate themselves; the rich become less humane.

The resentment of the poor whose independence has turned to dust will hardly be diminished by the reflection that after all it was they who wanted independence in the first place, inspired by a nationalism borrowed from the west. Their cries of exploitation, that had some semblance of justification in the nineteenth century, must become ever less convincing as they see that they suffer from the opposite of exploitation—markets have altered so that no colonial exploiter is able to put their labor to a profit. They are worse than exploited—they are irrelevant. The exploited could always strike against those who were making a profit on them; what recourse is there for the unexploitable, locked out of the market by the shift of prices? I can only predict the intensification of resentment, the evolution of new ideologies to express this resentment. Since by the very nature of their situation the independent poor cannot strike militarily at the rich, they may show resentment by striking at one another as India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaya, Egypt and the Yemen have done. Such wars are at least feasible, if they are not very profitable to those participating.

The rich, on the other hand, will have less and less reason to want to understand the poor as relatively less and less exchange of goods and investment takes place. And when interest and understanding of people falls below a certain point they cease to be human, and dropping bombs on them becomes a reasonable form of treatment. Korea and Vietnam may be only the first of a new series of wars of this character, having nothing in common with wars of decolonization like that of Algeria and of Vietnam prior to 1954.

### **Isolation—a Solution?**

Is the sense of common interest likely to unite the internationally poor and lead them to exclude the rich? Could a Chinese wall around the whole underdeveloped world enable it to escape the undercutting of its labor by the technology of the rich? The poor countries could avoid the demonstration effect of the consumer goods of the rich which

acts to corrupt their labor and leads to demands for high wages, and frustrates saving. They could prevent the rich from drawing off their most promising physicists, engineers and statisticians, a process whereby the poor country subsidizes the rich one. If the poor countries could thoroughly exclude the rich and their products they could advance by a division of labor among themselves; the overwhelming weight of American and European technology on the poor country would be rendered inoperative by a customs union surrounded by a sufficiently high tariff wall against all the synthetic products by which the rich have made the poor populations irrelevant. The latter could then go ahead and develop, just as England did in the early nineteenth century when there was no outside source of industrial capital or industrial capital goods. Such a process would at best be slow, and at worst it would be rendered impossible by leaks in the wall. It is essentially the way which China is now following, inspired by an exceptional intensity of resentment and a powerful central authority.

This solution—if it is a solution—would not be a happy one. It does avoid a major war, because the rich have little reason to attack one another, and the poor do not have the equipment to fight the rich. Its uneasy peace is broken by intermittent minor wars among the poor and between individual poor countries and individual rich ones. Resentment and hopelessness on the one side are matched by incomprehension and inhumanity on the other. No policy would seem too strenuous to avoid such a configuration.

### For the Rich and Poor—a Bridge

A start can be made toward the construction of a bridge between rich and poor more substantial than foreign aid or public-relations diplomacy. The method has been suggested by several writers, including Gunnar Myrdal and Raul Prebisch, and has recently been discussed by Harry G. Johnson (1966, 1-18). It does not go as far as the subsidies mentioned above, but is simply a preferential treatment in the markets of the rich countries for goods made in the poor ones, a proposal now placed on the world's agenda by a resolution of the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Johnson shows that such preferences need not be protectionist—they could be liberalizing in spirit and in effect. "This would require", he says

. . . concentrating the preferences on products in which the developed countries have a visible comparative disadvantage and the less developed countries an established or potential comparative advantage—broadly speaking, on products which are unskilled and semi-skilled labour-intensive, and which employ a relatively simple technology. The objective would be a "new international division of labour" to be achieved by a

planned transfer of such industries from the developed countries to the less developed countries. The process would be politically unpopular on both sides—the developed countries would have to devise policies for the planned contraction or extermination of established protected industries, while the less developed countries would have to give up their aspirations for industrial self-sufficiency—but it would contribute both to increased efficiency in the utilization of the world's human and material resources, and to the economic development of the less developed world.

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## Changing Dimensions of the Colonial Problem\*

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Colonialism, which in the parlance of contemporary world affairs is usually roughly defined as Western rule of nonmetropolitan areas and non-Western peoples, or rather the ending of colonialism, has been one of the most potent sources of conflict and violence in international politics in the period since the conclusion of the Second World War. With the exception of the Greek Civil War, the Chinese Civil War, the Korean War and the Chinese-Indian conflict, all of the major outbreaks of organized violence in the past two decades can be traced directly or indirectly to decolonization. If one could measure the potential of this issue as a source of future conflict simply on the basis of the number of people still under colonial rule as compared with the number that were in this status in 1945 some optimism would be warranted, for the proportion is twenty-five per cent or less. Unfortunately, however, sources of conflict can seldom be analyzed so mechanistically, and colonialism is probably no exception. The question should at least be asked whether the remaining issues of decolonization, although few in number, are not among the most virulent. The mere fact that they are the last to be solved rouses the suspicion that they might be. One also ought to consider the extent to which the

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formal transfer of political sovereignty has actually eased the underlying sources of tension which existed in the colonial relationship.

## The Remaining Colonies

The first step in an analysis of the colonial problem as a source of conflict must be an examination of the territories still under colonial rule. Broadly, they can be divided into two categories. Either they are what can be called the oddments of empire, tiny territories, usually islands or enclaves, with small populations and sparse economic resources or they are located in the southern third of Africa. Gibraltar, Guam, Hong Kong, Nauru, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and the Virgin Islands are examples of the first category; Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa, examples of the second (United Nations, 1965). This simple scheme, however, requires two qualifications. The first is the admission that Aden, New Guinea and Papua are exceptions of sorts, which will require some individual analysis. The second is the controversial contention that the Republic of South Africa, despite its long-standing independence, must be included within the second category. Admittedly apartheid raises juridically different issues, yet political practices within the Republic fit at least part of the definition of colonialism used here. More importantly, when Africans speak of liberating Africa it is clear that they have in mind applying the formula of one man-one vote all of the way down to the southernmost tip of the continent (Quaison-Sackey, 1963, x). The Afrikaners themselves see the fate of their country as being closely linked with that of the dependent territories immediately to the North. Thus any discussion of the colonial problem as a source of tension in Africa which did not include the Republic of South Africa would be incomplete and unrealistic.

## Decolonization—a Likelihood

One might ask whether the process of decolonization will inevitably be carried to all of these territories. Accurate predictions in such matters are obviously impossible, but all evidence indicates that it will. For one thing, there are militant international pressures against the continuation of colonialism. In 1955 twenty-nine African and Asian states meeting in Bandung firmly declared themselves on this issue, and every similar international gathering since then has followed a like course, with increasing vigor. For example, one of the principal sections of the program for peace and international cooperation adopted by the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, which met in Cairo in October 1964, was entitled "Concerted Action for the Liberation of the Countries Still Dependent; Elimination of Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism and Imperialism" (Conference of Heads of State,

5-10). One of the major functions of the Organization of African Unity, established in 1963, is to aid and promote decolonization in Africa.

The world's most broadly based and widely publicized forum, the United Nations General Assembly, has also put itself clearly on the anticolonialist side. In 1960 it adopted the "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples". The terms of this resolution [1514 (XV)] merit analysis, since they have characterized the Assembly's proceedings since then. The preamble expresses the belief ". . . that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith". The last phrase was clearly aimed at South Africa. The operative part of the resolution declares that "The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation". A second operative paragraph proclaims the right of all peoples to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development". A third asserts that "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence". Other operative paragraphs call for the cessation of armed action against dependent peoples, and for immediate steps to transfer all powers to the people of nonselfgoverning territories. Finally, the resolution enjoins against attempts to disrupt the national unity and territorial integrity of countries and entreats all states to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of others and to respect the rights of sovereignty. The call to battle could hardly be clearer.

A variety of forces are at work to insure the continuation of these international pressures. First, the leaders of several of the new states, and especially of the African states, feel an extraordinary sense of identification with and commitment toward those still under colonial rule. They have even been willing to take actions harmful to themselves and to their own countries to further the process of decolonization for others. Then too, anticolonialism is one of the few unifying elements both among and within the new states. Further, the Soviet Union and Communist China can be counted on to fan the flames of anticolonialism. The communist countries are by the terms of their political creed strongly opposed to colonialism. Moreover, they find it a convenient issue through which to attack the West and its institutions and policies. The communist countries will not allow the colonial issue to lie dormant, and once it is raised everyone must take a stand, especially the Africans and Asians. Finally, it must be acknowledged that at least some of the anticolonial pressure originates within the

West itself. The United States has a tradition of anticolonialism, and it also has several concrete economic, political and strategic interests in seeing decolonization occur. Moreover, because of competitive co-existence it cannot allow the communist countries to capture the leadership of the anticolonialist movement; it too must at least take the field. Official British colonial doctrine has long been oriented toward independence for many of the territories. Several individuals and groups within Western countries have consistently advocated courses concerning decolonization far more radical than the relatively cautious ones pursued by their governments, thereby prodding their governments to greater venturesomeness. As a consequence of the interplay of all of these forces, special organs have been established within such bodies as the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations with the sole purpose of maintaining the momentum now established, and the very existence of these organs in itself creates another force insuring continued international pressure for decolonization.

For the moment, in many if not most cases the international pressure for decolonization is greater than that within the dependent territories themselves. But one of the intended effects of the international pressures is to stimulate and nourish indigenous nationalist movements. Quite apart from this, it would be difficult to believe that the growth of nationalism, such a pronounced and common feature on the road to modernity, could somehow be avoided in those areas still under colonial rule.

### **Implementing Decolonization—A Source of Conflict**

Meeting the pressure for decolonization is easiest with respect to the oddments of empire, although it is not as simple as it might seem at first glance. Partly the problem is conceptual. Many of these territories hardly seem capable of being independent states, at least as this status has traditionally been understood. They could not by themselves sustain economies that could support any reasonable level of modernity. On the other hand, because of distance, differing ethnic composition or other factors, many of them are unlikely to be offered the opportunity for full and equal integration within their metropolitan countries. How then can decolonization be accomplished? Is there an internationally acceptable solution involving neither full independence nor complete integration?

Since the end of the Second World War efforts have been made to define such a status. The constitutional positions of Martinique, Puerto Rico, Réunion and Surinam are examples. Opinion on the merits of these solutions differs. What is clear is that a sizeable segment of the international community views them with suspicion. As a check against injustice this suspicion could exercise a useful influence.

On the other hand, if carried too far it could foreclose promising solutions. Another possibility is that of trying to weld together several tiny territories, but the British experience in this regard in the West Indies, Malaysia and South Arabia is not encouraging. Creating a sense of loyalty toward the central institutions of a newly independent state is a difficult enough task without the sudden inclusion of new communities. New Zealand has given full independence to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands, but these territories have asked their former metropole to continue to exercise responsibility for their defense and foreign affairs. Perhaps this is a fruitful formula worthy of imitation.

Beyond the conceptual problem, other complicating factors are the believed strategic significance of some of these territories and the fact that some are subject to conflicting claims. Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands or Malvinas illustrate both points. The importance of their location is obvious. Britain's jurisdiction is contested by Spain and Argentina respectively. Even with these difficulties though the probability of the decolonization of any of the oddments of empire leading to serious conflict and violence seems slight indeed.

Aden is already slated for independence and, in terms of the size of their population and territory, New Guinea and Papua could also aspire to that goal. Nevertheless, these three territories raise many of the same problems as the oddments of empire. Further, the population of New Guinea and Papua is incredibly far from modernity. It is impossible to know Indonesia's long-run ambitions, but surely it is plausible that the border between Indonesian administered West Irian and Australian administered New Guinea and Papua could become a scene of confrontation. In these four instances then the potential for serious conflict and violence is greater.

The most serious problems, though, are likely to arise in the southern third of Africa. There is little indication that the Europeans or whites now in command are willing to contemplate any solution even remotely acceptable to the international community or to the black nationalists on the scene. Salazar's Portugal is determined to continue its self-proclaimed civilizing mission in its African territories, which it calls provinces of a unitary state. The unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia's Smith government and the policy of apartheid are signals of the determination of these governments and of the people that support them to maintain their exclusive economic, political and social privileges. Different elites with different policies may come to the fore. If they do not, and if the present elites do not change their views, a most violent clash is possible. Some even see it as inevitable (Ziegler, 1963, 227). Were it to occur, such a clash because of its racial nature could have profound implications for the relations between white and black throughout Africa and even for distant societies such as the United States which aspire to the creation of harmonious racial relations.

## The Role of International Institutions

All of the remaining issues of decolonization have become important items on the agendas of international institutions, and especially of the United Nations. This is in marked contrast to the past. The United Nations was not at all involved in the decolonization of Indochina and was only marginally involved in that of French North Africa. Probably this greater involvement of international institutions is, or could be, an ameliorating factor. In such complicated matters it can be argued that collective judgments are more likely to have wisdom than national ones. Moreover, some within the UN can always be counted on to urge restraint in the employment of violence. Before reaching an optimistic conclusion, however, the reasons for the involvement and its effects should be scrutinized.

One explanation for the greater involvement of international institutions is fortuitous. South West Africa happened to be a mandated territory under the League of Nations, thus there have been legal grounds for discussing this territory in the United Nations and for bringing litigation before the International Court of Justice. In the past, other things being equal, the extent of the involvement of the UN in decolonization has generally varied inversely with the importance of the colony and the strength of the metropole, and the present situation is in accord with this maxim. The oddments of empire are not the most important colonial possessions, and Portugal and South Africa are hardly the most powerful of the administering authorities. Moreover, Britain has generally been more sympathetic than France to the involvement of the UN, and Britain presently has more colonial responsibilities than France. Finally, the United Nations itself has changed. Since 1960 especially, because of the increased membership, it has been much easier to muster an anticolonial majority in the General Assembly (Jacobson, 1965). Starting in 1966, when the Charter amendment went into effect increasing the size of the Security Council and decreasing the relative majority required for a decision there, this also became true for this organ, although the anticolonial preponderance is not as large and the five great powers continue to hold the right of veto. In addition to these changes in the balance of forces, there has also been an increasing anticolonial consensus within the United Nations (Rowe, 1964, 53-73).

## UN—Involvement, Authority and Consequences

Given the explanation for the increased involvement of international institutions in the process of decolonization, the fact that the increase in the scope of activities relating to decolonization has not been matched by an increase in authority should not be surprising. Some might even argue that the authority of international institutions in this sphere has declined. The United Nations has adopted resolu-

tions on Portuguese, Rhodesian, South African and other issues of decolonization despite the opposition or abstention of the only states that could make them effective, namely the major Western powers, and especially the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1962 the General Assembly called for an arms embargo against Portugal, the suspension of the 1961 Rhodesian Constitution and the immediate convocation of a constitutional conference to formulate a new constitution, and a total embargo against South Africa (United Nations General Assembly, Resolutions 1819, 1760, 1761). Compliance with these resolutions has been limited; many states have simply ignored them. Although some states have always done this, the number seems to have increased with the growing militancy of the UN's resolutions since 1960. This is not to say though that the resolutions have had no effect. There is evidence that several states, for example the United Kingdom and the United States and even Portugal and South Africa, while not fully complying with certain resolutions, have modified their conduct because of them (Wohlgemuth, 1963). If one views the concept of authority with subtlety, even this is significant. Whether or not a decision is authoritative is after all determined by those who must implement it, and even a slight shift of policy is an acknowledgement of some authority. If they are pushed too far and too fast, however, the Western powers may not continue to do even this. At the same time, the very dynamics of the situation make it difficult for the anticolonialists to be patient. Inaction or movement at too leisurely a pace could result in a sharp decline of their affection for the United Nations and the growth of a movement oriented toward seeking satisfaction of their demands through other means. Until now, a precarious balance has been maintained within the UN between those with demands and those who hold the keys to action. If this balance were disturbed, it could have serious consequences for the future of the organization.

Another aspect of the effects of the involvement of international institutions in the process of decolonization also needs to be considered. The Portuguese, Rhodesians and South Africans claim that external forces, including the UN, must bear the responsibility for whatever conflict and violence occurs within their territories. Since the local nationalist forces are presently weak and divided, there is an element of truth to this. Moreover, the anticolonialists have sought and still aspire to have the United Nations resort to coercion in circumstances involving little open violence. So far no one within the United Nations has suggested more than economic sanctions and a blockade, the assumption being that these measures would suffice to bring changed policies in the southern third of Africa. The Rhodesian case will provide a test of this assumption, but certainly the history of the application of economic sanctions gives little ground for optimism (Taubenfeld, 1964, 183-206). If economic sanctions were to

fail, there would surely be a demand for stronger measures. Some have already interpreted the UN's actions against Katanga as setting a precedent for the use of force against the white-dominated regimes in the southern third of Africa (Ziegler, 1963, 129). What this would mean, especially for the United Nations itself, is impossible to foresee.<sup>1</sup> A counter argument to those posed by the Portuguese, Rhodesians and South Africans is of course that if the situations in their territories were allowed to run their course undisturbed by external forces, the degree of conflict and violence would ultimately be even greater. Among other things it is argued that racial relations will worsen with the passage of time. More importantly from their point of view, the proponents of change feel that justice is on their side and argue that a certain amount of coercion is often required to correct wrongs.

### Does Decolonization Ease Tension?

It is more difficult accurately to describe the extent to which the formal transfer of political sovereignty involved in decolonization has actually eased the underlying sources of tension which existed in colonial relationships. Opinions on this issue differ greatly. Ghana's ex-President Kwame Nkrumah has argued that neocolonialism has replaced colonialism as "the main instrument of imperialism" (Nkrumah, 1965, ix). According to Nkrumah:

The essence of neocolonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside (Nkrumah, 1965, ix).

The result of neocolonialism, in his view, is the exploitation rather than the development of the less developed parts of the world and a growing economic gap between the rich and the poor states. Although he is never very specific, it is clear that he feels that most of the states of Africa and Asia have fallen prey to neocolonialism. Few leaders of the new states have publicly taken such an extreme position. Most of them place much greater emphasis, importance and value on the political sovereignty that their states have gained. On the other hand, some communists, especially the Chinese, have viewed decolonization even more cynically than Nkrumah. At the other end of the continuum, many policy-makers in Western states feel that they have precious little influence over the policies pursued by several if not most of their country's former wards.

The problem involved is that of relating "political power to political weakness, and economically developed societies to underde-

<sup>1</sup> The practical dimensions of the task though can be analyzed. See the excellent study edited by Amelia C. Leiss, *Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures: An Analysis*. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965.

veloped ones" (Good, 1959, 17). Colonialism provided one solution to this problem, but a solution generally judged to be unacceptable in the mid-Twentieth century. Surely the issue of who had ultimate legal authority was an important explanation for the demise of colonialism, but it was not the only one. Many questions were at stake involving the direction, pace and pattern of the economic, political and social development of the dependent territories and also the nature of their relations with the external world. These are the questions that have to be solved in the post-colonial era.

The nature of the post-colonial relationship between rich and poor states is obviously being determined mainly through bilateral arrangements, or through arrangements with and among limited regional groupings such as the European Economic Community. The extent to which these relationships are considered and discussed and even handled within international organizations with wide memberships, though, is interesting. This relationship was really the core subject of the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and it permeates almost all of the activities of the United Nations and its affiliated agencies. Presumably in this instance too, the involvement of international institutions could be an ameliorating factor. The glare of publicity can limit opportunities for exploitation. Moreover, the rules of the game in the UN and like institutions tend to favor the weaker parties, thus decisions arrived at there are likely to be more responsive to their interests than those arrived at privately *à deux*.

Perhaps the fact that few leaders of the new states have chosen to range themselves with Nkrumah on the issue of neocolonialism can be taken as evidence that the majority of them are presently at least willing to be patient; that they are willing for the moment to observe the evolution of the relationship between the rich and the poor nations without complaining too vociferously. However, the interaction between the seventy-seven self-styled developing states at the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the Western countries indicates that the former definitely have demands which the latter find it difficult to grant. An example is the attitude that the industrial products of the less-developed states should be given preferential treatment in the markets of the industrial states. If in the long run a mutually satisfactory post-colonial relationship cannot be defined, or if the poor become poorer, Nkrumah's position, or that of some communists, could serve as a rallying point for discontent. In either position there are ample grounds for an extremely sharp clash with the West. Here too the future of international institutions is at stake. Nkrumah has already labeled economic aid from the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation and the International Development Association as a "neo-colonialist trap" (Nkrumah, 1965, 242).

To argue then that because the major tasks of decolonization have been completed, the potential of the colonial problem as a source of conflict and violence has been greatly reduced would be too simple a view. To be sure the dimensions of the colonial problem have changed, but broadly defined it still contains possibilities for serious conflict and violence. Some of the remaining issues of decolonization are difficult and so are many of those involved in achieving mutually acceptable post-colonial relationships. On the basis of an analysis of voting patterns within the General Assembly, Bruce M. Russett has concluded that the North-South conflict, which centers around the issues of decolonization and development, "may contain the seeds of an especially bitter quarrel, one that in the long run might not be restrained by world-wide ties even as much as the East-West struggle is now restrained" (Russett, 1965, 101). On the other hand, on the basis of the record thus far established it is possible to hope that these issues will be handled in a relatively peaceful manner within the framework of international institutions. If this is to be the case, all parties will have to exercise skill and restraint, for the record also indicates how close deep conflicts are which could threaten even the existence of the international institutions themselves.

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## **Part II**

# **CHANGING IMAGES OF CONFLICT AND COMMUNITY**

## Changing Images of International Conflict

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Political thinkers and philosophers long have held several different images of international conflict. Some of these basic images or themes have persisted for thousands of years, with only surface variations. Others have developed during the last few centuries, and some are still more recent. Today all of them are confronted with the reality of world-spanning transport and communication and with the accelerating development of potentially world-devastating weapons. All of our major images of international conflict, therefore, are now undergoing reappraisal and reexamination.

### Seven Major Images of War

#### *The Image of Necessity*

One of the oldest images of war is the image of necessity. War, like famine, plague, hailstorm or earthquake, is seen as an inexorable act of God or nature, an event that comes and will come again, in response to the will of a deity or to some processes of nature too vast to be concerned with any acts, desires, hopes or fears of human beings.

This image pictures war as a catastrophe in which human attitudes and emotions are irrelevant. Just as no individuals or peoples can stop Shiva's dance of destruction once it has begun to run its course, so no such act could stop the ride of the Four Horsemen in the Book of Revelations. All that remains for human beings to do is to

bow down and take what fate befalls them and to adjust their minds and souls to its acceptance. In a slightly varied version of the same image, war is still seen as a catastrophe, but now as one sent as divine punishment for some human transgression of divine law or ritual. If war seems to strike down the seemingly just with the unjust, it may still be a punishment for some hidden sin of the former, or else the justice of the deity may be beyond mere human comprehension. In either case, this image once again demands passive acceptance and adjustment.

Still another version of the same image depicts war as desirable and good, in which believers participate enthusiastically and emotionally, for war and all other catastrophes are gigantic testing devices through which a deity—or nature—selects the best of human beings. In some of its religious versions particularly the old Norse and the Moslem religions, the best are selected for salvation after death in some paradise of warriors. In its secularized version such as Social Darwinism, the selection is for survival on earth, if not for best young men—who are more frequently killed off in wars—then at least for their offspring, their relatives or their nations.

Such images of war as a perpetual necessity and a basically beneficial process have been held by theorists ranging from Heraclitus, to Machiavelli and finally to Adolf Hitler. It was Hitler who described nature as "the cruel queen of all wisdom" and saw the German people inescapably committed to an unending Malthusian chain of future world wars for survival.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, if it should turn out that whole nations might perish in war, an extreme version of this image still could picture war as a selection device to bring out the noblest attitudes, actions and emotions within each individual personality and each social group. Men cannot master fate, says Oswald Spengler (1950, and Hughes, 1952) but they can choose the attitude with which they bear it. In this philosophy, war becomes a selection device for styles of histrionics on the stage of history.

<sup>1</sup> For Heraclitus' view of war as "the father of all things", cf. fragment 44, p. 91 in Milton C. Nahm, Ed., *Selections from Early Greek Philosophy*, 34th Edition, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947; Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, Vol I, p. 182; and Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945, 41-42. For Machiavelli, cf. Leo Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. See also Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*. Chap. 14, "The Prince's Duty in Military Matters", tr. by Thomas G. Bergin, New York: F. S. Crofts, 1947, 41-43. See also Jacques Maritain, "The End of Machiavellianism", *Review of Politics*, 1942; and "The Concept of Sovereignty, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 44 (2), June, 1950, 343-357. See also Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, German edition, Munich: F. Eher, 1939; English translation, edition sponsored by John Chamberlain, Sidney B. Fay et al., New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939, see especially 606-610, 888-91, 935-67.

## *The Augustinian and Thomistic Images of Human Weakness and Limited Just Wars*

A second group has an image of war in which war is not a result of the grandeur of God or of nature, but of the weakness of men. For Augustine, as for Thomas Aquinas and for Edmund Burke, man was a weak and limited creature, prone to error and conflict, and burdened with original sin (Augustine, 1948). Where the group, who held to the first image of war, exhorted man to bow down to the divine right of necessity, the second group of thinkers dared, at most, to hope for the limited right of justice. Justice they felt, in so far as men's erring minds could discern it, could turn the secular state from a city of robbers into an orderly city of man and into a fit secular shelter for the city of God on earth, the Church. The Church, Augustine taught, had to help and guide men, both subjects and rulers, to recognize justice and to strive for it, but the reason and conscience of individuals could help them in the same direction. St. Thomas strengthened this stress on reason and by implication stressed the conscience that accepted reason. His doctrine of the single truth asserted that right reason could never lead men astray from truth and from the faith. Even though some matters could not be understood by reason but by faith alone, reason could never contradict faith and, therefore, could be trusted.

St. Thomas' doctrine of the single truth logically leads to his doctrine of the just war. Each war had to be judged in reason and conscience, he suggested, by every Christian. If the war appeared just, it was one's duty to support it; but if the war was unjust, it was to be opposed. It was not consistent with Thomistic philosophy, therefore, for Christians to support patriotically and uncritically all wars fought by their governments.<sup>2</sup> "My country, right or wrong", would have sounded to Aquinas more like the battle cry of a pagan tribe or the slogan of a newly risen Antichrist than a fit sentiment for a prelate of the Church.<sup>3</sup>

To expect men to judge discerningly the justice or injustice of a war, or that of the cause of one or the other side in such a war, required precisely the "curiously darting confidence" of Thomas—as G. K.

<sup>2</sup> For the testimony of an eminent Catholic historian on this point, see Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion*, New York: Macmillan, 1960, 181, 71-72.

<sup>3</sup> The philosophy implicit in these words, from a celebrated toast by Stephen Decatur, was explicitly rejected by John Quincy Adams, who commented: "I disclaim all patriotism incompatible with the principles of eternal justice". (Cited in W. E. Woodward, *A New American History*, New York: Garden City Publishing Co., 1939, 363.) The words themselves, it was reported in 1945, were found by troops of the United States inscribed in German above the main gate of the Nazi concentration camp at Buchenwald. In late 1965, Francis Cardinal Spellman was reported using the words, "right or wrong, my country" as expressing his attitude to the United States military effort in Viet Nam.

Chesterton has called it—in the limited but real powers of human reason and judgment. More timid or conservative thinkers, such as Edmund Burke, would prefer to stress the "weak and giddy" nature of most men.<sup>4</sup> They would then suggest that, in their inability to discern truth or justice, the common people of each country should rest content to leave such judgment to their betters in society, to their ruling classes, such as the nobility, and to the secular governments—even if those governments, at war with each other, should summon their subjects to mutual killing. From this Burkean viewpoint, however, the traditional elites or governments would be expected to resort to war only in a limited fashion, with due regard to justice, or at least to prudence and moderation. In all cases, force and war were to be kept in bounds appropriate to the end sought, and that end always remained the continued living together of many imperfect rulers, governments and populations. Within these limits, recurrent wars might seem inevitable, and at least for one side in each war, they might seem legitimate.

### *The Rationalistic Image of War as Last Resort*

Closely related to the image of recurrent wars as the result of human limitation and error is a third group of images in which war is pictured as a last resort, either of governments in their disputes with one another, or of men confronting their rulers. *Ultima ratio regum*—"the last argument of kings"—was engraved on the cannons of a European king. "As a last means, when nothing else will serve", wrote Friedrich Schiller about man's vindication of his inalienable rights, "the sword is given him".<sup>5</sup>

These images show the intellectual style of naive rationalism, untroubled by any self-criticism of its own perceptions or judgments. The limited right of justice among fallible men is here replaced by their inalienable rights, or else by the divine right of kings or of nations. In any case, it is replaced by rights that in the last emergency can or must be asserted to their full extent by violence or war. The naive rationalist images focus our attention on the legitimacy or necessity of this assertion, leaving its limits to be defined at most by implication. They do imply, to be sure, that force and war are not

<sup>4</sup> G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, New York: Dodd Mead, 1924, London-New York: J. Lane, 1918. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the French Revolution*, London: J. M. Dent, New York: E. P. Dutton, 1955. Cf. also Ross J. S. Hoffmann and Paul Levack, eds. *Burke's Politics*, New York: Knopf, 1949, see 285. For Burke's emphasis on prudence see xxxi-xxxiv.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. the poem by Stephen Spender, "Ultima ratio regum," in R. Eberhard & S. Rodman, Eds., *War and the Poet*, New York: Devin-Adair, 1945, 185-186. Spender's poem attacks the philosophy implied in its title. The citation from Friedrich Schiller is from *Wilhelm Tell*, New York: Macmillan, 1898.

legitimate where they are not an unavoidable last resort, and not necessary to vindicate some essential truth or right. But they pay little attention to the possibility that men could err, and that they could be mistaken about the substance of their asserted right or claim, or else about the supposed necessity to resort to force. The government or parties, who claim to have exhausted all peaceful means to press their cause, may be claiming for their side not only more justice but also more infallibility of judgment than may be warranted in fact.

### *The Optimistic Image of War as Obsolescent*

If rationalism sees war as the last resort of reason or justice against otherwise invincible ignorance or the denial of justice, then a more optimistic version of the same outlook may expect that such unenlightened opposition to righteousness and reason will in time diminish and ultimately disappear. This optimism gives rise to a fourth group of images. These are the images of the obsolescence of war and of organized large-scale violent conflict, and of their eventual disappearance from the affairs of men. Here we find the great and familiar visions of Immanuel Kant (1957) and Alfred Lord Tennyson (1938) of a warless world, brought about by the growth of human consciousness, education and enlightenment. Here we also find in our own century Sir Norman Angell's (1933) hope that men will outgrow war as "the great illusion", Norman Cousin's (1946) hope that nation-bound modern man will perceive himself and his nation-state as "obsolete", and Stanley Hoffmann's (1965) more understated but essentially not less optimistic notion of the possible gradual "atrophy of war" in the last decades of our century.

### *The Image of Transitory Historical Necessity*

A combination of the preceding elements gives rise to the classic Marxist images of war, from Marx and Engels to Lenin and Mao Tse Tung. In the thought of these theorists, war among feudal or capitalist regimes is a historical necessity, due to the relative backwardness and error inherent in these social systems. With economic, social and intellectual development socialism becomes technologically and politically possible. It becomes a vital interest of a growing international working class. In country after country a new kind of struggle, the struggle for the abolition of capitalism and for socialism, is expected to follow. In most countries, according to this classic Marxist theory, this struggle is expected to be a violent revolution, or a revolutionary war waged in order to establish or spread the new order or to defend it against the expected attacks of the counter-revolution of the ruling classes. During the same period, according to some versions of the

theory, vast wars will break out among the capitalist countries, but these wars will offer added opportunities to the proletariat and to the Marxist parties to transform these wars into struggles to overthrow some of the capitalist regimes and put communist ones in their place. Such conflicts, civil wars and wars—particularly those for the establishment of the new Socialist or Communist regimes—are held to be inevitable at this stage of history, but this age of violence is then to lead to a new socialist era of history in which the main economic, social and psychological motives for war will disappear. Out of the age of wars and revolutions will come, according to this view, a warless world and indeed a world free from all large-scale social conflict and organized repression. In this image of the world, revolutionary violence now will lead to universal peace and harmony later.

This view may crucially underestimate the destructiveness of modern weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. It may also underestimate the complexities of international politics among a plurality of nationally based Communist regimes. Such a plurality of Communist countries has existed for nearly two decades, and no war has in fact occurred between any two such countries. It may even be conceded that the Marxist system of beliefs would make a conflict among Socialist countries unexpected, illegitimate, and on the whole less probable. In recent years, however, the evidence from the USSR and Communist China has by no means been conclusively against the possibility of a conflict occurring at some time in the future.<sup>6</sup> The divine right of historical necessity, as it can be glimpsed in some versions of this Marxist view, seems more likely to encourage militant conflict behavior now than to guarantee a long-run peaceful future. Moreover, by involving such grand prospects of future peaceful rewards for present violence, the Marxist imagery has seriously contributed to the rise of totalitarian or quasi-totalitarian ideologies of "holy wars" and "last battles" in our century.

### *The Images of Armageddon and the Manichean Heresy*

The images in this sixth group are based on two themes which are combined in varying proportions. One theme is that of a holy war of

<sup>6</sup> For recent examples of Chinese Communist thinking along these lines, see *Jen-min jih pao* and *Hung-ch'i*, Editorial Department, "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace—Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (5)", translated in *Peking Review*, VI. No. 47 (November 27, 1963), 6-16, reprinted under the title "The Fantasy of a Warless World", Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *Toward a Strategy of Peace*, New York: Rand-McNally, 1965, 78-103. I am indebted to Mr. Clemens for help in completing this reference. Also Cf. documents in Clemens, Ed. *op. cit.*, and *World Perspectives on International Politics*, Boston: Little Brown, 1965. For a broader discussion, see also Marshall D. Shulman, *Beyond the Cold War*, New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1966.

good against evil. The other theme is that of a last battle of good against evil, in which evil finally and forever will be defeated.

The theme of a holy war is old. It is recurrent in the Old Testament whose views on the wars of the Israelites, fighting with the aid of the Almighty against unbelievers, are, as A. J. Toynbee once put it, "very clear and very savage". The same theme is made general and absolute in the Zoroastrian religion of ancient Persia, which saw a deity of goodness and light, Ahuramazda, locked in everlasting combat with a deity of evil and darkness, Ahriman. Men could only choose their side in this inexorable struggle; but those who believed themselves fighting for the good and for the side of light could then perceive their adversaries as the servants of the forces of darkness and smite them with pitiless enthusiasm.

Much of this imagery recurred in the Manichean heresy of the first centuries of the Christian era. The followers of the teachings of Mani believed that evil was just as substantial, strong and enduring as good and that the world was a perpetual battleground between God and the Devil, who appeared evenly matched. The Manicheans thus saw their adversaries as tools or incarnations of Satan, and so they could struggle against them in an exalted mood of mingled pessimism, self-glorification and self-righteousness. Manicheanism thus was a doctrine of eternal conflict in which men could deify their own side and themselves and at the same time Satanize their opponents. Seeing themselves as instruments of God and their adversaries as tools of Satan, they felt little need to see themselves and their enemies as men, imperfect, fallible, with good and bad traits intermingled and much in need of humility, self-doubt, kindness and compassion.

Just these aspects of man, which Manicheanism slighted, were implicit in the thought of St. Augustine who denied that evil had any substance of a kind comparable to good. A shadow, the Saint reasoned, is nothing more than the absence of light and not a beam of "black light" cast by any "source of darkness". Likewise, a hole is the absence of matter not the presence of any "negative matter". Similarly, as Augustine saw it, evil was nothing more than the absence of good. It was certainly real, as shadows or holes are real, but it had no substance or powers of its own comparable to those of good. In modern terms, Augustine might have compared evil to a deficiency disease, caused by the absence of some needed vitamin or other nutrient, and not by the presence of any poison or hostile organism. This view leads to the Augustinian and Thomist view set forth in an earlier section: of possible just wars within limits, of the likelihood of some evil being intermingled even on the side of goodness or justice, and of the ever-present need for moderation, self-criticism, realism and compassion.

Across the centuries, these alternative intellectual positions have persisted. Despite many and important intellectual differences some-

thing of the Augustinian and Thomist tradition lives on in the thought of Albert Camus, Winston Churchill and of such contemporary writers on international conflict as Reinhold Niebuhr, Jacques Maritain, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Kenneth Thompson and Arnold J. Toynbee.<sup>7</sup>

The Manichean view of conflict has flourished more strongly. Islam, it seems, brought to the world from the seventh century onward the concept of the *jehad*, the Holy War against the infidels. From the eleventh century, Western Christendom developed its own form of the *jehad* or Holy War in its Crusades. With the spread of mass armies and mass politics from the age of the French Revolution onward, there also spread the tendency to see one's own side, country or ideology as endowed with quasi-religious sanctity and to ascribe to one's adversaries unrelieved Satanic evil. By the time of the First World War, Satanism had become a standard technique of war propaganda for depicting enemies, and the collective self-worship of one's own side was not far behind (Lasswell, 1965 & Wright, 1965).

In the Second World War, these traits culminated in the quasi-paranoia of Nazism; however, similar though weaker psychological tendencies also appeared on the Allied side. How they contributed there to the gradual acceptance by public opinion of the previously abhorred practice of area bombing of cities and civilian populations, culminating in the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, is recounted in Robert Batchelder's book, *The Irreversible Decision* (1962).

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Manichean view of political conflict also became associated with political ideologies. Liberals and Abolitionists saw themselves as fighters for Light and Goodness against Darkness and Evil. So they were shown in Julia Ward Howe's *Battle Hymn of the Republic*, and in the liberal poems of Ferdinand Freiligrath in 1848. From the last third of the nineteenth

<sup>7</sup> See Albert Camus, *Resistance, Rebellion and Death*. New York: Knopf, 1961, esp. "Pessimism and Courage", 57-60, and "The Unbeliever and Christians", 67-74. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. New York: Scribner, 1955, and *The Structure of Nations and Empires*. New York: Scribner, 1959. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*. 3rd Edition. New York: Knopf, 1964. George Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, Ch. 6, "Diplomacy in the Modern World", Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951, 91-103; Cf. also Kennan, *Totalitarianism in the Modern World* in Carl J. Friedrich, Ed., *Totalitarianism*, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1954, New York: Grossett & Dunlop, Universal Library, 1964, 17-31. Kenneth Thompson, *Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics*, Ch. 4, "The Limits of Principle in International Politics: Necessity and the New Balance of Power", Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 12 vols. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1935-1961, and especially the excerpts collected in A. J. Toynbee, *War and Civilization*, selected by A. V. Fowler from "A Study of History", Oxford University Press, 1950.

century on, the Socialist and Labor movements took up the same themes, with the same unhesitating identification of themselves as the children of light and their opponents as the incarnations or servants of darkness.

In all these political movements a second theme was added, the theme of the "last battle". Julia Ward Howe's *Battle Hymn* took some of its chief symbols from the Book of Revelations.<sup>8</sup> Freiligrath's poem "The Battle at the Birch Tree" is a vision of the final battle of the forces of goodness and the liberal West, including liberal Germany, against the forces of darkness and the—then—conservative East, notably including Russia. The Armageddon symbol recurred in the liberal rhetoric of Theodore Roosevelt and, on a larger scale, of Woodrow Wilson, whose appeal for "a war to end war" combined the symbols of the last battle and of a crusade. From 1878 on, followers of Socialist—and later also Communist—parties in many countries would sing the "International" with its vision "C'est la lutte finale . . ." (" . . . and the last fight let us face . . .") and its promise that ". . . et demain l'international sera le genre humain" ("tomorrow the international will be mankind").

The themes of the sacred war and the last fight were then echoed and reechoed in many other songs of the continental European labor movement, and they reached the peak of emotional commitment in the imagery and ideology of the various Communist movements and parties. At the same time they also reached there the peak of potential intolerant self-righteousness and of the rejection of any need for doubt or pity. Pitilessness against "traitors"—which might be no more than ideological or political dissenters or "deviationists"—became a specific theme in some of the leftist songs in the Spanish Civil War, just as it became a strident theme in the bloody purges of the Stalin era. Communist parties and regimes have retained much of this political Manicheanism to this day, and with it they have retained its dangerous link of self-glorification with the devil image of one's adversaries and, perhaps even, of all dissenters. Purges and splits within parties and countries and the tendency toward lasting ideological divisions among the Communist regimes of different countries have been the result, at least in the sense, of the built-in intolerance, fanaticism and self-righteousness of the Manichean imagery shared by many Communists. This has tended to aggravate any disagreements among them, in some cases possibly beyond repair.

Since the end of World War II and the coming of the Cold War, many anti-Communists in the West have adopted much of the Manichean imagery of the Communists, only with inverted value signs.

<sup>8</sup> "Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord, He is trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored. . . ." Cf. *Revelations*, 14: 19-20, 19: 15, etc.

Now it is anti-Communism that is held to represent *ipso facto* the cause of goodness, truth and light and that spreads an aura of sanctity to all its allies, however dictatorial—from Generalissimo Franco to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek—their governments may be. And it is Communism, of course, of whatever variety, that is now seen as unrelieved evil and the cause of Hell. Moreover, whoever lags, doubts, falters or dissents in this sacred struggle may well be tainted with evil. Extreme anti-Communists and Communists agree in suspecting treason in every instance of dissent. With this adoption of the Manichean imagery comes, of course, the adoption of its weaknesses: rigidity and self-righteousness of outlook, suspicion of diversity, the incapacity to keep many genuine allies and to maintain for long the unity of any broad coalition. It is worth bearing in mind that the most effective leaders of the West against the challenge of Communism have had little or no use for such Manichean images.

The divine right of ideology is no less dangerous and obsolete today than the divine right of kings. In the age of nuclear weapons, Manichean images of politics might well point the way to mutual suicide for any parties to a major international conflict. Different, more flexible and effective images of conflict are needed. Some images of this kind are now being developed from the viewpoint of communication and control.

### *The Image of War as Failure of Control*

The writers and poets were the first to explore the image of war as a failure of control; however, only the philosophers could begin to sort out its implications and to pursue them to their consequences. G. K. Chesterton used words that could apply to many a dispute between the globe-girdling political ideologies of the 1960's when he spoke of the ideological conflict between certain interpretations of science and religion in his day as "the clash between two very impatient forms of ignorance" (1918). Matthew Arnold saw man in the world "as on a darkling plain . . . where ignorant armies clash by night" (1949).

The image of the blind collision is sometimes combined with a perception of some underlying unity of the clashing forces. Two armies fighting each other, wrote the French writer Henri Barbusse in World War I, "are one great army committing suicide" (Barbusse, 1928).

The conception implicit in such images is that of some interdependent system within which control has failed in regard to some crucial interactions, and violent conflict has arisen as a result of this failure.

The implications of this concept of an interdependent system in which control has failed can be stated more precisely. It requires, first

of all, a high degree of interdependence between at least two actors, such that the actions of at least one of them makes a significant difference to the outcomes of some important actions of the other. And, it presupposes, in the second place, a time lag in the actual performance of control, or a lack of ability in one or the other actor, for the level of control required for the continued smooth functioning of the larger system (Deutsch, 1954, 1963).

This failure of control may occur at the level of the subsystem or the actor. A collision will occur if there is a failure of the steering mechanism of a car or of the navigation of a ship. The failure can even occur at the level of the larger system. This would produce an "irrational conflict system out of rational components" such as a frustrating jam made up of cars with purposeful drivers or the great economic depression of 1929. A mathematical and experimental example of classic simplicity for this phenomenon is found in the "Prisoners' Dilemma" game, in which the most rational individual decisions of the two players who make up the system result only in conflict and penalties for both of them. They can avoid this outcome only by coordinating their behavior at the level of the larger system which consists of both of them together. From this viewpoint, Anatol Rapoport's important theoretic and experimental studies of the "Prisoners' Dilemma" can be considered as evidence of the success or failure of the players in achieving joint control and coordination of their actions. Overt conflict between them is the result of their failure to achieve that coordination.

Failure to achieve or maintain adequate control in the larger system then means that at least one actor finds himself confronting at least one specific frustrating partner—now become an adversary—or a more general frustrating environment, now perceived as hostile. Power or Force are then likely to be resorted to by the threatened or frustrated actor. Efforts to threaten, to compel or to use outright violence represent his attempts at escape from or damage control in, an intolerable situation in which the injured, frustrated or threatened actor cannot continue without what seems to him even more severe damage to his material or psychic self-system. Where control failed in forestalling the intolerable situation, force and violent conflict may yet serve to resolve it. They may modify the environment and overcome obstacles or opposing actors, until a more tolerable situation has been reached, or they may at least be expected by the actor to accomplish this result. Even if violence should fail to produce any significant change in the environment of the actor, it may reduce some disequilibrium within his own acting system and thus relieve his inner tensions. Psychiatrists are familiar with this function of violence in relieving the inner tensions of individuals in the behavior patterns sometimes called "*Abreaction*" or "*cathexis*".

The behavior of nation-states in international politics may show

some limited similarities to these phenomena. A nation-state often finds itself driven by its own inner structure and processes to seek a certain relation with another state, or with its larger international environment—a relation in which some inner disequilibrium or tension would be lessened. This is called its *goal*. The inner tension or disequilibrium driving the nation-state and its government to seek to attain this goal in the international arena may arise from tension between different interest groups, between different economic reward mechanisms, between contradictory elements in its prevailing political imagery and ideology or from some combinations of all these. If the nation-state cannot control its own internal political processes sufficiently to stop this drive toward a goal situation in foreign policy which this nation-state is unlikely to attain or preserve without violence, and if this nation-state is at the same time unable to control its environment sufficiently to permit the nonviolent attainment of the national foreign policy goal to which it has become committed, then a situation of intense national frustration, mounting domestic political pressures and finally violent international conflict is likely to ensue.

What causes conflicts in such situations, according to this image, is a triple failure of control. First, there is a failure at the level of the international system to maintain a state of affairs in which nation-states can pursue without violent international conflict their probable goals—that is those goals which they are likely to choose and to pursue. Second, there is a failure on the part of at least one of the nation-states within the system to control its environment sufficiently so as to reach its goal without violent conflict. And third, there is a failure on the part of the same nation-state to control its own domestic-political processes and to modify its own foreign policy goals and strategies so that violent international conflict would be avoided.

In this image of war—and generally of prolonged large-scale violent conflict—such a failure of control would lead to several predictions. It predicts that, if other things are equal, the intensity or duration of violence in a conflict will increase the greater the interdependence between the contending parties. Conversely, other things being equal, the probability or intensity of violent conflict between two nations, groups or persons could be reduced by reducing their material or psychic interdependence, that is, the amount and/or importance of the matter-energy transactions, communication flows or memories that connect them.

Another prediction is that violence will become more likely as the tasks, burdens or difficulties of control increase. If other things remain equal, any substantial increase in the speed, complexity, or variability of transactions, or in any other loads upon the limited control capabilities of the participants will increase the chances of some failure of control, and hence the chances of violent conflict. Correspondingly,

and again other things being equal, any decline in the steering and control facilities and capabilities of any relevant participant in the system will have the same effect of making war more likely.

According to this image, the crucial relation is that between the tasks or burdens of control, if violence is to be avoided, and the capabilities for such control at any relevant point in the system. If a critical gap between limited control capabilities and varying control tasks is to be avoided, it may seem rational to centralize control capabilities as much as possible at what seems to be the most important point, and to hope that the control burdens will not reach a critical level at any other point. This may be the basis of many of the proposals for political centralization, limited world government, a world police force and the like.<sup>9</sup> Such schemes often beg a decisive question. They assume that controls will not break down at any other crucial point in the international system and particularly not in regard to the policies of any major national state or world region.

A related fallacy is the belief that the maintenance of peace requires a monopoly of force in the hands of a single government or central authority.<sup>10</sup> No such monopoly of force existed for several centuries in the Swiss Confederation, nor for the United States from 1790 to 1860, nor for Scandinavia since 1815. Only a plurality of cantonal forces existed for a long time in Switzerland; only several national forces exist in Scandinavia; and the state militia forces in the United States long remained much stronger than the Federal army. Yet peace was kept in each of these political systems for prolonged periods, and long enough to let the Swiss and the American community each become sufficiently consolidated to withstand later challenges. What counts is not whether control facilities are monopolized or centralized, but whether they are adequate to the burden of coping with the relevant transactions, and thus of avoiding or preventing war (Deutsch, 1957). The ecology of international conflict depends on this balance between burdens and controls, overall and at every critical point in the international system, and in each of the major national actors within it.

### The Changing Ecology of International Conflict

During the 20th century, there has been a rising trend in the burden placed upon the control capabilities of national governments and

<sup>9</sup> For an early example, see Emery Reves. *The Anatomy of Peace*. New York-London: Harper, 1945. For a far more careful and in many ways impressive scheme, see Grenville Clark & Louis Sohn, *World Peace through World Law*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ Press, 1958.

<sup>10</sup> For a recent discussion of this view, and for the evidence of the relevant actual facts of United States history, see Ronald Spector. "Force and Nation-Building", unpublished draft, Yale University, 1966.

of the international system. About 0.75 per cent of the population of many developing countries has been shifting each year from traditionalism, rural isolation and political apathy into the sector of the socially mobilized population and into its potentially politically relevant strata. By now the politically relevant strata usually includes well above the majority of the population in the highly developed countries, and the developing countries are moving over the next few decades toward similar levels of potential and actual political participation. Between 1900 and 1913, the attitudes and feelings of perhaps 200 million people had to be taken into account in international politics. This was perhaps five or ten times as many as had to be taken into account in 1815 or 1820, but it was only perhaps one-quarter of the politically relevant populations—about 1 billion scattered from Pakistan to Nigeria, Cyprus and China—whose mass attitudes and actions have at least a potential effect on world politics and international peace today. The order of magnitude of the tasks of political control may thus have risen by as much as a factor of five in the last half century, and it may still double or treble during the next.<sup>11</sup>

A consideration of the much smaller fractions of the politically active populations—those whom Ithiel Pool once called the “activists” and whom he put in the United States at about 3 per cent of the population—leads to a similar perspective. In 1815 the politically active fraction of the population was perhaps no more than 0.5 per cent of a world population of about 500 million, or a total of perhaps 2.5 million persons—even if distance had not separated many of them effectively from each other. In 1900, perhaps less than 2 per cent of a world population of 1,500 million were politically active, or a total of 30 million—far too many, it seems, to permit the national governments and the almost nonexistent international institutions of the time to prevent the outbreak of World War I. In the world of 1966, perhaps 3 per cent are politically active in some way, out of a world population of over 3,100 million. This is a total of over 90 million political activists, and it indicates a broadening and diversification of the basic political elites of the world. It quite possibly might mean a proportional expansion of the top elites of the world, and this might turn out to be far beyond what our national and international instruments of effective political communication and control can manage.

At the same time, improvement in transport and weaponry have increased the strategic interdependence of the world far beyond its economic, cultural and social interdependence, and still farther beyond the capacities of national states to respond adequately and peaceably to the urgent messages, demands and needs of their neighbors.

<sup>11</sup> For partial data on relevant rates of change, see K. W. Deutsch, “Social Mobilization and Political Development”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55 (3), September 1961, 493-514; and Bruce M. Russett, et al. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964.

Interdependence has been outstripping responsiveness among nations and populations, at least temporarily; and narrowly power-oriented psychological interdependence has outstripped the broader and varied forms of interdependence in economics, society and culture.

At the same time, the rising levels of social mobilization and political participation in many countries have led to steadily rising costs of foreign intervention. Countries are getting harder to govern, even from within, and very much harder to occupy and govern from abroad.

All this produces an increasing sense of a loss or lack of control among many elite members particularly in the old and formerly well-established elites, and even more so perhaps among some of the new entrants into such elites who now are finding their new positions so much less powerful and secure than they had imagined. Some militant neoconservatives among the first and second generation industrialists and financiers in the South and West of the United States may be examples of this trend; and so may be, in a very different context, some militant members of the new elites of Communist China.

Anxiety, disappointment and frustration often breed resentment and an aggressive mood and cast of mind. It is with such a cast of mind that many elite members—and indeed large sections of the population in some countries—are turning to the old images of conflict, so as to find there some reassuring picture of their own situation and some simple directives upon which to act. Some of them will select images that lead to war. Others are retaining or adopting images that may lead to actions that may promote peace. What contrasts and alignments, what coalitions and what strategies of peace can be expected to develop in such a situation?

### **Images of Conflict and Possible Strategies of Peace**

Our age of mass mobilization and mass anxiety has produced attempts at escapism and denial of the threat of war on the part of many individuals in all strata, but it has also produced among several significant and influential minorities an increased acceptance of war-promoting images of international—and sometimes interracial—conflict.

The virtual coalition of war-promoting images has several components. It includes the traditional images of war as necessity, either as an inevitable pseudo-Darwinian or Malthusian process of selection, or else in somewhat rarer versions a fundamentalist imagery of war, as recurrently ordained by God. The holders of such images are joined by dogmatic believers in naive rationalism, who hold that the world needs federal world government, or free private enterprise, or some other institution which they consider reasonable, and who now may think of war as a last resort to impose it on the benighted and unwilling popu-

lation of some foreign country. A variant of this image is the notion that foreign populations have no will and desires of their own, but will fall, like rows of dominoes, in the direction of the stronger and more determined push. A more inspiring-looking version is supplied by the members of various dogmas that exalt war now as a transitory historical necessity, and who summon their believers to a last battle in a war to end war, or to make the world safe for democracy, or for dogmatic Communism, depending on the details of each particular doctrine. These views then culminate in the quasi-Manichean images of Armageddon and the last battle between Good and Evil—images which may be held or temporarily adopted by many anxious individuals, not so much because they are looking forward to living to see the final victory of the Elect, or the side of Light, but because they derive from their imaginary or real participation in the struggle a sense of their own personal worth, affiliation and identity.

What of the possible coalitions among the holders of potentially peace-promoting images?

This coalition would be even more variegated. In the advanced countries of the West, it would notably include the Augustinian and Thomistic believes in the weakness and fallibility of men, who would distrust the claim that any human government was quite wise and righteous enough to take its people and the world on any road of escalation toward total war. To be an Augustinian or Thomistic Christian is to be an antiescalationist. Believers in other great world religions, stressing both man's worth and his limitations, are likely to oppose escalation and total war for similar reasons.

In the same coalition are likely to be the modern humanists and agnostics, if they are realistic enough to believe that all-out war is obsolescent, and optimistic enough to think that man is not. Side by side with them we may find nondogmatic thinkers from both sides of the Cold War, including Marxists who are willing to believe that something decisive has changed with the coming of nuclear weapons and that all men, of whatever ideology or class, now have added to their old conflicting interests a new common interest in physical and cultural survival.

Finally, this coalition is likely to be joined by many social scientists. Whatever their preferred theoretical approach, and whether they are dealing with the psychology of individuals or groups or with the political behavior of governments or nations, most social scientists feel that man must increase greatly and rapidly his capabilities for understanding, communication, organization, control and self-control if his history is to continue. It is a major task of social scientists to do all they can to contribute to this growth in social, political and human capabilities. It is also their task, as it is the task of all men of good will to resist escalation toward all-out war and to make sure that man-

kind is given time enough to grow up to the point where he can control his conflicts and his fate.

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## The Growth of Transnational Participation

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A fruitful concept is one subsuming data that need to be held together if one is to make valid generalizations. This does not mean that the bundle of data thus held together always has the same consequences. Take the concept of bureaucracy, for instance. There has been much dispute about the effects of what we call bureaucracy, and we now believe that under certain conditions it has one set of effects, under other conditions another set. But few would deny that it is a useful concept because it puts together a cluster of relationships that is central to modern complex societies.

### Transnational Participation

Transnational participation is a concept that will probably have increasing fruitfulness as communication and transportation draw the world closer together. In trying to isolate the right set of phenomena to be conceptualized, the importance of the idea of crossing national borders is obvious; but it is not at all obvious what set of relationships among persons from different nations needs to be specified. The term participation is designed to draw upon the work of the social psychologists who have found that certain kinds of relationships have much more profound influence on the value-orientations of the actors than others. These relationships are of two sorts: (a) those in which there is necessary collaboration in achieving common objectives, and (b)

those in which there is an intimate living together. In the former the participants have a specific, in the latter, a diffuse relationship. In both the interaction is close. If these relationships have been established voluntarily, the result is usually some convergence of the value-orientations of the participants. If, on the other hand, the participants find themselves together involuntarily, the consequence may be hostility and divergence. In either case the effect is profound. Thus, the concept of transnational participation draws together data on relationships across borders that are fateful one way or the other.

This definition of transnational participation excludes much that could be termed transnational experience. The brief and fleeting contacts of the tourist, for instance, are omitted. A *fortiori*, distance communication through the mass media or via school textbooks is not included. Even international trade is beyond the pale unless the traders are functioning in some non-contractual grouping. And if they are, it is that grouping, not their trade, that makes them transnational participants.

A concept is developed because it is useful in thinking about a problem—either practical or scientific. Transnational participation is useful for both reasons. It is relevant to the problem of attaining world peace, since it refers to the intimate connection for good or ill of citizens of the units that make war, the nation-states. It is significant scientifically because sociologists are becoming interested in intersystem relations at all levels—interinstitutional as well as intermetropolitan and intersocietal. Participation across system boundaries is therefore a phenomenon in need of conceptualization. Transnational participation can become a subconcept under the broader term, intersystem participation.

From the standpoint of intersystem conflict or cooperation there are two central questions to be asked about any form of intersystem participation: (a) What are the effects on the connected systems? and (b) Is the participation growing or shrinking? I am investigating both of these questions for the transnational case, but I am here presenting material only on the second question. These data are of course, inconclusive for both the practical problem of peace and the theoretical problem of intersystem accommodation without data on the first question, but as trend data they have interest because they describe what is going on in the world.

The six categories of transnational participation that follow are not the fruit of theoretical analysis but are simply those in which existing statistical series are gathered. One category that is important is not represented. This is residence abroad in military service. So far, we have been unable to unearth reliable figures on which trend analysis could be based. Since for several of the categories adequate statistics have only recently been tabulated, the trends are those of the last

decade. The time span covered varies, but the figures for different categories are made comparable by computing the rate of increase compounded annually.

### *Participation—By Renewing Family Ties*

Perhaps the oldest and the simplest form of transnational participation is the visiting of relatives and friends abroad. Human migration must always have been followed by the desire to renew old ties. With the explosion outward of European populations in the nineteenth century and the ability to pay for transportation in the twentieth this form of participation has mushroomed. The only adequate statistics on the subject, however, come from the United States. Fortunately they cover movement in both directions.

The Aviation Department of the Port of New York Authority made a study of all passengers departing for overseas from its international airport (then Idlewild) in 1956-57. The study was repeated in 1963-64. The data are broken down in two ways—by American or foreign residence of the passenger and by European or Bermuda-Latin American destination. We have chosen to utilize data on both American and foreign residents because transnational participation is a two-way street, but have utilized only the Europe-bound trips because we wished to adjust the figures to include those going by ship, and such figures are more reliable for transatlantic than for other voyages.

The adult passengers in a carefully designed sample of all outbound trips filled out questionnaires about themselves and their trips. They were asked the reasons for their journey and these were coded into eleven categories. One was visiting relatives and friends.

Since roughly two-thirds of all transatlantic flights from the United States originate in New York, we assume that the proportions of all transatlantic air travelers going to or returning from visits to relatives and friends will be much the same as those given by the Port of New York Authority. It is, of course, much more risky to assume that the same proportions hold for transatlantic passengers going by sea. Since, however, there are no data on the reasons for the sea voyages, we make that assumption as better than any other. The number of air and sea passages to Europe are compiled annually by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. It is unimportant that the Service distinguishes between Americans and foreigners on the basis of citizenship rather than residence (which was used by the Port of New York Authority).

The proportion of New York transatlantic departures of American residents for the purpose of visiting relatives and friends in 1956-57 was 28%. Of foreign residents returning from visits in the United States it was 15%. In 1963-64 the corresponding figures were 29% and

TABLE 1  
TRANSATLANTIC TRAVEL TO VISIT RELATIVES AND FRIENDS

Means	American Citizens Going to Visit in Europe				Foreign Citizens Returning from Visits in the United States			
	1956-57	1963-64	Number	Increase or (Decrease)	1956-57	1963-64	Number	Increase or (Decrease)
			Per Cent				Per Cent	
By air	93,481	276,790	183,309	196.1	16,291	141,416	125,125	768.1
By sea	66,793	63,453	(3,340)	(5.0)	19,651	36,601	18,950	86.3
Total	160,274	340,243	179,969	112.3	35,952	178,017	142,075	398.1

27%. If these percentages are applied to all air and sea departures from the United States in the two years we get Table 1.

The 112.3% increase in seven years for American citizens amounts to a yearly rate of increase of 14% (compounded). The greater increase for aliens of 398.1% for the same period yields a rate of increase of 25.8% per year. This rapid rise undoubtedly reflects the fact that the economic recovery of Europe is allowing older Europeans to visit relatives and friends in the United States who migrated before the onset of the Great Depression. Americans have been able to afford the reverse journey since World War II. Though the numbers visiting in Europe are still almost twice the numbers visiting in the United States, the disproportion is decreasing rapidly. If the trends shown were to continue (which is unlikely) the two movements would balance in the year of 1967. A point that is interesting, but irrelevant for our purposes, is that foreigners continue to use sea travel more than citizens of the United States.

### ***Participation—By Conducting Business***

The second category of transnational participation on which we have data is sojourn abroad for business reasons. These data too are drawn from the two studies of the Port of New York Authority. We have attempted to include only sojourns that involve organic ties with business enterprises or businessmen abroad by omitting those who were coded as traveling to attend a convention or fair or those traveling for business and pleasure combined.

As in the case of visiting relatives and friends abroad we have extrapolated the percentages for both Americans and foreigners leaving the New York International Airport to all those leaving by sea and air from the United States for Europe. These percentages were 19% for Americans and 30% for aliens in 1956-57. In 1963-64 the corresponding figures were 20.4% and 26.6%. Table 2 gives the estimated number of businessmen sojourning abroad in each of the two years.

In this case the rates of increase are quite similar in both directions, that for the United States citizens amounting to a compound increase of 11.9% a year and for the foreign citizens one of 13.5%. The volume of travel of the United States citizens is not very much greater than that of the foreigners. This is a little surprising in view of the much greater United States investments in Europe than of European countries in the United States. Perhaps it is explained, in part, by the employment of foreign nationals as managers by American companies operating abroad.

The term sojourn perhaps aptly describes what is involved in most business trips. The stays are short. The involvement in the other country may be minor. It, therefore, becomes important to ask what are the

TABLE 2  
TRANSATLANTIC TRAVEL FOR BUSINESS REASONS OTHER THAN ATTENDANCE AT A CONVENTION OR FAIR

Means	American Citizens Going to Europe				Foreign Citizens Returning from the United States			
	1956-57	1963-64	Number	Increase or (Decrease)	1956-57	1963-64	Number	Increase or (Decrease)
By air	63,433	194,719	131,286	207.0	32,582	139,215	106,633	327.3
By sea	45,324	44,636	(688)	(1.5)	39,301	36,059	(3,242)	(8.2)
Total	108,757	239,355	130,598	120.1	71,883	175,274	103,391	143.8

TABLE 3  
DURATION OF TRIPS OF TRANSATLANTIC TRAVELERS FOR BUSINESS PURPOSES

Duration	American Citizens Going to Europe				Foreign Citizens Returning from the United States			
			Increase				Increase	
	1956-57	1963-64	Number	Per Cent	1956-57	1963-64	Number	Per Cent
Less than one year	97,881	216,377	118,496	121.1	70,445	168,088	97,643	138.6
More than one year	10,876	22,978	12,102	111.8	1,438	7,186	5,748	399.7
Total	108,757	239,355	130,598	120.1	71,883	175,274	103,391	143.8

trends so far as long periods of residence are concerned. Since the duration of actual stay in the case of foreigners returning home and of expected stay in the case of natives is recorded in the Port of New York Authority surveys, we have constructed Table 3 to show the trends in stays of less than and more than one year. Here we note that both types of stays for both United States and foreign citizens are increasing rapidly but that increase is most rapid for long-term stays of foreigners and least for long-term stays of Americans. If we call the long-term stays residence abroad in contrast to sojourn, the rates of increase per year are as follows:

Residence of Americans abroad:	11.6%
Sojourn of Americans abroad:	12.0%
Sojourn of foreigners in the United States:	13.2%
Residence of foreigners in the United States:	25.8%

Although the numbers involved in the residence of foreigners in the United States for business purposes are small, the rate of increase is surprisingly large. It is a curious fact that it is almost identical with the rate of increase of foreigners visiting relatives and friends in this country. It would seem to be true that transatlantic transnational participation is becoming a more balanced process than it has been in the past.

A word of caution is in order about extending the findings on transatlantic visiting and business to the whole globe. Both series would undoubtedly show sharp increases in many parts of the world, but whether the rates would be increasing in all parts of the world as fast as they are across the Atlantic seems doubtful. Per capita income is not increasing as rapidly in most other parts of the world. Nor are there as many ties of relationship and business enterprise.

### ***Participation—By Study Abroad***

For our third category of transnational participation—residence abroad for study—we do not have to rely on data from the United States alone, but can turn to the world data set forth in the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook for 1963. Unfortunately the data there are quite incomplete. For many countries the data on foreign students either have not been collected or have not been reported to UNESCO. Table 15, for instance, shows the total number of students in the institutions of the third level (higher education) for 125 countries, but Table 17 which records the number of foreign students, gives data for only 75 countries. And for only 45 of these 75 can good trend data be obtained; that is, a comparison of 1955 with 1961 (or in a few cases 1960).

Before looking at the trends for these 45 countries it is important to indicate to what degree they can be regarded as representative of

the world trend. First, one can estimate roughly the percentage of all students studying abroad. From Table 15 we learn that in 1961 there were 13,012,996 students in the institutions of higher education of the 125 countries. More than 61% of these were in the 45 countries for which we have trend data. The other 80 countries in the table contributed under 39% of the total.

The most damaging omission from the standpoint of knowing the world picture is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It had 2,639,900 students in its institutions of higher education in 1961, the second largest number for any country. Foreign students are perhaps 1% of this total, or 26,400. Other important omissions are the Chinese Peoples Republic and the Philippines, each with nearly 300,000 students in higher education, and Argentina with nearly 200,000. If the rate of increase in foreign students in these four countries is sharply different from that in the 45 countries for which we have trend data, the latter may be misleading.

TABLE 4  
NUMBER OF FOREIGN STUDENTS, 15 COUNTRIES

1955	1961	Increase	Per Cent Increase 1955-61	Per Year
107,283	191,359	84,076	78.4	10.0

Table 4 shows that the increase for the 45 countries over the six-year period is 78.4%. This is a yearly rate of increase of 10.0%. Although we cannot have great confidence in this figure as reflecting the world situation, it probably is based upon some 70% of the students in foreign institutions. Although the 45 countries included in this tabulation have only 61.5% of the students in 125 countries, their institutions tend to be the larger and better known ones and hence more attractive to students wishing to study abroad. We might guess, then, that there are some 270,000 foreign students in all countries.

Though the world figures are the significant ones, it is interesting to compare them with the trends as shown by the departures from New York International Airport expanded to the total sea and air departures for Europe. Using the same techniques described for other forms of transnational participation, we find the compound yearly increase in travel for study and research is 16.6% for Americans leaving for Europe and 18.3% for foreign citizens returning home. These higher rates of increase shown for study abroad on the world level are somewhat surprising since one might have assumed that the United States, as a country long in the business of scholarly exchange, might not show as high rates of increase as more recently participating nations.

Beside data on trends in numbers, the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook gives, in Table 18, data on foreign students by country of origin,

in fifteen countries for 1960, 1961 or 1962. Although we cannot derive trends from this table, it does make possible an analysis of the types of relationships that are being established—whether study abroad is mostly confined within ideological blocs, whether it is mostly a matter of students from developed countries going to other developed countries, or whether it is students from underdeveloped countries going to developed countries, and the like. Unfortunately again the fifteen countries are not well distributed over the several types. None of them is a Communist country. Eight of them are Western European, and 10 of them are in the Western camp. The 15 nations are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Senegal, Switzerland, Syria, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, United States. In view of their unrepresentative character we shall supplement the pattern of linkages shown by the recorded data by estimating the pattern of linkages for the countries with large numbers of foreign students not included in the 15, and then combine the two sets of data into an estimated world pattern.

In order to analyze the pattern of transnational participation through study abroad we will classify nations on two bases. One is ideological, the other concerns the degree of development. There are three categories in each: Western, uncommitted and Communist; and developed, semi-developed and underdeveloped. The ideological classification is the conventional one, though some difficult choices had to be made. Finland, Israel and Japan, for instance, were included among the Western nations. Yugoslavia and all the Latin American Countries except Cuba were classified as uncommitted.<sup>1</sup>

The work of Harbison and Myers, *Education, Manpower and Economic Growth*, (1964) was drawn upon for the developmental classifications. Gross national product per capita and their Composite Index of Human Resource Development were used as follows:

**Developed Nations:** at least \$400 gross national product per capita and at least 53 or more on the Composite Index.

These criteria bring in all the Western nations given above except Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey plus the following: Argentina, Uruguay, Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

**Semideveloped Nations:** those not qualifying as Developed, but that are above \$200 gross national product per capita and above 20 on the Composite Index.

<sup>1</sup> The Western camp has the following members: United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Switzerland, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Republic of China, South Korea, South Vietnam and Hong Kong. The Communist bloc embraces: Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Mongolia, Peoples Republic of China, North Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. All the rest of the nations are classified as uncommitted.

These criteria bring in the following nations: Mexico, Cuba, Costa Rica, Panama, Columbia, Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, South Africa and Malaysia.

**Underdeveloped Nations:** those not qualifying as either Developed or Semideveloped.

The ideological and developmental classifications yield a nine-fold table. In such a table there are 45 sorts of linkages including linkages of a country of a particular type with another country of the same type. To simplify matters we have combined cases like the following: the linkage of a Western developed country with an uncommitted semideveloped one, and the linkage of an uncommitted developed country with a Western semideveloped one. This reduces the types of linkage to 36. The situation is most easily expressed in terms of barriers crossed. Table 5 is drawn up in this manner. It will be noted how few linkages there are across the Communist barrier. This, of course, is because only students from Communist countries going to other countries for study could gain entrance into this table, since there is no Communist nation among the 15 comprising it to catch the reverse flow. Hence this table is almost worthless for considering the world situation.

As a basis for estimating the world situation there are two sets of relevant data in the UNESCO volume. Table 17 gives the number of foreign students in 1960 or 1961 for 29 nations in addition to the 45 for which comparisons can be made with 1955. Of these 74, full data are available on 15. An estimate of the numbers in various categories of countries-of-origin for the remaining 59 could be made; however, it hardly seems worth the effort for those having less than 500 foreign students. This cuts out 39. Left are the 20 for which we have established the types of countries from which their foreign students come. This has been done by examining the distributions in the countries that are near them geographically, or like them in either ideology or level of development. It is obvious that there are inadequate analogues for many of them.<sup>2</sup>

The other set of relevant data is contained in the UNESCO Table 15 where the total number of students in 126 countries is given. By applying percentages of foreign students in countries known to be similar in certain respects, the percentage of all their students that are foreign can be estimated. Only 13 further countries were estimated to have more than 500 foreign students.<sup>3</sup> For these 13, distributions

<sup>2</sup> The 20 countries are Morocco, Uganda, Canada, Columbia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Spain, Yugoslavia and New Zealand.

<sup>3</sup> The 13 countries are: S. Africa, Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Peoples Republic of China, Iran, Philippines, Singapore, West Berlin, East Germany, Sweden and Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.

TABLE 5  
NUMBER OF FOREIGN STUDENTS IN 15 COUNTRIES IN RELATION TO BARRIERS

	Both Western	Both Un-Committed	Both Com-munist	One West-ern, one Uncommitt.	One West-ern, one Communist	One Uncom-mitted, one Communist	Total
Both developed	46,446			903	2,329		49,678
Both semideveloped		331		14		27	372
Both underdeveloped		7,323					7,323
One developed, one semideveloped	14,232	14		12,489	1,349		28,084
One developed, one underdeveloped	11,656	66		70,578			82,300
One semideveloped, one underdeveloped		1,136		84		4	1,224
Total	72,334	8,870	0	84,068	3,678	31	168,981

TABLE 6  
NUMBER OF FOREIGN STUDENTS (ESTIMATED) IN 33 COUNTRIES IN RELATION TO BARRIERS

	Both Western	Both Un-Committed	Both Com-munist	One West-ern, one Uncommit.	One West-ern, one Communist	One Uncom-mitted, one Communist	Total
Both developed	4,685	348	15,953	606	846	68	22,515
Both semideveloped	899	835	195	1,282	336	940	4,487
Both underdeveloped	74	6,530	2,494	632		2,787	12,517
One developed, one semideveloped	1,294	2,236	5,341	3,098	614	1,005	13,588
One developed, one underdeveloped	265	1,644	3,190	6,558	58	8,365	20,080
One semideveloped, one underdeveloped	37	5,209	310	5,563	84	837	12,040
Total	7,254	16,794	27,483	17,739	1,955	14,002	85,227

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TABLE 7  
NUMBER OF FOREIGN STUDENTS (ESTIMATED) IN 48 COUNTRIES IN RELATION TO BARRIERS

	Both Western	Both Un-Committed	Both Com-munist	One West-ern, one Uncommitt.	One West-ern, one Communist	One Uncom-mitted, one Communist	Total
Both developed	51,131	340	15,953	1,509	3,192	68	72,193
Both semideveloped	899	1,166	195	1,296	336	967	4,859
Both underdeveloped	74	13,853	2,494	632		2,787	19,840
One developed, one semideveloped	15,526	2,250	5,341	15,587	1,963	1,005	41,672
One developed, one underdeveloped	11,921	1,710	3,190	77,136	58	8,365	102,380
One semideveloped, one underdeveloped	37	6,345	310	5,647	84	841	13,264
	<u>79,588</u>	<u>25,864</u>	<u>27,483</u>	<u>101,807</u>	<u>5,633</u>	<u>14,033</u>	<u>254,208</u>

have been estimated by the country of origin as in the case of those countries the number of whose foreign students is known. Table 6 gives the linkages for these 33 countries. Whereas Table 5 showed a large proportion studying abroad within the Western orbit, Table 6 shows about one-third studying abroad within the Communist bloc. This is only natural since the Communist countries of study did not appear in Table 5.

Table 7 is a composite of Tables 5 and 6. If any reliance can be placed at all on the estimates in Table 6, it would give some inkling of the world picture. Note first that it shows 254,000 students abroad, somewhat less than the 270,000 thought likely on the basis of world enrollments in higher education. Since, however, there are 78 of the 126 nations represented in UNESCO Table 15 that have not been included because they probably have less than 500 foreign students each, the original estimate may be not far from the truth. An average of 200 apiece would bring the total to 270,000.

It is no surprise to find the largest group of students are those linking the uncommitted, underdeveloped countries with the developed, Western countries. Next most important is the group from one Western developed country studying in another. At a much lower level is the Communist interchange of the same kind. If one looks at the columns that show the interchange with uncommitted countries it appears that there is a 7 to 1 advantage in favor of the Western as against the Communist nations.

Review of the data on study abroad indicates that this form of transnational participation is increasing steadily, though not so fast as visiting relatives and friends, and sojourn for business reasons. Study abroad, however, is linking nations of very different kinds and may well, therefore, have a more profound influence on future relationships in the world.

### *Participation—By Offering Technical Assistance*

The fourth category of transnational participation is technical assistance. Both bilateral and multilateral assistance are included. For bilateral trends we have only United States data; for multilateral, the data from the United Nations.

The United States has had a succession of agencies in the technical assistance field—the Mutual Security Agency, The Technical Cooperation Administration and the Agency for International Development—but statistics on civilian personnel involved in foreign aid programs have been kept continuously. From 1958 to 1964 the statistics seem to have been gathered in identical categories. Table 8 gives information on American nationals abroad and foreign nationals brought to this country or sent to other countries for training, for the three years—

1958, 1961 and 1964—because the former upward trend in personnel has been reversed of recent years. The figures for yearly increases in this situation are meaningless because they represent a combination of two trends. If the recent one persists the mean yearly increase will go to zero or even become negative. It is clear that United States Technical Assistance is not at present a source of increasing transnational participation.

TABLE 8  
TRANSNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED STATES  
PROGRAM OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

	U.S. Nationals Abroad Paid from Regular Program Funds	In the U.S.	Foreign Nationals Training In Third Countries	Total
1958	2926	5598	1746	7342
1961	3485	6915	2093	9008
1964	3431	6511	1703	8214
Increase 1958-64	505	915	(43)	872
% Increase	17.3	16.4	(2.5)	11.9

The situation with respect to United Nations Technical Assistance is different. Both the regular programs of technical assistance of the several Specialized Agencies and the Expanded Program financed by the Economic and Social Council (often in cooperation with the Specialized Agencies) are steadily growing. Table 9 gives the figures. It is obvious that the Expanded Program, though growing slowly, is rapidly losing ground to the programs of the Specialized Agencies. This mirrors the fact that the Specialized Agencies, which originally performed mainly clearing-house functions in the field of technical assistance, have more lately been carrying out field projects. Thus, there is more decentralization of the programs.

The overall rates of increase of the number of experts and of the holders of fellowships for training are modest but significant. It is apparent that even if bilateral technical assistance declines, as that of the United States seems likely to do, the multilateral programs are likely to grow and take over a larger share of the total effort.

### *Participation—By Working for International Organizations*

The fifth sort of transnational participation to be examined is that connected with international nongovernmental organizations. These bring people from different countries together in a multilateral fashion to achieve common objectives. For their study the *Yearbook of International Organizations* published by the Union of International Asso-

TABLE 9  
TRANSNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

	Experts			Fellowships		
	Expanded Program	Regular Program of Specialized Agencies	Total	Expanded Program	Regular Program of Specialized Agencies	Total
1956	2346	549	2895	2128	1041	3169
1963	2817	1866	4683	2545	3437	5982
Increase 1956-63	471	1317	1788	417	2396	2813
% Increase	20.1	240.0	61.3	19.3	230.2	88.6
Compound Yearly % Increase	2.7	19.1	7.1	2.6	18.6	9.5

ciations is essential. Here we will analyze the trends as shown in the 1956-57 and 1962-63 editions.

The *Yearbook* includes both intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. In the analysis to follow the 177 intergovernmental organizations in the 1962-63 edition are excluded. Such are the units of the United Nations, the official bodies of the European Community, those of the Communist bloc, and technical organizations resulting from treaties like the International Wheat Council. This leaves 1,570 nongovernmental organizations.

Table 10 shows the comparison of 1962-63 with 1956-57 in mere numbers of such organizations, classified according to whether they are regional in name or in fact, whether they have a religious, ideological or ethnic limitation though otherwise potentially world-wide in scope (particularistic), or whether they are potentially world-wide and actually more than regional. The much higher rate of increase for regional organizations is largely due to the great proliferation of groups formed within the Common Market after that was established in 1958. Almost two-thirds of the growth in this category is accounted for by the 223 such organizations. But this would have been the fastest growing category in any case. One reason for this may be the resentment by the less developed countries of the dominance of Europeans in world-wide international organizations. Of all the organizations in the 1962-63 *Yearbook*, more than 85% had their headquarters in Europe and more than 75% of their directors and officers were from Europe.

The rate of growth for all types of organization of 8.77% certainly underrepresents the rate at which new people are becoming involved in this form of transnational participation, since the existing organizations are growing at the same time that new ones are being added. Although we cannot obtain any data on individual activity in connection with nongovernmental organizations we can obtain data on how many involvements of countries there are in particular organizations. For this purpose, involvement of Americans in the activities of any nongovernmental organization would count as one involvement for the United States. We have not analyzed this matter for all the organizations but we have done so for a selected group of "globally oriented" ones. These are of three types: those whose aim is to strengthen political ties among nations, those that are in fact participating in a non-political world system, like organizations of meteorologists and those whose main purpose is international understanding. Table 11 gives the number of involvements in such organizations in 1956-57 and 1962-63.

It is clear from the data presented that, not only is the number of these globally oriented organizations growing, but the number of

TABLE 10  
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

	World-Wide	Particularistic	Regional	Date Insufficient to Classify	Total
1956-57	503	248	191	13	953
1962-63	677	312	555	26	1,570
Increase	174	66	364		617
% Increase	34.8	26.8	190.6		64.7
Compound Yearly % Increase	5.1	4.1	19.5		8.7

TABLE 11  
NUMBER OF COUNTRY INVOLVEMENTS IN GLOBALLY ORIENTED  
INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

	Number of Involvements 1956-57	Number of Involvements 1962-63	Per Cent Increase
12 Organizations	250		
1956-57 edition, not in 1962-63 edition			
151 organizations in both editions	4,529	6,534	44.3
33 organizations in 1962-63 edition, not in 1956-57 edition		874	
Total	<u>4,779</u>	<u>7,408</u>	<u>55.0</u>

countries involved in each is doing so. For those existing at the beginning and end of the six-year span the mean yearly increase is 6.3%.

We can show the increasing participation in these organizations in still another way: by analyzing involvement in relation to the barriers discussed in connection with study abroad. The same three classes of ideological position and the same three classes of development are used in reaching the conclusions set for in Table 12. Here we see that only 5 organizations have gone backward in coverage, either ideologically or in terms of the development spectrum; 31 have increased their coverage. From Table 11 we learned that these organizations involved 44% more countries in 1962-63 than in 1956-57. It is evident that the net gain of 26 organizations with broader coverage

TABLE 12  
COVERAGE OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF COUNTRIES BY 150 GLOBALLY ORIENTED  
INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

With Respect to Development	With Respect to Ideology			Total
	Less in 1962-63 than in 1956-57	Same in 1962-63 as in 1956-57	More in 1962-63 than in 1956-57	
Less in 1962-63 than in 1956-57	1	1	0	2
Same in 1962-63 as in 1956-57	3	114	17	134
More in 1962-63 than in 1956-57	0	8	6	14
Total	<u>4</u>	<u>123</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>150</u>

among 150 organizations (17%) means that about two-fifths of the expansion in involvement carries these organizations across barriers.

Our discussion of nongovernmental organizations can be summed up in three statements: (a) the number of such organizations is growing at almost 9% per year; (b) their involvement of countries is growing at 6.3% per year; and (c) both ideological and developmental barriers are being progressively breached.

### **Participation—By Being a Member of the U.N.**

The last kind of transnational participation to be considered is membership in United Nations secretariats. These consist of the headquarters in New York plus its branches in other parts of the world and the headquarters of the twelve Specialized Agencies and their branches. Members of delegations from member countries to these

**TABLE 13**  
**ESTABLISHED POSTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND**  
**ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES**

	All Established Posts	Established Posts not Related to Technical Assistance
1956	8,370	7,821
1963	13,165	11,299
Increase	4,795	3,478
% Increase	57.3	45.8
Compound Yearly % Increase	6.7	5.5

bodies are not here considered, both for practical and theoretical reasons. Information on the numbers who have served on delegations at different points in time is not easily available. More important, it is doubtful whether such service should be included under the concept of transnational participation. Instructed delegates hardly participate in the solution of common problems in a way that changes them fundamentally. They tend to interact on a formal level, and they do not live intimately together. It is for the same reason that we have excluded other intergovernmental organizations from consideration while including nongovernmental organizations.

The Annexes to the Official Records of the United Nations General Assembly gives figures each year on the number of established posts in the various agencies of the United Nations system. These are given in Table 13. Since these engaged on the Regular Programs in Technical Assistance as contrasted with the Expanded Program are holders of established posts, and we have shown in Table 9 the growth in United Nations Technical Assistance, we also show here the growth in estab-

lished posts minus technical assistance personnel. The figures show that the technical assistance work has been growing somewhat faster than the other work of the several agencies, but both rates of increases are modest.

The six sorts of transnational participation that have been examined all show increases. Where we have some inkling of the worldwide situation, as in study abroad, multilateral technical assistance, international nongovernmental organizations and secretariats of the United Nations system, there seems to be a growth rate of between 5% and 10% a year. If this trend continues for a decade or more the results will almost certainly be important. But whether for good or ill will depend upon knowledge of the effects of the growing participation. Unfortunately, sociologists have carried out few studies of these effects.

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## The Interfaces of a Binational Third Culture: A Study of the American Community in India\*

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The recent sweep of human history clearly shows expanded linkages, both conflicting and cooperative, among societies of the world. Sectors of various societies are complexly related through: interlocking power structures of nation-states; communication and transportation networks; governmental and private enterprises in the fields of trade; monetary investments and welfare activities; and a series of organizational arrangements through which move artifacts, technology, food, scientific knowledge, funds, etc.

One reflection of the burgeoning interdependency among societies, so visible in our times, is the ever-increasing movement across conventional political boundaries, of persons who live among nationals of another society and interact with them in common enterprises. These are the men-in-the-middle who transform the broad aims of joint societal endeavors into going enterprises, who implement policy decisions through personal confrontations in the day-by-day performance of their work roles, who innovate the accommodations and adaptations necessary to interconnect two or more bureaucratic structures.

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For a number of years, we have been interested in studying the cultural patterns which are created by men who mediate between societies, the ways in which men-in-the-middle of intersecting societies perform their roles while engaged in the process of representing larger collectivities, the social structures in which these roles are embedded and the life styles and values which are generated in this interstitial zone between societies.

To delineate one series of these variables we use the concept, the third culture, and define it as the cultural patterns created, learned and shared by the members of different societies who are personally involved in relating their societies, or sections thereof, to each other.

Viewing mankind as a whole, we observe the evolving of many different kinds of third cultures; e.g., the patterns which regulate interactional behavior of national representatives at the United Nations; the rules and regulations governing the international exchange of students and the new cultural norms shaping their participation with members of host countries.

In order to carry out a manageable empirical study, we focused on but one type—the binational third culture which we define as the patterns generic to a community of men who stem from two different societies and who regularly interact as they relate their respective societies, or segments therefrom, within the physical setting of one of the societies. In particular, we studied the Indo-American third culture in India.

The design of our field study consisted of first discovering the parameters of the American community in India: its ecological distribution, the size of the population within its component parts and the range of functions in which it participates. Having identified a universe of approximately two thousand American households (tourists and other short-term visitors were eliminated as marginal to our central concerns), we then studied in depth a sample cross-section of the whole community. More specifically, we interviewed intensively a proportionately differentiated sample of one hundred and ninety household heads (plus their wives, if any) who live and work in India. In addition to the individual interviews (which encompassed from three to five hours on the average), we examined first-hand, whenever possible, their work world and social life. We also traced within the locality and the larger society the Indians with whom they associated in varying types of situations. The different strata from which the final sample was drawn include: the United States government (foreign service officers, information service officers, and technical assistants), both Protestant and Catholic missionary establishments, business firms, private voluntary associations, foundations, exchange programs and United Nations agencies.

During the year of concentrated field work, we carried our study

into each major region of the country and covered the four great cities—Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, New Delhi—and twenty-three middle-sized and smaller towns of the countryside. We spent periods of time in missionary compounds, industrial plants, governmental offices, schools, hospitals, private clubs and social gatherings, to get the feel for the total binational culture and especially to enrich our understanding of the detailed facts assembled from the individual case studies. In retrospect, we are not convinced that we adequately fulfilled all of the projected aims of our study. There are technical flaws and shortcomings. But at least the collected data offer a measure of knowledge, in place of often unfounded generalizations, about the ways in which people, who mediate between societies, pattern their lives in cross-cultural relations.

The following account focuses upon but one dimension of the interfaces of the binational third culture—the American community as a whole. We indicate the modes of participation in two basic types of social structures within the American community, the functions of the American community, the incidence of social interaction between the sample American population and segments of Indian society, and the collective image of the American community as being composed of "cultural ambassadors". Not covered here is the central role—the work role (J. Useem, 1966, 146-156).

### Social Groups of the American Community

The American community in India emerged as a distinct entity during the middle years of the present century. India's gaining her independence and America's emerging as a world power brought both increasing numbers of Americans to India and a new significance to their presence.

Any human grouping, when viewed from the outside, appears homogeneous, cohesive, unified and subject to easy generalizations. The outer surfaces of the American community in India often make this impression on a casual observer who passes quickly through an Indian city with a large foreign settlement. The brief visitor or the fresh arrival sees, for example, the accouterments of Americans who live together in modern apartments, or within a neighborhood of British-colonial-style bungalows, or in traditional compounds. To the inexperienced in present-day third culture patterns, these surfaces of social life and physical settings seemingly give credence to prior references he has heard about how Americans live overseas in "transplanted little Americas", "golden ghettos", or self-contained cultural enclaves. To probe beneath these commonplace observations and accompanying easy generalizations about the American community, we attempted to discern the actual extent of personal involvement

in and commitment to any form of American group life and to trace the relationship between such involvements and the degree and type of social contacts with Indians.

On the basis of observation of social gatherings and from the descriptions given by the sample, we discerned two types of groups which contained only Americans:

(a) A locality-linked group consists of any enduring association of Americans who are connected together in their place of residence. The character of these local groupings may be formal or informal, tightly-knit into an exclusive social set or open-ended with a hard core of members and others who become temporarily involved; some are composed of couples, others of one sex only (wives have more of these exclusively American groupings than do the husbands).

(b) A functionally-linked group consists of a social network of Americans who have a "consciousness of kind", a shared ethos and an interpersonal system of communication. The nucleus may be found in a locality, but such groups fan out into a region, the whole of India, or even include Americans who are stationed in other countries or who are passing through India. The members are held together by a variety of specific interests or specialized activities.

Thus, there are functional groups composed of old hands in the business community, missionaries of one or several closely related denominations, those having professional interests in common; others are made up of those who share a concern for the performing arts, modernization, etc. Gatherings of this type are usually smaller, conversations may range over a wide variety of topics but always include some discussion of their common interest, and wives are often excluded or, if included, the gathering breaks down into two groupings with the men and an occasional professional woman "talking shop" and the wives discussing their common concerns. Whenever a member visits a city or town which contains another American known to have similar interests, he tries to include a visit with him during his stay. Some plan vacations together, and still others have "rump" sessions in connection with annual meetings. (Men and professional women belong to more of the functionally-linked groups than do wives.)

We devised a fourfold classification to sort out the nature of each person's identification with either type of American grouping. For this purpose:

(a) Integrated—signifies a person who both considers himself and is so regarded by others in the group as being an active member in its social life: who conforms to its customs in his style of living and who, in general, shares the prevailing values of the particular group.

(b) Fringe—refers to a person who identifies himself as a nominal part of a group but who does not feel strongly attached to it and enters only intermittently into its routinized social life. Reciprocally,

integrated members of the ingroup identify him as an acceptable but peripheral figure to be occasionally included on ceremonial events or under special circumstances.

(c) Deviant—indicates a person who clearly must be included in a group because of his work-role, residence, status or organizational affiliation; nonetheless, he feels alienated from the group's predominant social behavior, outlook and activities. He, therefore, is apt to express opinions or act in a manner contrary to the common expectations of the integrated, and attends with reluctance the social gatherings which demand the presence of all those who "belong". The integrated are bothered by his nonconformity, and most of them feel somewhat estranged from him. By tacit mutual understanding, polite cordiality is maintained for the sake of appearances or to avoid open friction.

(d) Isolate—represents a person who simply has no social group available to him, or who is unaware of and unknown to a relevant group.

The following percentage table summarizes what we found in terms of these classifications.

TYPE OF PARTICIPATION OF SAMPLE AMERICAN HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN AMERICAN LOCALITY OR FUNCTIONAL GROUPINGS<sup>1</sup>

Nature of Individual's Participation	Locality-linked Groups	Functionally-linked Groups
Integrated with	54	64
Fringe to	19	13
Deviant from	9	8
Isolated from	18	15
Percentage totals	100	100

Most people going out for the first time say that the question of becoming involved with their fellow countrymen either did not enter their minds before entry into India or they had determined they would not become "caught up" in the "American crowd". Yet most report that after entry, accommodating to American groups concerns them as much as accommodating to Indian groups.

If participation in the two types of all-American groupings are lumped together, nine out of every ten Americans have a mutually acknowledged social involvement in groups composed of other Americans, i.e., they are integrated with, fringe to, or deviant from either locality or functional groupings. Half are integrated into both types. The fact that so few, ten per cent, lack any enduring social ties with

<sup>1</sup> The distribution of wives is different; they have a higher proportion integrated into locality-linked and a lower proportion into functionally-linked groups.

other Americans in India (i.e., are isolates from both locality and functional groupings), reveals the magnitude of identification with one or more sectors of the American community.

Any set of activities which is so pervasive calls for analysis as to the functions it serves for individuals and groups.

## Functions of American Groupings in India

Some of the functions of the American community overseas have been elaborated elsewhere (Useem and Donoghue, 1963, 169-179; R. Useem, 1966, 132-145). Simply summarized, they are: fulfilling needs of men and their dependents (ninety per cent of our sample are married men accompanied by one or more dependents), needs which are non-work-role related but which if not satisfactorily resolved have negative repercussions on the work role performance (e.g., adequate housing, education of children, body maintenance, recreational needs, social outlets for wives and children, etc.). Locality groups meet some of these needs directly and are the source of information and aid for meeting others.

More than ninety per cent of the Americans working in India are under the sponsorship of an organized enterprise. Both locality and functional groups help new arrivals to establish and maintain ties with others who are sharing program responsibilities or who share professional concerns even though they are under different auspices.

Locality and functional groups help to socialize new arrivals to the local third cultural ground rules for interaction with Indians, reduce the number of "incidents" which can occur to disturb the relationships between the two nations, and are the place where Americans can discuss their problems, share their information and coordinate their activities without fear of damaging their work relationships with Indians (who have their own network of internal groupings).

And, contrary to popular notions, a majority of these American groups, rather than cutting their participants off from meaningful contacts with Indians, open the first pathways for the newcomer into segments of Indian society and are the source for the enlargement of significant contacts during the individual's stay. To cite but one figure, two-thirds of persons integrated in any type of American group regularly take part in mixed Indian-American gatherings.

## Incidence of American Interaction With Indians

Obviously, every American comes into contact with a great many Indians from the day he steps off the plane or ship and catches his first glimpse of massive numbers, until the day he departs from the

country. He encounters household servants, salesmen, clerks, public servants, repairmen. Depending upon the nature of his work-related role, he may meet Indian businessmen, governmental officers, students, writers, cultivators, hospital patients, etc. But it is equally apparent that a few thousand Americans cannot associate on a meaningful personal level with the other 400 million Indians (R. Useem, 1961, 395-407).

Those Indians who regularly interact socially with Americans are modern in orientation to life, educated but not necessarily Western-educated, English-speaking, upper middle class, mobile in their life histories, urban or town residents, Hindu or Parsee and for missionaries a greater proportion of modern-oriented Indian Christians. Of course the bulk of the local inhabitants in a specific area with these particular characteristics have no social contacts with Americans, but most Indians who interact with Americans correspond to this general profile. Although but a fraction of the total Indian population, they are persons of either actual or potential importance in the newer decision-making structures of the local area or the country. Often they have a reputation inside their Indian circles as individuals of influence, authority or on their way up. Exceptions are those who represent only their own interests and who are known to foreigners as "hangers-on". They seldom have much prestige within any segment of Indian society.<sup>2</sup>

The social encounters of Americans with these segments of Indian society can be put into three broad rubrics:

(a) *Categorical, nonpersonalized contacts.* For about one-fifth of the total sample (significantly, two-fifths of those who are isolated from American groups), social encounters with Indians are confined to this type of casual, intermittent, surface-like interaction. Though constantly in touch with individual Indians, they do not regularly associate in depth with any. The contacts are polite social exchanges between relative strangers.

(b) *Congeniality relationships.* Three out of every five Americans (many of whom also have some categorical contacts) regularly inter-

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<sup>2</sup> The segments of the total society which seldom have close social contacts with Americans also need to be noted: (a) the largest segments of Indian society—the cultivators in some five hundred thousand villages and the lower and lower-middle classes of the city (there is little in common to make for a shared social life between the average foreigner and the agricultural worker, the urban laborer, the clerk, and the small shopkeeper); (b) the orthodox Hindus who do not savor personal contacts with foreigners; (c) the Muslims; (d) the vast majority of the modern-oriented who do not move in social circles which regularly include foreigners but who do not actively reject them (Americans who "break out" of the established circles ordinarily find their way into this segment).

act with the same Indians in one or several social circles. Congeniality types of relationships are formed around fairly stable, mixed Indian-American groupings, or an international social set. Pathways into this type often start from the locality-linked all-American groups.

(c) *Interpersonal but work-role-related friendships.* One in five Americans interacts rather constantly and intensively with a limited number of Indians on a highly personalized basis. Although interpersonal friendships are characterized by mutual warmth, respect and, most of all, trust, they are not so intimate as to encompass the total personality. Both the Americans and the Indians share a deep concern for the advancement of third-cultural values, but they are not necessarily interlocked in a specific binational social structure or program. Unlike the ready-made congeniality groups to which Indians and Americans who possess the right social credentials and social connections can gain easy access, close personal binational friendships depend on a fairly prolonged period of "testing", and on an even longer time span for crystallization. They cannot be passed on to newcomers. First contacts may come in categorical or congeniality situations or, for the American, the lead may come from his all-American, functionally-linked circle. Indians who have had a close American friend are more open to establishing another, but they are cautious about making any depth of commitment until "bona fides" are clear.

### The Part-Time Cultural Ambassador

Along with a sharp increase in size and social visibility of the American community in India after Independence, there evolved a general recognition among the various groups of Americans that, altogether, they served as a collective representation of American life. Two old hands reminisce on the changes in outlook witnessed in their life-span. A business executive recalls, "In the old days, it didn't matter very much what you did and said, for you lived your own life. Things have changed. In these times, everyone in the American community has to act as a good ambassador for our way of life". A missionary educator reflects on the impact of the changing patterns on his own self-image:

Having lived for so many years in a foreign country, I had lost my insularity and I had become more of a cosmopolitan and less of an American. But after World War II and Independence, the Americans here were distinguished from the British to a far greater degree than before. Since then, we have been treated as part of a new group coming into prominence in the country, not as part of the British Raj. Now you are taken as a representative of your country, whether you like it or not. I have had imposed on me a new self-consciousness of my national identity.

Less than a tenth of our sample take exception to their having a role as a representative of American society in India.<sup>8</sup>

During the early decades of this century, there was no powerful incentive for Americans to act as cultural ambassadors in India. The world view of a colonial people typically focuses on the governing foreign country, and only tangentially on other countries. The newer institutions, technology and artifacts which came from the outside were, for the most part, British. The modern-oriented looked to England for standards of what constituted Western styles of life, and the only prestigious schools to attend for foreign studies were in Great Britain. The United States as a noncolonial country in the Western world and a coming society in technological advances, excited the interest of only a minority among intellectuals and the rising entrepreneurial classes. In the pre-Independence period, American residents in India, primarily missionaries and businessmen, were little aware of each other and blended into the British communities of India.

As a term of reference, "the American community" came into usage among Americans not as a designation of a unified organization but rather as a symbol of their recognition that they shared in the new, but uncrystallized total relationship between India and the United States. It did not mean, for example, that businessmen and missionaries became directly involved in the political affairs between the two countries (and, indeed, many have deliberately attempted to detach themselves from the political domain) but it did mean that the character of the political relationship was a new and significant factor to be reckoned with in accomplishing their aims and purposes for being in India. What they did in their fields of specialty also could have repercussion on the overall relationship between two nations.

The American Community became a common term among Indians associated with Americans as the Indians began defining their roles as nationalists, rather than as colonial dependents, *vis-à-vis* the new foreign power.

Recognition that there is an American community does mean the acceptance of at least three basic assumptions: (a) that a comparatively small number of Americans represent their homeland in the host country and, therefore, each individual carries a disproportionately

<sup>8</sup> Some, particularly those under the auspices of a world-wide organization (e.g., United Nations, Society of Friends, Catholic Church) believed that ideally the national identity of everyone should be played down. Others were in India in search of self, and were so preoccupied with this private need that they evinced little concern for other questions (although their behavior often provoked concern among other Americans). A few others were a bit startled by our even asking the question. After some hesitation they responded that they were in India to do a specific job. If that in some way indirectly contributed to a better understanding of America by Indians, that was fine—but otherwise they were not concerned.

large responsibility; (b) that only a small number of Indians have any intimate understanding of American life, and, therefore, the personal and public behavior of Americans not only provides Indians with examples of what Americans are really like but also has significance for the prestige, influence, and power in their internal society for those Indians who associate with Americans; (c) that the cumulative Indian-American interpersonal encounters in everyday life will have a direct impact on the outlines of the developing binational third culture within India, and through it onto the larger cultural relations between the two societies.

Although an overwhelming percentage of our sample concur in the notion that the American overseas should be a good representative of his nation, there is far less consensus on what the substantive manifestations of the part-time cultural ambassador role should be. We observed that, save for the few who expressed no interest in the mediating role, nearly everyone had a great many things he wanted to say on this topic. He often conveyed his views with a sense of strong conviction as to their rightness and with a rich abundance of specific illustrations.

The norms which the average American invokes are a reflection of the salient values embedded in the particular groups with which he identifies—and then with minor refinements he uses these as a universal yardstick to measure all groups of Americans in the country. Those who are integrated into American locality or functional groups invoke the standards developed there. Those who are deviant from or fringe to American groups but involved in an Indian group, will generalize the norms of the particular Indians with whom he identifies as the basis of judgment on how all Indians expect Americans to act. The implication is that if the Indians other Americans associate with expect something different, then the others are interacting with the "wrong" or "unimportant" or not the "real" Indians.

### Rapid Turnover Produces Cleavages

With the rapid turnover of both American and Indian personnel, some groups break down into sharply divided factions until they work out a new set of agreements. Old line groups often manifest cleavages between those who have been in India a long time and the newer arrivals who have little sympathy for the old-timers who prefer to continue to act according to the norms of an earlier period.

Contrasts in both conduct and viewpoints can be most simply illustrated by comparing model responses of two sections of the American community. In new-line programs composed of a substantial proportion of first-time-outers who expect to stay less than two years, the fresh arrivals regard their current activities as a once-in-a-lifetime

experience and plunge into Indian life from the outset of their stay. Those who manage to gain entree as the first American into an all-Indian group, take especial pride in their accomplishment. They are eager to exchange views with Indians on contrasts between American and Indian ways of doing things. Their critical evaluation of the long-term American residents or the new members who fit smoothly into old-line groups are expressed as follows:

Why, they hardly know they are in another country. They establish little Americas and hold themselves apart. They don't know what's going on in the country for they seldom get out of their air-conditioned rooms and their only social contacts are with the westernized upper-class and hangers-on.

The social gulf between Indians and Americans is appalling. Americans build up antagonism to America by living so much above the local people. We have the responsibility of acting like plain Americans and they take the facade of gentility. It's tragic the way they cause cleavage between Americans and Indians.

In contrast, old-line groups with predominantly long-term residents discount the social skills and influence of American groupings which contain a high proportion of the inexperienced and have high turnovers every year. They are apt to fret about the indiscriminate ways in which the newcomers collect Indians, their naive experiments in "going native", their lack of sensitivity to the local ground rules of the prevailing third culture, and the damage done to the image of America the more experienced "have worked so hard to establish". Each group we visited seemed to possess a rich fund of folklore about how one or another group of Americans had acted in a manner unbecoming to their function as cultural ambassadors.

The question could be raised whether the Indian participants in the binational third culture are equally concerned about the image they present as a totality. The answer is no. For one thing, the Indians they are representing are there for the Americans to observe. Furthermore, many aspects of their total behavior—economic, educational, social, civic and kinship—are in social systems not relevant to or can be sealed off from the Americans. For the foreign members of the third culture, more of their behavior and that of their dependents may have repercussions on the relationships between the two nations. How an Indian spends his income, treats his wife, educates his children, occupies his leisure hours, worships, drives his car, manages his servants, shops in the bazaar, clothes himself or decorates his house may be the subject of conversation and even evaluation among Americans, but these behaviors and patterns are taken as givens—to be understood, worked with, adjusted to or ignored. But they do not make the Indian members of the third culture highly visible—it is their country. For the Americans, not only are the standards of living and styles of life

different, but often they are ones which cannot be even approximately adhered to in a non-Western society without becoming highly visible.

## **Mediating between American and Indian**

### ***First Level***

Despite the fact that Americans do not agree on specifics of how they should act in mediating between American and Indian societies, we discovered three levels of fulfillment. The first level takes as its base line the ideal projected by our sample of "getting along" sufficiently well in social contacts so as to gain social acceptance or, minimally, to avoid the glaring mistakes, or "incidents" which might antagonize Indians toward Americans. This is the most widely subscribed to norm in the American community. It serves as the acid test of whether or not an American should be in the country at all, intrigues many into attempting to specify the desirable personal qualities of an American in India, and certainly evokes the keenest emotional reactions when any of them see another American openly violating the minimal norms. It derives from the American premise that any "normal" individual who is willing to make a sincere effort can learn to adjust well enough to get along with the inhabitants of the host country. It is reinforced by the underlying American faith in the capacity of men to break through the surface differences between cultures and to find underneath the fundamental human qualities. Thus, it is felt, on the foundations of the common human, a genuine person-to-person and altogether people-to-people relationship can be built which assures some degree of mutual acceptance. As one person put it, "They get a true picture of America when they see us in the flesh and blood. We will make mistakes, but they will know that we are human too, and so they will realize that what we have in common is far more important than any cultural differences we have".

### ***Second Level***

Our second level centers on improved understanding of Americans and American life by Indians.<sup>4</sup> Most Americans nowadays enter into segments of Indian society which already have rudimentary factual information and oftentimes well-crystallized sentiments about America. Americans feel that Indians have more knowledge than understanding of domestic life in American society. Our sample was of the opinion

<sup>4</sup> Quite unexpectedly, we learned that for most Americans one of the great breakthroughs in understanding is with respect to American life. Their personal experiences and confrontations with both Indians and Americans in India compel them to re-examine their own perceptions of America and, as a consequence, most report that they rediscovered America in India.

that the overseas American community could persuade the Indians through interpersonal experiences to take a more sophisticated view and have increased understanding of the intricate complex of factors which govern American life. It was their hope that the result would be not endorsement by Indians of everything American but, ideally, a more balanced appraisal.

In the setting of mixed Indian-American groups, Americans experiencing their first cross-cultural exploration of ideas and impressions, have a compelling need to initiate explanations of things American in contrast to things Indian. "In America, we do. . ." Americans longer in India do not bring up the topic in mixed groups of long standing; the constant exchange of views has run its course and no longer dominates the conversation. Should a dramatic event or crisis occur, the Americans, relying on the strength of the interpersonal relations they have established with Indians, feel less impelled to defend and more free to explain and explore a topic. These patterned relationships keep lines of communication open despite severe strains. In friendship groupings, turns of events, crises in one or the other country or differences between official policies of the two countries are either irrelevant to their shared purposes or are considered their mutual problems. Occasionally the active pursuit of the friendship will be held in abeyance during a crisis by mutual agreement, knowing that the relationship will be reactivated under more favorable circumstances.

### *Third Level*

A third level takes its general bearings from the occasionally cited common ground—the larger community of mankind. The everyday cross-currents of irritations and amicable associations in social contacts plus the deepening understanding of what is happening to America are not discounted as trivial. They seem, however, to some in the larger view of things as evanescent or subordinate to the great social and economic tides set in motion by a changing world. The model of the part-time cultural ambassador is perceived from this level as more than a decent guest who knows how to get along smoothly with his relevant social groups in the host country, and more than being a fine miniature of his own society presenting a good image of Americans, and more than a gifted interpreter of American society. A few in almost every group we surveyed—whether they serve as businessmen, missionaries, foreign service officers, educators or in other work roles—feel the challenge to expand their efforts in constructing not a utopian world community but, more modestly and realistically, a viable association of Indians and Americans who can help to sustain their shared values in the modernization of India and in the further development of shared enterprises among Americans, Indians and other sections of the world.

This type of cultural ambassador takes care to keep his membership viable in Indian groups, in both locality and functional American groups and in mixed Indian-American groups but seldom is he a hard core member of any group. He is accepting and supporting of a variety of third-cultural behaviors for he sees how they are all parts of the larger perspective to which he is committed.

The American community in India today is but a fragile social structure. It cannot serve as the sole bridge between two massive civilizations. But along with many other social arrangements it offers a locus for the day-by-day working out of ties between nations despite the inevitable conflicts inherent in the confrontations between the nationals of differing countries.

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# The Study of Conflict and Community in the International System: Summary and Challenges to Research

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It is a paradox that research on conflict processes and integrative processes in the international system has been slow in getting under way in that very same century which has made the great discovery that there *is* an international system. In the dawn of the year 1900 it looked as if a peaceful world community would come of itself. World War I made this prospect a little less self-evident, and in the thirties a number of social scientists began thinking about what contributions their disciplines might make to the problems of international order. Quincy Wright's *A Study of War* (1942) embodied the pioneering interdisciplinary efforts for a new study of international relations made at the University of Chicago in that decade. Anthropologists struggled to conceptualize modern warfare more adequately and to relate the phenomenon of war to evolution.

There was much intellectual ferment concerning the nature of society taking place in England in the twenties and thirties, which was slow to make its impact on American thought. The concept of general systems, which is currently the cutting edge of social science theory and research in the United States, was battling its way out through minds like H. G. Wells. In writing the Prelude to his *Experiment in*

*Autobiography* (1934), he foresaw a new world germinating and developing "in studies and studios and laboratories, administrative bureaus and exploring expeditions". "We originative intellectual workers are reconditioning human life". In the same years a Quaker meteorologist who in 1919 had privately distributed a completely unconventional and daring piece of mathematical research entitled "The Mathematical Psychology of War", continued with a series of little-noticed publications which represent a contribution of the twentieth century to the analysis of the causes of war. Only in 1960 with the posthumous publication of this work in two volumes, *Arms and Insecurity* and *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels* (Richardson, 1960) has Lewis F. Richardson's approach to a general theory of large-scale conflict found its proper place in the field of social science research.

Not everything was happening on the other side of the ocean, however. In 1937 Ross Stagner served as chairman of a Committee on the Psychology of Peace and War, of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. The committee contacted political scientists, sociologists and economists, conducted some studies and prepared what was to have been the 1941 Yearbook of SPSSI on the subject of the Psychology of Peace and War. The events of December 7, 1941 and America's entry into the war rendered the material unacceptable, so this yearbook was never published. In 1945 another move was made in this direction, and Gardner Murphy successfully brought to publication a SPSSI Yearbook on *Human Nature and Enduring Peace* (Murphy, 1945). Since then, the *Journal of Social Issues* has given periodic attention to research in this area.

By and large, however, the forties were not productive years in the area of research on world order. When James Miller issued a plea in 1941 from the University of Chicago for a crash program in behavioral science research for peace, he was questioned by his fellow social scientists about the idea that anything could be gained by putting intensive effort in a field that had to grow slowly and naturally.

## Founding of UNESCO

New possibilities seemed to open up with the founding of UNESCO, with its avowed intention of dealing with the roots of war in the minds of men. It was with great hope that eight social scientists met together in the summer of 1948 for two weeks in Paris under the auspices of UNESCO to inquire into "the influences which predispose toward international understanding on the one hand and aggressive nationalism on the other". The scientists came from Brazil, France, England, Hungary, Norway and the United States. They issued a joint statement (Cantril, 1950) concerning the nature and causes of international tension and the vital role which the social sciences can play in

understanding and putting to constructive use the forces which work upon man and society both from without and from within. The statement pointed out that while many social scientists are studying these problems, they are separated by national, ideological and class differences which make it difficult to achieve genuine objectivity within a global frame of reference. The scientists urged the cooperation of social scientists on broad regional and international levels, the creation of an international university and a series of world institutes of the social sciences under international auspices. They closed with the statement,

The social scientist can help make clear to the people of all nations that the freedom and welfare of one are ultimately bound up with the freedom and welfare of all, that the world need not continue to be a place where men must either kill or be killed. Effort in behalf of one's own group can become compatible with effort in behalf of humanity.

This should have been the start of a great international research effort on conflict in the world community. It wasn't; the silence which followed was deafening. The postscript to the Paris conference throws a little light on that silence, for each of the participating scientists went home to write out lengthy papers amplifying their individual points of view. These were duly circulated and published together with the original statement, with this significant postscript added by Professor Szalai of Hungary:

At our conference a pleasant personal contact had been established among us social scientists from different parts of the world. Even a joint statement had been signed by all of us—due to the diplomatic talent of our esteemed chairman. Then everybody went home to write down what he had to contribute to the theme of this conference. And—as the friendly international atmosphere of the UNESCO conference room vanished—the political and socio-economic determination of the "home surroundings" began to act. Many of us wrote down sentences which had never been said (either by them or by anybody else) in the conference room, and, what is worse, many wrote things that *could never have been said there* [italics E. Boulding's].

Thus verbal dueling replaced what had begun as a genuine intellectual search, and international cooperation between social scientists to search out and remove sources of tension and international aggression received a setback.

## National Versus International Interests

The inevitably double orientations of national security and international order which the 1948 UNESCO conference had to deal with and which all social scientists must come to terms with in one way or another create continuing problems for the research community, both

within each country and between countries. Project Camelot was not the first, nor will it be the last, research crisis to raise the question of national interest versus world interest. Troubled scholars have increasingly been seeking ways to bring research findings which they feel will contribute to both national and international security to the attention of decision-makers in the national government. A growing number of scholars not connected with the well-funded national security research programs have also sought, with what might be termed spectacular unsuccess, for funds to do research which they believe will be relevant to national and international security. Lack of success in government circles and with foundations has until recently been closely matched by lack of success in persuading university administrations and fellow scholars to enter new "peace research" areas. There is nothing new or remarkable in this. The bastions of government and the bastions of the academic community have always existed to conserve the old as long as possible. The new is incorporated only when the pressure becomes intolerable. The same forces which finally created the Council of Economic Advisors after long blunderings through the depression (some of the best talent in the country is now brought to bear on economic problems) will in time create a similar Council of International Affairs Advisors, which will mobilize presently unused resources for international policy-making. Perhaps the John Maynard Keynes of international relations is waiting in the wings.

## Institutions for Peace Research

The surprising thing is not how little peace research there is, but how much. There is a growing international community of scholars whose primary commitment is to research on world order. Some indication of this is found in the number of new international research institutes devoted to interdisciplinary international studies. Sweden is establishing a new international peace research institute which is to be internationally administered and staffed; the Oslo Peace Research Institute has changed its status from that of a national to an international institute. The United Nations Institute for Training and Research<sup>1</sup> is becoming operational. The International Social Science Council is con-

<sup>1</sup> For:

"1) Research, study, analysis, and discussion of major questions relating to international peace and security and the promotion of economic and social development, and 'the techniques and machinery of the United Nations.' Emphasis will be placed on operational analysis.

2) Training of personnel, especially from the developing countries, for national or UN service.

3) The creation of a 'pool' of highly qualified men and women who can be detached at short notice by the Secretary-General for special missions".

(*International Peace Research Newsletter*, Vol. I, No. 3, 1963)

ducting an expanding program of cooperative international research on such topics as "Images of a Disarmed World", "International Studies of Values in Politics" and "The Role of International Cultural Cooperation in the Promotion of Peaceful Relations" (UNESCO). New international professional associations particularly concerned with world order and conflict management, such as the World Peace Through Law Center (Geneva) and the International Peace Research Association (Groningen, Netherlands) are appearing on the scene.

Research on problems of world order is certainly not a new phenomenon. There are institutions in both Europe and American with as much as a half-century behind them of history of research on international relations with reference to the problems of peace and war, within the framework of the traditional discipline of political science. But in the United States (as elsewhere) the extraordinary intellectual and moral dilemmas felt by thoughtful citizens generally and the academic community in particular, as cold and hot wars alternately threaten, has increasingly pushed social scientists to a consideration of international problems from fresh points of view. Psychologists, social psychologists, sociologists, economists and others have finally begun to wonder if their disciplines could not contribute new and useful theoretical models, quantitative measures in areas where none exist and practical approaches to conflict resolution. As interdisciplinary lines have been crossed and recrossed in the last two decades, there has been a growing realization of the possibility of radically new approaches to international conflict outside the traditional academic boundaries. The resulting revolution in research is now to be seen in the over 70 centers and research institutes around the United States which are now actively engaged in research on international conflict. If the heavily national-security oriented programs are included, over 100 institutions, including industrial organizations and "think" factories, are now engaged in serious research on international conflict in the fields of strategy, political science, law, technology, psychology, sociology, economics and history. Informal faculty seminars in this area have arisen at many American universities.

This spurt of activity has led to increasingly sophisticated studies involving quantitative measurements of attitudes and interaction patterns among nations, influence of social values on public policy, simulation studies of decision-making under crisis conditions, the social dynamics of ideological confrontation, etc. A body of knowledge is being developed concerning the accommodation process between parties to conflict, on international institutions and organizations and their functioning, on the psychological prerequisites to the development of a viable international organization, and on technical problems of transfer from an armed to a disarmed society. Finally, serious efforts are getting under way to develop systematic world-wide data collection

from national units comparable to statistical data collected within the developed national units, to contribute to the social "mapping" of the globe.

## Some Current Research Approaches

The two sets of processes which rivet attention on the international scene today are the conflict processes which drive nations and groups apart and the integrative processes which draw them together. Earlier battles over whether the "conflict model" or the "integrative model" was more basic to the workings of society have been superseded by increasing agreement that these are equally researchable complementary processes.

The dialectics of conflict and integration are touched on in a variety of ways in the papers of this symposium. On the one hand the conflict-generating aspects of international communication and of the integrative international networks of trade and aid are dealt with by Tanaka, Boulding, Keyfitz and Jacobson. On the other hand the integrative aspects of overt conflict which emerge from mutually agreed-upon rules of conflict are treated by Boulding, Deutsch and the Useems.

Assuming that both conflict and community must be studied, a wide choice of approaches remains. Two of the major approaches used today in the international field are the study of social systems, and the analysis of images of systems. One or another or both of these approaches are used by each author. The international system is a system of nations acting and reacting on each other. As is pointed out in several papers, these actions and reactions are based on the images which the participants have of each other and the situation as a whole. This introduces an additional set of variables into the analysis. Whether the researcher is focussing on systems analysis as such, or on images of systems, he generally has to take both into account. This dual focus is evident in many of the papers, but perhaps most of all in the papers dealing with the bipolarized world in terms of the war industry, the population problem and the colonial problem.

The social psychologist is concerned with the triple interpenetration of the meanings, motivations and acts of the individual with the complex structures of culturally patterned goals and behaviors and with the economic, political and social institutions which embody these goals and behaviors. He may well despair at the complexity of his problem when it is carried to the international level. The papers presented here provide a helpful frame of reference in their explorations of the above-mentioned concepts of images and systems. These approaches provide a guide through the maze of empirical complexities. The concept of systems gives a manageable way to think about Tanaka's cultural meanings, Boulding's world war industry, Keyfitz' and Jacobson's

polarized groups of nation states, Deutsch's participating national elites and Angell's and the Useems' transnational elites.

The concept of images, the second key approach, recurs thematically after Tanaka's initial analysis of culturally unique evaluative organizations of reality into semantic space, producing "typically Japanese" images and "typically American" images of objectively similar behavior. As Boulding points out in discussing the reactivity coefficients of nation states in the world war industry system, it is not the reality (of armed might, in this case) but the image, which dominates the behavior of nations. Outmoded images of a special kind of economic interdependence, relevant during a brief interlude in the colonial history of the later nineteenth century, live on today to obscure the realities of technological change and the meaning of such change for rapidly exploding societies whose main resources are untrained hands. This cultural lag in images of the interdependent world community underlies much of what Keyfitz and Jacobson are dealing with. Deutsch, in reviewing mythological images of the world community which, by promising both too much and too little, have provided the rationale for international conflicts in the past, presents the need to bring existing images into closer conformity with the very modest realities of existing international networks of communication and potential cooperation.

The concept of the image and its relation to a postulated underlying social reality is a fruitful research tool in many areas of social science, and perhaps it is particularly vital for the study of the international system in the face of increasing awareness of the dangers inherent in the gap between image and reality in this area. At the moment, however, the field is full of questions and no answers. Given the fact that individuals from different cultures all have structurally similar semantic spaces (Tanaka), what determines the culturally unique organizations of meanings and how can the semantic barriers erected by these unique meaning structures be breached? There are two possible approaches to these questions. It is a tautology to say that unique cultural experiences produce unique cultural meanings, and that Japanese associations with the word "democracy" are determined by their particular life experiences as American associations with the same word are determined by similarly particularized life experiences. But a systematic examination of the critical social happenings during the adolescent years of contemporary, decision-making elites for a specific set of countries which comprise a significant interacting system, could transform this tautology into additional insights into the content of the images which the elites of each country have of the salient others in the system. Instead of being aware in a generalized way of the changing meanings of emperor-worship and modernization for Japanese of different ages in the twenties, the

thirties and the forties and the effect of these changing meanings on attitudes toward the West; or instead of vague references to the "Munich trauma" and "depression psychology" as explaining certain aspects of American behavior in the international system—why not systematically relate events of national magnitude taking place during the formative years of key decision-makers to their current foreign policy decision-making? Studies of this kind have been done at the individual case history level, but I am proposing a simultaneous examination of images of the international system in terms of the "shaping experiences" in adolescence of key decision-makers in member states.

An additional research problem brought to mind by Tanaka's paper concerns the concept "democracy". Ponder for a moment the significance of the fact that the democratic-undemocratic scale used in his study turned out to be cross-culturally unique, and that in sharp contrast to other nationals, fully one-third of the Americans treated "democratic" as an independent criterion of judgments, separate from all other criteria. This finding points up what I believe to be a critical weakness in the rapidly burgeoning field of political sociology, particularly as developed by American social scientists. Many of the current models of economic and political development focus on one particular concrete structure, the democracies of the industrialized twentieth-century West, and use this not only as if it were an analytic model, but as if it were an ideal end-point on a development continuum. This methodological confusion between folk model and analytic model (Ayoub, 1961) hampers the understanding of basic political processes. It keeps the U.S. from understanding its own political system, and certainly contributes substantially to communication difficulties with the post-war ally, Japan, with the new African states and with nations in the socialist-communist spectrum. Each of these groups has its own folk model of democracy and the basic analytic model is still to come. The problem of conflicting images of democracy can not be dealt with until the relationship between folk and analytic models of political systems is properly understood.

There is no intent to imply here that if there is a "reality-based" analytic understanding of other political systems, there would be no ground for conflict. Images have their own reality, and must be understood in their own terms, but must not be confused with the social matrix which generates them. Images can be thought of as "preferred conceptualizations of reality". (The preferences may be conscious or unconscious, or pre- or post-Mannheimian!) (Mannheim, 1946). They not only exist as representations of the "now" in the minds of men, but they also exist as dynamic foreshadowings of the future. Men hold images not only of the present, and the past, but of the future, and there is a constant interplay of these three time dimensions of the image in the human mind. Aspirations for the future can redefine the

past and transform the present. There is an increasing sophistication in the awareness of how each society rewrites its own past—communist nations have no monopoly on this—but there is just beginning to be an understanding of how each society writes its own future (Polak, 1961). Increased awareness of the variety of "preferred conceptualizations" of the international system does not remove the problems which conflicting images generate, but rather it prepares the way for a broader frame of reference within which these images of a preferred present and hoped-for future can interact.

Boulding's notion of the reactivity coefficient in the international system is based on the fact that decision-makers treat images, or preferred conceptualizations, as if they correspond precisely to the underlying structure of fact which gives rise to the images. The problem of reducing reactivity is two-fold. How an image of the armed enemy is disentangled from the reality of the armed enemy (see accurately and without exaggeration the factual dimensions of the threat), and what steps can be taken to help the enemy see the threat in its factual, not exaggerated, dimensions. Osgood's (1962) formula for doing this by a series of carefully planned unilateral initiatives (Graduated Reciprocal Tension-reduction, or GRIT) has aroused a good deal of interest and has possibly had some impact on foreign policy, but the problem is always, how many *Acts* does it take to change an *Image*? That a sufficiently consistent series of acts will change the images hostile nations hold of each other is concretely testified to by the gradual but uneasy disarmament of the Great Lakes after the Rush-Baghot Agreement, which resulted in a completely disarmed border between two former enemies, the U.S. and Canada.

Another interesting aspect of images of the international system touched on by Boulding is the matter of time perspectives. Miscalculations about the rate of growth of other nations was an important factor in both the first and second World Wars. While calculations about rates of future growth, and "overtake dates" for various developing nations as given on p. 58 is, as Boulding says, already an "obsolete arithmetical exercise", it leaves no doubt that there will be major shifts in the international system which no one can predict today. Deutsch has a tabulation elsewhere (1963) which documents the fact that every 25-year period for the past century has brought about a major political realignment and major new technologies which have changed the face of the world and that these could not possibly have been predicted 25 years earlier. While projections to the year 2000 are becoming fashionable,<sup>2</sup> many national governments operate with a time perspec-

<sup>2</sup> Note such projects as the British-based Mankind 2000 (3 Hendon Avenue, London N. 3, England); the Austrian Institut für Zukunftsfragen (Goethegasse 1, Vienna I, Austria, Robert Jungk, Director); and in the U.S., studies such as the Rand Report on a Long-Range Forecasting Study.

tive of six months at the most, and five-year plans are a very recent innovation for nation states. This may have something to do with the fact that most nation states *are* very recent. Very likely it is China's three-thousand-year old sense of national identity which makes it possible for the leaders of the People's Republic to speak of needing a century or two to build the kind of communist society the Party aspires to.<sup>3</sup> Social scientists have done very little with the time dimension of the images which people hold and its relevance for behavior. Most people know that images of the future which relate to aspiration level determine performance (Atkinson, 1957; McClelland, 1953), but for what time periods can aspiration levels determine performance? The puritan work ethic made it possible for people to sustain high productivity for long periods with the promise of "pie in the sky when you die". Can the communist work ethic make it possible for people to sustain high productivity levels for a series of generations so that in a future century there may be pie on earth?

There are many problems connected with images of the future in the international system, because there is not only the problem of lack of knowledge on which to base realistic projections (or aspirations) concerning developments within and between nations for even a century ahead, but there is also the problem of what kind of images of the future can be "lived with" psychologically, in terms both of prospects for economic development which will stave off mass famine in less-developed countries, and prospects of the rise of great new cultures not based on the traditions of the industrialized twentieth-century West.

## Perspectives for Future Research

The time dimension becomes a critical problem in the image of the future when we confront seriously the polarization of rich and poor, powerful and powerless, as presented by Keyfitz and Jacobson. If Keyfitz is correct in assuming that the economic interdependence of the colonial era was a transitory stage of early industrialization, and economists generally confirm this, then left are the uncomfortable alternatives of: (a) taking up the burden of the world welfare state<sup>4</sup> which some welfare-oriented leaders of thought in the West are ready for, but which is not yet wholly acceptable even at the national level in the United States (how much federal support for southern schools?);

<sup>3</sup> "This is an arduous, complex, long-term struggle which will take dozens of years, perhaps centuries". From a Liberation Army Daily editorial, "Hold High the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-Tung's Thinking; Actively Participate in the Great Socialist Cultural Revolution", translated in *Peking Review*, April 29, 1966, 6.

<sup>4</sup> As discussed in Gunnar Myrdal's *Beyond the Welfare State*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960.

(b) resigning ourselves to an uneasy isolation from the famines and misery of countries which don't reach take-off, salvaging consciences with sporadic technical aid missions which dress the surface wounds of ailing societies; or (c) scrapping all the warmed-over Victorian images of the world on which the two previous alternatives are based and taking a hard fresh look at the situation of developing countries in the late twentieth century.

Taking this fresh look is hampered by the curiously foreshortened historical perspectives which have nurtured the rise of social science in the West. It is perhaps not really surprising that a social science born of the industrial revolution failed to develop a sense of history. It is part of the intellectual heritage of the west to see continuous change and expanded social awareness as attributes only of developed societies. Raymond Grew and Sylvia Thrupp (1966), in a recent review of *World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators* by (Russet et al.,) point out that today's particular wave of modernization stems from an eight-centuries-old urbanization process reaching back to medieval Europe, and that "Today's modernization is but one of a vast series of 'movements' in human experience which have had disturbing and re-organizing effects". Among the many good points made in this review of the contemporary concept of stages of development is "how unevenly various aspects of modernization are likely to occur and what remarkable inconsistencies society can tolerate". In addition there is the final sharp reminder from history that "processes of development even in a developing world can be stopped or even reversed"; therefore the task of framing the social process in developmental stages ought to be approached rather humbly.

It is possible that unwittingly the growth of some of these societies has been hampered by a facile assumption that they must recapitulate the development process of the U.S. The social technology available now makes the early twentieth-century approaches to public health, education and welfare perfected in the West outmoded and inappropriate for developing countries. The separate bureaucracies of school systems, welfare services and health clinics can ill be afforded by societies which barely have the personnel to administer one of these bureaucracies effectively. Current pioneering with integrated community services for all ages and needs, in both communist and noncommunist West, takes place in total isolation from the needs of developing countries. Because a certain coincidence of technologies which occurred in the modernization of the U.S. has been confused with immutable stages of development, western advisors to development administrators in developing countries have ignored the relationship pointed out by Stinchcombe (1965) between the organizational inventions that can be made at a particular time in history and the social technology available at the time.

Scientists and educators in developing countries are beginning to evolve their own image of the future which involves putting together technologies in ways that do not occur to even the most pioneering of westerners, handicapped by their dependence on their own past experience. The Citta Scientifica Internazionale (1965) represents an attempt on the part of innovation-minded leaders in developing countries to pool their limited technological and research resources to seek breakthroughs in education for their illiterate masses, scrapping outmoded educational systems which don't even work well in the industrialized countries for which they were originally designed. The role of western technical advisors in the Citta may be very different from the role of technical advisors in national aid missions treading well-worn grooves in excolonial countries.

While things look black enough at this point in world history, the technological watershed which Keyfitz fears will permanently divide the haves and the have-nots may conceivably work very differently. The greatest failure may be the failure of imagination.

There are other aspects of polarization, as Jacobson has pointed out. There is the bipolarity created by the relative eagerness of many colonial powers to divest themselves of empires, coupled with the discovery by excolonial nations that formal transfers of sovereignty are a hollow mockery in the absence of physical resources and skills of social organizations. Can the machinery of international institutions develop fast enough to deal with the disparate wants and needs of a community of nations which is formally equalitarian and factually semifeudalistic?

The position Deutsch takes on this in his paper is not an optimistic one. With increasing trends toward centralization of control within nations, and increasing preoccupation with the possibility of some kind of international controls to contain conflicts between states, he sees increasing burdens being placed on inadequate control systems. At the same time, he points to the rapidly expanding population of politically relevant elites around the world whose attitudes and actions have to be taken into account. It is to be hoped that "national and international instruments of effective political communication" will be able to absorb this extra load of participation. In this crisis of interdependence, Deutsch sees a coalition arising of religionists, humanists, agnostics and social scientists in an all-out effort to develop the necessary capabilities for mankind's survival.

There is mounting evidence for just such a coalition. Angell's paper documents one aspect of this, the tremendous growth in transnational participation over the last decade. However, a major turning point in transnational participation came back in 1900, the date of the fourth Paris Exposition, which was also the occasion of 122 international congresses which spawned innumerable international organizations in succeeding years. These new associations are developing so rapidly

that scholars are barely able to document their growth, and the study of the dynamics of this new development remains in the future. The whole process of mobilizing national elites for international participation and the effects of this activity on levels of civic competence and participation within national societies needs to be examined, particularly if there is to be understanding of the dynamics of political socialization in developing countries. Many case studies of different types of binational communities such as the one reported by the Useems, of effects on students and businessmen of study and work abroad (Kelman, 1962), and of the effects of these transnational experiences on political behavior of nationals, need to be undertaken. Chadwick Alger (1961) has reported on the effects on national delegates to the UN of daily participation in a consensus-creating international agency, and Ingrid Eide Galtung (1965) has written about the denationalization of the international civil servant. Much more needs to be known about what is happening when images of national identity undergo change.

There is no doubt that there is a growing nucleus of scientists, scholars and leaders of thought who are concerned with creating an adequate communication and coordination structure at the international level to carry the heavy participation load that the mass media have unleashed in national societies. Not only is the technology of communication and coordination being studied, but the kinds of images which societies have of each other and of a future world community. Hadley Cantril, who chaired the earlier-mentioned UNESCO gathering of social scientists twenty years ago, has built on what he learned from that experience and recently published a book of major importance, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (1965), in which he undertakes to discover from the point of view of the individuals in different societies what the dimensions and qualities of their reality worlds, and of their aspirations for themselves and their societies, are. A major research program for the future will be the periodic replication of this study in the 13 countries of Cantril's sample, and the extension of the research to more countries.

One of the most interesting developments of the last two years is the number of groups which have arisen, in Europe and the U.S., concerned with a study of the future. Out of all the images of the future which vie for attention in a given society at a given time, which ones will take hold, have resonance with society, and become dynamic forces in the shaping of social structures in the international community? If current research bears fruit, much more will be known about this in a decade than is known now.

<sup>5</sup> For example, Anatol Rapoport and associates at the University of Michigan, Harold Guetzkow and associates at Northwestern University, Robert North and associates at Stanford, and many others.

The simulation studies which have been taking over the international relations field in the past five years have not been touched upon in this review (Cantril, 1950).<sup>5</sup> If major breakthroughs are achieved in the understanding of the parameters of decision-making at the international level through these drastically simplified laboratory replications of the decision-making situations which national leaders face, research on the international system may reach a new level entirely. At present, however, the understanding of that system is so crude that social scientists are in the rather dull stage economics was in 50 years ago of needing to collect vast quantities of data in order to begin to see the nature of the system. Data of many kinds are needed—political, economic, social—and at many levels from local to national to regional to international. Anyone who has worked with the data from the UN Statistical Yearbooks realizes how many new methods have to be found in order to collect accurate and comparable data from all parts of the world on even the simplest demographic and economic variables. Meaningful data on the more complex variables of functional literacy, political stability, degrees of participation and social integration within a society, national self- and other-images, the national "temperature" as measured on hostility-friendship scales vis-a-vis other nations, must wait on the development of internationally accepted indices of these variables, as well as on the further development of the mechanics of data collection.

These are not small tasks, and the developed nations will have to make considerably larger investments in the data collection branches of the United Nations Organization before the needed data will become available. The cloak-and-dagger approach to data collection as represented by the CIA, which absorbs vast resources which might better be invested in international data-gathering organizations, will in time be discarded as national decision-makers become more sophisticated. One may well ask, will this happen soon enough?

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## Biographical Sketches

**YASUMASA TANAKA** is Associate Professor of Social Psychology and Communications in the Department of Political Science at the Gakushuin (Peers') University, Tokyo, Japan, and a Specialist Member of the Japan Science Council Subcommittee on the Human Sciences. He received his Ph.D. in communication at the University of Illinois. His current research includes the psycholinguistic study of inter-nation perception among different language/culture communities.

**KENNETH E. BOULDING** is Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. His published work covers a wide range of fields, including most notably in addition to Economics, the field of peace research and international systems. From its beginning, he has been associated with the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan.

**NATHAN KEYFTITZ** is Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, currently serving as the Chairman of that Department. He has served as Visiting Professor in several areas of the world, including South America (Argentina, Chile) and East Asia. He has contributed extensively to the study of populations, both as author and as Editor of *Demography, 1965*.

**HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON** is Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. During 1965-1966 he served as Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. He is the co-author with Eric Stein of a study of the nuclear test ban negotiations entitled *Diplomats, Scientists and Politicians*. He has traveled extensively in Africa in connection with his work on the United Nations and decolonization.

KARL DEUTSCH is Professor of Political Science at Yale University and associated with the Yale Political Data Project. He is also consultant in political science to the Mental Health Research Institute, University of Michigan, and has published extensively on the role of communications in the political process.

ROBERT C. ANCELL, Professor of Sociology and for several years Co-Director of the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, University of Michigan, has contributed a paper and several documents for the Sixth World Congress of Sociology held in Evian-les-Bains, September, 1966. In addition to a paper on "Empirical and Experimental Studies", given at a plenary session on The Sociology of International Relations, he prepared an issue of *Current Sociology* (published by the International Sociological Association) on The Sociology of International Relations—a trend report and annotated bibliography. He also chaired a Working Group on Conflict Research and Research in Conflict Resolution for which about ten sociologists around the world prepared working papers.

JOHN AND RUTH HILL USEEM are Professors in the Department of Sociology at Michigan State University. They have been engaged in studying cross-cultural relations for a number of years.

ELISE BOULDING is Editor of the International Peace Research Newsletter and currently a Danforth Fellow in the Department of Sociology at the University of Michigan. She has recently published studies of women's perceptions of their public roles in civic and peace organizations in Japan and the U.S.

YASUMASA TANAKA, Cross-Cultural Compatibility of the Affective Meaning Systems (Measured by Means of Multilingual Semantic Differentials), *J. of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 1, 27-46.

Findings of this paper are part of a research project on the Cross-Cultural Generality of Meaning Systems, supported by the NSF fund, of which C. E. Osgood is Principal Investigator. The paper discusses the structures of various "semantic spaces" and their general compatibility across different language/cultural communities, especially Japan and the United States. There seem to be some scales of judgment which are specially susceptible to interaction with cultures and reflect unique cultural distinctions. Incompatibility in the meaning systems is considered as a possible and critical obstacle for intercultural cooperation.

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KENNETH BOULDING, The Role of the War Industry in International Conflict, *J. of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 1, 47-61.

The war industry is defined as that segment of the economy which produces whatever is bought by the defense budget. The question at issue is that of the reciprocal relations between the war industry and other elements of the international system. The war industry is a component of the threat system aspect of the international system, and in this sense, the various national war industries are symbiotic. Equations are developed for the equilibrium of the world war industry on the assumption that the size of the war industry of any nation is a function of that of the war industries of other nations. It is shown that the likelihood of stability of this system diminishes sharply as the number of nations increases even beyond two. The adjustment of the total economy to disarmament is more a psychological than an economic problem. The impact of diverse rates of economic growth on the stability of the international system is considered, also the high cost of being a world power. The present international system may have considerable stability in it, if it remains bipolar.

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NATHAN KEYFITZ, National Populations and the Technological Watershed, *J. of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 1, 62-78.

The ability of capitalism to produce material goods has been paralleled by its production of people. This latter was a "spin-off" from the early industrial system which not only survives into the present, but has attained a momentum of its own. The concern about the people-producing process as we enter the last third of the twentieth century lies especially in the fact that the people and the goods are not being produced in the same places, and disproportions in the rates are leading to unprecedented contrasts of wealth and poverty.

This inequality in command of goods is given a strange aspect by a pathological elaboration of the 19th century concept of nationhood, in which the poor insist on living independently, and in separate territorial units from the rich. The fantasies for which liberal romantics fought in 19th century Greece and Italy, and conservative romantics in Germany, have now become commonsense reality to the inhabitants of Ceylon and Tanzania. The newly created large populations are framed in one or another national state, of which there are now approximately 120. If things go as badly as they may during the next 33 years, the end of the century could see about one billion rich people, mostly of European and Japanese descent, in a score of countries, facing five or more billion desperately poor, in a hundred national states. The population problem which is intimately related to the problem of development is given an especially critical turn by a decisive alteration of western technology which took place in the middle third of the twentieth century.

HAROLD KARAN JACOBSON, *Changing Dimensions of the Colonial Problem*,  
*J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 1, 79-88.

Although the number of people under colonial rule has diminished greatly in the past two decades, the colonial problem broadly defined still remains a potent source of conflict. The decolonization of the southern third of Africa presents especially difficult problems. Where decolonization has already occurred there is still the issue of achieving mutually satisfactory post-colonial relationships between powerful and rich states on the one hand and poor and weak ones on the other. The extent to which these matters have thus far been considered and handled within international institutions is significant. The future could bring extremely sharp conflicts. On the other hand, there are grounds for hope that the issues will be resolved relatively peacefully within the framework of international institutions. If they are, all parties will have to exercise skill and restraint for the record indicates how close deep conflicts are which could threaten even the existence of the international institutions themselves.

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KARL DEUTSCH, *Changing Images of International Conflict*, *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 1, 91-107.

Major images of war which have prevailed in various periods of history are reviewed: war as inexorable through God's design or man's weakness, as the *ultima ratio*, as Armageddon, as obsolescent, as failure of control. Coalitions among contemporary holders of potentially peace-promoting images are examined. The warning is given that existing national and international instruments of political communication and control may not be able to cope with the demands placed on them as the world's strategic interdependence outstrips its economic, cultural and social interdependence.

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ROBERT C. ANGELL, *The Growth of Transnational Participation*, *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 1, 108-129.

The concept transnational participation covers situations where people of different nations are collaborating to achieve common objectives or are living in close contact. Excluded are communication at a distance, trade, and tourism. Though the question of effects of such participation is crucial, here only quantitative trends are analyzed. Trends in the last decade are given for six categories of participation: visiting friends and relatives abroad, sojourn abroad for business reasons, study abroad, technical assistance, international non-governmental organizations, and membership in United Nations secretariats. These all show rapid increases at the world level. Sociologists need to study the effect of such trends.

**JOHN and RUTH HILL USEEM, The Interfaces of a Bi-national Third Culture:  
A Study of the American Community in India, *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No.  
1, 130-143.**

The American community in India, composed of Americans who live and work in India as representatives of the United States, emerged as a distinct entity in response to the new relationship established between the two countries at mid-century. The confrontation among Americans overseas and between Americans and Indians precipitated new patterns for social interaction, called "the Third Culture." Americans interact among themselves in locality-based and functionally-linked groupings. Nine out of ten Americans participate in either or both types. Contrary to popular notions, membership in these all-American groupings aid rather than deter Americans in establishing relationships with Indians.

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**ELISE BOULDING, The Study of Conflict and Community in the International System: Summary and Challenges to Research, *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 1, 144-158.**

Serious social science research on conflict processes and integrative processes began in the twenties and thirties but was brought to a halt by the second World War. It is only now emerging from the paralysis of the Cold War of the late forties and fifties and a growing number of international research institutes and associations are making international cooperative research on the international system a possibility. The earlier polarization of research at the integrative or the conflict end of the interaction continuum has been replaced by a view of conflict and integration as complementary processes. Much of today's research focuses on analysis of systems and of images of systems. Lack of adequate data remains the major obstacle to research.

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
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VOL. XXIII • NO. 2

## PROBLEMS OF BILINGUALISM

John Macnamara

SUSAN ERVIN-TRIPP  
JOSHUA A. FISHMAN  
A. BRUCE GAARDER  
JOHN J. GUMPERZ  
DELL HYMES  
HEINZ KLOSS  
WALLACE E. LAMBERT  
JOHN MACNAMARA



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
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# The Journal of **SOCIAL ISSUES**



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APRIL 1967 VOL. XXIII No. 2

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## PROBLEMS OF BILINGUALISM

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## BILINGUALISM IN THE MODERN WORLD

Perhaps the first impression which the reader of this issue will receive is that bilingualism is far more widespread than he imagined. This is not the result of any deliberate plan, yet so many contributors refer to so many bilingual settings that the effect is just as forceful as if it had been planned. Americans in general and American academics in particular are so accustomed to a seemingly monolingual environment that they are likely to be surprised by the extent of bilingualism. Indeed few among them suspect that for the majority of those who speak it, English is a second language. Before going on to the more central problems of the issue it might, then, be profitable to elaborate a little on the magnitude of these problems in terms of the number of persons involved.

Most nation's of Europe—whether Western or Eastern, Northern or Southern, or Central—are multiethnic and as a result multilingual. As national ideologies involve ever increasing proportions of their populations in national processes, the proportions of these populations which become bilingual grows accordingly.

The Catalans, Basques and Galicians in Spain; the Bretons and Provencals in France; the Welsh and Scots in the United Kingdom; the Flemings and Walloons in Belgium; the Romansh in Switzerland; the Valoise, Piedmontese, Germans in Italy; the Frisians in Holland; the Laps throughout Scandinavia; the Italians, Hungarians, Slovenes, Croatians, Albanians and Macedonians in Yugoslavia; the Germans, Poles and Slovaks in Czechoslovakia; the Germans and Ukrainians in

Poland; the Hungarians in Rumania; the Macedonians in Bulgaria; the Turks in Cyprus; the Greeks in Turkey; the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, White Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Jews and various peoples of the Caucuses in the Soviet Union—these are merely the most obvious bilingual populations in Europe, after generations and even centuries of national unification, transfer of populations, expulsion and genocide. Little wonder then that European scholars, governments and voluntary organizations continue to be highly interested in bilingualism (Vildomec, 1963; UNESCO, 1966; *Europa Ethnica*, 1967).

If bilingualism is still so widespread and so diversified in Europe, how much more so is it in Latin America, Africa and Asia! In these continents, too, there are numerous instances of bilingualism based on ethnic differentiations within the body politic (e.g. Quechua in Peru; the many linguistic groups in India; Guarani in Paraguay, etc.). Bilingualism which is due to the distance (and formerly the social gulf) between the vernacular and the standard varieties is also found (e.g. Classical Arabic on the one hand and Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqui and other varieties of vernacular Arabic on the other—the differences being far greater than between, say, Chaucerian English and contemporary Bostonese). Finally, widespread bilingualism occurs because of the revival and expansion of national languages formerly not spoken for centuries or used only for limited purposes by restricted populations—e.g. Hebrew in Israel, Swahili in Tanzania, Bahasa Indonesia in Indonesia, and Pilipino (Tagalog) in the Philippines.

However, besides these kinds of bilingualism, there is another type which characterizes many of the new and developing nations. Many such nations have frontiers that are no more than arbitrary lines drawn on the map by agreement between formerly contending colonial powers. As a result, many new nations are marked by such extreme ethnic diversification (far beyond any European nation) that no indigenous language can hope to become the instrument of national unification and development. In addition none of the indigenous languages is currently equipped to deal with the modern world of technology and bureaucracy (UNESCO 1953; Bull, 1955). Certainly these languages could be developed as literary, commercial and industrial instruments, as were English, Spanish and French many centuries ago and as were Finnish, Bulgarian and Ukrainian more recently. However, given the context of ethnic diversification, pressing exigencies of modern nationhood, and the heritage of excolonialism and neo-colonialism, it appears impossible (or inadvisable) to wait to develop the indigenous languages as instruments of modern commercial, technocratic and literary communication. In order to obviate these difficulties, languages of wider communication, such as English or French, have been adopted as national languages and, as a result, countless new bilinguals have been and are being created.

## Diglossia . . . a Recurrent Theme in this Issue

But it is not enough merely to list bilingual situations or to classify them according to their origins. One recurrent theme in this issue is that it is more important to ask what functions are served by each of the languages in a bilingual situation, and what settings and functions are considered appropriate to each by their speakers. Such questions, which for some time have been a major concern of sociolinguists, were given initial prominence by Charles A. Ferguson (1956) who not only described a particular type of bilingual situation, but coined the now popular term *diglossia* to describe it. Diglossia, as Ferguson defines it, "is a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier period or of another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector of the community for ordinary conversation". An example of diglossia is the coupling of Standard German and Swiss German in the German-speaking cantons of Switzerland. The whole adult population knows both varieties, but employs them for distinct functions. In the decade since the appearance of Ferguson's article the term diglossia has been generalized to all situations in which a *high* or standard variety is employed for the purposes of more formal communication, and a *low* or relatively uncultivated variety is employed for the purposes of more intimate communication. Fishman makes particular use of this more refined contrast in his article, but it also underlies the articles of Hymes and Gumperz and to some extent that of Kloss.

Fishman, Hymes and Gumperz also stress the further point that both bilingualism and diglossia are best not considered in isolation, but rather as salient examples of a capacity for code variation which is also to be found among monolinguals. In order to appreciate this point it is necessary to recall the work of such scholars as Bernstein (1961) and Labov (1966) who showed that the differences between the English spoken by upper and lower class native English speakers can be surprisingly large. In fact such differences in what is generally considered to be a single homogeneous code can in some cases match the linguistic code differences of bilinguals. However, for the present purpose, the point to note is that several contributors advocate the use of a single theoretical model to handle all code variation whether monolingual or bilingual, and Hymes actually proposes such a model in detail. This development is of great value in allowing us to see bilingual functioning in much broader perspective than has hitherto been the case.

## Other Themes . . .

Other themes running through the issue relate more specifically to the psychological and educational aspects of bilingualism. Ervin-Tripp and Lambert discuss the effects of attitudes toward race and language on the individual bilingual. Ervin-Tripp's paper deals with the effects of such attitudes, and those of other factors, on the acquisition of English by Japanese women who married English-speaking Americans and came to live in the United States. This study is of particular interest in that it is one of the very few which combines the theoretical frameworks and techniques of both psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics. Lambert studies the effects of social attitudes on the individual bilingual's perception of himself in each of his two language roles and on his perception of others with whom he comes in contact. Taken together these two papers treat of language learning and of norms and attitudes which the learner acquires often quite unconsciously together with language. Thus these studies complement the work of sociolinguists who study language usage from the point of view of society by adding the dimension of the individual within society.

Two other papers, those by Gaarder and Macnamara, study problems relating to the education of bilinguals with special reference to the use of the "weaker" language as medium of instruction. Education is of course the meeting point of those cross winds which others observe in isolation, but which the educator must deal with in combination without the leisure to await the outcome of academic researches. For these reasons studies of the educational problems associated with bilingualism are at once particularly valuable and particularly difficult.

While the issue does throw new light on some aspects of these problems it does not carry articles on two perennial problems of the greatest importance, the effect of bilingualism on the cognitive and linguistic development of children. Critical summaries of relevant research may however be found in Darcy (1953 and 1963), Peel and Lambert (1962) and Macnamara (1966).

### *Bilingualism and the Developing Nations*

For many bilinguals in the new and developing nations the languages of wider communication to which they are exposed (such as English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, Chinese and Swahili) will doubtless remain *weaker* languages. Some will master only the written form of these languages and only rarely use them in face to face communication. Others on the contrary will never learn to read and write these languages and will function in them only at the level of speech.

In either case, the burden of functioning in a weaker language must be added to the already great burdens of the poor nations of the world. Many consider this to be a necessary but passing burden, one

which will be lifted within a few generations as the new *foreign* languages become *indigenized* and displace the local vernaculars that now divide the citizens. Obviously, however, some vernacular speakers will resist displacement of their mother tongues and the possibilities of secessionism are very real, as the cases of India, Nigeria and other new nations, so clearly demonstrate.

### Bilingualism—a Constructive Force

Bilingualism is potentially at once a powerful disruptive force and a source of enrichment for mankind. The danger is that a nation may attempt to control this force by destroying it. Fishman's work, *Language Loyalty in the United States* (1966), documents the struggle in one country. Aware principally of the disruptive power of language, the United States set about making of its people, drawn from all over the world, a monolingual nation. Now, at last, somewhat aghast at its success, the United States is becoming aware of the riches it has sacrificed to national unity and appreciative of the cultural groups that resisted its conscious, and unconscious, policies of homogenization. The new tendency is seen in educational programs which aim at preserving and fostering what remains of those treasures. (Brault, 1963 and 1964; Center for Applied Linguistics, 1967) and at promoting the learning of foreign languages (Gaarder, 1965). Certainly the United States is now sufficiently influential to give the world an important example of linguistic tolerance. This example is likely to loose much of its force unless there is an understanding of the inspiration which brought it about and the bilingualism which it hopes to achieve.

Bilingualism is so complicated a phenomenon that one has the giddy feeling that in speaking of it one speaks of all things at once. It has been studied by psychologists because it raises problems about the use of two sets of language skills by a single individual and problems about the sometimes conflicting emotions and attitudes associated by the individual with his two languages. It has been studied by educators because of the basic relationship of language to all learning, because of the access which bilingualism allows to two cultures, and because of the administrative problems to which it gives rise. It has been studied by linguists because of its effects on language usage. It has been studied by sociologists and anthropologists because associated with language are attitudes and norms which have an effect on social and cultural institutions. Finally, it has been studied by political scientists who see in it a challenge to political institutions.

It is impossible for any one man to master all the disciplines required for the adequate description and study of bilingualism; so progress depends on the collaboration of representatives of these disciplines. Several contributors appeal for such collaboration. Hymes, in particular points out that the reality to be studied is the use of language

for a human purpose in a particular social environment. When the society, the individual and the language are studied in isolation the reality is lost. Nor can the reality be recaptured from the separate parts studied, because the frames of reference for each study were not developed with a view to the subsequent reconstruction of the living speech act. This issue of the *Journal of Social Issues* brings together for the first time articles from scholars in all the relevant disciplines. For this reason alone, and despite the fact that no attempt has been made to cover exhaustively the whole area of research on bilingualism, the contributors are particularly happy to present this issue on Problems in Bilingualism. The issue appears at a time when researches, conferences, and international seminars on bilingualism are more numerous than ever before. It is our hope that it will promote further collaboration between scholars from the fields represented here to their mutual benefit and to the benefit of those bilingual persons and societies who form the object of their studies.

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## Models of the Interaction of Language and Social Setting

Dell Hymes

University of Pennsylvania

Diversity of speech, within the community and within the individual, presents itself as a problem in many sectors of life—in education, in national development, in transcultural communication. When those concerned with such problems seek scientific cooperation, expecting to find a body of systematic knowledge and theory, they must often be disappointed. Practical concern outpaces scientific competence.

The questions which arise from diversity of speech are questions addressed to an understanding of the functional roles of languages. They take for granted a world in which communities have a plurality of languages (or code-varieties) and in which languages have a plurality of roles, the two, codes and roles, often being related in complex and distinctive ways. In expecting to find a scientific theory of such interaction of language and social setting, one in effect expects theory based on successfully asking (at least as a start), what code is used, where and when, among whom, for what purpose and with what result, to say what, in what way; subject to what norms of interaction and of interpretation; as instances of what speech acts and genres of speaking? How do community and personal beliefs, values and practices impinge upon the use of language, and upon the acquisition of such use by children?

No such body of systematic knowledge and theory as yet exists. There is not even agreement on a mode of descriptive analysis of language in interaction with social setting, one which, being explicit and

of standard form, could ensure development of knowledge and theory through studies that are full and comparable.

### The Phenomenon of Bilingualism

The phenomenon of bilingualism has been the main focus of such interest as has been shown, both in its own right and as medium of linguistic diffusion. (Dialectology in the United States until recently was mostly an abstraction of language from interaction with its immediate social setting, having primarily a geographical and reconstructive orientation of little relevance to contemporary American society.) Thus, the significant work in American linguistics during the 1950's which provides some sociolinguistic orientation to language deals with the description of bilingualism (Weinreich, 1953; Haugen, 1953, 1956).

Yet, bilingualism, it must be said, is not in itself an adequate basis for a model (or theory) of the interaction of language and social setting. From the standpoint of such a model or theory, bilingualism is neither unitary as a phenomenon, nor autonomous. The fact that two distinct languages are present in a community or in a person's communicative competence is compatible with, and may depend on, a great variety of underlying functional relationships. Conversely, it is not necessary that two distinct languages be present for the underlying functional relationships to appear.

Cases of bilingualism par excellence (as for example French and English in Canada, Welsh and English in Wales, Russian and French among pre-revolutionary Russian nobility) are salient, special cases of the general phenomena of variety in code repertoire and switching among codes. No normal person, and no normal community, is limited in repertoire to a single variety of code, to an unchanging monotony which would preclude the possibility of indicating respect, insolence, mock-seriousness, humor, role-distance, etc. by switching from one code variety to another.

Given the universality of code repertoires and of code-switching, then it does not appear decisive that the code-varieties be distinct languages (bilingualism par excellence). Relationships of social intimacy or of social distance may be signalled by switching between distinct languages (Spanish : Guarani in Paraguay), between varieties of a single language (Standard German : dialect), or between a pair of pronouns within a single variety (*tu* : *vous*). Segregation of religious activity may be marked linguistically by a language not generally intelligible because it is of foreign provenance (e.g., Latin, Arabic), or because it is a lexically marked variety of the common language (Zuni). Conversely, shift between codes may mark a shift between wholly distinct spheres of relationship and activity (Standard Norwegian : Hennies dialect), or it may simply mark the formal status of talk within a single integral activity (e.g., Siane in New Guinea).

If the community's own theory of code repertoire and code-switching is considered, as it should be in any serious descriptive approach, matters become even more complex and interesting. Among the American Indian peoples, such as the Wishram Chinook of the Columbia River in the state of Washington, it was believed that infants knew first a special language shared with certain guardian spirits and interpretable only by men having those spirits; the *native language*, Wishram, was in native theory a second language to everyone. Furthermore, one pair of communities may strain to maintain mutual intelligibility in the face of great differences in dialect, while another pair of communities may refuse to maintain intelligibility although the differences seem minor. In native theory, then, cases indistinguishable by objective criteria of linguistic differentiation may be now monolingual, now bilingual, depending on local social relationships and attitudes.

Finally, while it is common to look for specialization in the function, elaboration and value, of a language in a bilingual situation, such specialization is merely an aspect of a universal phenomenon that must be examined in situations dominantly monolingual as well. In doing so it must be borne in mind that language is not everywhere equivalent in communicative role and social value; speaking may carry different functional loads within the communicative economies of different societies. One type of hunting and gathering society, the Paliyans of South India, "communicate very little at all times and become almost silent by the age of 40. Verbal, communicative persons are regarded as abnormal and often as offensive" (Gardner, 1966, 398). Thus the role of language in thought and culture (Whorf's question) cannot be assessed for bilinguals until the functional role of each of their languages is assessed; the same is true for monolinguals, since in different societies language may enter differentially into educational experience, the transmission of beliefs, knowledge, values, practices, the conduct of life (Hymes, 1966b).

What is needed, then, is a general theory and body of knowledge within which code-switching and diversity of code repertoire could find a natural place, and within which salient bilingualism could be properly assessed. Little of such a theory and body of knowledge now exists partly because the social scientists asking the right sort of functional questions have not had the linguistic training and insight to deal with the linguistic face of the problem, and because linguistics, the discipline central to the study of speech, has been occupied almost wholly with analysis of the structure of language as a referential code. In defining such structure as object of study, linguists have tended to dismiss or ignore the functional role. Sometimes as a matter of simplifying assumption, sometimes as a matter of principle, linguistic theory has been almost exclusively concerned with the nature of a single

homogeneous code, shared by a single homogeneous community of users, and (by implication) used in a single function, that of referential statement. There have been notable exceptions to such a view, especially among linguists of Prague and London, but only very recently has there emerged something tantamount to a movement to redress the situation. This movement has come to be called sociolinguistics, especially when it focuses attention upon language proper in relation to sociological categories, or ethnography of communication, where there is focus upon verbal art, native taxonomy of speech types and functions, and other features more typically studied by anthropologists (Whiteley, 1968). In point of fact, an adequate study of language in interaction with social setting will enlist scholars from all the social sciences in a common enterprise. Throughout this article I shall use sociolinguistics, intending by it the name of a problem area mediating among disciplines. Ultimately such a term may become redundant, if linguistics comes to accept the sociocultural dimensions of its subject-matter and its theoretical bases; one might then speak simply of linguistics (Hymes, 1964a, 1968a, ms. a.).

### The Case for Sociolinguistic Description

For some of the most brilliant workers on the interaction of language and social setting, a general theory and body of knowledge is to be achieved by selecting problems that contribute directly to present linguistic theory and social theory. The mode of progress is direct action: use of multiple working hypotheses and strong constraints on relevance and verification in quite particular problems, intended to satisfy adherents of traditional linguistic theory and social theory. Studies in exotic societies are not particularly valued, since strong control over data and hypothesis-testing cannot be maintained. Information of the sort given (most often incidentally) in reports from other societies is not found to be convincing. A concern to secure reports focused on sociolinguistic information from such societies is thought pointless, since it suggests a prospect of endless descriptions that, whatever their quality and quantity, would not as such contribute to present theory.

My own view is different. I accept that intellectual tradition which since the eighteenth century has sought to understand the unity of mankind through both its ethnographic diversity and its general evolution. In that tradition a theory, whatever its logic and insight, is ultimately unsatisfying if divorced from the natural and existential world of mankind as a whole. The concern is consonant with that of Kroeber, reflecting upon Darwin:

... anthropologists . . . do not yet clearly recognize the fundamental value of the humble but indispensable task of classifying—that

is, structuring—our body of knowledge, as biologists did begin to recognize it two hundred years ago (1960, 14).

One recognizes that communities differ significantly in patterns of code-repertoire, code-switching, and, generally, in the roles assigned to language. Ethnographic reports indicate differences with regard to beliefs, values, reference groups, and the like, as these impinge on the on-going system of language use and its acquisition by children. Since there is at present no systematic understanding of the ways in which communities differ in these respects, we need one. We need, in effect, a taxonomy of sociolinguistic systems.

From this standpoint, each of a variety of diverse cases may be felt to be of value in its own right, as an expression of mankind. In any case, such instances are valued as enlarging and deepening insight. We require a widely ranging series of sociolinguistic descriptions because a particular model, let alone an integrating theory, is not convincing unless it has met the test of many diverse situations, of a mass of systematic data. (Recall that Darwin's exposition of evolution was convincing for such a reason.) A taxonomy and a descriptive model are joint conditions of success.

Information from exotic societies, analyzed with the goals of taxonomy and descriptive models in mind, is in fact interdependent with detailed work in one's own society. Each may provide insight and a test of significance for the other. Thus it has been suggested that there is only a class-linked British relevance to Bernstein's sociological model of elaborated vs. restricted forms of code, governed by personal vs. positional types of social control. [Elaborated codes are largely *now-coding*, adaptive in lexicon and syntax to the ad hoc elaboration of subjective intent, whereas restricted codes are largely *then-coding*, adaptive to the reinforcement of group solidarity through conventional expression. Personal social control appeals to individual characteristics, role discretion, and motivation; positional social control bases itself on membership in categories of age, sex, status, etc.]

### From the Standpoint of Taxonomy

From the standpoint of taxonomy, the model takes on a new dimension. It is found to be a valuable set of polar ideal types, applicable to the comparison of whole societies as communicative systems (see the description of Arapesh and Manus by Mead, 1937), and suggestive of new hypotheses linking socialization and adult religious experience. Among the Hopi and Zuni of the American Southwest, for instance, severe socialization pressure is initiated at about two years of age, before the child can have reasons verbally explained, and thus is necessarily experienced as positional control. Among the Wishram Chinook socialization pressure is withheld until the child can talk and have reasons verbally explained; the native view of socialization is

explicitly one of personal control through verbal means. Adult religious activity among the Hopi and Zuni is dominated by positional relationship (clan membership, etc.), and its verbal aspect is highly prescribed. Among the Wishram it is dominantly unique to each individual; the verbal aspect is private between person and guardian spirit, and interpreted by the person according to his own life experience.

Furthermore, I believe that failure to postulate a model and taxonomy of sociolinguistic systems as a goal will perpetuate a long-standing, unsatisfactory state of affairs, namely, the failure of scientific study to address itself to the unity of language and social life. This unity is rooted in the use of language in social life, in the integrity of the message as an act. Because of the common divorce of the study of language, as grammar, from the study of society, the unity does not come into view. Each of the separate specialisms abstracts from the speech act its own aspect for its own purposes. A theory of language in society, when envisaged, is usually thought of as uniting the results of such separate enterprises, institution-free grammar and grammar-free institutions. But these enterprises, having made their abstractions in quite disparate frames of reference, and never having been responsible for the study of speech acts as such, are quite incapable of supporting the act of reintegration. What from the standpoint of the actors and the community is an integral act, motivated and subject to shared rules of interpretation, remains invisible. It is both less and more than it was: less, because it lacks its own form and motivation; more, because having been dismembered according to conflicting claims of jurisdiction by specialisms, each concerned to gerrymander speech to its own taste, the parts to be fitted now overlap. The act, still lifeless, has grown grotesque. All approaches in which the relation between language and social life is regarded wholly as a matter of correlation, or of variation, are vitiated by the implicit assumption that integration is a matter of post-hoc putting together of separate results, none obtained with the integral object in view.

In short, there must be a study of speaking that seeks to determine the native system and theory of speaking; whose aim is to describe the communicative competence that enables a member of the community to know when to speak and when to remain silent, which code to use, when, where and to whom, etc. (This view is an application to speaking of the general view of ethnography as the construction of descriptive theory that has been elaborated by Goodenough, Conklin, Frake, Sturtevant, myself and others; for its application to speaking, cf. Hymes 1962, 1964b, 1964c, and ms. b.)

In considering what form sociolinguistic description might take, and what form an integrated theory of such description might take, one needs to show sociologists, linguists, ethnographers and others a way to see data as the interaction of language and social setting. The need for this is clear from the frequency with which researchers have

had informal field experience of great sociolinguistic interest, but, lacking precedent and format for its presentation, have let the information lie fallow as at best a matter for anecdotes.

Only a specific, formal mode of description can guarantee the continuation of the present interest in sociolinguistics. Such interest is sustained more by fashion and practical issues, perhaps, than by scientific conviction and accomplishment. It was the development of a specific mode of description that ensured the success of linguistics as an independent discipline in the United States in the twentieth century, and the lack of it that led to the decline and peripheral status of folklore, both having started from a similar base, i.e., the interlocking interest of anthropologists and humanistic scholars in language, in the one case, verbal tradition, in the other.

Such a goal is of concern to practical and applied work as well as to scientific theory. When a problem of bilingualism is to be studied, for example, the components of speaking that are taken into account will depend upon a model, implicit if not explicit, of the interaction of language with social setting. The significance attached to what is found will vary with the understanding of what is possible, what universal, what rare, what linked, in a comparative perspective. What survey-researchers need to know linguistically about a community, in selecting the code of questioning, and in conducting questioning, is in effect an application of the community's sociolinguistic description. In turn, practical work, if conducted with the needs of taxonomy and theory in mind, can make a special contribution, for it must deal directly with the interaction of language and social setting, and so provide for a test of the relation between theory and practice.

The goal of sociolinguistic description can be put in terms of the present situation in the disciplines whose interests converge in sociolinguistics. Whatever his questions about language, a linguist is clear that there is an enterprise, description of languages, which is central and prerequisite. Whatever his questions about society and culture, a sociologist or an anthropologist is clear that there is an enterprise (whether called ethnography, social structure, social organization) that is concerned with the concepts and methods prerequisite to particular studies and answers, a system that provides a coherent, general guide to inquiry. In other words, such workers understand what it means to describe a language, a social system or the culture of a community. We need to be able to say the same sort of thing, i.e., what it means to describe a sociolinguistic system.

## Toward a Descriptive Theory . . .

Sociolinguistic systems may be considered at the level of national states, and indeed, of the emerging world society. The concern of this

paper is with sociolinguistic systems at the level of the speech economies of individual communities. The interaction of language with social setting is viewed first of all as a matter of human action and of the knowledge, sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious, that enables persons to use language in social life. Larger systems, it is true, may have properties not reducible to those of the speaking competence of persons, just as the world economy has properties not reducible to those of the economies of nations, communities or persons. Such competence, however, underlies communicative conduct, not only within communities, but in encounters between them. Whenever a larger system is dependent upon communication among persons, then the point of departure is persons. The speaking competence of persons may be seen as entering into a series of systems of encounters at levels of different scope. The considerations to be advanced here apply in principle to analysis of any social relationship in which norms of communicative conduct entailing speech have arisen. The examples will typically be from the analysis of relationships characteristic of individual communities.

An adequate descriptive theory would provide for the analysis of individual communities by specifying the technical terms required for such analysis, and by specifying what form the analysis should take. That form would be formal (i.e., would deal with the actual forms of speaking in a wholly explicit way) and standard (in the sense of being subject to general constraints on order, interrelationship and the character of rules). However, only extended empirical work, and extended experimentation with alternative modes of statement, can show what form of descriptive theory is to be preferred. When achieved, such a theory, by providing for the explicit, standard analysis of individual systems will at the same time provide a theory of their universal features.

### *Some Notions with which the Theory Must Deal*

Among the notions with which such a theory must deal are those of speech community, speech situation, speech act, speech event, fluent speaker, native speaker, factors (or components) of speech events, functions of speech, rules of speaking, types of speech event and act. I have sketched a partial approach to such notions, first in "The ethnography of speaking" (1964a, 33-44; 1964b). I shall not repeat the ways in which the approach has already been developed, but show how it has been modified in the course of recent work. It must be emphasized that the discussion at this stage is of a heuristic guide to the analysis of systems, and that an eventual theory will have properties that can emerge only from the results of such analyses.

The recent work has been aimed at analyzing ethnographic data so as to provide at least a preliminary taxonomy of the variety of socio-

linguistic systems that impinge upon education and the child. In socialization a child acquires not only language(s), but also sets of attitudes and habits with regard to the value and utilization of language(s). A child capable of any and all grammatical utterances, but not knowing which to use, not knowing even when to talk and when to stop, would be a cultural monstrosity. Often enough a child is confronted not only with more than one code, but also with more than one system for the use of the codes. There may be what linguists have come to call interference (Weinreich, 1953) not only between two sets of code habits, but also between two sets of habits for the use of codes.

In educational situations made complex by diversity of speech, then, whether saliently bilingual or not, one needs to understand the general patterns of communicative competence being acquired by children as background for understanding the outcome of the small fraction of communicative experience encountered by children in school. A comparative perspective may help one to understand problems of a particular case.

In the course of this work a guide to the analysis of socialization, focused on speaking, has been prepared. (Existing guides neglect speech as a variable.) In one sense, such work focuses on the acquisition of a pre-existing system of interaction of language with social setting. In a deeper sense, such work studies the whole system as viewed from the standpoint of the child.

The guide is organized from the more general to the more specific, and is consciously designed to present the acquisition of linguistic codes as but a part of the acquisition of communicative competence as a whole. Its outlines are:

## A Guide to Analysis of Speech Socialization

### (A.) General Aspects of Socialization

- I. Life cycle (the ways in which speech and language enter into the distinguishing and accomplishing of reference points in the life cycle)
- II. Learning and teaching (the place of language and speaking in native conceptions of acquisition of culture and of modes of teaching)
- III. Social control (the relative place of verbal means and verbal explanations)

### (B.) Competence in Speaking

- IV. Speaking competence (general attitudes toward speaking in relation to valued types of person, satisfactions, normal demeanor; the system of speaking as something in which competence is acquired and evaluated; conceptions of such competence, and its place among other modes of communicative competence)

- V. Linguistic code competence (general attitudes toward knowledge of linguistic codes in relation to valued types of person, satisfactions, conduct; the repertoire of codes in the community, their uses, their order and mode of acquisition; conceptions of competence in linguistic codes, and their place among other communicative codes)

(C.) *Processes of Acquisition*

- VI. Communicative environment of the infant (what communicative behavior is directed at the infant, in what ways its behavior is interpreted as communicative, differential response to its use of communicative modalities)
- VII. Acquisition of speaking competence (conceptions of children's first speech acts, what speaking is directed at children, how their speech is responded to, conceptions of sequence of acquisition of speaking competence, of how competence comes about, what is done)
- VIII. Acquisition of linguistic code competence (conceptions of first words, of sequence of acquisition of code(s), of how it comes about, what is done)

(D.) *Generalizations, Typological Contrasts*

The detailed contents of the guide, and the practical procedures for their application to data, must be passed over here. What is directly pertinent is the effect of applying the guide on that part of the guide which sketches the analysis of sociolinguistic systems. As work continues, feedback from data continues too; but certain general formulations have been shown to be necessary and have remained stable. To these I now turn after a brief comment on the background of such efforts.

Most general treatments of language, speech, rhetoric, literature and some treatments of other topics, make assumptions, explicit or implicit, as to notions with which a descriptive theory of speaking must deal. With particular regard to the components of speech events and the functions served in them, there have been important classifications by Karl Bühler, Kenneth Burke, Roman Jakobson, Charles Morris, C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards and others. With particular regard to code repertoire in relation to social setting there are important classifications and findings in the work of Basil Bernstein (see above), Joshua A. Fishman, H. A. Gleason, Jr., John J. Gumperz, Michael Halliday, William Labov, and others. These studies provide terms and notions that may prove quite useful, and the same is true of studies of other aspects of the field of sociolinguistic description: there is much to be gained heuristically from them. It would not be to the point, however, to review such studies here with the object of picking among them, amalgamating them, or the like. While each suggests a schema that may prove useful in part or in whole, the fundamental problem—to discover the underlying communicative competence that enables members of a community to use and interpret the use of language, and

to provide a formal description that is a theory of that competence—cuts deeper than any schema so far proposed.

Concern must now be with terms as heuristic input to descriptive analyses, but just as a theory of language structure must have its universal terms (e.g., sentence, distinctive feature), so must a theory of language use. At least some of the terms now to be discussed will no doubt survive empirical revisions and permanently remain as part of the theory.

### Toward a Descriptive Theory . . . Social Units

One must first consider the social unit of analysis. For this I adopt the common expression:

*Speech Community.* Speech is here taken as a surrogate for all forms of language, including writing. The necessity and primacy of the term, speech community, is that it postulates the basis of description as a social, rather than a linguistic, entity. That is, one does not start with a code and look afterward to its context. One starts with a social group and looks within it at the codes present.

Bloomfield (1933) and others have in the past reduced the notion of speech community to the notion of language. Those speaking the same language (or first language, or standard language) were defined as belonging to the same speech community, and this confusion still persists in much social science literature, a quantitative measure of frequency of interaction sometimes being appended. The present approach requires a definition that is qualitative and expressed in terms of the *use* of language. Tentatively, a speech community is defined as a community sharing both rules for the conduct and interpretation of acts of speech, and rules for the interpretation of at least one common linguistic code. The sharing of code rules is not sufficient: there are persons whose English I can interpret, but whose message escapes me. Nor is the sharing of speech rules sufficient: such sharing may characterize a *speech area* (*Sprechbund*—I owe the term to J. Neustupny), comprising several distinct speech communities, not necessarily sharing a common language, but agreeing in patterns of speaking.

The *speech field* (akin to the notion of social field) can be defined as the total range of communities within which a person's knowledge of code and speaking rules enables him to move. Within the speech field must be distinguished the *speech network*, the specific linkages of persons through code and speech rules across communities. To illustrate: one's speech community may be, effectively, a single city or portion of it; one's speech field will be delimited by one's repertoire of codes, sometimes by a single language (say to England, Canada, Australia, and the United States, given a command of English), some-

times not; one's speech network, based for example on the practice of a common profession (say, sociology), may extend across communities, the common profession providing sufficiently common rules of speech.

Obviously part of the work of definition is borne by the community, and the difficulties of defining it are here by-passed. Criteria of frequency of interaction, regularity of interaction, focus of interaction, contiguity, degree of commonality of pattern, etc., may be invoked, each perhaps representing a continuum. The essential thing is that the object of description is an integral social unit. Probably it will be useful to reserve the notion of speech community for the social unit most specifically characterized for a person by common locality and primary interaction (Gumperz, 1962, esp. 30-32). I have essentially drawn distinctions of scale and kind of linkage within Gumperz' wholly general concept of *linguistic community* which amounts to any distinguishable intercommunicating group.

**Speech Situation.** Within a community one readily detects many situations associated with (or masked by the absence of) speech. Such contexts of situation will often be naturally described as ceremonies, fights, hunts, meals, love-making and the like. It would not be profitable to convert such situations *en masse* into parts of a sociolinguistic description, by the simple expedient of relabelling them in terms of speech. (Notice that the distinctions made with regard to speech community are not identical with the concepts of a general communicative approach, which must note the differential range of communication by speech, film, art object, music.) Such situations may enter as contexts into the statement of rules of speaking as aspects of setting (or of genre). In contrast to speech events, they are not in themselves governed by such rules, or one set of such rules throughout. A hunt, for example, may comprise both verbal and nonverbal events, and the verbal events may be of more than one type.

In a sociolinguistic description, then, it is necessary to deal with activities which are in some recognizable way bounded or integral. From the standpoint of general social description they may be registered as ceremonies, fishing trips, and the like; from particular standpoints they may be regarded as political, aesthetic, etc., situations, which serve as contexts for the manifestation of political, aesthetic, etc., activity. From the sociolinguistic standpoint they may be regarded as speech situations.

**Speech Event.** The term speech event will be restricted to activities, or aspects of activities, that are directly governed by rules for the use of speech. An event may consist of a single speech act, but will often comprise several. Just as an occurrence of a noun may at the same time be the whole of a noun phrase and the whole of a sentence (e.g., *Fire!*), so a speech act may be the whole of a speech event, and of a speech situation (say, a rite consisting of a single prayer, itself a

single invocation). More often, however, one will find a difference in magnitude: a party (speech situation), a conversation during the party (speech event), a joke within the conversation (speech act). It is of speech events and speech acts that one writes formal rules for their occurrence and characteristics. Notice that the same type of speech act may recur in different types of speech event, and the same type of speech event in different contexts of situation. Thus, a joke (speech act) may be embedded in a private conversation, a lecture, a formal introduction. A private conversation may occur in the context of a party, a memorial service, a pause in changing sides in a tennis match.

*Speech Act.* The speech act is the minimal term of the set being discussed, as the remarks on speech events have shown. The work on speech acts inspired by British philosophers such as the late J. L. Austin provides many helpful indications of the types of speech acts and the relationships among them. It also contributes to the task of determining for English the membership and meaning of native sets of terms for speech acts.

### Toward a Descriptive Theory . . . *Components of Speech*

In discovering the native system of speaking, certain familiar guidelines may be mentioned. One must determine the native taxonomy of terms as an essential although never perfect guide. A shift in any of the components of speaking may mark the operation of a rule (e.g., from normal to another tone of voice, from one code to another). Correction, embarrassment, withdrawal and other negative responses may indicate the violation of a rule. There may also be positive evaluation (more in some groups than others) of effective use of speech and its rules.

One must have in addition some schema for the components of speech events. Traditional in our culture is the three-fold one of speaker, hearer and thing spoken about. That has been elaborated upon in various ways, e.g., in information theory. Work with ethnographic data, however, has shown the necessity of a somewhat more detailed schema. The constraints on such a heuristic guide are that it should be ample enough to handle data without arbitrariness, yet compact enough to be kept in mind for use. Being heuristic, rather than at present a theory, there is no harm and a definite advantage in organizing the schema as a mnemonic device. It so happens that in English the letters of the term SPEAKING itself can be used rather naturally for this purpose. (That the analysis of components is not language-bound, determined by the accidents of spelling, can be shown by the possibility of alternative keywords, were the spelling different. Thus what below is I[instrumentalities] could as well be M[eans], A[gen-

cies]; what below is K[ey] could as well be T[one], M[anner], W[ay], H[ow]; etc. Changes of terminology, rather than exact translation, may permit an analogous mnemonic device in other languages. (In French, for example, PARLANT could be adapted to the purpose, as will be shown below.)

The criterion for registering a component is that it should be part of the definition of a rule of speaking. Rules of speaking, in other words, entail structured relationships among two or more components.

Organized in terms of the English code-word, components are:

(S) *Setting, or Scene.* By setting is intended of course time, and place, of a speech event. In addition, psychological setting, and cultural definition of the setting as a certain type of *scene*, may be implicated here, as when, within a play on the same stage, during the same performance, the dramatic time or place shifts: "ten years later", "a battlefield in France". The types of scene defined by a society may be basic to an analysis of speech events and the role of speaking. For example, among the Subanun of the Philippines, described by Charles O. Frake (ms.), there is a basic division into festive and nonfestive scenes. Thus, the character of Subanun litigation derives from its occurrence in festive scenes and the verbal art appropriate to them. A frequent type of rule is one in which a form of speech act is dependent on an appropriate scene; of equal importance is the use of speech acts or the choice of code to define scenes as appropriate.

(P) *Participants or Personnel.* Schemes of components usually distinguish Speaker and Hearer (Sender and Receiver, Addressor and Addressee). From the standpoint of explicit rules for speaking, such a categorization is at once too specific and too imprecise. It is too specific in that some rules hold for a participant independent of his role as speaker or hearer. Thus, in conversations among the Abipon of Argentina, if a participant (speaker or listener) is a member of the Hocheri (warrior class), then -in is added to the end of every word. It is too imprecise, because societies commonly differentiate a variety of roles for participants in speech events, and these must be specified. The importance of the category of auditor or audience, as a constraint on rules of speaking has recently been emphasized by the sociologist, Allen D. Grimshaw. Among the Wishram Chinook, formal speech events are defined by the relationship between sender, or source (e.g., a chief), a repeater of the sender's words, and an audience constituted as a public; in the major Wishram speech event the addressees at crucial points are not the audience, but the spirits of the surrounding environment.

It is typically in their definitions of the presence or absence of participants in speech events (more generally, communicative events) that societies most differ. Much of religious behavior can be viewed as application of a native theory of communication, often associated with elaboration of a specific code and code-switching.

(E) *Ends*. Here an English homonymy is exploited, two types of *ends* being meant: *ends* in view (goals, purposes), and *ends* as outcomes. In one sense, intentions and effects; in another, manifest and latent functions. Previous schemata of speech events have most often not provided a place for intention and outcome. (Kenneth Burke, 1945) is the exception, perhaps because of an unconscious behaviorism. Analysis of speech events from several societies shows the category of purpose and that of outcome to be crucial to the distinguishing of varieties of event. Among the Waiwai of Venezuela, for example, the varieties of the central speech event, the *oho*-chant, are to be distinguished as to whether the purpose is a marriage-contract, a trade, a communal work-task, an invitation to a feast, or a composing of social peace after death. Rules for participants and settings vary accordingly. Among the Yakan of the Philippines a taxonomy of four levels of event focused upon speech is to be differentiated in terms of purpose and outcome. Interpreted in a linguistic mode of statement, one has:

- (a) [Focus] → [talk about a topic] / *miting*  
 [Outcome] → [no special outcome]

That is, the type of speech event called *miting* has as its focus simply talk about some topic; no special outcome is expected.

- (b) [Focus] → [talk about an issue] / *qisun* ("conference")  
 [Outcome] → [decision]

That is, the type of speech event called *qisun* has as its purpose simply talk about something regarded as an *issue*, as when to plant rich, when to take a trip, and a *decision* is expected as the outcome.

- (c) [Focus] → [talk about a disagreement] / *mawpakkat*  
 [Outcome] → [settlement] / (negotiation)

That is, the type of speech event called *mawpakkat* has as its purpose talk about a *disagreement* involving conflicting interests, and as its expected outcome, a legally binding *resolution*, or *settlement*.

- (d) [Focus] → [talk about a dispute] / *hukum* (litigation)  
 [Outcome] → [ruling]

That is, the type of speech event called *hukum* has as its focus a *disagreement* arising from a charge that an offense has been committed, and as its expected outcome, a legal *ruling*, based on precedent and carrying special sanctions. The Yakan examples are from a paper by Frake, *Struck by Speech*, to appear in a volume on the ethnography of communication edited by John Gumperz and myself.

As the varied wording of the Yakan account has shown, where the *focus* of a speech event requires special attention, it seems most naturally to be an aspect of this portion of the heuristic scheme. Contrast in focus is often important for comparative study. Thus litigation

among the Subanun (Philippines) has special focus on message-form, in the elaboration of verbal art, in keeping with its occurrence among Subanun festive scenes; whereas Yakan (Philippines) litigation has focus only on topical content, in keeping with its place among Yakan informal scenes.

(A) *Art Characteristics.* Here two closely linked aspects of acts of speech are grouped together: the form, and the content, of what is said. The technical terms *message-form* and *topic*, respectively, are adopted for these. One context for the distinction is in the reporting of speech events: "He prayed, saying . . ." (preserving message-form) vs. "He prayed that he would get well" (preserving topic only).

Perhaps the gravest and most common defect in most reports of speech events is that it is impossible to recapture the rules for message-form. Without such rules, however, it is impossible to characterize the nature of the competence in speaking of members of the society. Commonly one reads that a certain use of language is important, even crucial to a society—gossip, for example, among the Makah Indians of northwestern Washington or among fox-hunting English aristocrats. If one does not know how to gossip correctly, one cannot be an adequate member of the group. It must, then, be possible to say of an act of speech that it does or does not fit the rules. Possibly the rules for gossip are defined entirely in terms of participants, topics and settings, and not in terms of message-form; but it seems far more likely that some forms of presenting the gossip-content are acceptable and some not. In any case it is certain that where there are genres of speech act, such as gossip, there is differential skill in their accomplishment, and such skill will include handling of the message-form.

A concern for the details of actual form strikes some as picayune and removed from humanistic and scientific importance. Such a view betrays an impatience that is a disservice both to humanistic and scientific purposes. It is precisely the failure to unite form and content in the scope of a single focus of study that has held back scientific understanding of the fundamental human skill, speaking and vitiated so many quasi-scientific attempts to prove the significance of expressive behavior through content categories alone. One can never prescribe in advance the size of signal that will be crucial to content and skill in a communicative genre. The more the genre has become a shared, meaningful expression within a group, the more likely that the crucial cues will be efficient, that is, slight in scale. If one balks at such detail, perhaps because it requires technical skills in linguistics, musicology or the like, one should face the fact that one is simply refusing to take seriously the human meaning of one's object of study and the scientific claims of one's field of inquiry.

A further consideration is that such genres which become shared, meaningful expressions within a group acquire a partial autonomy, an

inner logic of their means of expression, that conditions and sometimes even controls their content. For members of the group, then, "freedom is the recognition of necessity"; mastery of the detail and formal logic of the genre is prerequisite to personal expression. Again serious concern for the human meaning of such genres requires analysis that goes beyond gross content to precise, explicit statement of the rules and features of the form.

While such a perspective may seem to apply first of all to genres recognized as conventionally aesthetic, it applies as well to conversation in daily life. Only the most painstaking analysis of form (similar to that of literary criticism) can reveal the fantastic depth and adequacy of the elliptical art that is talk.

(K) *Key*. This component is introduced to distinguish the tone, manner or spirit in which an act is done. Acts otherwise the same as regards setting, participants, message-form and content, may differ in key, as between *mock : serious*; *perfunctory : painstaking*; and the like.

The communicative significance of key is underlined by the view that, where the two are in conflict, the manner of an act overrides the content in determining its true significance. The signalling of key may sometimes be a part of the message-form itself, but may be nonverbal such as a wink, gesture, attire, musical accompaniment.

(I) *Instrumentalities*. Here are grouped together two closely linked components, those of *Channel* and *Code*. By choice of *Channel* is understood the choice of oral, written, telegraphic, semaphore or other medium of transmission. By choice of *Code* is understood a choice at the level of distinct languages. Where the distinction is necessary, varieties within a language may be designated *subcodes*.

For the student of bilingualism, of course, rules linking choice of *Code* (or *subcode*) with the other components are of primary interest. Each component seems to covary with choice of code in some case or other: setting, participants, ends and outcomes, message-form and topic, key, channel and (to be cited below) norms of interaction and interpretation, and genres.

(N) *Norms of Interaction and of Interpretation*. By Norms is meant not the normative character that may attach to all rules for choice among components, but specific behaviors and proprieties that may accompany acts of speech—that one must not interrupt, for example; that normal voice must not be used except when scheduled (e.g., in church service). Here, too, may be considered shared rules for the understanding of what occurs in speech acts, e.g., as to what can be ignored or discounted.

In a thoroughgoing analysis of a community, the notion of norms of interaction would implicate the social structure—the members' categories of kinds of person (role, status and the like), and the norms of interaction obtaining between them. Analysis of these norms would be

prerequisite to adequate statement of rules governing modes of address and the symbolic import of other choices, such as choice of code (see discussion of formal rules below).

The notion of norms of interpretation implicates the belief system of a community. In the history of ethnographic analysis of language, the classic precedent is the treatment of symbolic meanings of elements of Trobriant magical formulae and ritual by Malinowski (1935), under the heading of *Dogmatic Context*. Malinowski's other rubrics for analysis are roughly related to those presented here in the following way: *Sociological Context* and *Ritual Context* subsume information as to setting, participants, ends in view and outcome, norms of interaction, higher-level aspects of genre; *Structure* reports salient patterning of the verbal form of the act or event; *Mode of recitation* reports salient characteristics of the vocal aspect of message-form.

(G) *Genres*. By Genres are meant categories or types of speech act and speech event: conversation, curse, blessing, prayer, lecture, imprecation, sales pitch, etc.

[With reference to French, the heuristic set of components might be presented in terms of PARLANT: (P) Participants; (A) Actes (form, content); (R) Raison, Resultat (= ends, outcomes); (L) Local (= setting; the English adaptation of the French word, locale); (A) Agents (channels, codes); (N) Normes; (T) Ton (= Key); Types (= Genres).]

### Toward a Descriptive Theory . . . *Formal Rules*

Rules of speaking do not usually refer to all components of a speech event, and often to as few as two or three. Choice of code may be defined in terms of code and interlocutor alone; or code and topic alone; or code, interlocutor, and setting; etc. It is necessary to distinguish the entire range because in a given case any one may be defining. Moreover, a non-defining component may yet condition the success or other aspect of the outcome of a speech event.

Many generalizations about rules of speaking will take the form of statements of relationship among components. It is not yet clear that there is any priority to be assigned to particular components in such statements. So far as one can tell at present, any component may be taken as starting point, and the others viewed in relation to it. When individual societies have been well analyzed, hierarchies of precedence among components will very likely appear and be found to differ from case to case. Such differences in hierarchy of components will then be an important part of the taxonomy of sociolinguistic systems. For one group, rules of speaking will be heavily bound to setting; for another primarily to participants; for a third, perhaps to topic.

Experimentation with the form of statement of rules of speaking

has not proceeded very far. Work of Joel Sherzer and myself with some American Indian data suggests the possibility of adapting a linguistic mode of statement. In such a format, generalizations applying throughout a speech event are stated at the outset in a sort of lexicon. The sequential form of the act itself is stated in a sort of syntax by means of context-sensitive rewriting rules (Chomsky, 1965). When prose descriptions of events have been so restated, there has been a considerable gain in understanding of structure. The explicit form of statement makes demands upon description that go beyond what is usually in prose accounts. The form of the event is disengaged, as it were, from the verbal foliage obligatory in prose sentences, and can be more readily *seen*. Such formal restatement is essential, if comparative work is to proceed. One must be able to compare events within a society, and across societies, in concise and standard format. Such comparison cannot depend upon memorizing or shuffling of prose paragraphs vastly different in verbal style. And it is through some formal restatement that one can commit oneself to a precise claim as to what it is a member of a society knows in knowing how to participate in a speech act.

A grave defect in many studies which examine the interaction of language and social setting has been the failure to state precisely (a) the difference and (b) the interrelationship between values pertaining to the sociolinguistic feature, on the one hand, and the values pertaining to the social context in which it can occur.

A related defect has been failure to state precisely the difference, and the interrelationship, between the normal, ordinary, or "unmarked" value of a sociolinguistic feature, on the one hand, and the "marked," or specially loaded values, on the other. Studies of the use of a given code in multilingual situations, like studies of modes of address, may state the range of contexts in which the code can occur, appending information about its use in each, but without contrasting the effects of varying code and context. However, as the Uruguayan linguist, J. P. Rona, has insisted, sociolinguistics deals not only with linguistic facts in contexts, but with linguistic facts having social value in contexts.

Just as the linguistic sign is a relation between a linguistic form and a linguistic value (e.g., the form "dog" and meaning "dog"), so a sociolinguistic feature, such as a choice of code, is a sign, a relation between a form (here, the linguistic fact, such as a code) and a sociolinguistic value (say, respect, or formality). The set of code-varieties within a community may thus be analyzed as a semantic set. One may determine for normal contexts the dimensions of meaning along which choice of code-variety implies contrast. To complete the analysis, one must then state separately the domains—settings, role relationships or whatever—across which the normal meanings of code choice are de-

fined. Having done so, one may now state the ways in which code choice may be used to insult, to flatter, to boast—the marked, specially loaded uses—by stating the corresponding, *different* relations between code values and domain values that govern these uses.

All these relationships can take the form of linguistic rules, such as those developed by Chomsky (1965) for handling lexical elements. In effect, one specifies form, content, and context—an overt element, semantic values, and rules governing its selection in those values. Such a form of statement is no more than an elaboration of the form of statement familiar to us in dictionaries now, e.g., "reach" (form), "a tack sailed with the wind coming more or less from abeam" (semantic value), with the specification (selection rule), "*in nautical usage*". To pursue such a form of statement in sociolinguistics, however, will have as consequence the *inseparability of sociolinguistic analysis from the full-scale analysis of social life itself*, for it is in the analysis of social life that the requisite rules of selection for sociolinguistic features are to be found and stated. (For a detailed example of this mode of analysis, see my "Quasi-Korean Modes of Address", submitted to *Anthropological Linguistics*, with the Korean data on Richard Howell (1965), it can be shown that values of authority and intimacy assigned to the modes of address (values often assigned to choice of code in some societies) are in fact properties of the social relationships in terms of which the use of the modes of address is to be defined. The modes of address themselves form a set on a single dimension of social distance. The formal separation of the set of linguistic choices and the set of social relationships reveals the true nature of the relationship between them. For major detailed work on Speech Communities from this standpoint see Gumperz (1964) and Labov (1966).)

Such a mode of analysis permits formal treatment of many of the functions served in acts of speech. The conventional means of many such functions can indeed be analyzed as relations among components, e.g., message-form, genre and key in the case of the -*y* form of the accusative plural of masculine nouns in Polish, which has the value "solemn" in the genre of poetry, and the value "ironic, pejorative" in the genres of non-poetic speech. Functions themselves may be statable in terms of relations among components, such that poetic function, for example, may require a certain relationship among choice of code, choice of topic and message-form in a given period or society.

It would be misleading, however, to think that the definition of functions can be reduced to or derived from other components. Such a thought would be a disabling residue of behaviorist ideology. Ultimately the functions served in speech must be derived directly from the purposes and needs of human persons engaged in social action, and are what they are: talking to seduce, to stay awake, to avoid a war. The formal analysis of speaking is a means to the understanding of

human purposes and needs, and their satisfaction; it is an indispensable means, but only a means, and not that understanding itself.

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## Bilingualism With and Without Diglossia; Diglossia With and Without Bilingualism.

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The psychological literature on bilingualism is so much more extensive than its sociological counterpart that workers in the former field have often failed to establish contact with those in the latter. In the past decade a very respectable sociological (or sociologically oriented) literature has developed dealing with bilingual societies. It is the purpose of this paper to relate these two research traditions to each other by tracing the interaction between their two major constructs: bilingualism (on the part of psychologists) and diglossia (on the part of sociologists).

### Diglossia

In the few years that have elapsed since Ferguson (1959) first advanced it, the term diglossia has not only become widely accepted by sociolinguists and sociologists of language, but it has been further extended and refined. Initially it was used in connection with a society that used two (or more) languages for internal (intra-society) communication. The use of several separate codes within a single society (and their stable maintenance rather than the displacement of one by the other over time) was found to be dependent on each code's serving functions distinct from those considered appropriate for the other. Whereas one set of behaviors, attitudes and values supported, and was expressed in, one language, another set of behaviors, attitudes and values supported and was expressed in the other. Both sets of behaviors,

attitudes and values were fully accepted as culturally legitimate and complementary (i.e., nonconflictual) and indeed, little if any conflict between them was possible in view of the functional separation between them. This separation was most often along the lines of an H(igh) language, on the one hand, utilized in conjunction with religion, education and other aspects of high culture, and an L(ow) language, on the other hand, utilized in conjunction with everyday pursuits of hearth, home and work. Ferguson spoke of H and L as superposed languages.

To this original edifice others have added several significant considerations. Gumperz (1961, 1962, 1964a, 1964b, 1966) is primarily responsible for our current awareness that diglossia exists not only in multilingual societies which officially recognize several "languages" but, also, in societies which are multilingual in the sense that they employ separate dialects, registers or functionally differentiated language varieties of whatever kind. He has also done the lion's share of the work in providing the conceptual apparatus by means of which investigators of multilingual speech communities seek to discern the societal patterns that govern the use of one variety rather than another, particularly at the level of small group interaction. On the other hand, I have attempted to trace the maintenance of diglossia as well as its disruption at the national level (1964, 1965a, 1965c, 1965d, 1965f, 1966a, 1966b), and in addition have attempted to relate diglossia to psychologically pertinent considerations such as compound and coordinate bilingualism (1965e). The present paper represents an extension and integration of these several previous attempts.

For purposes of simplicity it seems best to represent the possible relationships between bilingualism and diglossia by means of a four-fold table such as that shown in Figure I.

FIGURE I  
THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BILINGUALISM AND DIGLOSSIA

BILINGUALISM	DIGLOSSIA
+	+
-	-
+	1. Both diglossia and bilingualism
-	2. Bilingualism without diglossia
-	3. Diglossia without bilingualism
	4. Neither diglossia nor bilingualism

## Speech Communities Characterized by Both Diglossia and Bilingualism

The first quadrant of Figure I refers to those speech communities in which both diglossia and bilingualism occur. At times such communities comprise an entire nation, but of course this requires very widespread (if not all-pervasive) bilingualism. An example of this type of nation is Paraguay, where almost the entire population speaks both Spanish and Guarani (Rubin, 1962; 1966). The formerly monolingual rural population has added Spanish to its linguistic repertoire in order to talk and write about education, religion, government, high culture and social distance or, more generally, the status stressing spheres; whereas the majority of city dwellers (being relatively new from the country) maintain Guarani for matters of intimacy and primary group solidarity even in the midst of Spanish urbanity.<sup>1</sup> A further example is the Swiss-German cantons in which the entire population of school age and older alternates between High German (H) and Swiss German (L), each with its own firmly established and highly valued functions (Ferguson, 1959; Weinreich, 1951; 1953).

Below the level of nationwide functioning there are many more examples of stable diglossia co-occurring with widespread bilingualism. Traditional (pre-World War I) Eastern European Jewish males communicated in Hebrew (H) and Yiddish (L). In more recent days their descendants have continued to do so adding to their repertoire a Western language (notably English) for *intragroup* communication as well as in domains of *intergroup* contact (Fishman, 1965c; Weinreich, 1951, 1953; 1962).<sup>2</sup> A similar example is that of upper and upper middle class males throughout the Arabic world who use classical (koranic) and vernacular (Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, etc.) Arabic and, not infrequently, also a Western language (French or English, most usually) for purposes of *intragroup* scientific or technological communication (Blanc, 1964; Ferguson, 1959; Nader, 1962).

All of the foregoing examples have in common the existence of a

<sup>1</sup> Note that Guarani is not an official language (i.e.) recognized and utilized for purposes of government, formal education, the courts, etc.) in Paraguay. It is not uncommon for the H variety alone to have such recognition in diglossic settings without this fact threatening the acceptance or the stability of the L variety within the speech community. However, the existence of a single "official" language should not divert the investigator from recognizing the fact of widespread and stable bilingualism at the levels of societal and interpersonal functioning.

<sup>2</sup> This development differs significantly from the traditional Eastern European Jewish pattern in which males whose occupational activities brought them into regular contact with various strata of the non-Jewish coterrestrial population utilized one or more coterrestrial languages (usually involving H and L varieties of their own, such as Russian, German or Polish on the one hand, and Ukrainian, Byelorussian or "Baltic" varieties, on the other), but did so for *intergroup* purposes almost exclusively.

fairly large and complex speech community in which the members have available to them both a range of *compartmentalized* roles as well as ready access to these roles. If the *role repertoires* of these speech communities were of lesser range, then their *linguistic repertoires* would also be(come) more restricted in range, with the result that separate languages or varieties would be(come) superfluous. In addition, were the roles not compartmentalized, i.e., were they not kept separate by dint of association with quite separate (though complementary) values, domains of activity and every day situations,<sup>3</sup> one language (or variety) would displace the other as role and value distinctions merged and became blurred. Finally, were widespread access not available to the variety of compartmentalized roles (and compartmentalized languages or varieties), then the bilingual population would be a small, privileged caste or class (as it is or was throughout most of traditional India or China) rather than a broadly based population segment.

These observations lead to the conclusion that many modern speech communities that are normally thought of as monolingual are, rather, marked by both diglossia and bilingualism if their several registers (speech varieties related to functional specificity; Halliday, 1964) are viewed as separate varieties or languages in the same sense as the examples listed above. Wherever speech communities exist whose speakers engage in a considerable range of roles (and this is coming to be the case for all but the extremely upper and lower levels of complex societies); wherever access to several roles is encouraged or facilitated by powerful social institutions and processes; and finally, wherever the roles are clearly differentiated (in terms of when, where and with whom they are felt to be appropriate), both diglossia and bilingualism may be said to exist. The benefit of this approach to the topic at hand is that it provides a single theoretical framework for viewing bilingual speech communities and speech communities whose linguistic diversity is realized through varieties not (yet) recognized as constituting separate "languages". Thus, it becomes possible for us to note that while nations characterized by diglossia and widespread bilingualism (the latter term being understood in its usual sense of referring to separate languages) have become fewer in modern times, those characterized by diglossia and diversified linguistic repertoires have increased greatly as a consequence of modernization and growing social complexity. The single theory outlined above enabling us to

<sup>3</sup> The compartmentalization of roles (and of domains and situations as well) requires the redefinition of roles, domains and situations in any encounter in which a seemingly inappropriate topic must be discussed between individuals who normally stand in a given role-relationship to each other. Under such circumstances one or other factor is altered (the roles are redefined, the topic is redefined) so as to preserve the cultural norms for appropriateness (grammaticality) of behavior between interlocutors.

understand, predict and interrelate both of these phenomena is an instance of enviable parsimony in the behavioral sciences.<sup>4</sup>

## Diglossia Without Bilingualism

There are situations in which diglossia obtains whereas bilingualism is generally absent (quadrant 3). Here, two or more speech communities are united religiously, politically or economically into a single functioning unit notwithstanding the socio-cultural cleavages that separate them. At the level of this larger (but not always voluntary) unity, two or more languages or varieties are recognized as obtaining. However, one (or both) of the speech communities involved is (are) marked by relatively impermeable group boundaries such that for "outsiders" (and this may well mean all those not born into the speech community, i.e., an emphasis on ascribed rather than on achieved status) role access and linguistic access are severely restricted. At the same time linguistic repertoires in one or both groups are limited due to role specialization.

Examples of such situations are not hard to find (see, e.g., the many instances listed by Kloss, 1966). Pre-World War I European elites often stood in this relationship with their countrymen, the elites speaking French or some other fashionable H tongue for their *intragroup* purposes (at various times and in various places: Danish, Salish, Provencal, Russian, etc.) and the masses speaking another, not necessarily linguistically related, language for their *intragroup* purposes. Since the majority of elites and the majority of the masses never interacted with one another *they did not form a single speech community* (i.e. their linguistic repertoires were discontinuous) and their intercommunications were via translators or interpreters (a certain sign of *intragroup monolingualism*). Since the majority of the elites and the majority of the masses led lives characterized by extremely narrow role repertoires their linguistic repertoires too were too narrow to permit widespread societal bilingualism to develop. Nevertheless, the body politic in all of its economic and national manifestations tied these two groups together into a "unity" that revealed an upper and a lower class, each with a language appropriate to its own restricted concerns.

Thus, the existence of national diglossia does *not* imply widespread

<sup>4</sup> A theory which tends to minimize the distinction between languages and varieties is desirable for several reasons. It implies that *social consensus* (rather than inherently linguistic desiderata) differentiates between the two and that separate varieties can become (and have become) separate languages given certain social encouragement to do so, just as purportedly separate languages have been fused into one, on the ground that they were merely different varieties of the same language.

bilingualism amongst rural or recently urbanized African groups (as distinguished from Westernized elites in those settings); nor amongst most lower caste Hindus, as distinguished from their more fortunate compatriots the Brahmins, nor amongst most lower class French-Canadians, as distinguished from their upper and upper middle class city cousins, etc. In general, this pattern is characteristic of polities that are economically underdeveloped and unmobilized, combining groups that are locked into opposite extremes of the social spectrum and, therefore, groups that operate within extremely restricted and discontinuous linguistic repertoires. Obviously, such polities are bound to experience language problems as their social patterns alter in the direction of industrialization, widespread literacy and education, democratization, and modernization more generally. Since such polities rarely developed out of initial socio-cultural consensus or unity, the educational, political and economic development of the lower classes is likely to lead to secessionism or to demands for equality for submerged language(s). The linguistic states of Eastern Europe and India, and the language problems of Wales, Canada and Belgium stem from origins such as these.<sup>5</sup> This is the pattern of development that may yet convulse modern African nations if their de-ethnicized Westernized elites and diglossic language policies continue to fail to create bilingual speech communities, incorporating the masses, within their ethnically arbitrary political boundaries.

### Bilingualism Without Diglossia

We turn next to those situations in which bilingualism obtains whereas diglossia is generally absent (quadrant 2). Here we see even more clearly than before that bilingualism is essentially a characterization of individual linguistic behavior whereas diglossia is a characterization of linguistic organization at the socio-cultural level. Under what circumstances do bilinguals of similar cultural extraction nevertheless function without the benefit of a well understood and widely accepted social consensus as to which language is to be used between which interlocutors, for communication concerning what topics or for what purposes? Under what circumstances do the varieties or languages involved lack well defined or protected separate functions? Briefly put, these are circumstances of rapid social change, of great social unrest,

<sup>5</sup> Switzerland as a whole is not a case in point since it is not an example of discontinuous and hierarchically stratified speech communities under a common political regime. Switzerland consists of geographically stratified speech communities under a common regime. Except for the Swiss-German case there is hardly any societally patterned bilingualism in Switzerland. Only the Jura region, the Romansch area and a very few other small areas have (had) a recent history of diglossia without bilingualism.

of widespread abandonment of prior norms before the consolidation of new ones.

Many studies of bilingualism and intelligence or of bilingualism and school achievement have been conducted within the context of bilingualism without diglossia, often without sufficient understanding on the part of investigators that this was but one of several possible contexts for the study of bilingualism. As a result many of the purported "disadvantages" of bilingualism have been falsely generalized to the phenomenon at large rather than related to the absence or presence of social patterns which reach substantially beyond bilingualism (Fishman, 1965b, 1966c).

The history of industrialization in the Western world (as well as in those parts of Africa and Asia which have experienced industrialization under Western "auspices") is such that the means (capital, plant, organization) of production were often derived from one speech community while the productive manpower was drawn from another. Initially both speech communities may have maintained their separate diglossia-with-bilingualism patterns or, alternatively, that of an overarching diglossia without bilingualism. In either case, the needs as well as the consequences of rapid and massive industrialization and urbanization were frequently such that members of the speech community providing productive manpower rapidly abandoned their traditional socio-cultural patterns and learned (or were taught) the language of the means of production much earlier than their absorption into the sociocultural patterns and privileges to which that language pertained. In response to this imbalance some react(ed) by further stressing the advantages of the newly gained language of education and industry while others react(ed) by seeking to replace the latter by an elaborated version of their own largely pre-industrial, pre-urban, pre-mobilization tongue.

Under circumstances such as these no well established, socially recognized and protected functional differentiation of languages obtains in many speech communities of the lower and lower middle classes. Dislocated immigrants and their children (for whom a separate "political solution" is seldom possible) are particularly inclined to use their mother tongue and other tongue for intragroup communication in seemingly random fashion (Nahimy and Fishman, 1965; Fishman, 1965f). Since the formerly separate roles of the home domain, the school domain and the work domain are all disturbed by the massive dislocation of values and norms that result from simultaneous immigration and industrialization, the language of work (and of the school) comes to be used at home (just as in cases of more radical and better organized social change the language of the home comes to be established in school and at work). As role compartmentalization and value complementarity decrease under the impact of foreign

models and massive change the linguistic repertoire also becomes less compartmentalized. Languages and varieties formerly kept apart come to influence each other phonetically, lexically, semantically and even grammatically much more than before. Instead of two (or more) carefully separated languages each under the eye of caretaker groups of teachers, preachers and writers, several intervening varieties may obtain, differing in degree of interpenetration. Such fused varieties may, within time, become the mother tongue and only tongue of a new generation. Thus, bilingualism without diglossia tends to be transitional<sup>6</sup> both in terms of the linguistic repertoires of speech communities as well as in terms of the speech varieties involved per se. Without separate though complementary norms and values to establish and maintain functional separation of the speech varieties, that language or variety which is fortunate enough to be associated with the predominant drift of social forces tends to displace the other(s). Furthermore, pidginization is likely to set in when members of the "work force" are so dislocated as not to be able to maintain or develop significantly compartmentalized, limited access roles (in which they might be able to safeguard a stable mother tongue variety) and, furthermore, cannot interact sufficiently with those members of the "power class" who might serve as standard other-tongue models.

### Neither Diglossia nor Bilingualism

Only very small, isolated and undifferentiated speech communities may be said to reveal neither diglossia nor bilingualism (Gumperz, 1962; Fishman, 1965d). Given little role differentiation or compartmentalization and frequent face to face interaction between all members of the speech community no fully differentiated registers or varieties may establish themselves. Given self-sufficiency no regular or significant contacts with other speech communities may be maintained. Nevertheless, such groups—be they bands or clans—are easier to hypothesize than to find. All communities seem to have certain ceremonies or pursuits to which access is limited, if only on an age basis. Thus, all linguistic repertoires contain certain terms that are unknown to certain members of the speech community, and certain terms that are used differently by different subsets of speakers. In addition, metaphorical switching (Blom and Gumperz, 1966) for purposes of emphasis, humor, satire or criticism must be available in some form even in relatively undifferentiated communities. Finally, such factors as exogamy, warfare, expansion of population, economic growth and

<sup>6</sup> At an individual level this need not be the case since translation bilingualism can be maintained for intragroup communication purposes and for individual vocational purposes without the formation of natural bilingual speech communities.

contact with others all lead to internal diversification and, consequently, to repertoire diversification. Such diversification is the beginning of bilingualism. Its societal normification is the hallmark of diglossia. Quadrant four tends to be self liquidating.

Many efforts are now underway to bring to pass a rapprochement between psychological, linguistic and sociological work on bilingualism. The student of bilingualism, most particularly the student of bilingualism in the context of social issues and social change, may benefit from an awareness of the various possible relationships between individual bilingualism and societal diglossia illustrated in this paper. Since all bilingualism occurs in a social context, and since this context is likely to influence both the manifestations and the concomitants of bilingualism, it is incumbent on the student of bilingualism to differentiate accurately between the particular and the more general phenomena that pertain to his field of study.

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## Bilingualism and Nationalism

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Bilingualism and nationalism are both highly complex phenomena, each of which merits a thorough analysis on its own, yet I have set myself the task of writing about the relationship between the two without the opportunity to describe the real complexity of either. Being short of space my best approach is a rigidly pragmatic one which naively assumes that in spite of differences in outward appearances the various situations described as bilingual have an underlying common core, and that the same holds good for phenomena designated by the term nationalism.

### Nationalism and the Role of Link Languages

The first topic I am going to discuss is the role of link languages, i.e., languages of wider communication, in international relations. To begin with, what makes for a language to be employed as a vehicle of international communication? There are many reasons, such as religious importance (Arabic), political and commercial power (English in the 19th and 20th centuries, also Russian), multiplicity of sovereign states sharing a language which enjoys official status in each (Spanish and Arabic).

How does nationalism affect the use and spread of such link languages? There are three ways in which it does: (a) nationalism gives rise to an urge to expand one language as a second tongue across large parts of the globe; (b) it may motivate a nation to reject one foreign

language in favor of another; (c) it may cause some new-born nations to adopt some foreign language as the accepted, acclaimed, even adored, symbol of their nationhood when none of the indigenous languages seem to suit the purpose.

The outstanding example of nationalism's backing up the spread of a link language is that which brought about the almost miraculous recovery of French as a leading language in the period since 1945. French was almost bound to recover some lost ground, but its gains were enormously increased by the tireless and zealous efforts of France's policy makers. The Soviet Union, too, is endeavouring to make Russian the second language not only of those 45% of its inhabitants whose mother tongue is non-Russian, but also of the Communist nations of Eastern Europe. Of course both Frenchmen and Russians see the spread of their languages as a part of their mission in the service of mankind. Both are convinced that their language represents the most advanced civilization on earth. While the Russians proudly emphasize their materialism, the French feel that theirs is the last leading civilization which is primarily spiritual, surmounting the problems and perspectives, the fruits and the failures of technology and the natural sciences.

The attitude of the French and Russians is better understood if compared with that of the Anglo-Saxon nations. Until quite recently the Anglo-Saxon nations did very little to promote English as a second language in foreign countries. English grew in importance as a result of the growth first of British and then of American power. Even today Great Britain and the United States promote English not to enhance their influence; their influence is already so enormous that they feel obliged to help foreigners who wish to learn their language. This is just the opposite of how the French look at the language problem.

The native language of only a few countries is of sufficient importance to warrant attempts to have it introduced abroad as a second language. But all nations without exception are faced with the necessity —more urgent to be sure in the case of the smaller speech communities—of learning one or more foreign languages. Their choice is generally determined by utilitarian considerations, but it is occasionally influenced by emotional nationalism. So, for example, after both world wars many European nations reduced the time for German in their school timetables. The diminished stature of Germany in political and cultural life was not, however, the sole motive for the reduction in time. This is clearly shown by the fact that Denmark more drastically reduced the number of German lessons in North Schleswig than elsewhere in Denmark, though North Schleswig is the region adjoining Germany. Conversely, Germany has occasionally profited since 1945 from the fact that her name had long since ceased to be bound up with

colonialism. Egypt, for example, reacted to French policies in Algeria by attempting to supplant at least in part French with German.

A good many African and Asian nations have adopted as official languages, languages which come from outside their own nations such as English and French. At first glance this setting up of *exoglossic* states<sup>1</sup> seems to follow a uniform pattern. Closer examination, however, reveals two basically different types: (a) a European language is together with indigenous tongues accorded official status; (b) a European language is granted a virtual monopoly. The first phenomenon prevails in India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Malaysia and the Philippines where English is admitted in addition to Hindi, Singhalese, Urdu and Bengali, Malayan and Tagalog respectively. In each of those countries the ancestral language, not the imported one, is considered the symbol of national identity,<sup>2</sup> though of course its status is not always undisputed.<sup>3</sup>

The second type of *exoglossic* state exists chiefly in Africa where French or English have succeeded in ousting the aboriginal tongues. For Gabon, Upper Volta, Malawi and Zambia, the language of the former colonial power seems to be the only conceivable instrument to overcome the numberless tribal loyalties. India grudgingly puts up with English and in doing so hurts its nationalistic feelings: Ghana makes of English the rallying flag of emerging nationhood.

Yet these developments in Africa may yet give rise to a curious paradox. If by employing French or English as *national* languages these new states succeed in overcoming tribalism and tribe-based *lingualism* (to borrow a term used in India), their very success in doing so may be their own undoing as nations. Indeed the success of the present movements would mean that the imported language would become the sole hallmark of national identity; and since many of these states border on other states with the same imported language, they may well be drawn together by their common national symbol to form a new and much larger nation.<sup>4</sup> Thus, for example, Senegal, Mali, the Central African Republic and others, may be irresistibly drawn together by their common possession of French (instead of being separated by Wolof, Bambara and Sango, the principal native lan-

<sup>1</sup> The term *exoglossic* was coined by Joshua A. Fishman. He considered it more apt as a description of countries which have adopted a foreign language than the alternative, *teleglossic*, suggested by me.

<sup>2</sup> Notice the change of name from Tagalog and Malayan to Pilipino and Bahasa Indonesia respectively.

<sup>3</sup> Tamil opposition to Hindi is leading to a feeling that Hindi is becoming a wedge dividing Indo-Aryan and Dravidian India.

<sup>4</sup> Linguistically isolated countries like Ghana and Sierra Leone, English enclaves in an ocean of French, would not be affected by this trend.

guages). On the other hand this overriding drift toward unity may in turn give rise to counter-currents re-emphasizing traditions and cultural values linked to the major indigenous languages.

## Bilingualism and Nationalism in Multinational States

There are many interpretations of the term *multinational*, but I shall use it here of countries in which two or more languages enjoy equal status. The languages need not be official throughout the nation, but each must at least be official in the region where it is the mother tongue of the bulk of the population. Such countries fall into three classes depending on the type of status they allow the several languages: (a) countries in which the languages enjoy complete equality of status; (b) those which make of one the official national language, but otherwise treat all languages as equal; (c) those which in theory make all languages equal, but in practice discriminate amongst them.

Complete equality of status seems possible only in countries which have two or at most three languages. No country could conduct its affairs in four or more languages without becoming hopelessly muddled. Switzerland has three official national languages, Belgium and Finland have two—but India and the Soviet Union, each with a multiplicity of indigenous languages, recognize only one of their languages as official (Hindi in India, supplemented by English; Russian in the Soviet Union).

Bilingual and trilingual countries commonly give the appearance of unanimity and equality; yet their present stability can be maintained only if all their separate speech communities are on an equal legal footing and none can be called an underdog. Unfortunately, however, legal equality does not always rule out sociological inequality. In Belgium, for instance, the Flemish who are the numerical majority are conducting an enervating struggle against the superiority complex of their numerically weaker French-speaking compatriots. The latter for their part proclaim that by acquiring a little-known language like Dutch they are wasting time which they could better employ in learning English or even German. Similarly, in Canada French-speakers do not enjoy equal status with English-speakers; while in Switzerland, Italian as a second language, lags hopelessly behind German and French. In other words the number of French-Canadians who know English is far greater than the number of Anglo-Canadians who know French; in Belgium the number of Flemish who know French is far greater than the number of Walloons (French-speakers) who know Dutch; and in Switzerland French-speakers are far more likely to learn German and German-speakers to learn French than to learn Italian, while the Italian-speakers commonly learn French or German or both. As has long been apparent in Belgium, such inequalities make for dissatis-

faction and for nationalistic strife. This is becoming apparent in Canada, and may some day become apparent in Ticino, Switzerland's only Italian-speaking Canton.

If even bilingual and trilingual states are not assured of peace amongst their different ethnic groups, how much more quarrelling, bitterness and open discord is to be expected in countries with a greater number of languages, where sheer necessity compels the government to single out one language (at most two languages as in Pakistan where Urdu and Bengali are the official languages), and make it the national language.

No government has ever shown greater willingness to respect and promote all languages within its territories than that of Imperial Austria. But inevitably one language, German, had to remain the universal link-language to be studied by all non-German speakers as their principal second language. This circumstance was by no means the least important in bringing about the disruption of the Empire and the formation of splinter states in which hitherto *minor* languages such as Czech and Slovenian became ruling languages. India in our day is faced with the same problem. She has selected Hindi for preferential treatment to the dismay of other speech communities, notably the Tamils, who interpret the move as discrimination against their own languages. Indeed it is difficult to see how India can arrive at a stable solution of its linguistic problems.

It is important to note that in Imperial Austria, also in present day India, the official national language held no privileges at the regional or local level. In this respect the Soviet Union differs from both. A Ukrainian or Latvian who migrates to Siberia is expected to send his children to a Russian school. A Russian who moves to Riga or Odessa is expected not to send his children to a Latvian or Ukrainian one. Thus in the Soviet Union language equality is nominal rather than real. As some of the national republics are flooded with Russian immigrants, we may suspect that a good deal of nationalistic resentment and even hatred smolders under the surface. Though not every exile's report on the matter is to be swallowed without scrutiny.

### Bilingualism and Nationalism in the Nation State

By nation state I mean a country with a single official language which is the mother tongue of the great majority of the inhabitants or of that ethnic group which feels and claims that it possesses some special title to rule and represent the nation as a whole. Examples of the first type of nation state are Denmark, Brazil, Tunisia and Honduras. To the second type belong Ethiopia, Liberia and Bolivia, where native speakers of the official languages form respectively 32%, 5% and 32% of the total populations.

It may be justifiable to call countries of the first type genuine nation states and those of the second type section-based nation states.

Obviously in many section-based nation states the ruling minority is bound to clash sooner or later with the nationalism of the non-dominant ethnic groups. The awakening and rising of the nondominant groups may be delayed by their backwardness which in turn is often largely due to the fact that they are neglected educationally and politically. Frequently the dominant group tries to have its language established first as a lingua franca with the ultimate aim of having it completely supplant the local vernaculars. While the first goal may be well within reach, the second seems to be largely illusory. Thus most minority-based nation states face the prospect of permanent internal tension, though educational policies may temporarily lull the nondominant majority into long periods of apparent ethnic peace.

In the section-based nation states which I have just described the nondominant ethnic groups are usually subjugated by the minority group. But there exists another type of section-based nation state in which the minority language has been elevated to the dignity of an official national language with the consensus of all the major speech communities in the nation. Thus Bahasa-Indonesia, Swahili (in Tanzania) and Tagalog-Pilipino (in the Philippines), though the native languages of only 8%, 5% and 20% of the populations respectively, have been accepted by the major indigenous speech communities as their common national link-languages. As a rule such a solution is possible only where the languages involved are closely akin.<sup>5</sup> As an exception to this rule may be cited the acceptance of Hebrew by all Israelis.

The genuine nation state is basically different from the section-based nation state. In the former the majority has a real chance of successfully imposing its language not merely as a lingua franca but also in time as the sole language of the entire nation. An ethnic group forming just 2% or 8% of the country's inhabitants will not infrequently surrender to the impact of the dominant language. The minority may even surrender their language voluntarily, as did the Polish-speaking Masurians in Eastern Prussia or the German-speaking Belgians living within the pre-1914 boundaries of Belgium, or the speakers of Pennsylvania Dutch (Pennsylvania Dutch) in Eastern Pennsylvania. In such language shifts a period of replacive bilingualism is bound to occur during which the yielding language becomes laden with loadwords and loan-shifts from the overcoming language.

More often than not however ethnic minorities in genuine nation

<sup>5</sup> Thus in India it is interesting to observe that Hindi is accepted by speakers of related Indo-Aryan languages but resisted by those who speak Dravidian languages.

states are anxious to retain and defend their ancestral language. (Such minorities may be called *national minorities*, as distinct from minorities which being indifferent to the fate of their ancestral language, might be called *linguistic minorities*.) One of the great disillusionments which ensued upon the break up of multilingual empires was that new governments failed to adopt liberal linguistic attitudes. Successor states to the Turkish, Habsburg and Russian Empires turned out to be more intransigent toward minor ethnic groups than were their predecessors. The Kutz-Vlachs or Aromunians, an ethnic group speaking a Romanian dialect but living in areas now belonging to Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, enjoyed much more cultural freedom under Turkish rule than they did after the Balkan wars. Table I which sets out the number of minority schools in certain territories before 1918 and after 1920 throws light on these developments. Nothing of course is to be said against the desire of the new post-1912-13 and post-1920 governments to have linguistic minorities learn the new national language as a second language. But obviously what these governments aimed at was blotting out the minority tongues by means of coercive measures leading first to replacive bilingualism and later to a new monolingualism. That is, the aim was complete language shift.

TABLE I

NUMBER OF MINORITY SCHOOLS IN CERTAIN TERRITORIES IN CERTAIN YEARS  
BEFORE AND AFTER 1920.

Territory	Ethnic Group	Year	Schools	Year	Schools
East Galacia	Ukrainian	1918	2600	1928	400
Poland	Lithuanian	1918	147	1931	2
Lithuania	German	1918	37	1925	14
Bukovina (Romania)	Ukrainian	1914	216	1924	0
Dobrudja (Romania)	Bulgarian	1910	60	1931	0
Greece	Aromunian	1912	45	1939	27
Albania	Aromunian	1912	20	1939	3-4

So ruthlessly did many European governments in the inter-war period pursue an assimilationist policy that many statesmen and scholars came to believe that the nation state, by nature and definition, seeks the linguistic assimilation of all its subjects. That of course is not true. There is no reason why the nation state should not rest content if citizens whose mother tongue is not the official language also learn the official language. In our time Denmark's treatment of her citizens who speak Faroese, or Eskimo (Greenland) or German, is a shining illustration of a genuine nation state's linguistic broad-mindedness.

## A Special Aspect of the Problem of Assimilation: "Dialectization"

In the foregoing paragraphs I spoke of assimilationist policy as aiming at replacive bilingualism. Actually the situation is more complex. A linguistic assimilation policy may have to deal with basically different minority tongues some of which are closely related to the national language and others which are not. Therefore, speakers of the dominant language have two ways of doing away with a nondominant language: replacing it, or *dialectizing* it. In other words, the policy may aim at diglossic bilingualism<sup>6</sup> instead of replacive bilingualism. To be sure, diglossic bilingualism is only possible where the dominant and nondominant languages are close relatives. So the Spanish government in trying to establish and maintain the monopoly of Castilian Spanish must (and does) try to blot out the Basque language completely, for there is no possibility that the Basques will ever loose consciousness of the fact that their language is unrelated to Spanish. The position of Catalan is quite different, because both Catalan and Spanish are Romance Languages. There is a chance that speakers of Catalan can be induced to consider their mother tongue as a patois, with Castilian as its natural standard language. As a matter of fact this attitude to Catalan is already to be found not in Catalonia proper but in the province of Valencia and in the Balearic islands. In a similar manner, nearly all speakers of Low Saxon (Low German) and the overwhelming majority of Occitan (Provencal) speakers have lost consciousness of their linguistic identity and consider their folk speech as naturally subordinated to German and French respectively, though linguists continue to group these folk languages with other Gothic and Romance Languages. The spiritual subjugation of speakers of Sardinian, and of Haitian Cr  ole is no less complete. These languages seem never to have been used for literary purposes to any extent; yet all linguists regard them as autonomous systems which have to be classified as languages. Thus these are examples of what have been called *abstand* languages (*languages by distance*).<sup>7</sup>

It is well known that the Czarist government in the 19th century tried to persuade the Ukrainians that theirs was not an *abstand* language but a Russian dialect, usually called Little Russian, and that the natural thing was that they be educated and governed in Russian. The

<sup>6</sup> Each fulfills a function distinct from the other. The most common type is where the standard language is used in government, commerce, education and literature, the dialect being reserved for more intimate discourse, as for instance within the family.

<sup>7</sup> On *abstandsprachen* (*languages by distance*) and *ausbausprachen* (*languages by elaboration*) see my book, *Die Entwicklung neuer Germanischer Kultursprachen*, Munich: Pohl, 1952.

Turkish government would like to see the Kurdish language disappear from Turkish soil, but the Persian government plays up the kinship of Persian and Kurdish (both Iranian tongues) in order to pave the way for a diglossic situation with Persian the (near-) dialectized vernacular restricted to oral conversation and, at most, some poetry. Low Saxon, Occitan, Sardinian and Haitian Cr  ole are near-dialectized (or semi-dialectized), since the intrinsic distance between them and the related standard languages remains undiminished. They remain *languages by distance, or abstand languages.*

An altogether different category of languages is the *ausbau* language, *language by elaboration*, for example Lallans (Broad Scots) which from the linguistic point of view is merely an offshoot of English. During the centuries before Scotland lost its independence Lallans became, according to the then modest standards, an *ausbau* language which served for all purposes (there were not too many of them) not reserved for Latin. Since the Scottish Act of Union, Lallans has slumped to the level of a mere dialect, thus becoming an example of a dialect which achieved *ausbau* status and returned again to the status of a dialect. A final illustration of complete dialectization is those areas of Southern Sweden which speak a dialect resembling Danish more than Swedish. Danish was once the ruling language of these areas, but nowadays Swedish is, with the result that the dialect speakers feel, and believe, Swedish to be the standard language which naturally corresponds to their folk-speech.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Similarly, local dialects spoken in Moravia are actually more akin to Slovak than to Czech, yet the Moravians have accepted Czech as their *natural* standard language. Standard Slovak, however, was never the official language of Moravia, so unlike Lallans and the Danish dialects of Southern Sweden, the Slovak dialects of Moravia cannot be said to have been "re"-dialectized.

## On the Linguistic Markers of Bilingual Communication\*

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A major linguistic problem in the study of bilingual behavior is the description of the verbal skills involved in the speaker's concurrent use of the two languages. Recent ethnographic literature increasingly deals with stable bilingual societies, where several distinct languages are spoken by peoples who in all other respects form part of a single social system (Leach 1954; Salisbury 1962; Ferguson 1964; and Rice 1962).

To the extent that not all members have adequate facility in these languages, language choice is of course affected by requirements of intelligibility. But we also have evidence to show that frequently a majority, or at least a significant minority of residents can communicate effectively in either language, and that they alternate between the two languages for much the same reasons that monolinguals select among styles of a single language (Rubin 1961; Fishman 1965). That is to say, the same social pressures which would lead a monolingual to change from colloquial to formal or technical styles may lead a bilingual to shift from one language to another. Where this is the case, the difference between monolingual and bilingual behavior thus lies in the choice of linguistic symbols for socially equivalent processes. In one instance speakers select among lexical or phonetic variants of

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what they regard as the same language; in the other case speakers choose between what they view as two linguistic entities. The question to be asked then is this: what special verbal skills does the process of interlanguage shift require; and how do these skills differ from those needed in the monolinguals' stylistic shift?

Since the classification of speech varieties as belonging to the same or different languages is in fact in large part determined on socio-political grounds (Ferguson and Gumperz 1960), it can easily be shown that the purely qualitative distinction between monolingualism and bilingualism is by no means adequate to answer our question. Language pairs like Serbian and Croatian in Yugoslavia, Hindi and Urdu in India, Bokmal and Nynorsk in Norway, all of which have figured prominently in recent accounts of language conflict, are, for example, grammatically less distinct than some forms of upper-and lower-class English in New York. Colloquial and literary varieties of Arabic, on the other hand, would be regarded as separate languages were it not for the fact that modern Arabs insist on minimizing the differences between them. The speakers' view of language distinctions may thus be quite far from linguistic reality.

Even in cases where the languages concerned must be considered separate both on linguistic and social grounds, their separateness is not necessarily absolute. Scholars working in the Balkans, where multilingualism has long been widespread, have frequently noted the considerable overlap in lexicon, phonology, morphology and syntax among local varieties of Slavic and adjoining dialects of Greek, Rumanian and Albanian. They also point out that these relationships are independent of historical relatedness, (Sandfeld 1931). More recently Charles Ferguson (1964) in his discussion of diglossia—the use of grammatically separate varieties among educated residents of several societies—states that the varieties concerned in each case constitute a single phonological structure, in spite of their grammatical differences. Stewart's comparative study of Haitian Creole and French shows similar findings (1964).

### *The Results of Code Switching*

The evidence suggests therefore that bilingualism may correspond to quite diverse linguistic phenomena. The problem is particularly great in bilingual or multilingual societies. Although subgroups within such societies may regard themselves as ethnically and culturally distinct, code switching in everyday interaction sets up cross currents of diffusion which materially change the structure of local speech varieties. The linguistic affinities among such varieties are thus not simply functions of genetic affiliation, but are affected by intensity of communication and speakers' values.

Viewed from the point of view of the standard languages, the peculiarities of bilingual speech constitute deviations from the mono-

lingual norm. They are of interest, for example, to the historical linguist because of the insights they provide into processes of language change. For our purposes, however, it seems more important to consider the effect of internal diffusion on intrasocietal communication. Thus if diffusion in multilingual societies results in structural overlap, to what extent does this affect the difficulties that speakers face in switching from one code to another? Rather than comparing bilingual speech varieties with the monolingual standards it seems more appropriate to deal with them directly as constituent elements of a socially defined system, the linguistic repertoire (Gumperz 1964a). What is needed are empirical measures capable of determining the degree of overlap or language distances of constituent varieties within the repertoire without reference to genetic relationship or to other varieties spoken elsewhere.

### *Interference Measurements*

Much of the linguistic research on bilingualism to date relies on measures of interference, "the use of elements from one language while speaking or writing another" (Mackey 1965). The usual procedure is to search the bilingual performance for features of pronunciation, grammar and lexicon not present in the monolingual standard, which can be attributed to second language influence. Interference analysis has provided important insights into the more general processes of borrowing (Weinreich 1952) and its effect on linguistic change. It also serves as an important tool in language pedagogy, where the object is to study what is involved in the monolinguals' learning of a new language and acculturating to a different monolingual community.

Interference measurements of all kinds, however, assume that the structure of the standard is known and that speakers have direct access to the standard and seriously attempt to imitate it. These assumptions are justified for the ordinary second language learner or for isolated speakers of minority languages, whose significant contacts are largely with the surrounding monolingual community and who can thus be expected to conform to its norms. They do not, however, apply in our case. Members of stable bilingual communities interact largely with other bilinguals and it can be shown that such interaction generates its own norms of correctness (Ervin-Tripp 1964). Although learning through prestige imitation takes place in all societies, the particular linguistic object of this imitation in bilingual societies must be established through empirical research; it cannot be assumed.

### *Contrastive Analysis*

A second technique of inter-language comparison is that of contrastive analysis, which finds extensive application in the preparation of pedagogical language texts (Kufner 1962, Moulton 1962, Stockwell,

Bowen and Martin 1965.) This method consists of a direct point by point comparison of the two grammars at each component of structure. Differences are evaluated according to their place within the respective system (i.e., whether they are phonetic, phonemic, syntactic, etc.). They are then counted under the assumption that "what the student has to learn equals the sum of the differences established by this comparison" (Banathy, Trager and Waddle 1968). The linguist's structural analysis plays an important part in predicting the learner's difficulties. For example, the fact that in Spanish the segments ([d] and [s]) are in complimentary distribution, with the former occurring initially in words like *dar* and the latter medially in words like *lado*, whereas they contrast in English words like *dare* and *there*, may lead to the diagnosis that the Spanish-speaking student has the problem of assigning phonemic status to two phonetic entities which are allophones and not phonemes in his own language (Banathy, Trager and Waddle 1968). But the assignment of phonemic status to a linguistic feature is generally based on the performance of "ideal speakers living in a homogeneous community" (Chomsky 1965). Since bilingual speakers are excluded from consideration here, the structural categories of ordinary grammars can hardly be used to predict bilingual performance. Techniques of contrastive analysis, thus, require considerable modification if they are to be applied to the measurement of intrasocietal language distance.

### *Machine Translation*

An alternative approach derives from recent work on machine translation. This approach has the advantage of enabling the investigator to focus directly on speakers' performances without reference to outside information. In some earlier work in machine translation, it had in fact been assumed that grammatical information could be disregarded, but this assumption was soon proved wrong when it was shown that grammatical analysis is the most efficient way of organizing the information required for translation so as to fit into a computer's storage capacity (Lamb 1965). If we then ask what is the minimum coding necessary to translate the speaker's performance in Language A to the same speaker's performance in Language B, we must in fact do a linguistic analysis. But note that a grammar in these terms is merely an information storage device; it is not an independently patterned organic entity. Its categories are justified only to the extent that they facilitate the translation process. This provides the criteria of relevance which enables us to avoid some of the most bothersome questions of linguistic analysis such as segmentation of strings into one or more morphemes. The best solution is simply that which provides the simplest translation rules. Since the greater the grammatical overlap, the easier the translation process, it is simplest to assume that there is a single under-

lying system from which the differences of the two languages can be derived. Language distance can then be measured as a function of the number of nonshared rules.

If translatability measures are based only on a single set of texts, the number of grammatical rules needed will be an arbitrarily restricted selection. The greater the number of speakers measured, and the greater the variety of contexts in which the texts are collected, the more complete will be the body of rules. Translatability measures thus are akin to sociological forms of measurement in that they depend for their validity on sample size and on interaction processes and are therefore ideally suited for sociolinguistic analysis where interspeaker variation is the central problem.

### Some Case Studies . . .

During the last few years, my collaborators and I have experimented with translatability measures in several societies. Although our results are still preliminary, they are of sufficient general interest to warrant reporting here. The following data collection procedure was employed. Tape recorded speech samples in two languages were collected from bilingual speakers interacting in natural settings. Texts originally recorded in Language A were then retold orally in Language B by other native speakers and texts recorded in Language B were retold in Language A. Story retelling in a different language is common in daily interaction, so that informants found it an easy and quite natural task. Most sentences in the derived texts were in fact direct translation equivalents of the originals. Since we were interested in determining the minimum number of differences necessary for utterances to be perceived as distinct languages by their speakers, translations were further edited to substitute translation equivalents so as to minimize the language distance in those instances where different expressions had been used. A third group of bilinguals was asked to check each translated text individually to judge its grammaticality.

#### *Hindi-Punjabi*

A preliminary study of Hindi-Punjabi bilingual college students in Delhi shows that varieties of both languages are analyzable in terms of a common set of grammatical categories, e.g., pronouns, adverbs, inflectional patterns, etc., and in terms of identical rules for their combination in sentence structures. They furthermore have the same articulatory base. Our texts in the two languages differ only in morphophonemics, i.e., in the rules which determine the phonetic shape of relevant words and affixes. Here is an extreme example (morpheme boundaries are indicated by a dash, word boundaries by a space).

1. Punjabi	oo	naii	khaa-	nd-	aa
	personal	negative	verb	participle	agreement
	pronoun	adv.	stem	suffix	
Hindi	woo	naii	khaa-	t-	aa
Literal English	he	not	eating		
Idiomatic English		He doesn't eat (it).			
2. Punjabi	oo	kar-	wic	hee-	g-aa
	personal	noun	post	auxiliary	particle
	pronoun	stem	position		
Hindi	woo	ghar-	me	hee-	
Literal English	He	house	in	is	
Idiomatic English		He is in the house.			

Note that even content words such as *eat* and *house* are almost identical in the two languages. Differences lie primarily in the function words (i.e., words referring to grammatical relations such as *in*) and inflectional endings. The position of these items within the sentence is the same in each case. Only the Punjabi particle *g-aa* in sentence two does not have a direct Hindi equivalent in the context. However, *g-aa* does occur elsewhere in Hindi (Gumperz 1964b).

### Kannada and Marathi

An even more striking example of overlap is found among bilingual speakers of Kannada and Marathi, two genetically unrelated languages along the Maharashtra-Mysore boundary in central India. Our data here was collected in the course of approximately three months of field work during which we resided in a local village home. Texts were recorded in a wide variety of settings covering the entire range of everyday village activity. In a more formal test of translatability, the edited material was programmed as if for machine translation using a program devised by Douglas Johnson (1965), based on the work of Sydney Lamb (1965). Here are some sample results:

Kannada:	hog-	i	wand	kudri	turg	maR-	i	aw	tand
	verb	partic.	adj.	noun	noun	verb	partic.	pro-	past
	stem	suffix				stem	suffix	noun	verb
Marathi:	ja-	un	ek	ghoRa	cori	kar-	un	tew	anla
Literal English:	go	having	one	horse	theft	take	having	he	brought
Idiomatic English:		Having gone and having stolen a horse he brought it back.							

While on the surface the above two sentences are different in every respect, they have the same constituent structure. We were able to analyze our whole extensive corpus of bilingual texts without having to postulate further grammatical rules in one language which were not present in the other language. Independent phonetic perception tests further showed that native speakers were unable to keep the two languages apart on phonological grounds alone. As in the case of Hindi-Punjabi, therefore, the two languages differ only in their morphophonemics. It is interesting to note that, when examined separately by historical linguists specializing in South Asian languages, our texts are characterized as somewhat deviant but nevertheless easily identifiable specimens of Dravidian and Indo-Aryan, respectively. Genetic relationships among languages are established largely through a process of matching at the morphophonemic level. Since this is the area of structure where the two varieties differ most, it is not surprising that historical linguists in the past have failed to make systematic analyses of the underlying similarities.

To be bilingual in either Hindi-Punjabi or Kannada-Marathi—as these languages are spoken in our experimental community—a speaker simply needs to internalize two sets of terms for the same objects and grammatical relationships. He can switch from one language to the other by merely substituting one item in a pair for the other without having to learn new grammatical rules other than the ones he already controls. If we contrast this form of bilingual communication with the rather complex selection among phonological, syntactic and lexical variables, which Labov's recent work in New York has revealed (1966), it seems clear that there are at least some circumstances where bilingualism may require less skills than the normal process of communication in some monolingual societies.

In evaluating the significance of the above data, it must be kept in mind, however, that our sample was somewhat biased when compared to what is normally understood as bilingual behavior. In attempting to see whether it is possible for one speaker to speak two languages using the same set of grammatical categories, we confined ourselves only to those speech varieties which are regularly used in bilingual interaction. If we take into account literary varieties or varieties used in religious ritual and other activities that are language specific, a number of new differences arise. In more formal Punjabi, for example, we would have to account for word tone at the phonetic level and for additional differences in lexicon and in the system of function words (Gumperz 1964b). In educated Marathi and Kannada, even when it is used among Marathi-Kannada bilinguals, differences in gender and in rules governing adjective-noun agreement not found in casual village speech will arise. Since the linguist's grammars rely heavily on educated speech, contrastive analysis based on these grammars will show considerably more language distance than our data reveal. The formal

varieties concerned, however, are learned primarily through formal education; not all members learn them equally well. Translatability measures can account for this by successively sampling different groups of speakers in different settings. However, language distance when measured in this way is not a constant. It varies both with social context and social class.

### New York Spanish-English

Because of the special circumstances of long and continuous contact between speakers of the languages concerned, our Indian examples are not likely to have too many parallels elsewhere. More recent work among Spanish-English bilinguals in New York shows somewhat different results. The two languages in this case are quite distinct phonetically. There are further more obvious differences in syntax. Where, for example, Spanish distinguishes between two verbs of "being," *ser* and *estar*, English has only one.

In the realm of verb tenses, Spanish has a number of special subjunctive forms and an inflected future which do not occur in English. It is interesting to note though that in the conversational speech of the uneducated the inflected future is dropped in sentences like "I will write" in favor of the periphrastic construction which, like the English, is formed with the verb *ir* "go" as the auxiliary. Similarly the only subjunctive form which occurs with any frequency is the conditional which serves as the direct translation equivalent of English constructions with "would". Social interaction seems to lead to increased translatability also with English and Spanish.

On the whole, however, the speech of the Spanish-English bilingual in New York approaches the usual image of bilingual behavior. In spite of some overlap, the systems concerned are distinct in every component. Nevertheless, even in this case, the translatability approach raises some new questions about the nature of bilingual skills. To give a phonological example, much of the difference between the two languages results from the presence in one language of articulations not occurring in the other. Thus Spanish lacks the [s] of English *shoe* and English lacks the [ñ] of Spanish *baño*. Further distinctions however emerge when we compare the articulation of phonetically equivalent words. Thus the word *photo* will be [fowtow] in English and [foto] in Spanish in the same speaker's pronunciation. Whereas in Marathi-Kannada such pairs would be undistinguishable. Spanish-English bilinguals maintain two parallel sets of phonetically similar articulation ranges corresponding to functionally equivalent phones.

It would seem that the necessity of keeping the above ranges separate is an important problem in Spanish-English code switching. Comparison of the formal speech of educated bilinguals with that of uneducated bilinguals or with the same speakers in informal speech shows in fact that these distinctions are frequently collapsed.

## Some General Features of Bilingualism

Different as the above bilingual situations are, they nevertheless share certain common characteristics. All repertoires maintain an unusually large number of variants at the morphophonemic level. In actual sentences, moreover, the variants never appear in all combinations. Regardless of how large or small the number of nonshared rules, however, differences in the phonological realizations of morphemes play an important part. Even in Hindi-Punjabi where the list frequency of differences is relatively low, differences are very noticeable because they affect affixes and common function words with high text frequency. Variants furthermore never occur in isolation, but in co-occurrent patterns, so that if a Hindi-Punjabi bilingual begins a sentence with *oo* "he," he must also use the participle affix *-nd-*. The alternate affix *-t-* does not co-occur with *oo*. The rigidity of such co-occurrence rules reinforces the perceptual distinctness of codes. In spite of the underlying grammatical similarities, therefore, the shift between codes have a quality of abruptness which to some extent accounts for the speaker's view of them as distinct languages. Such codes seem ideally suited for communication in societies which stress cultural distinctions, while at the same time requiring regular and frequent interaction. In stylistic switching, co-occurrence rules also exist, but they seem less strictly defined, and transitions between styles are more subtle. Stylistic variation, furthermore, is signalled less by morphophonemic distinctions than by differences at the lexical level.

Our listing of the variant linguistic correlates of bilingualism was intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. Nevertheless the view that language distance is a function of social interaction and social contexts raises some interesting general problems. If, in spite of surface appearances, as our Indian examples indicate, language is not necessarily a serious barrier to communication, why do such differences maintain themselves over long periods of time? What is it within the system of roles and statuses or in the norms of social interaction that favors the retention of such overt symbols of distinctness? Under what conditions do such symbols disappear?

Of more direct practical value is the question of the relative importance of social and language barriers to communication. Intra-language variation clearly plays an important part in bilingual behavior and measures of bilingual competence must account for it if they are to be socially realistic. Furthermore, the common assumption that uneducated speakers of minority languages learn better when instructed through the medium of their own vernacular is not necessarily always justified. Instructional materials in these vernaculars may rely on monolingual norms which are culturally quite alien to the student and linguistically different from his home speech. Con-

siderably more research is needed on these and similar questions. We hope that our discussion highlights the importance of ethnographically oriented linguistic measurement in this task.

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## The Bilingual's Linguistic Performance— A Psychological Overview

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The psychologists who first began the study of bilingualism seem not to have been interested in bilingualism so much as in its effect on children's scholastic attainment and intellectual functioning. Before the year 1950 a very large number of studies were carried out to determine the relationship between bilingualism and IQ (Darcy, 1953) on the one hand and between bilingualism and attainment on the other (Macnamara, 1966a). Since 1950, however, there has been a change of interest. Recent studies in general have been aimed at explaining bilingual functioning itself and have led to some revealing discoveries. Specifically, they have tackled problems such as the meaning and measurement of bilingualism, the amount of overlap in the linguistic systems of bilinguals, success and failure in keeping linguistic systems from getting mixed up, the ability to switch from one system to the other and the ability to translate. These are the areas which I propose to review. Before going on to do so, however, it is necessary to make some distinctions in language functioning which are particularly helpful in the interpretation of work on bilingualism.

The educated person can typically speak and write his language

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as well as understand it when spoken and written. That is he has two production or encoding skills, speaking and writing, and two reception or decoding skills, listening and reading. In each of these skills four aspects can be distinguished. Thus for example in listening there are the phonological, the lexical, the syntactic and the semantic (meaning) aspects. The complete matrix of four aspects of each of the four skills is set out in Figure 1. Bilingualism, of course, involves two such matrices or, because not all bilinguals possess all four skills, at least

FIGURE I

## MATRIX OF FOUR ASPECTS OF EACH OF THE FOUR MAJOR LANGUAGE SKILLS

Encoding		Decoding	
Speaking	Writing	Listening	Reading
Semantics	Semantics	Semantics	Semantics
Syntax	Syntax	Syntax	Syntax
Lexicon	Lexicon	Lexicon	Lexicon
Phonemes	Graphemes	Phonemes	Graphemes

sections from two such matrices. Many bilinguals, of course, possess all four skills, but preschool bilingual children generally cannot read or write either of their languages, while persons who have been educated in only one of their languages may be quite unable to read and write the other, especially if the two orthographies differ greatly. Furthermore, there are instances of bilinguals who can understand but cannot speak one of their languages. This is sometimes called receptive bilingualism and it typically occurs in homes where the parents are immigrants to a country which differs in language from their country of origin.

These distinctions are particularly pertinent to the first section which deals with the description and measurement of bilingualism.

### Major Distinctions Among Bilinguals

#### Degree of Bilingualism<sup>1</sup>

Anyone who wishes to study bilingualism is immediately confronted with the problem of defining bilingualism and then with the further problem of determining who is bilingual and to what extent. Without going deeper into the matter I will use the term *bilingual* of persons who possess at least one of the language skills even to a

<sup>1</sup> This term is preferred to the now common *balanced-dominant* usage. The term dominant suggests competition between two languages, and therefore might best be employed to describe two tendencies: (1) the tendency for one of the two languages to be used where, from the point of view of both speaker and topic, the two languages are equally suitable; (2) the tendency for the phonological, syntactic, lexical or semantic systems of one language to intrude on those of the other one.

minimal degree in their second language. That is, I shall consider as bilingual a person who, for example, is an educated native speaker of English and who can also read a little French. This means that we consider bilingualism to be a continuum, or rather a whole series of continua, which vary amongst individuals along a whole variety of dimensions. That there can be variations in an individual's degree of bilingualism from speaking to listening, or from reading to writing is well known (Weinreich, 1953). What is not so commonly considered is that there might also be variations within a single modality, such as listening, from one aspect of linguistic performance to another. For example, it is quite possible for a person to be almost equally skilled in the syntactic analysis of French and English, but not in the ability to perceive spoken French and English. The possibility is not so far-fetched as one might suppose, since an individual might have considerable practice at reading a language such as French without having had much opportunity to hear it spoken, with the result that he might be able to analyze the syntax of spoken French quite well if only he could make out the words which were being used. Nor is the point merely theoretical since some progress has been made in examining bilingual performance in its various linguistic aspects (see Macnamara, this issue).

The term "balanced" has been introduced to describe persons who are equally skilled in two languages. Strictly speaking, if a person is described without qualification as balanced he is stated to be equally skilled in two languages in all aspects of the language skills he possesses. Thus if he is an educated person, it is implied that he is balanced in all sixteen cells of Figure 1. Clearly, however, the term is generally intended, implicitly if not explicitly, in a more limited sense: the claim is that a person is balanced in understanding or in speaking two languages, or at least in some particular facet of linguistic performance.

To take for the moment a less analytic point of view, one frequently meets bilinguals who appear to be balanced over a wide range of linguistic skills. However, as Fishman (this issue) points out, such persons are most commonly found in situations characterized by bilingualism without diglossia; that is in situations where both languages are indiscriminately employed across the whole range of human discourse. When bilingualism and diglossia go hand in hand each language is considered appropriate for a certain set of topics, roles, etc. In such situations the vocabulary, phraseology, syntax and literary skills required in one language generally have no exact counterpart in the other. So it is pointless to look for balanced bilinguals—as we have described them—in such a setting. However the bilingual settings most commonly studied by psychologists seem to be those in which bilingualism is not accompanied by diglossia.

How are we to measure degree of bilingualism and categorize bilingual performance along the relevant continua? Lado (1961) shows the complexities involved in composing appropriate tests of skills in a single language; the complexities involved in establishing comparable measures of skills in two languages are, if I may be permitted to quantify, far more than double. To illustrate the point the measurement of vocabulary in two languages will suffice. To begin with, even if standardized vocabulary tests are available in two languages, they may not be appropriate for the population one wishes to test. Thus an English vocabulary test standardized in the United States, and a French vocabulary test standardized in France, may not be valid for use with French-English bilinguals in Quebec. Additionally, vocabulary tests generally assume a vocabulary of about 6000 words, the commonest words in the language, and test for knowledge beyond these. This assumption may be quite invalid when applied to the second language of bilinguals which has been learned in school only. Persons whose knowledge of a language is confined to what they learned in school often fail to learn many words which native speakers of the language picked up as children about their homes and in play with other children. Furthermore, because of the tendency for many European languages to share a learned vocabulary, an educated adult English speaker, for example, may, despite grave deficiencies in French vocabulary, fare better on the more "difficult" items towards the end of a French vocabulary test than on the *simple* ones occurring at the beginning. It is difficult to imagine what effect this might have on the validity of the test. Still further, a bilingual may have received his education at some age level in his second language with the result that he may have a more adequate vocabulary for discussing certain topics in his second than in his first language. Finally, the fact that a bilingual can give an acceptable definition of a word may not reveal whether he is capable of exploiting its full semantic possibilities. Many common words, for example *get* in English or *faire* in French, have extraordinary semantic flexibility which is not tested by conventional vocabulary tests; and yet the ability to use this flexibility seems so typical of the effortless performance of the native speaker.

Difficulties such as these must be considered when testing any bilingual skill, but there is no reason to suppose that they are insurmountable. All that is needed is that the researcher be aware of them.

In order to get around the difficulties involved in directly measuring degree of bilingualism by means of tests of reading, writing, speaking and listening, a number of indirect measures have been devised. These may be loosely classified under four heads: rating scales, tests of verbal fluency, flexibility tests and tests of dominance.

**Rating Scales.** The technique most frequently employed to determine degree of bilingualism is the language background question-

naire. Most questionnaires of this type derive from the work of Hoffman (1934) and require the subject to estimate the extent to which each of his languages is used in his home. The reliability of such measures is generally quite high, yet it remains to be seen how validly they describe linguistic background and, further, how validly linguistic background can be used to predict language skills. Almost certainly the validity will be found to vary from country to country, owing to varying social pressures to exaggerate or underestimate the use of a particular language. For example the Irish government makes a grant of £10 per annum per child to parents who make Irish the home language. It is not difficult to imagine the effect of these grants on the validity of responses to language background questionnaires.

A second form of rating scale used to measure bilingualism is self-rating for language skills. Typically such ratings correlate highly with ratings of language background. However, Macnamara (1967a) found them less powerful than a richness of vocabulary test (described below) in distinguishing between groups clearly differing in experience in the two languages. He explained the relative weakness of self-ratings by the influence of examination marks. Many subjects rated their skills in their second language above those in their first language if their marks in the second language were higher than those in the first, although the marks were patently non-comparable.

*Fluency Tests.* There are a number of economic and convenient tests of speed of responding to verbal stimuli or speed of verbal production in two languages. One such is Ervin's (1961a) picture-naming test which yields times for naming pictures of certain objects. Times thus obtained correlated highly with years of experience in the two languages. A second test is that described by Rao (1964) which measures the speed with which bilinguals follow simple instructions given in their two languages. Several other tests of fluency are due to Lambert and his associates (1955b, 1959, 1967). In one test they measured reaction times in response to instructions to press keys; in another they counted the number of French and English words beginning with a particular pair of letters which bilinguals were able to write. Other fluency tests deserving further study are described by Scherer and Wertheimer (1964), the most interesting of which is their "assimilation of meaning" test in which subjects indicate as quickly as possible whether statements are true or false. Finally, Johnson (1953) and Macnamara (1967b) used a task in which subjects were required to say as many different words as they could in one language (and later in the other) within a limited period.

Many of these tests are ingenious, but their validity as measures of degree of bilingualism remains in doubt. So far, researchers have been content if they found that the data they obtained with such tests correlated with language background questionnaires or estimates of

years of experience in the two languages. It remains to be seen how well they correlate with direct measures of language skills.

**Flexibility Tests.** The easiest way to show what I mean by flexibility tests is to give some examples. Macnamara (1967a) devised a test, which is called a richness of vocabulary test. In this subjects were presented with a series of phrases of the type, "he is *drunk*" (later the same item occurred in translation), and asked to write as many words or expressions as they could which are synonymous or nearly synonymous with the word italicized in the phrase. The idea behind this is that bilinguals seem to have far more ways—some formal, some informal, some humorous—to express a concept in their strong than in their weak language. A possible objection to this test is the fact that languages vary in the number of ways they have to express a particular concept. However this ceases to be important if one can find out the number which native-speakers of each language give in a limited period of time. Macnamara found that results obtained with his test could be used to control 80% of the variance in degree of bilingualism as determined by experience in the languages. A complementary test, a semantic richness test, might also prove worth investigating. This would be a test in which subjects were asked to show in how many senses a given word may be used.

Lambert's word detection test may also be classified as a flexibility test. The test requires subjects to identify as many words (from two languages) as they can in a long nonsense word, for instance the French and English words in the string DANSONODENT. Data obtained with this test correlated highly with ratings obtained by means of language background questionnaires.

**Dominance Tests.** A dominance test is one in which a bilingual is confronted with an ambiguous stimulus (which could belong to either of two languages) and asked to pronounce or interpret it. The language most frequently used is the dominant one. One example of such a test is that devised by Lambert *et al.* (1959) who presented bilinguals with a list of words to be read aloud of which some items were ambiguous, e.g. *pipe* which is both English and French, but pronounced differently in the two languages. Measures obtained with the test correlated with measures of degree of bilingualism based on linguistic background.

Lambert, Havelka and Gardner (1959) have gone further than others in their studies of how to measure degree of bilingualism and have administered to a group of bilinguals a battery of tests in which all four types of indirect measures were represented: rating scales, fluency, flexibility and dominance tests. They found that all such measures were intercorrelated and could be interpreted as measuring a single factor. This is encouraging because the various tests appear at first sight to measure quite distinct skills. Nevertheless it is necessary

to sound a warning note: results of factorial studies of the linguistic performance of monolinguals (Thurstone, and Thurstone, 1941, Carroll, 1941, Vernon, 1961) would suggest that verbal functioning comprises many factors, and that some of these factors, for example verbal fluency, can be subdivided into several factors. However the findings of monolingual studies do not apply directly to work with bilingual measures of the types described. Typically indirect measures of bilingualism have been used to derive difference scores by subtracting scores for performance in one language from those for performance in the other. Thus, from the resulting difference scores the influence of all factors which contribute equally to performance in the two languages has been removed. For this reason a difference score *may be* a better measure of degree of bilingualism than the original measures from which it was derived. However, such difference scores have never been validated by comparing them with direct measures of bilingual skills. To correct this omission is surely the next task in the study of how to measure bilingualism.

### ***Coordinate-Compound***

The second major distinction among bilinguals is that between coordinate and compound bilinguals. The distinction, by no means a new one, was brought to the attention of psychologists principally by Weinreich (1953), and was further elaborated by Ervin and Osgood (1954). It refers essentially to the semantic aspects of language. Compound bilinguals are defined as those who attribute identical meanings to corresponding words and expressions in their two languages. The fusion of meaning systems is said to result from their having learned both languages in the same context (e.g., a bilingual home), or one language through the medium of the other (the so-called indirect method). Coordinate bilinguals, on the other hand are defined as those who derive different or partially different meanings from corresponding words and expressions in their two languages. The distinction in the coordinates' meaning systems is said to arise because they acquired their languages in different contexts, e.g., French in France and English in the United States.

Interest in the distinction rests primarily in its implications about the effect of acquisition context on the semantic aspects of language. The distinction also draws attention to cultural differences between language settings and to the possibility of cross-cultural misunderstanding even when fluent bilinguals are available as mediators. Finally the distinction aids us in understanding how coordinate bilinguals manage to keep their languages from becoming mixed up, though it increases our difficulties in explaining how compound bilinguals do so.

The first empirical evidence for the coordinate-compound distinction was produced by Lambert, Havelka and Crosby (1958). They found that two groups of French-English bilinguals, distinguished by

the manner in which they had learned their languages, differed in the affective or connotative meanings they attributed to translated equivalents in the two languages. Further, they found that their compound group was better able than their coordinate one to make use of a list of translated equivalents in one language while learning a list of words in the other. However, the groups did not differ in speed of translating words.

The strongest support for the distinction comes from a study by Jakobovits and Lambert (1961) in which a satiation technique was used. Lambert and Jakobovits (1960) had previously found that continuous repetition of a word decreases (satiates) its affective meaning. Jakobovits and Lambert used the technique with bilinguals and found that compounds when satiated in one language also showed satiation effects in the other language; coordinates on the other hand showed no such effects. These results have since been replicated by MacLeod (1966). Further support for the distinction is to be found in the work of Lambert and Fillenbaum (1959), and Lambert (1967).

However two other studies failed to yield the expected support for the theory. Olton (1960) had bilingual subjects read a list of English and French words and note which words signalled an electric shock. He then presented a new list in which some of the words were the translation of the signal words. Contrary to expectations, coordinates did not differ from compounds in their responses to the translations. Similarly, in a task which involved learning a list and later recognizing the items learned, no differences were found between the two groups. It had been expected that compounds would make more "translation errors" than coordinates. However, both studies depended on bilinguals making translation errors. It seems likely that such errors are too rare to show up a difference between the two groups.

Two other studies also serve to temper enthusiasm. Kulers (1963) and Lambert and Moore (1966) made painstaking, though quite different, studies of the word associations of bilinguals in their two languages. The bilinguals examined in each study seem to have been mainly compounds (Kulers describes his Ss as such), yet in each, considerable differences between associational networks in the two languages were observed. These findings probably imply greater differences between the semantic systems of compound bilinguals, at least in relation to individual words and their translations, than has hitherto been considered.<sup>2</sup>

The overall status of the distinction between coordinate and com-

<sup>2</sup> Ervin studied the effect on bilinguals' recall of varying the language of learning and language of recall. She found that neither variation affected the recall of compound bilinguals, whereas significant differences associated with such variation were found for coordinate bilinguals. Unfortunately, however, no statistical comparison was made between the two groups, so we do not know whether they differ significantly.

pound bilinguals, and consequently of its theoretical implications, is difficult to assess. The linguistic area in which it has most reliably been found is affective meaning, it has not so been found reliably in the area of denotative and connotative meaning.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, every study mentioned in this section deals with isolated words, which are certainly convenient materials for study. Yet no evidence derived from such materials is likely to describe adequately so complicated a process as the relating of language and meaning. Even the most cursory acquaintance with dictionaries reveals that there is scarcely a word in any language which has only one meaning. The precise meaning attributed to a word in normal usage is determined by the context, verbal or otherwise. Without such a context the flexibility of word meanings is enormous, and so there is no way of knowing what meanings suggest themselves to bilingual subjects during testing. It would therefore seem that the next logical step is to search for a coordinate-compound distinction among bilinguals with materials in which the meaning of words is determined by a verbal context.

### Special Aspects of Bilingual Performance

*Linguistic Independence.* One of the most remarkable aspects of bilingual performance—so obvious in fact that it has scarcely been mentioned in the literature—is the bilingual's ability to keep his languages from getting mixed up. Many bilinguals know the entire phonological and syntactic systems of two languages and many thousand words in each, yet they manage to function in each language with very little interference from the other. This feat of separate storage, retrieval and processing I shall call linguistic independence. Needless to say, few if any bilinguals are fully successful in maintaining linguistic independence at all times; the ability to do so varies among bilingual communities (Kloss, this issue), among individuals within a com-

<sup>3</sup> It may be interesting to refer briefly to studies of the semantic values attributed by bilinguals to color words in two languages which divide the color continuum differently—see, for example, Lenneberg and Roberts (1958) and Ervin (1961a). Particularly instructive is Ervin's finding that bilinguals tend to shift the semantic value of color words to lessen or remove disagreement between the two languages. This phenomenon, so reminiscent of Festinger's (1957) theory that cognitive dissonance tends to disappear, suggests that there is a strong pull in the direction of semantic fusion. Kulers (1963) has pointed out that persons can hardly be categorized for life on the basis of how they originally learned their languages. In a similar vein, Fishman (1964) observes that shifts from coordinate to compound bilingualism, and in the opposite direction, may well be affected by the domains in which the two languages are employed throughout life. Interestingly enough, in all studies where a coordinate-compound distinction was found, Ss were highly educated. By contrast, Ervin's Ss were relatively uneducated. It may be that distinctive semantic systems cannot be maintained without a good deal of education directed at keeping them distinct. See Gumperz (1964).

munity and even within an individual's performance depending on occasion, topic, etc. (Ervin-Tripp, 1964, Gumperz, 1964, Mackey, 1962).

In order to explain linguistic independence Penfield and Roberts (1959) proposed the theory that the neurological systems underlying the two languages of bilinguals are functionally separate in such a way that when one is *on* the other must be *off*. This is to propose what may be termed a *single switch* model of bilingual functioning, since it states that the whole system associated with each language is either on or off and so implies a single switching system to control which language is on.

To test this theory Preston (1965) used a bilingual version of the Stroop Color-World Test (1935). In this version a subject is shown a series of color words printed in a variety of colors, the color of the ink always differing from that of which the word is the name (for example, the word, red, printed in blue). The subject's task is to ignore the word and name the color of the ink. Preston's subjects were French-English bilinguals who were asked to respond to series of French color words and series of English ones. Each subject's time to complete the task was taken under four conditions: English stimuli and English responses; English stimuli and French responses; French stimuli and English responses; French stimuli and French responses. Performance times were also taken for control conditions in which noncolor words and patches of color were used. In general, times for the experimental conditions (color words) were appreciably longer than times for the control conditions; times for the four experimental conditions did not vary much. These findings were interpreted as evidence against the Penfield and Roberts theory. This seems reasonable, since the theory would predict that when subjects were set to respond in  $L_1$ , the  $L_1$  system would be on and the  $L_2$  system off. In that case, subjects ought to have had no difficulty in ignoring stimuli in  $L_2$ , and their times ought to have been the same as if they were merely naming patches of color. The findings, however, were to the contrary.

Preston's study suggests that a slightly more complex theory of functional separation is required, a two switch model. On other grounds, too, such a model seems desirable. A bilingual can decide to speak in one language rather than the other independent of his environment, and so he acts as though he had a language switch controlling his language output system. On the other hand, when he sees some print or hears some words in one of his languages he automatically carries out the decoding process in the appropriate language. In this case he acts as though he had a language switch at the beginning of his input or decoding system which is controlled by the environment. If a *two switch* model is accepted, the Preston findings can be reinterpreted. The requirement to respond in  $L_1$  meant the output system, but not in the input system, of  $L_1$  was on. The input system would

automatically and simultaneously be on in the language of the stimuli. If the further reasonable assumption is made that the semantic values of the corresponding English and French color words are either equal or equally disruptive to the subjects' performance, then the results are quite in keeping with the theory.

In order to validate the two switch theory of functional separation and of linguistic independence a series of studies of language switching is required. Such a series of studies would comprise separate investigations of the hypothesized output switch, input switch and of the two in combination. On the assumption that switching takes an observable amount of time, it would probably be possible to determine whether two switches exist, and if they do the relationship between them. This would also throw much light on how linguistic independence is achieved and maintained.

Although no systematic study of linguistic independence along the lines just indicated has been carried out, there are some indications that it would be rewarding. Macnamara (1967b) had bilinguals say as many individual words as they could in a given period while switching (alternating), without translating, from one language to the other. He found that under this condition performance was decidedly poorer than under other conditions when subjects gave words unilingually in either of their languages. Kokers (1966b) studied the performance of bilinguals (French and English) when asked to read and spontaneously produce passages in which two languages were mixed. He found that although comprehension of linguistically mixed passages was not inferior to that of unilingual ones, speeds for reading and spontaneous production were very much slower. Moreover, in the reading and spontaneous production of mixed passages many curious errors of pronunciation and syntax appeared. For example, in reading, subjects showed a marked tendency on coming to the end of a French string to pronounce the English string which followed as though it were French. There was also a tendency, though less marked than the first, to pronounce the last items in a French string as though they were English. That is, subjects seemed, on seeing the English string which followed, to change the pronunciation prematurely. This of course argues that the two switches are not entirely independent. However, taken together, these two studies create the distinct impression that the linguistic performance of the bilingual is similar to that of a musician who observes the notation for key at the beginning of a piece of music and then forgets about it, though in his playing he performs the actions appropriate to the key. Similarly, the bilingual once started in one language can forget about which language he is speaking and yet obey the rules of that language. The two studies mentioned show how much his performance is disrupted if he has to concentrate on the language he is using and switch about from one to the other.

A consistent set of findings from another group of studies throws light on linguistic independence but also raises an unsolved problem. Kolars (1965, 1966a) and Lambert, Ignatow and Krauthammer (1966) examined the free recall of bilinguals for three types of word lists: unilingual word lists in each of the two languages and linguistically mixed lists. Subjects were required to recall the items they had seen in the language in which they were presented. The findings were that subjects recalled items from mixed lists just as well as from unilingual lists and that they made amazingly few translation errors. Kolars (1966a) found further that the repetition of items in translation is just as helpful for recall as repetition in the same language. This suggests that subjects employ a nonlinguistic semantic store for the items; but then, why is no storage space, to borrow a computer term, taken up with assigning the language to the semantic value? We do not know the answer, but it must somehow depend on language being a highly distinctive and overlearned coding system. This in turn helps to explain linguistic independence.

*Linguistic Interference.* Linguistic interference, the tendency for the phonological, lexical, syntactic and semantic systems of one language to intrude on those of another, is the opposite of linguistic independence. Linguists have studied linguistic independence for a long time, but psychologists have paid little attention to it. Apart from those studies already discussed in connection with the coordinate-compound distinction (in essence a distinction between linguistic independence and linguistic interference at the semantic level), there seem to be no relevant studies in the psychological literature. Yet interference in phonology, syntax and vocabulary must surely be related to other types of interference described by psychologists.

Perhaps the best way to approach the matter is to study the performance of persons who are learning a second language or children who are learning two languages simultaneously. Two studies of such children by linguists already exist: Ronjat (1913) and Leopold (1939-49). The difficulties to be anticipated in this approach are (a) particular examples of interference in the learner's performance may have been taught to him by his parents or teachers; (b) sophisticated teaching tends to wipe out as much interference as possible. However, these are not formidable difficulties, and in any case instances of true interference are so abundant in the language of children that the researcher will easily find enough of them for his purpose.<sup>4</sup> In addition, there have been advances recently in techniques for collecting and analysing

<sup>4</sup> Frequently interference is so clear that even the most conscientious advocate of the competence-performance distinction will have little scruple in allowing that such instances are more than a mere slip of the tongue. For example, a young German-English bilingual girl once said of the present writer to her mother: "Der can German talken."

the speech of young monolingual children (see Smith and Miller, 1966) which could be adapted to the learning of two languages.

**Switching.** Part of the bilingual's skill is his ability to switch from one language to the other. I have already dealt to some extent with switching in connection with linguistic independence. Now, however, I wish to focus attention now on the nature and functioning of the switching devices and on the cues which control them.

Switching may take the form of linguistic interference, but in this section I shall confine myself to full code switching without interference.

From the studies of Kolars (1966b) and myself (1967b) it would appear that switching takes an observable amount of time, though it would be premature to suggest actual figures. Differences between individuals in switching time do not appear to be related to degree of bilingualism, since I, while working with groups quite distinguishable in degree of bilingualism, failed to discover a relationship.

If switching takes time, how is it that in normal discourse a bilingual can frequently without seeming to pause have recourse to his other language for a word, a phrase, or an apt quotation? The most likely explanation is that he has the capacity to activate the L<sub>2</sub> system, carry out the semantic encoding, the selection of words and the syntactic organization while more or less mechanically producing in L<sub>1</sub> material which has already been prepared for production.

Support for the above hypothesis is to be found in another study which I made of language switching (1966). Bilingual subjects read two types of lists in three different manners. One type of list consisted of 20 numbers drawn at random from the numbers, 1 to 20; the other consisted of 20 sums of money (e.g., 5s.-8d.) also arranged in random order. Each subject read one number list and one money list in Irish, a similar pair of lists in English; in the third pair he had to switch languages for each new item. Languages were always cued by the color in which the item was written, green for Irish and red for English. A subject was told what type each list was before he came to it and given six practice items. The test items were shown to him one at a time when he completed his response to the previous one. Overall times for reading each list were taken with a stopwatch.

The findings were that unilingual performance on the number lists taken together and unilingual performance on the money lists taken together did not differ significantly. However, times for the mixed lists were decidedly longer than those for the corresponding unilingual lists. Additionally the time which could be attributed to switching when reading numbers was significantly longer than that which could be attributed to switching when reading money lists, though each list involved the same number of switches.

As the main difference between the two types of list was in length of response, the hypothesis was set up that shorter switching times for money lists were due to subjects' ability to anticipate the language of the next item while more or less mechanically naming the item before them. To test this hypothesis two further money lists were presented to the same subjects. Both lists were mixed, both involved the same number of switches, but the pattern of switches in one list was regular and could be anticipated, while in the other list switches occurred in a random pattern. The finding supported the hypothesis: the random order list took significantly longer to read than the regular one.

Two features in these findings deserve particular attention. The improvement in switching times for money lists with a regular pattern of switching occurred, (1) although subjects had to anticipate a switch *while speaking*, and (2) although they did not know what the next response would be—they only knew that it would be in a particular language. The first of these points supports our interpretation of how bilinguals in normal discourse can switch without an apparent pause. They anticipate the switch while speaking and thus avoid disrupting the flow of their speech. The second point is support for some form of the theory of functionally separate language systems (discussed above). It is an advantage to anticipate a language switch even when what is to be said in the other language is still unknown. The most reasonable explanation of this is that a language system can be made ready for a response even before the response has been determined. For this to be possible it must be distinct, at least functionally, from the other language system.

Little is known from a psychological viewpoint about the second aspect of language switching, that is, the cues which guide bilinguals in their choice of language. Bilinguals can of course decide which language to use in the absence of cues or even running counter to available ones. However, it is generally possible to discover in the environment some of the cues which guided a particular choice. The most obvious cues are linguistic: spoken or written language. Sometimes these cues are so powerful that the bilingual is not conscious that he has switched languages (see Graur, 1939). Other cues are nonlinguistic and depend on associations between a particular language on the one hand and certain persons, places and topics on the other. When such associations exist, the persons, places and topics act as cues to language choice and language switches. In fact the study of such cues has been a major interest in sociolinguistics (Hymes, this issue). Bilinguals also seem to become adept at discerning nonlinguistic cues to language choice even among strangers, as daily experience in a city like Montreal testifies. Here, bilinguals seem to be relying on such cues as hair color, facial features, dress and the like. The evidence, however, is only anecdotal.

*Translation.* Translation is switching with the added limitation

that a message already encoded in  $L_1$  be encoded in  $L_2$ . The ability to translate, then, involves the ability to map one code on the other in such a way that the new string in  $L_2$  has the same meaning as the original in  $L_1$ . The key to the mapping is meaning; and meaning is superordinate to the two languages, although related to them by the semantic networks of the two languages.

This description of translation does not imply that every word and expression in every language has an exact counterpart in every other language. It merely states that whether a word or phrase in one language translates a word or phrase in another language is determined by reference to the meaning. Neither does our description of translation remove the possibility of a coordinate-compound distinction. That distinction rests on the possibility that some bilinguals (compounds) attribute a single meaning to words or phrases in two languages where other bilinguals (coordinates) do not.

The interest of translation for psychologists is the light it can throw on language switching mechanisms, on the semantic aspects of bilingualism, and of course on the problems and possibilities of communication across language boundaries.

There is some evidence that degree of bilingualism and speed of translating are unrelated. Lambert, Havelka and Gardner (1959) presented bilinguals with a list of French and a list of English words and measured the time taken to translate each list. The resulting measures did not correlate with other measures of degree of bilingualism. I (1967b) also measured speed of translating individual words by asking bilinguals to say as many words as they could in a minute in one language following each word by its translation in the other language. Measures thus obtained were not related either to degree of bilingualism as determined by experience in the two languages or to unilingual production (saying distinct words) in either language. Treisman (1965) has a similar finding in a study (described below) of the simultaneous translation of continuous strings.

These findings are surprising because at first sight they imply that speed of decoding and encoding are unrelated to the extent of overall skills in two languages. However, the most likely explanation is that the constant requirement to switch languages has such a disruptive effect on production that it wiped out any differences associated with degree of bilingualism.

Oléron and Nanpon (1964) compared times taken to translate unconnected words presented orally with times taken to repeat them in the same language. They found a difference of about 0.4 seconds. Part of this time may be taken up with the choice of a meaning for the word, since unconnected words are never unambiguous; part is possibly due to language switching<sup>5</sup>, and part to the search for the appropriate word in the second language.

I did not find reliable differences due to the direction of translation ( $L_1$  to  $L_2$  or  $L_2$  to  $L_1$ ), though Lambert *et al.* did find such differences and traced them to different sorts of language settings.

### Three Studies . . .

Three studies are particularly interesting in that they go beyond the translation of words and deal with the translation of sentences. Treisman (1965) examined the speed with which bilinguals could carry out simultaneous translation from English to French and vice versa. More specifically, she measured the extent to which her subjects lagged behind the incoming message. She found that the extent of this lag was principally determined by the amount of information (uncertainty or improbability in transition from one item of a string of words to the next) in the incoming message. She also found that translation was slower than repetition in the same language, and, though her subjects varied considerably in degree of bilingualism (some were native French-speakers, others were native English-speakers), that translation from English to French was consistently faster than translation in the opposite direction. This suggests either that there is something about English which makes it easier to decode than French, or something about French which makes for easier encoding. It also suggests that the translation of continuous passages and unrelated words are different processes.

Oléron and Nanpon (1965) also studied delays in simultaneous translation by skilled translators and found that the delays could range from 2 to 10 seconds. The extent of the delay, they suggest, is determined by the difficulty experienced by the translator in organizing the incoming material. The translator must grasp a certain amount of the material before he can begin to translate, the amount varying with the position in the sentence of certain key words such as the verb. On the other hand he cannot afford to fall too far behind because of the limitations of short-term memory. Numerous errors of omission and less numerous errors of addition were also observed.

Hepler (1966) made a systematic and careful study of the effect of combining syntactic transformations with translation on the performance of Russian-English bilinguals. As expected, she found that when her subjects had to combine both tasks (transform and trans-

<sup>5</sup> However, the two switch model of linguistic performance would not suggest a loss of time due to switching in this investigation. The model allows for the input system to be on in the language of the stimuli and the output system to be simultaneously on in the language of the response. Thus no language switch would be required. On the other hand, there might be a tendency for the switches to operate in harmony which would have to be counteracted in the translation test, and thus give rise to a loss of time.

late) their response times were significantly longer than when they carried out transformations within the language of the stimulus. However, the time taken by translation was in general less than that taken by transformation. In general, too, the time added by translation was only about half that observed by Oléron and Nanpon for translating unconnected words. Finally, Hepler found that tasks involving translation from English to Russian were carried out significantly faster than tasks involving translation in the opposite direction.

The studies of Treisman and Hepler suggest that unlike the translation of individual words speed of translation may vary with the pair of languages involved and with the direction in which the translation is made. Treisman's study suggests further that the variables responsible for this are linguistic rather than psychological, but as yet there are no indications as to what these variables may be. Hepler's finding that the translation of simple sentences takes less time than the translation of unconnected words (Oléron and Nanpon) lends support to the view that in the later task subjects lose time in choosing one of the many possible meanings.

So far as I am aware no studies have been made of the quality of translations made by different sorts of bilinguals, for example co-ordinate and compound bilinguals. The theory behind the distinction would suggest that they would perform translation tasks differently. However this raises the thorny problem of how to evaluate the quality of translations, a problem which is basic to the extension of studies on translation. Fortunately a recent paper by Carroll (1966) takes up this topic.

Carroll thought it unlikely that objective scales would prove useful in the assessment of the quality of translations, so he addressed himself to the development of subjective scales. He personally divided translations into nine bundles using first a subjective scale of fidelity and then one for intelligibility. He then formulated descriptions of each bundle, one set of descriptions for fidelity and one for intelligibility. Next he described the bundles to groups of subjects and had them discriminate among a large number of translations first for intelligibility and then for fidelity. He found high inter-judge reliability on each scale and high inter-scale agreement.

These findings in so complicated an area are very encouraging indeed. They also suggest that a slightly different approach might prove fruitful. A group of highly skilled bilinguals might be divided at random, one half to study the original of a message and one to study a translation. Afterwards they might be set questions on the material they had studied, and the translation assessed in terms of the number of questions answered correctly by the translation group compared with the original group. Repetition of the experiment with various translations might well provide a ranking of the translations for fidelity.

and intelligibility. If successful, the advantage of this technique over Carroll's is likely to be a considerable saving of time. Carroll's subjects took four and a half hours to assess 144 sentences. In addition, subjects received one hour of instruction on the use of the scales.

## In Conclusion—Two Themes

If a broad view is taken of the studies reviewed, one cannot but be impressed at the interest of the problems raised and the progress that has been made in a relatively short time. Even more impressive, however, is the amount of work which still remains to be done. Two themes which run through the review are worth singling out for special attention as they seem so relevant to the further progress of psychological studies of bilingualism: the complexity of language functioning and the complexity of the social settings in which language is employed. Lack of awareness of these very different sets of complexities have frequently led to unjustified generalizations as well as to seeming contradiction between findings.

To offset the disadvantages just referred to, there is the attraction of research on bilingualism, first because of its obvious value to society, and secondly because of the opportunity it affords for elegant and rigorous research designs. In most studies the researcher can use the same subjects as their own controls. In this way it is possible to study such basic problems as for example the relationship between language and thought, because one can study subjects who have a single level of cognitive development and two different levels of language development. To study the same relationship in monolingual subjects is not nearly so easy, since in most tasks language and thought are inextricably confounded. Thus it seems likely that many students will be attracted to bilingualism in the hope of solving some of the most basic problems in human psychology.

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## An Issei Learns English

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In the years since the second world war, large numbers of American servicemen have brought home Japanese wives. These women, who are Issei, or first-generation, have been exposed to English intensively. Few of their husbands know any Japanese. Few of the women have the intention of teaching their children Japanese. They are scattered about rather than clustered residentially, so that in many cases their friendships are with Caucasians.

They maintain Japanese primarily through reading or friendships with other war brides whom they meet through the war brides clubs or through employment in Japanese restaurants. Since there are two other Japanese communities in the area, comprised of earlier immigrants and of the young business and official groups, one might expect ties with other Japanese. But the other immigrants are mainly older and of rural background. Furthermore, interracial marriages are sufficiently unpopular in Japan to inhibit friendships between the war brides and other Japanese.

I have investigated two aspects of the acquisition of English in this special group of Issei: Why do some learn English faster than

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others, and why do some learn what to say as well as how to say it in English?

I will use in this report several different types of measures of English mastery. *Relative fluency* is a measure of comparative speed in naming pictures of simple objects in Japanese and in English. This measure has been found before (Ervin 1961), to be a useful and valid device for assessing purely oral skills, but it does not, of course, take into account any grammatical skills at all. *Morphology* was a test based on a purely verbal version of the device Jean Berko (1958) used with children which asks for the plural, past tense, or possessive of a number of nonsense syllables. For example, one might say "I have a nizz. There are two of them. What are they?" The interest in this measure was whether the speaker inflected the form or not. Japanese does not have inflectional suffixes for nouns so the women often omit them in English. *Prosody* was a score for appropriate stress and intonation patterns in reading sentences designed to test typical contrasts in English. *Phonemes* were measures of the success in distinguishing English phonemes in pictures or in sentences containing key words like *ship* and *sheep*, *light* and *right*, and *hat*, *hot* and *hut*. *Subphonemes* were allophonic contrasts like vowel length before final consonants, pronunciation of consonant clusters, and syllabic nasals of *wooden* and *mountain*. These were treated separately from phonemic errors on the grounds that subphonemic errors were less likely to lead to misunderstanding of messages.

Many factors should be related to ease in acquiring English. The most important of these are the amount of contact with English including, separately, hearing and speaking the language. In addition it was believed that certain variables of an attitudinal type might be important, in view of Lambert's work (1965) which showed differences between students who varied in level of motivation to learn a second language. Attitudinal variables should have more effect on the features least important for intelligibility.

The number of women in this study was small. Thirty-six Issei women were tested on a variety of tests for a total of around nine hours per woman. In the correlational analysis resulting from the large array of data, there is some problem in sifting causal relations from simple co-occurrences.

### ***Relative Fluency***

Basically English dominance, results in terms of naming speed, seems to be a function of exposure to English. There is a relation of .42 to over-all exposure, and both the number of years in the United States and the age of children are related to fluency in English.

On the other hand, some beliefs about oneself are related to low English fluency. The women who judged themselves to be relatively

conservative, and those who still yearned to visit or live in Japan, had relatively low fluency in English.

The naming measure is also a relatively good predictor of associate fluency in *both* languages. (Associate fluency refers to the number of word associations given in each language in the test described below.) Evidently the women who have greater verbal fluency in Japanese succeed in learning English more rapidly.

### **Morphology**

Second language learners can successfully communicate in spite of quite deviant grammar in certain respects. Many Japanese women speak English without the usual English inflectional affixes. They omit subjects or objects when these are obvious from context. In many situations of encounter between speakers of two unrelated languages, we find stable pidgins developing. Listening to the "transitional pidgin" of the Issei, and struck by its surprising success in terms of conveying messages, one must ask why these women ever go beyond this stage of learning.

Pidgins typically develop when both parties to a transaction are satisfied with or derive benefit from using this special language. On the other hand, if there is sufficient contact with monolingual norms for the deviance of a pidgin to be disapproved, if there is sufficient contact to allow at least one group to become bilingual, and if there is social equality so that relative rank is not marked by the use of pidgin, bilingualism or even language shift may result from contact. Since the condition of the Issei women is one that makes for bilingualism or language shift, we expect that under the pressure of contact and standard English norms they will gradually shift toward standard English.

Morphological omissions in English are similar to phonemic errors in that they can occasionally result in misunderstanding. Learning of morphology and learning of phonemes go hand in hand ( $r = .70$ ). The strongest predictors of morphological skill are schooling and reading ( $p < .05$ )<sup>1</sup> which is hardly surprising.

### **Phonemic System**

In every language some sound differences alter messages; others simply indicate dialect, style, accent or mood. Phonemic distinctions are those which can give a different message. The greater variety of word forms and phonemes in English present serious difficulties to Japanese who wish to learn English. Among the most frequent sounds in English are /l/ and /r/, indistinguishable to a Japanese, who imitates both as a flap, as in a stereotyped British *very*. Japanese has

<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise indicated Mann-Whitney U-Tests were used.

five vowels; American English has at least nine. The Japanese confuse *ship* and *sheep*, *pool* and *pull*, *cat*, *cot*, and *cut*. Since /v/ and /θ/ don't exist in Japanese, substitutes are made.

The astonishing result of this study is that the highest predictor of phonemic mastery, even in naming pictures, is reading, ( $p < .01$ ) though exposure to English in school and on jobs, ( $p < .05$ ), and correction by others are also significant predictors, ( $p < .05$ ). On the other hand, movies, TV and radio are unrelated with phonemic skills and, indeed, phonemic scores are slightly lower for regular movie-goers.

There are two quite different interpretations of the finding that reading is the best predictor of phonemic mastery. One possibility is simply that people who read a lot care more about language, are more motivated to learn, and are more disturbed by failure to be understood, to understand or to meet the norms for English.

Another possibility is that reading helps to supplement oral training. Since many of the phonemic distinctions which cause trouble for the Japanese have spelling correlates, reading is in fact not unrelated to phonemic training. Teachers find that children who have phonemic confusions in discrimination or articulation have trouble reading. If two words have a distinctive spelling, their phonemic distinctiveness in listening could be sought, and in articulation better remembered. In this view, distinctive spelling could accelerate learning. Which of these is the better explanation can only be discovered by experimental manipulation.

### *Prosody and Accent*

In addition to phonemic differences, some measures were included which related to aspects of English less crucial to the intelligibility of messages. One problem with these measures is that they are often more difficult to assess reliably, since the native speaker's ear judges phonemic errors most acutely and tends to disregard features of speech which are not essential to intelligibility. Both of these measures have some relation to phonemic scores (prosody,  $r = .41$ ; phonetic accuracy  $r = .55$ ).

Prosody appears to have some relation to attitudinal variables, in that women with poor prosody scores were more likely to report that it is important to be attractive ( $p < .01$ ) and that jobs are important and may require an accent ( $p < .05$ ). Voices with more Japanese accent were also judged less favorably than samples of American voices ( $r = .33$ ) by women with better English prosodic pattern.

The phonetic scores were better ( $p < .05$ ) for women who said it is important to be a good wife and mother, and if one knows English one can understand the family better. On the whole, prediction of both measures was poor.

## *Attitudes*

I had expected that attitudinal variables might prove to be related closely to the acquisition of prosody and phonetic patterns in English, and included items bearing on both the advantages and disadvantages of an accent and on attitudes about language purity or mixture. Most of the Issei, unlike the French-born bilinguals in an earlier study (Ervin, 1955), do not feel there is anything wrong with language mixture. However, Ss whose pronunciation was poor generally see both more advantages and disadvantages attached to an accent. These findings render the technique suspect because if it had assessed real and possibly effective differences in motivation, I would have expected a relation between good pronunciation and belief that accents are disadvantageous. In conclusion, I think that the attitudes reported arise from the woman's skills at the time of the interview. The French informants who had more language mixture in their speech also approved of it more. Their judgment may rationalize the fact.

## **Language and Content**

### *Content Shifting*

The recent work of Blom and Gumperz (1966) has revealed that language switching is a subtle and pervasive process. In groups of friends in a Norwegian village they found that the introduction of topics of a general sort as opposed to local questions led to an unconscious increase in the use of the standard Norwegian lexicon. One might think that this kind of tie between form and content can only be effective when the forms are not sharply distinct, as in dialect variation where co-occurrence restrictions may be less than in language variation. The observation of the natural speech of many bilinguals belies this belief.

Our concern here will be with the reverse facet of this tie of form and content, i.e., with the effect of language choice upon content. Within the life of a bilingual individual who has moved from one linguistic milieu to another the two languages may have been used in distinctive physical and social environments and at different parts of the life cycle. If there are differences in social experience and beliefs in the two cultural milieux we might expect that language shift will be accompanied by a shift in content. These changes might be due to differences in the perception or recall of experience associated with the two languages, or to differences in verbally expressed values in the two cultures. In other words such a bilingual, in becoming competent in two cultures, learns to associate particular kinds of content with each language.

What might we expect the content differences associated with language to consist of? The simplest possible assumption is that the

differences between content in the two languages of a bilingual might be similar to differences between two monolingual groups. This is at least a starting point. In an earlier study with French who came to the United States as adults, predictions were made about content differences in Thematic Apperception Test latent themes. For some variables the themes of the stories changed with language in the direction predicted as likely for monolinguals (Ervin, 1955 and 1964).

In the present study, monolingual norms were obtained for a series of verbal measures. These were Thematic Apperception Test stories, word associations, sentence completions, semantic differentials and story completions. The monolinguals were similar in age, education and social class to the bilingual women. Two groups of bilingual women were studied, the Issei described earlier, and a sample of Kibei Nisei, or second generation Japanese American who returned to Japan for education.

For each type of content, a system was devised for scoring distance from American norms, distance from Japanese norms, and relative dominance of the two distance scores. Thus for stories, sentence completions and word associations, responses were weighted by their frequency in the norm group. For example, on the TAT card MF13, a score of 3 Japanese and 18 American is given for a guilt theme, since 3 Japanese women and 18 Americans said the man felt guilty; in Japan the more common theme was failure. For the semantic differentials a deviation score was devised. While the differences in norms were in some cases surprising, the procedure was completely mechanical and required no judgment about the typicality of the responses.

An analysis of the monolingual norms for story completion led to some curious findings. For example one story ran: "A father died leaving many debts. His only son, earning his own living is studying". One might guess that the Japanese would feel a greater obligation to maintain the family good name in such a case. However, about half the Japanese said that the student finished his studies before repaying, and another 13 per cent never repaid; almost all of the Americans said the student repaid soon by leaving school or working part time. After the fact, one can see that two differences are involved. One is the close tie in the Japanese industrial system between school and job through personal networks, which would make interrupting a highly competitive school career unthinkable; the other is the difference in student economics. The point of the illustration, however, is that the monolingual norms in some cases match a stereotype and in some cases sharply deviate from it.

### *Content Shifts for Each Task*

The most clear-cut effect of language was on word associations and sentence completions. When speaking Japanese, both Issei and Nisei gave associations more typical of women in Japan; when speaking

English, the Issei gave typically American associations. The over-all effect was that content shifted with language for both groups.

Some concepts, of course, are typically more Japanese while others are more American. Thus, *mushrooms* and *New Year's Day* are typically Japanese, while *kitchen*, *plate* and *marriage* are more typically American. There is not so much shift with language in connection with these words since they reflect a kind of domain specialization. Even in Japan, *kitchens* look American now; but *mushrooms* have, even in English, a rich evocation of the pine forests in the fall in Japan. On the other hand, *tea* evokes lemon and cookies in English, and in Japanese the utensils of the tea ceremony.

As expected, then, shifting was greater for some words. It was also greater for those Issei who were more fluent in English. Evidently learning English brings with it learning appropriate American associates.

Sentence completions also showed a marked relation to language for both groups. In particular the Issei shifted markedly towards the American norms when responding in English. When responding in Japanese both groups increased their Japanese content scores.

Some of the differences are quite subtle. For instance, Japanese women more often say "what I want most in life . . . is peace". Americans say "... happiness". "When I am with men . . ." Japanese women are uncomfortable, American women contented. "When a husband finds fault with his wife, the wife . . ." in Japan—is defensive, in America—tries to improve.

For both word associations and sentence completions, though the change in conformity to American norms with language was considerable ( $p. < .001$ ) for the Issei, the Nisei responses, though differing in the two languages, were equally close to American norms in both. Possibly the difference between Issei and Nisei lies in the greater separation of two cultures for the Issei. For the Nisei the American milieu has always been bilingual, since often their families mix languages. But since they were in Japan during the conservative, nationalistic thirties, traditional Japanese culture is uniquely tied to the Japanese language for them, even more than for the Issei who knew post-war Japan.

For story completions, both groups again showed an increase in Japanese solutions when the Japanese language was used. But American solutions did not depend on language. For example, "it is closing time, but the boss is still in his office. An office girl finished her work, but as usual many of the other workers are still remaining". The typical American solution has the girl leave without asking; in the Japanese solutions she waits without asking. Frequently the women commented about the difference in customs. One Issei gave this solution in Japanese: "I think that since she is a working person I guess she will not be able to leave until her boss goes home. She will wait". And in English:

"Well sometimes she have to work, boss say to her . . . I think he say wait, well she does wait". In this case, there is neither a typical American nor a typical Japanese solution at the second session.

The semantic differential results indicated that the effect of language depended on the concept being judged; in the Thematic Apperception Test stories there was no over-all shift with language at all.

### Set

One way to account for these effects is to attribute them to self-instructions. If the women can guess what typical responses are, they may be able to shift content with language because the change in language implies a difference in what they ought to say. We sought to separate this feature from language by holding language constant and asking some subjects to give typically Japanese responses at one session and typically American responses at the other.

For some words, set did produce an effect on word association responses. For example, *New Year's Day* drew quite different responses from one woman under different sets—"New Year's celebration, New Year's greetings, New Year's cards, New Year's house visiting, New Year's eve", vs. "New Year's Eve party, champagne, holiday, New Year's resolution". Most women could simulate typical Japanese responses appropriately but not typically American responses, perhaps because they don't know them. The over-all effect was to increase relative dominance of Japanese under the Japanese set and decrease it under the American set.

For the completions also, the Japanese scores could be increased. In addition there was change for some stories in the American score. Evidently the stereotype of the norms varied from story to story. The two examples we have given of the student with his father's debts and of the office girl leaving at the end of the day illustrate cases where the norms do not conform equally to a stereotype.

In the case of the semantic differential, an American set was effective for some concepts, but not for all. For sentence completions, set affected only American scores, and for the TAT, an American set makes stories more Japanese!

It thus appears that the subjects were able to manipulate proximity only to the Japanese norms on those measures where there had been an effect of language, with the exception of sentence completions. The over-all increase in American score in English testing for word associations and story completions in the Issei is thus unexplained by set.

### Individual Differences

I have suggested that learning what is typically American content may be part of the competence to be acquired along with the English

language itself. The Issei might be expected to have as wide a range in this kind of mastery as was found in their phonological skills.

What kind of women shifts scores with language? In order to classify them, I ignored how deviant from the norms each woman was and simply looked at how close to each norm group she was at each session, and gave her a relative score.

A woman who moves to the United States might simply learn English and in effect translate her Japanese responses into English. Such a woman should, if she was relatively close to typical Japanese responses in Japan, give such responses in both languages. We shall call her J-dominant. J-dominant women are pictured as shy, conservative and lacking contacts in the United States.

A woman who moves to a different social context in the United States and learns new content appropriate to English would alter content with language. These women are called shifters. They probably have maintained contacts in Japan, and also are fairly acculturated in their behaviour in America, but without strong preferences.

Some women may become (or have become) Americanized even in their behaviour in Japanese. They will be called A-dominant. They probably have a strong identification with American women, show a high degree of acculturation and prefer American contacts.

The J-dominant on word associations do appear to be conservative. They would rather be Japanese than American, they serve Japanese food at home, believe in lucky days ( $p < .01$ ), and wean their children late. But it is hard to distinguish shifters from A-dominant. The shifters wean their children early, have a separate room from the children, like driving a car, and are A-dominant on sentence completions. They are dependent on others and believe it is important to have many acquaintances, ( $p < .01$ ). The A-dominant identify with American women more than the others ( $r = .51$ ), and prefer them as friends ( $r = .35$ ). They go to American movies a lot, and know their neighbors but not their in-laws. They even expect their children to first-name adult friends.

The J-dominant on the TAT were similar in that they weaned their children late, have a typical Japanese New Year's, and are least acculturated. But most of their friends are American. A-dominants have closer friends in America, and have a more American New Year's. Shifters tend to be more acculturated on a few scales. They wean their children early, and have adopted American customs of courtesy and seldom follow such Japanese customs as bowing. They have many Japanese friends, but unlike the A-dominant they lack close friends in America, and are not affectionate. Their high shift score arises largely from being more typically Japanese in responses at the appropriate session.

The problem situations or story completions showed some marked

differences between the groups. The J-dominant write to Japan and prefer Japanese friends though they have been married a long time ( $p < .01$ ). They don't read American magazines ( $p < .01$ ) and hence may simply not know American norms for solutions. For them, comfortable living is paramount ( $p < .01$ ). The A-dominant does read American magazines ( $p < .01$ ), is highly dependent ( $p < .01$ ), and was encouraged in her American trends because the closest family member favoured her marriage. Her husband doesn't like her Japanese ties ( $r = .66$ ), doesn't ask her questions about Japan, and doesn't like to hear her speak Japanese. Shifters on the other hand are not dependent.

The J-dominant and shifters on sentence completions have no marked characteristics. The A-dominant are married to men who like the Japanese language, clothes and women, but they have high contact and are relatively acculturated. They have some definite verbal attitudes about values, saying it is important to be attractive, have many acquaintances, do well in a profession, be a good wife and mother and raise children a special way.

Some common themes showed in the results, though there were variations for the different verbal measures. The J-dominant were typically more conservative, more closely tied to Japan, and less acculturated. The particular measures revealing these features varied. Many said they would rather be Japanese than American.

The A-dominant were the reverse. Generally the A-dominant identified with American women more than the others, and preferred them as friends. They had close friends here, and were sometimes quite dependent on them. Their families did not oppose their marriages. They learned a good deal about America from the mass media, going to movies and reading magazines a lot.

The shifters, like the A-dominant, were more acculturated. But they often lacked Caucasian friends here, sometimes lacking any close friends here. Perhaps this is the key difference between shifters and A-dominant who have become completely "Americanized".

It is evident that the knowledge demanded to give American responses varies for the different tests. The word associations could be shifted simply by enumerating different objects; far subtler differences in preoccupations are revealed in the TAT's and sentence completions. The only conspicuous source discovered for American content is American magazines. Women who read them had high scores in both languages for American Content.

### *The Bilingual and Monolingual Norms*

This study began with a model of a bilingual as a person with access to two sets of norms, both of which must be learned. When the

norms are linguistic, and the two languages with which he has contact are both standardized languages with which he maintains contact through reading if not orally, such a model may have some appropriateness. But even in language, new norms develop for bilinguals<sup>2</sup> if they use either of their languages primarily with other bilinguals. Their sense of what is "correct" itself changes. Some French informants in the United States even asked me what was correct French. Since actual speech is likely to change even faster than beliefs about language, any group cut off from a monolingual community and low in reading, rapidly loses its ability to shift between two sets of monolingual norms. In the French study every informant, no matter how educated and committed to the maintenance of French and no matter how often he returned to France, showed evidence of English influences in his French, often subtly through semantic categories, frequency of cognates or word order.

In the case of content, there is no norm in the sense of a standard of correctness. Within each monolingual community there is diversity. An Issei who marries an American and emigrates must be deviant herself. Though she might know what average or typical behavior is, there is no reason to assume that she responds this way herself. Besides, of course, it is not clear what *average* she might be reflecting—the Japanese woman of the time she emigrated, or her contemporary in Japan, certainly changed with the years. In some cases I found that Navaho and Anglo monolinguals in the American southwest (Ervin-Tripp, 1964) were more alike than bilinguals on semantic differentials. For example, both Anglos and Navaho monolinguals think highly of doctors. Navaho bilinguals have, like the monolinguals, had contact with doctors in the hospitals, but in addition to recognizing their medical effectiveness, they are aware through their knowledge of English that some Anglo doctors have contempt for Navahos, and speak rudely to and about them. Bilinguals may thus be deviant from both groups.

Secondly, in all bilingual groups there is some specialization of function by language, so that the two languages taken together have the full range of functions for the bilingual individual that a single language has for a monolingual. Thus the bilingual women reported that they knew of their husband's work chiefly through English. The current specialization of functions and topics is closely tied to the fact that in their life histories the two languages were not learned at the same time. It cannot then be expected that they will have acquired knowledge of verbalized values and content in the same way as women who grew up here speaking English. Some content they can learn as

<sup>2</sup> Blom and Gumperz (1966), and Gumperz (this issue) show that where bilinguals have been interacting mainly with other bilinguals for a long time the model for each of their languages is not monolingual usage of those languages, but rather the modified forms of those languages as spoken by the bilinguals themselves.

adults; the story completions reflect themes discussed for adults in the women's magazines. But some of the subtle differences in TAT themes, such as the preoccupation with guilt or with failure, may reflect differences which can only be learned through childhood socialization, rearing children here, or decades of close association with Americans. As was pointed out (Ervin, 1964) with the French TAT protocols, the themes that showed most marked shift were those most obvious to adults (e.g., achievement).

In this report of initial results, I sought to characterize why some women learn English faster than others, and why some show more content shift than others. The strongest predictors of simple fluency were found to be contact with the language through the number of years in the United States. But for mastery of English morphological rules and pronunciation, reading of English was important, either because of its relation to values about correct use of language, or because of a direct influence on awareness of distinctions between words.

Marked shifts in content with shift in language were found in a variety of verbal measures. These changes appear to be due to more than self-instruction to give typical responses, because when such instructions were given, the women were unable to make their answers more American, except on sentence completions. Thus set may be a partial but not an adequate explanation for the fact that responses were more typical of the Japanese when given in Japanese and more typical of Americans when given in English.

Women who gave typically American responses in both languages differed on other measures—of conservatism, identification with Americans and acculturation—from women who gave typically Japanese responses in both. Thus the content data were consistent with other differences in these women's behaviour and were not particularly tied to the language being spoken. In one case, story or problem solutions, American themes seem to have been learned from the mass media. At this point in the analysis, the only difference that can be found between those who adopt American content only in English and those who do so also in Japanese is that the latter have stronger friendships here. Since the women who changed content with language were not the same for all the measures of content, I cannot conclude that there is a separate group of women who display two somewhat different selves in the two languages. This kind of shifting with context evidently occurs for most of the women some of the time.

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# A Social Psychology of Bilingualism

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Other contributions in this series have drawn attention to various aspects of bilingualism, each of great importance for behavioral scientists. For instance, we have been introduced to the psychologist's interest in the bilingual switching process with its attendant mental and neurological implications, and his interest in the development of bilingual skill, to the linguist's interest in the bilingual's competence with his two linguistic systems and the way the systems interact, and to the social anthropologist's concern with the socio-cultural settings of bilingualism and the role expectations involved. The purpose of the present paper is to extend and integrate certain of these interests by approaching bilingualism from a social-psychological perspective, one characterized not only by its interest in the reactions of the bilingual as an individual but also by the attention given to the social influences that affect the bilingual's behavior and to the social repercussions that follow from his behavior. From this perspective, a process such as language switching takes on a broader significance when its likely social and psychological consequences are contemplated, as for example, when a language switch brings into play contrasting sets of stereotyped images of people who habitually use each of the languages involved in the switch. Similarly, the development of bilingual skill very likely involves something more than a special set of aptitudes because one would expect that various social attitudes and motives are intimately involved in learning a foreign language. Furthermore, the whole process of becoming bilingual can be expected to involve major conflicts of values and allegiances, and bilinguals could make various types of

adjustments to the bicultural demands made on them. It is to these matters that I would like to direct attention.

## Linguistic Style and Intergroup Impressions

What are some of the social psychological consequences of language switching? Certain bilinguals have an amazing capacity to pass smoothly and automatically from one linguistic community to another as they change languages of discourse or as they turn from one conversational group to another at multilingual gatherings. The capacity is something more than Charles Boyer's ability to switch from Franco-American speech to Continental-style French when he turns from the eyes of a woman to those of a waiter who wants to know if the wine is of the expected vintage. In a sense, Boyer seems to be always almost speaking French. Nor is it the tourist guide's ability to use different languages to explain certain events in different languages. In most cases they are not fluent enough to pass and even when their command is good, their recitals seem to be memorized. Here is an example of what I do mean: a friend of mine, the American linguist, John Martin, is so talented in his command of various regional dialects of Spanish, I am told, that he can fool most Puerto Ricans into taking him for a Puerto Rican and most Columbians into taking him for a native of Bogota. His skill can be disturbing to the natives in these different settings because he is a potential linguistic *spy* in the sense that he can get along too well with the intimacies and subtleties of their dialects.

The social psychologist wants to know how this degree of bilingual skill is developed, what reactions a man like Martin has as he switches languages, and what social effects the switching initiates, not only the suspicion or respect generated by an unexpected switch but also the intricate role adjustments that usually accompany such changes. Research has not yet gone far enough to answer satisfactorily all the questions the social psychologist might ask, but a start has been made, and judging from the general confidence of psycholinguists and sociolinguists, comprehensive answers to such questions can be expected in a short time.

I will draw on work conducted by a rotating group of students and myself at McGill University in Montreal, a fascinating city where two major ethnic-linguistic groups are constantly struggling to maintain their separate identities and where bilinguals as skilled as John Martin are not at all uncommon. Two incidents will provide an appropriate introduction to our work. One involves a bus ride where I was seated behind two English Canadian ladies and in front of two French Canadian ladies as the bus moved through an English-Canadian region of the city. My attention was suddenly drawn to the conversation in front wherein one lady said something like: "If I couldn't speak English I certainly wouldn't shout about it", referring to the French conversation

going on behind them. Her friend replied: "Oh, well, you can't expect much else from them". Then one of the ladies mentioned that she was bothered when French people laughed among themselves in her presence because she felt they might be making fun of her. This was followed by a nasty interchange of pejorative stereotypes about French Canadians, the whole discussion prompted, it seemed, by what struck me as a humorous conversation of the two attractive, middle class French Canadian women seated behind them. The English ladies couldn't understand the French conversation, nor did they look back to see what the people they seemed to know so much about even looked like.

The second incident involved my daughter when she was about 12 years old. She, too, has amazing skill with English and two dialects of French, the Canadian style and the European style. One day while driving her to school, a lycée run by teachers from France, I stopped to pick up one of her friends and they were immediately involved in conversation, *French-Canadian* French style. A block or two farther I slowed down to pick up a second girlfriend when my daughter excitedly told me, in English, to drive on. At school I asked what the trouble was and she explained that there actually was no trouble although there might have been if the second girl, who was from France, and who spoke another dialect of French, had got in the car because then my daughter would have been forced to show a linguistic preference for one girl or the other. Normally she could escape this conflict by interacting with each girl separately, and, inadvertently, I had almost put her on the spot. Incidents of this sort prompted us to commence a systematic analysis of the effects of language and dialect changes on impression formation and social interaction.

### Dialect Variations Elicit Stereotyped Impressions

Over the past eight years, we have developed a research technique that makes use of language and dialect variations to elicit the stereotyped impressions or biased views which members of one social group hold of representative members of a contrasting group. Briefly, the procedure involves the reactions of listeners (referred to as judges) to the taped recordings of a number of perfectly bilingual speakers reading a two-minute passage at one time in one of their languages (e.g., French) and, later a translation equivalent of the same passage in their second language (e.g., English). Groups of judges are asked to listen to this series of recordings and evaluate the personality characteristics of each speaker as well as possible, using voice cues only. They are reminded of the common tendency to attempt to gauge the personalities of unfamiliar speakers heard over the phone or radio. Thus they are kept unaware that they will actually hear two readings by each of

several bilinguals. In our experience no subjects have become aware of this fact. The judges are given practice trials, making them well acquainted with both versions of the message, copies of which are supplied in advance. They usually find the enterprise interesting, especially if they are promised, and receive, some feedback on how well they have done, for example, if the profiles for one or two speakers, based on the ratings of friends who know them well, are presented at the end of the series.

This procedure, referred to as the *matched-guise* technique, appears to reveal judges' more private reactions to the contrasting group than direct attitude questionnaires do (see Lambert, Anisfeld and Yeni-Komshian, 1965), but much more research is needed to adequately assess its power in this regard. The technique is particularly valuable as a measure of *group* biases in evaluative reactions; it has very good reliability in the sense that essentially the same profile of traits for a particular group appear when different samples of judges, drawn from a particular subpopulation, are used. Differences between subpopulations are very marked, however, as will become apparent. On the other hand, the technique apparently has little reliability when measured by test-retest ratings produced by the same group of judges; we believe this type of unreliability is due in large part to the main statistic used, the difference between an individual's rating of a pair of guises on a single trait. Difference scores give notoriously low test-retest reliability coefficients although their use for comparing means is perfectly appropriate (Bereiter, 1963; and Ferguson, 1959, 285f).

Several of our studies have been conducted since 1958 in greater Montreal, a setting that has a long history of tensions between English- and French-speaking Canadians. The conflict is currently so sharp that some French-Canadian (*FC*) political leaders in the Province of Quebec talk seriously about separating the Province from the rest of Canada, comprising a majority of English-Canadians (*ECs*). In 1958-59, (Lambert, Hodgson, Gardner and Fillenbaum, 1960) we asked a sizeable group of *EC* university students to evaluate the personalities of a series of speakers, actually the matched guises of male bilinguals speaking in Canadian style French and English. When their judgements were analyzed it was found that their evaluations were strongly biased against the *FC* and in favor of the matched *EC* guises. They rated the speakers in their *EC* guises as being better looking, taller, more intelligent, more dependable, kinder, more ambitious and as having more character. This evaluational bias was just as apparent among judges who were bilingual as among monolinguals.

We presented the same set of taped voices to a group of *FC* students of equivalent age, social class and educational level. Here we were in for a surprise for they showed the same bias, evaluating the *EC* guises significantly *more* favorably than the *FC* guises on a whole series of traits, indicating, for example, that they viewed the *EC* guises

as being more intelligent, dependable, likeable and as having more character! Only on two traits did they rate the *FC* guises more favorably, namely kindness and religiousness, and, considering the whole pattern of ratings, it could be that they interpreted too much religion as a questionable quality. Not only did the *FC* judges generally downgrade representatives of their own ethnic-linguistic group, they also rated the *FC* guises much more negatively than the *EC* judges had. We consider this pattern of results as a reflection of a community-wide stereotype of *FCs* as being relatively second-rate people, a view apparently fully shared by certain subgroups of *FCs*. Similar tendencies to downgrade one's own group have been reported in research with minority groups conducted in other parts of North America.

### Extensions of the Basic Study

*The Follow-up Study.* Some of the questions left unanswered in the first study have been examined recently by Malcolm Preston (Preston, 1963). Using the same basic techniques, the following questions were asked: (a) Will female and male judges react similarly to language and accent variations of speakers? (b) Will judges react similarly to male and female speakers who change their pronunciation style or the language they speak? (c) Will there be systematic differences in reactions to *FC* and Continental French (*CF*) speakers?

For this study, 80 English Canadian and 92 French Canadian first year college age students from Montreal served as judges. The *EC* judges in this study were all Catholics since we wanted to determine if *EC* Catholics would be less biased in their views of *FCs* than the non-Catholic *EC* judges had been in the original study. Approximately the same number of males and females from both language groups were tested, making four groups of judges in all: an *EC* male group, an *EC* female, a *FC* male and a *FC* female group.

The 18 personality traits used by the judges for expressing their reactions were grouped, for the purposes of interpretation, into three logically distinct categories of personality: (a) *competence* which included intelligence, ambition, self-confidence, leadership and courage; (b) *personal integrity* which included dependability, sincerity, character, conscientiousness and kindness; (c) *social attractiveness* which included sociability, likeability, entertainingness, sense of humor and affectionateness. Religiousness, good looks and height were not included in the above categories since they did not logically fit.

*Results: Evaluative Reactions of English-Canadian Listeners.* In general it was found that the *EC* listeners viewed the female speakers more favorably in their French guises while they viewed the male speakers more favorably in their English guises. In particular, the *EC* men saw the *FC* lady speakers as more intelligent, ambitious, self-confident, dependable, courageous and sincere than their English

counterparts. The EC ladies were not quite so gracious although they, too, rated the FC ladies as more intelligent, ambitious, self-confident (but shorter) than the EC women guises. Thus, ECs generally view FC females as more competent and the EC men see them as possessing more integrity and competence.

Several notions came to mind at this point. It may be that the increased attractiveness of the FC woman in the eyes of the EC male is partly a result of her inaccessibility. Perhaps also the EC women are cognizant of the EC men's latent preference for FC women and accordingly are themselves prompted to upgrade the FC female, even to the point of adopting the FC woman as a model of what a woman should be.

However, the thought that another group is better than their own should not be a comfortable one for members of any group, especially a group of young ladies! The realization, however latent, that men of their own cultural group prefer another type of women might well be a very tender issue for the EC woman, one that could be easily exacerbated.

To examine this idea, we carried out a separate experiment. The Ss for the experiment were two groups of EC young women, one group serving as controls, the other as an experimental group. Both groups were asked to give their impressions of the personalities of a group of speakers, some using English, some Canadian style French. They were, of course, actually presented with female bilingual speakers using Canadian French and English guises. Just before they evaluated the speakers, the experimental group was given false information about FC women, information that was designed to upset them. They heard a tape recording of a man reading supposedly authentic statistical information about the increase in marriages between FC women and EC men. They were asked to listen to this loaded passage twice, for practice only, disregarding the content of the message and attending only to the personality of the speaker. We presumed, however, that they would not likely be able to disregard the content since it dealt with a matter that might well bother them—FC women, they were told, were competing for EC men, men who already had a tendency to prefer FC women, a preference that they possibly shared themselves. In contrast, the control group received quite neutral information which would not affect their ratings of FCs in any way. The results supported the prediction: The experimental Ss judged the FC women to be reliably more attractive but reliably less dependable and sincere than did the control Ss. That is, the favorable reactions toward FC women found previously were evident in the judgments of the control group, while the experimental Ss, who had been given false information designed to highlight the threat posed by the presumed greater competence and integrity of FC women, saw the FC women as men stealers—attractive but undependable and insincere. These findings support the general hypoth-

esis we had developed and they serve as a first step in a series of experiments we are now planning to determine how judgments of personalities affect various types of social interaction.

Let us return again to the main investigation. It was found that *FC* men were not as favorably received as the women were by their *EC* judges. *EC* ladies liked *EC* men, rating them as taller, more likeable, affectionate, sincere, and conscientious, and as possessing more character and a greater sense of humor than the *FC* versions of the same speakers. Furthermore, the *EC* male judges also favored *EC* male speakers, rating them as taller, more kind, dependable and entertaining. Thus, *FC* male speakers are viewed as lacking integrity and as being less socially attractive by both *EC* female, and, to a less marked extent, *EC* male judges. This tendency to downgrade the *FC* male, already noted in the basic study, may well be the expression of an unfavorable stereotyped and prejudiced attitude toward *FCs*, but, apparently, this prejudice is selectively directed toward *FC* males, possibly because they are better known than females as power figures who control local and regional governments and who thereby can be viewed as sources of threat or frustration, (or as the guardians of *FC* women, keeping them all to themselves).

The reactions to Continental French (*CF*) speakers are generally more favorable although less marked. The *EC* male listeners viewed *CF* women as slightly more competent and *CF* men as equivalent to their *EC* controls except for height and religiousness. The *EC* female listeners upgraded *CF* women on sociability and self-confidence, but downgraded *CF* men on height, likeability and sincerity. Thus, *EC* judges appear to be less concerned about European French people in general than they are about the local French people; the European French are neither downgraded nor taken as potential social models to any great extent.

*Evaluative Reactions of French-Canadian Listeners.* Summarizing briefly, the *FC* listeners showed more significant guise differences than did their *EC* counterparts. *FCs* generally rated European French guises *more* favorably and Canadian French guises *less* favorably than they did their matched *EC* guises. One important exception was the *FC* women who viewed *FC* men as more competent and as more socially attractive than *EC* men.

The general pattern of evaluations presented by the *FC* judges, however, indicates that they view their own linguistic cultural group as *inferior* to both the English Canadian and the European French groups, suggesting that *FCs* are prone to take either of these other groups as models for changes in their own manners of behaving (including speech) and possibly in basic values. This tendency is more marked among *FC* men who definitely preferred male and female representatives of the *EC* and *CF* groups to those of their own group. The *FC* women, in contrast, appear to be guardians of *FC* culture at

least in the sense that they favored male representatives of their own cultural group. We presume this reaction reflects something more than a preference for *FC* marriage partners. *FC* women may be particularly anxious to preserve *FC* values and to pass these on in their own families through language, religion and tradition.

Nevertheless, *FC* women apparently face a conflict of their own in that they favor characteristics of both *CF* and *EC* women. Thus, the *FC* female may be safe-guarding the *FC* culture through a preference for *FC* values seen in *FC* men, at the same time as she is prone to change her own behavior and values in the direction of one of two foreign cultural models, those that the men in her group apparently favor. It is of interest that *EC* women are confronted with a similar conflict since they appear envious of *FC* women.

*The Developmental Studies.* Recently, we have been looking into the background of the inferiority reaction among *FC* youngsters, trying to determine at what age it starts and how it develops through the years. Elizabeth Anisfeld and I (1964) started by studying the reactions of ten year old *FC* children to the matched guises of bilingual youngsters of their own age reading French and English versions of *Little Red Riding Hood*, once in Canadian style French and once in standard English. In this instance, half of the judges were bilingual in English and half were essentially monolingual in French. Stated briefly, it was found that *FC* guises were rated significantly *more* favorable on nearly all traits. (One exception was height; the *EC* speakers were judged as taller.) However, these favorable evaluations of the *FC* in contrast to the *EC* guises were due almost entirely to the reactions of the monolingual children. The bilingual children saw very little difference between the two sets of guises, that is, on nearly all traits their ratings of the *FC* guises were essentially the same as their ratings of *EC* guises. The results, therefore, made it clear that, unlike college-age judges, *FC* children at the ten year age level do not have a negative bias against their own group.

The question then arises as to where the bias starts after age ten. A recent study (Lambert, Frankel and Tucker, 1966) was addressed to solving this puzzle. The investigation was conducted with 375 *FC* girls ranging in age from 9 to 18, who gave their evaluations of three groups of matched guises, (a) of some girls about their own age, (b) of some adult women, and (c) of some adult men. Passages that were appropriate for each age level were read by the bilingual speakers once in English and once in Canadian style French. In this study attention was given to the social class background of the judges (some were chosen from private schools, some from public schools and to their knowledge of English (some were bilingual and some monolingual in French). It was found that definite preferences for *EC* guises appeared at about age twelve and were maintained through the late teen years. There was, however, a marked difference between the private and public

school judges: the upper middle class girls were especially biased after age 12, whereas the pattern for the working class girls was less pronounced and less durable, suggesting that for them the bias is short-lived and fades out by the late teens. Note that we probably did not encounter girls from lower class homes in our earlier studies using girls at FC collèges or universités.

The major implication of these findings is that the tendency for certain subgroups of college-age FCs to downgrade representatives of their own ethnic-linguistic group, noted in our earlier studies, seems to have its origin, at least with girls, at about age 12, but the ultimate fate of this attitude depends to a great extent on social-class background. Girls who come from upper middle class FC homes, and especially those who have become bilingual in English, are particularly likely to maintain this view, at least into the young adult years.

The pattern of results of these developmental studies can also be examined from a more psychodynamic perspective. If we assume that the adult female and male speakers in their FC guises represent parents or people like their own parents to the FC adolescent judges, just as the same-age speakers represent someone like themselves, then the findings suggest several possibilities that could be studied in more detail. First, the results are consistent with the notion that teen-age girls have a closer psychological relation with their fathers than with their mothers in the sense that the girls in the study rated FC female guises markedly inferior to EC ones, but generally favored or at least showed much less disfavor for the FC guises of male speakers. Considered in this light, social-class differences and bilingual skill apparently influence the degree of same-sex rejection and cross-sex identification: by the mid-teens the public school girls, both monolinguals and bilinguals, show essentially no rejection of either the FC female or male guises, whereas the private school girls, especially the bilinguals, show a rejection of both female and male FC guises through the late teens. These bilinguals might, because of their skill in English and their possible encouragement from home, be able to come in contact with the mothers of their EC associates and therefore may have developed stronger reasons to be envious of EC mothers and fathers than the monolingual girls would have.

Similarly, the reactions to "same-age" speakers might reflect a tendency to accept or reject one's peer-group or one's self, at least for the monolinguals. From this point of view, the findings suggest that the public school monolinguals are generally satisfied with their FC image since they favor the FC guises of the same-age speakers at the 16 year level. In contrast, the private school monolinguals may be expressing a marked rejection of themselves in the sense that they favor the EC guises. The bilinguals, of course, can consider themselves as being potential or actual members of both ethnic-linguistic groups represented by the guises. It is of interest, therefore, to note that both

the public and particularly the private school bilinguals apparently favor the EC versions of themselves.

## Two Generalizations

This program of research, still far from complete, does permit us to make two important generalizations, both relevant to the main argument of this paper. First, a technique has been developed that rather effectively calls out the stereotyped impressions that members of one ethnic-linguistic group hold of another contrasting group. The type and strength of impression depends on characteristics of the speakers—their sex, age, the dialect they use, and, very likely, the social-class background as this is revealed in speech style. The impression also seems to depend on characteristics of the audience of judges—their age, sex, socio-economic background, their bilingualism and their own speech style. The type of reactions and adjustments listeners make to those who reveal, through their speech style, their likely ethnic group allegiance is suggested by the traits that listeners use to indicate their impressions. Thus, EC male and female college students tend to look down on the FC male speaker, seeing him as less intelligent, less dependable and less interesting than he would be seen if he had presented himself in an EC guise. Imagine the types of role adjustment that would follow if the same person were first seen in the FC guise and then suddenly switched to a perfect EC guise. A group of EC listeners would probably be forced to perk up their ears, reconsider their original classification of the person and then either view him as becoming too intimate in "their" language or decide otherwise and be pleasantly amazed that one of their own could manage the other group's language so well. Furthermore, since these comparative impressions are widespread throughout certain strata of each ethnic-linguistic community, they will probably have an enormous impact on young people who are either forced to learn the other group's language or who choose to do so.

The research findings outlined here have a second important message about the reactions of the bilingual who is able to convincingly switch languages or dialects. The bilingual can study the reactions of his audiences as he adopts one guise in certain settings and another in different settings, and receive a good deal of social feedback, permitting him to realize that he can be perceived in quite different ways, depending on how he presents himself. It could well be that his own self-concept takes two distinctive forms in the light of such feedback. He may also observe, with amusement or alarm, the role adjustments that follow when he suddenly switches guises with the same group of interlocutors. However, research is needed to document and examine these likely consequences of language or dialect switching from the perspective of the bilingual making the switches.

Although we have concentrated on a Canadian setting in these investigations, there is really nothing special about the Canadian scene with regard to the social effects of language or dialect switching. Equally instructive effects have been noted when the switch involves a change from standard American English to Jewish-accented English (Anisfeld, Bogo and Lambert, 1962); when the switch involves changing from Hebrew to Arabic for Israeli and Arab judges, or when the change is from Sephardic to Ashkenazic style Hebrew for Jewish listeners in Israel (Lambert, Anisfeld and Yeni-Komshian, 1965). Our most recent research, using a modified approach, has been conducted with American Negro speakers and listeners (Tucker and Lambert, 1967). The same type of social effects are inherent in this instance, too: Southern Negroes have more favorable impressions of people who use what the linguists call *Standard Network Style English* than they do of those who speak with their own style, but they are more impressed with their own style than they are with the speech of educated, Southern whites, or of Negroes who become too "white" in their speech by exaggerating the non-Negro features and over-correcting their verbal output.

### Social-Psychological Aspects of Second-Language Learning

How might these intergroup impressions and feelings affect young people living in the Montreal area who are expected by educators to learn the other group's language? One would expect that both French-Canadian youngsters and their parents would be more willing, for purely social psychological reasons, to learn English than ECs to learn French. Although we haven't investigated the French-Canadians' attitudes toward the learning of English, still it is very apparent that bilingualism in Canada and in Quebec has long been a one-way affair, with FCs much more likely to learn English than the converse. Typically, this trend to English is explained on economic grounds and on the attraction of the United States, but I would like to suggest another possible reason for equally serious consideration. FCs may be drawn away from Canadian style French to English, or to bilingualism, or to European style French, as a psychological reaction to the contrast in stereotyped images which English and French Canadians have of one another. On the other hand, we would expect EC students and their parents in Quebec, at least, to be drawn away from French for the same basic reasons. It is, of course, short-sighted to talk about groups in this way because there are certain to be wide individual differences of reaction, as was the case in the impression studies, and as will be apparent in the research to be discussed, but one fact turned up in an unpublished study Robert Gardner and I conducted that looks like a group-wide difference. Several samples of Montreal EC, high school

students who had studied French for periods of up to seven years scored no better on standard tests of French achievement than did Connecticut high schoolers who had only two or three years of French training.

### Instrumental and Integrative Motivation

When viewed from a social-psychological perspective, the process of learning a second language itself also takes on a special significance. From this viewpoint, one would expect that if the student is to be successful in his attempts to learn another social group's language he must be both able and willing to adopt various aspects of behavior, including verbal behavior, which characterize members of the other linguistic-cultural group. The learner's ethnocentric tendencies and his attitudes toward the other group are believed to determine his success in learning the new language. His motivation to learn is thought to be determined by both his attitudes and by the type of orientation he has toward learning a second language. The orientation is *instrumental* in form if, for example, the purposes of language study reflect the more utilitarian value of linguistic achievement, such as getting ahead in one's occupation, and is *integrative* if, for example, the student is oriented to learn more about the other cultural community, as if he desired to become a potential member of the other group. It is also argued that some may be anxious to learn another language as a means of being accepted in another cultural group because of dissatisfactions experienced in their own culture while other individuals may be as much interested in another culture as they are in their own. In either case, the more proficient one becomes in a second language the more he may find that his place in his original membership group is modified at the same time as the other linguistic-cultural group becomes something more than a reference group for him. It may, in fact, become a second membership group for him. Depending upon the compatibility of the two cultures, he may experience feelings of chagrin or regret as he loses ties in one group, mixed with the fearful anticipation of entering a relatively new group. The concept of *anomie* first proposed by Durkheim (1897) and more recently extended by Srole (1951) and Williams (1952), refers to such feelings of social uncertainty or dissatisfaction.

My studies with Gardner (1959) were carried out with English-speaking Montreal high school students studying French who were evaluated for their language learning aptitude and verbal intelligence, as well as their attitudes and stereotypes toward members of the French community, and the intensity of their motivation to learn French. Our measure of motivation is conceptually similar to Jones' (1949 and 1950) index of interest in learning a language which he found to be important for successful learning among Welsh students. A factor

analysis of scores on these various measures indicated that aptitude and intelligence formed a common factor which was independent of a second one comprising indices of motivation, type of orientation toward language and social attitudes toward FCs. Furthermore, a measure of achievement in French taken at the end of a year's study was reflected equally prominently in both factors. This statistical pattern meant that French achievement was dependent upon both aptitude and verbal intelligence as well as a sympathetic orientation toward the other group. This orientation was much less common among these students than was the instrumental one, as would be expected from the results of the matched-guise experiments. However, when sympathetic orientation was present it apparently sustained a strong motivation to learn the other group's language. Furthermore, it was clear that students with an integrative orientation were more successful in learning French than were those with instrumental orientations.

A follow-up study (Gardner, 1960) confirmed and extended these findings. Using a larger sample of EC students and incorporating various measures of French achievement, the same two independent factors were revealed, and again both were related to French achievement. But whereas aptitude and achievement were especially important for those French skills stressed in school training, such as grammar, the development of such skills, skills that call for the active use of the language in communicational settings, such as pronunciation accuracy and auditory comprehension, was determined in major part by measures of an integrative motivation to learn French. The aptitude variables were insignificant in this case. Further evidence from the intercorrelations indicated that this integrative motive was the converse of an authoritarian ideological syndrome, opening the possibility that basic personality dispositions may be involved in language learning efficiency.

In this same study information had been gathered from the parents of the students about their own orientations toward the French community. These data suggested that integrative or instrumental orientations toward the other group are developed within the family. That is, the minority of students with an integrative disposition to learn French had parents who also were integrative and sympathetic to the French community. However, students' orientations were not related to parents' skill in French nor to the number of French acquaintances the parents had, indicating that the integrative motive is not due to having more experience with French at home. Instead the integrative outlook more likely stems from a family-wide attitudinal disposition.

### Language Learning and Anomie

Another feature of the language learning process came to light in an investigation of college and postgraduate students undergoing an intensive course in advanced French at McGill's French Summer

School. We were interested here, among other matters, in changes in attitudes and feelings that might take place during the six-week study period (Lambert, Gardner, Barik and Tunstall, 1961). The majority of the students were Americans who oriented themselves mainly to the European-French rather than the American-French community. We adjusted our attitude scales to make them appropriate for those learning European French. Certain results were of special interest. As the students progressed in French skill to the point that they said they "thought" in French, and even dreamed in French, their feelings of anomie also increased markedly. At the same time, they began to seek out occasions to use English even though they had solemnly pledged to use only French for the six-week period. This pattern of results suggests to us that these already advanced students experienced a strong dose of anomie when they commenced to *really* master a second language. That is, when advanced students became so skilled that they begin to think and feel like Frenchmen, they then became so annoyed with feelings of anomie that they were prompted to develop strategies to minimize or control the annoyance. Reverting to English could be such a strategy. It should be emphasized however, that the chain of events just listed needs to be much more carefully explored.

Elizabeth Anisfeld and I took another look at this problem, experimenting with 10-year old monolingual and bilingual students (Peal and Lambert, 1962). We found that the bilingual children (attending French schools in Montreal) were markedly more favorable towards the "other" language group (i.e., the ECs) than the monolingual children were. Furthermore, the bilingual children reported that their parents held the same strongly sympathetic attitudes toward ECs, in contrast to the pro-FC attitudes reported for the parents of the monolingual children. Apparently, then, the development of second language skill to the point of balanced bilingualism is conditioned by family-shared attitudes toward the other linguistic-cultural group.

These findings are consistent and reliable enough to be of general interest. For example methods of language training could possibly be modified and strengthened by giving consideration to the social-psychological implications of language learning. Because of the possible practical as well as theoretical significance of this approach, it seemed appropriate to test its applicability in a cultural setting other than the bicultural Quebec scene. With measures of attitude and motivation modified for American students learning French, a large scale study, very similar in nature to those conducted in Montreal, was carried out in various settings in the United States with very similar general outcomes (Lambert & Gardner, 1962).

One further investigation indicated that these suggested social psychological principles are not restricted to English and French speakers in Canada. Moshe Anisfeld and I (1961) extended the same experimental procedure to samples of Jewish high school students

studying Hebrew at various parochial schools in different sectors of Montreal. They were questioned about their orientations toward learning Hebrew and their attitudes toward the Jewish culture and community, and tested for their verbal intelligence, language aptitude and achievement in the Hebrew language at the end of the school year. The results support the generalization that both intellectual capacity and attitudinal orientation affect success in learning Hebrew. However, whereas intelligence and linguistic aptitude were relatively stable predictors of success, the attitudinal measures varied from one Jewish community to another. For instance, the measure of a Jewish student's desire to become more acculturated in the Jewish tradition and culture was a sensitive indicator of progress in Hebrew for children from a particular district of Montreal, one where members of the Jewish sub-community were actually concerned with problems of integrating into the Jewish culture. In another district, made up mainly of Jews who recently arrived from central Europe and who were clearly of a lower socio-economic level, the measure of desire for Jewish acculturation did not correlate with achievement in Hebrew, whereas measures of pro-Semitic attitudes or pride in being Jewish did.

### Bilingual Adjustments to Conflicting Demands

The final issue I want to discuss concerns the socio-cultural tugs and pulls that the bilingual or potential bilingual encounters and how he adjusts to these often conflicting demands made on him. We have seen how particular social atmospheres can affect the bilingual. For example, the French-English bilingual in the Montreal setting may be pulled toward greater use of English, and yet be urged by certain others in the *FC* community not to move too far in that direction, just as *EC*'s may be discouraged from moving toward the French community. [In a similar fashion, dialects would be expected to change because of the social consequences they engender, so that Jewish accented speech should drop away, especially with those of the younger generation in American settings, as should Sephardic forms of Hebrew in Israel or certain forms of Negro speech in America.] In other words, the bilingual encounters social pressure of various sorts: he can enjoy the fun of linguistic spying but must pay the price of suspicion from those who don't want him to enter too intimately into their cultural domains and from others who don't want him to leave his "own" domain. He also comes to realize that most people are suspicious of a person who is in any sense two-faced. If he is progressing toward bilingualism, he encounters similar pressures that may affect his self-concept, his sense of belonging and his relations to two cultural-linguistic groups, the one he is slowly *leaving*, and the one he is *entering*. The conflict exists because so many of us think in terms of in-groups and out-groups, or of the need of showing an allegiance to one group or

another, so that terms such as own language, other's language, leaving and entering one cultural group for another seem to be appropriate, even natural, descriptive choices.

### Bilinguals and Ethnocentrism

Although this type of thought may characterize most people in our world, it is nonetheless a subtle form of group cleavage and ethnocentrism, and in time it may be challenged by bilinguals who, I feel, are in an excellent position to develop a totally new outlook on the social world. My argument is that bilinguals, especially those with bi-cultural experiences, enjoy certain fundamental advantages which, if capitalized on, can easily offset the annoying social tugs and pulls they are normally prone to. Let me mention one of these advantages that I feel is a tremendous asset.<sup>1</sup> Recently, Otto Klineberg and I conducted a rather comprehensive international study of the development of stereotyped thinking in children (Lambert and Klineberg, 1967). We found that rigid and stereotyped thinking about in-groups and out-groups, or about own groups in contrast to foreigners, starts during the pre-school period when children are trying to form a conception of themselves and their place in the world. Parents and other socializers attempt to help the child at this stage by highlighting differences and contrasts among groups, thereby making his own group as distinctive as possible. This tendency, incidentally, was noted among parents from various parts of the world. Rather than helping, however, they may actually be setting the stage for ethnocentrism with permanent consequences. The more contrasts are stressed, the more deep-seated the stereotyping process and its impact on ethnocentric thought appear to be. Of relevance here is the notion that the child brought up bilingually and biculturally will be less likely to have good versus bad contrasts impressed on him when he starts wondering about himself, his own group and others. Instead he will probably be taught something more truthful, although more complex: that differences among national or cultural groups of peoples are actually not clear-cut and that basic similarities among peoples are more prominent than differences. The bilingual child in other words may well start life with the enormous advantage of having a more open, receptive mind about himself and other people. Furthermore, as he matures, the bilingual has many opportunities to learn, from observing changes in other peo-

<sup>1</sup> For present purposes, discussion is limited to a more *social* advantage associated with bilingualism. In other writings there has been a stress on potential intellectual and cognitive advantages, see Peal and Lambert (1962) and Anisfeld (1964); see also Macnamara (1964) as well as Lambert and Anisfeld (1966). The bilingual's potential utility has also been discussed as a linguistic mediator between monolingual groups because of his comprehension of the subtle meaning differences characterizing each of the languages involved, see Lambert and Moore (1966).

ple's reactions to him, how two-faced and ethnocentric *others* can be. That is, he is likely to become especially sensitive to and leery of ethnocentrism.

## Bilinguals and Social Conflicts

This is not to say that bilinguals have an easy time of it. In fact, the final investigation I want to present demonstrates the social conflicts bilinguals typically face, but, and this is the major point, it also demonstrates one particular type of adjustment that is particularly encouraging.

In 1943, Irving Child (1943) investigated a matter that disturbed many second-generation Italians living in New England: what were they, Italian or American? Through early experiences they had learned that their relations with certain other youngsters in their community were strained whenever they displayed signs of their Italian background, that is, whenever they behaved as their parents wanted them to. In contrast, if they rejected their Italian background, they realized they could be deprived of many satisfactions stemming from belonging to an Italian family and an Italian community. Child uncovered three contrasting modes of adjusting to these pressures. One subgroup rebelled against their Italian background, making themselves as American as possible. Another subgroup rebelled the other way, rejecting things American as much as possible while proudly associating themselves with things Italian. The third form of adjustment was an apathetic withdrawal and a refusal to think of themselves in ethnic terms at all. This group tried, unsuccessfully, to escape the conflict by avoiding situations where the matter of cultural background might come up. Stated in other terms, some tried to belong to one of their own groups or the other, and some, because of strong pulls from both sides, were unable to belong to either.

Child's study illustrates nicely the difficulties faced by people with dual allegiances, but there is no evidence presented of second-generation Italians who actually feel themselves as belonging to both groups. When in 1962, Robert Gardner and I (1962) studied another ethnic minority group in New England, the French-Americans, we observed the same types of reactions as Child had noted among Italian-Americans. But in our study there was an important difference.

We used a series of attitude scales to assess the allegiances of French-American adolescents to both their French and American heritages. Their relative degree of skill in French and in English were used as an index of their mode of adjustment to the bicultural conflict they faced. In their homes, schools and community, they all had ample opportunities to learn both languages well, but subgroups turned up who had quite different patterns of linguistic skill, and each pattern was consonant with each subgroup's allegiances. Those who expressed

a definite preference for the American over the French culture and who negated the value of knowing French were more proficient in English than French. They also expressed anxiety about how well they actually knew English. This subgroup, characterized by a general rejection of their French background, resembles in many respects the rebel reaction noted by Child. A second subgroup expressed a strong desire to be identified as French, and they showed a greater skill in French than English, especially in comprehension of spoken French. A third group apparently faced a conflict of cultural allegiances since they were ambivalent about their identity, favoring certain features of the French and other features of the American culture. Presumably because they had not resolved the conflict, they were retarded in their command of both languages when compared to the other groups. This relatively unsuccessful mode of adjustment is very similar to the apathetic reaction noted in one subgroup of Italian-Americans.

A fourth subgroup is of special interest. French-American youngsters who have an open-minded, nonethnocentric view of people in general, coupled with a strong aptitude for language learning are the ones who profited fully from their language learning opportunities and became skilled in *both* languages. These young people had apparently circumvented the conflicts and developed means of becoming members of both cultural groups. They had, in other terms, achieved a comfortable bicultural identity.

It is not clear why this type of adjustment did not appear in Child's study. There could, for example, be important differences in the social pressures encountered by second-generation Italians and French in New England. My guess, however, is that the difference in findings reflects a new social movement that has started in America in the interval between 1943 and 1962, a movement which the American linguist Charles Hockett humorously refers to as a "reduction of the heat under the American melting pot". I believe that bicultural bilinguals will be particularly helpful in perpetuating this movement. They and their children are also the ones most likely to work out a new, non-ethnocentric mode of social intercourse which could be of universal significance.

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## Organization of the Bilingual School

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A *bilingual school* is a school which uses, concurrently, two languages as mediums of instruction in any portion of the curriculum except the languages themselves. Thus, for example, arithmetic taught in both English and Irish, or arithmetic in English and history in Irish, or all subjects (except Irish and English) in both tongues would constitute bilingual schooling. English through English and all other subjects in Irish would not. The teaching of a vernacular solely as a bridge to another, the official language, is not bilingual education in the sense of this paper, nor is ordinary foreign language teaching.

Bilingual schools of several kinds and varied purpose are now and have long been in operation worldwide. This paper assumes that there are at present sound reasons, which will become increasingly more compelling, for establishing many more such schools and seeks to set forth some guidelines for their organizers. These reasons, briefly stated,

for adding the mother tongue as a teaching medium are

- a. to avoid or lessen scholastic retardation in children whose mother tongue is not the principal school language
- b. to strengthen the bonds between home and school
- c. to avoid the alienation from family and linguistic community that is commonly the price of rejection of one's mother tongue and of complete assimilation into the dominant linguistic group
- d. to develop strong literacy in the mother tongue in order to make it a strong asset in the adult's life

for adding a second tongue as a teaching medium are

- a. to engage the child's capacity for natural, unconscious language learning (Anderson, 1980; Penfield 1956; and Stern, 1963, chapter 11)
- b. to avoid the problems of *method, aptitude*, etc., which beset the usual teaching of second languages

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- c. to make the second language a means to an end rather than an end in itself (Stern, Chapter 9)
- d. to increase second language experience without crowding the curriculum
- e. plus other well-known reasons which do not concern us here: to teach the national language, to provide a lingua franca or a *world status* language, for cultural enrichment, and economic gain.

The literature on bilingualism gives virtually no information on the organization of bilingual schools. Furthermore it generally omits consideration of the teaching-learning process itself: what happens in the classroom—the interaction of teacher, pupils, methods and materials—and the theories of language and language learning underlying those happenings. This paper gives central importance to what happens in the classroom, and it is largely based on such a body of theory (Moulton, 1963). The position taken here is that however desirable—or undesirable—bilingual schooling may be, its effectiveness can neither be assessed nor assured without full consideration of school organization and classroom practices.

The following chart shows some basic features that differentiate bilingual schools (Stern, 1963, Part II; UNESCO, 1953).

<i>One-way</i> school: one group learning in two languages	Mother tongue added	Equal time and . . . (no example known) treatment
	Second tongue added	Unequal time and . . . Hiligayon in the Philippines; Welsh in Wales, in some schools.  Equal time and . . . In some Welsh-English schools, one language alone on alternate days. Irish in southern Ireland; Russian in non-Russian USSR; most bilingual schools in Latin America; English in Nigeria; French in Madagascar; English in Wales in some schools; French or Spanish in grade 12 in nine Virginia high schools.
<i>Two-way</i> school: two groups, each learn- ing in its own and the other's language	Segre- gated classes	Unequal time and . . . (no example known)  Equal time and . . . Spanish-English, Miami, Florida (mixed classes in grades 4-6).
	Mixed classes	Unequal time and . . . Spanish-English, Laredo, Texas; English-Swedish, Viggbyholmskolan, Sweden; German-American Community School, Berlin-Dahlem.  Equal time and . . . English-French, Ecole Active Bilingue—Ecole Internationale de Paris; L'Ecole Internationale SHAPE, St. Germain; the European School, Luxembourg.

The dynamics and pedagogy are not at all the same in a school which adds the mother tongue as in one which adds a second tongue. In the *two-way* model both the mother tongue and the second tongue are added.

Organization is here viewed as process and product. That is to say, organization is taken as (a) the process or course of action followed in bringing a bilingual school into existence and (b) as the educational structure which follows upon and is to some extent determined by (a). The view taken here is that the most important factors entering into the structure of bilingual schools are the time allowed for each of the languages, the treatment and use of each language and whether the language which is added to the previously existing system is the mother tongue or not. Other factors, too, can make a great deal of difference to the school's effectiveness, e.g., whether individual teachers teach in one or in both languages, whether one or two languages are employed within an individual class period, the relative socio-economic status of native speakers of each of the languages and the relative prestige of each (Carroll, 1963; Fishman, 1966).

## Organization as Product

### Coral Way Elementary School

A bilingual school which can be used to illustrate the major organizational patterns and the problems of bilingual schooling is the Coral Way Elementary School in Miami, Florida.<sup>1</sup> In operation since 1963, in a neighborhood broadly representative of all economic levels but mostly lower middle class, it is a six grade school with normally four classes at each grade level and a total of approximately 720 pupils. Half of the pupils enter the school as monolingual speakers of English; half are native speakers of Spanish (Cubans), some of whom know bits and pieces of English. Coral Way Elementary is a *two-way* bilingual school, since each group learns through its own and the other's tongue. Since Coral Way has segregated classes (the language groups are not mixed in grades 1-3 and only to a limited extent in grades 4-6), it is in effect two *one-way* schools. For the Cubans (in this United States setting) Coral Way adds the mother tongue; for the Anglos<sup>2</sup> it adds Spanish, a second tongue. It gives as nearly as possible *equal time and treatment* to the two mediums. Finally, since either of the two halves, the Anglo or the Cuban, could function alone as a *one-way* school with complete effectiveness, Coral Way exemplifies all the organizational possibilities except that of *unequal time and treatment*.

<sup>1</sup> The Coral Way project was established with Ford Foundation support. The director of the Ford Foundation Project was Dr. Pauline M. Rojas.

<sup>2</sup> A term widely used to differentiate native English speakers from native speakers of Spanish.

## Equal Time, Equal Treatment

*Equal time, equal treatment* means curriculum-wide (except for the languages themselves) use of both languages as mediums. Coral Way presents all subjects in grades 1-3 through the mother tongue for approximately half the day, and all are taught again through the other tongue during the following half. These are segregated classes. There is, however, free interchange of both languages for physical education, art, music and supervised play, during which periods the groups are mixed.

There are two sets of teachers, native English and native Spanish (four teachers in all, one for each of the four classes at each grade level), plus four bilingual teaching aides. The aides perform two kinds of teaching task: they are responsible for the physical education, art, music and supervised play; and they give special help to slow learners and transfer students. Even more importantly, they allow the regular teachers free time every day for consultation and planning for the purpose of coordinating the two halves of each child's program.

The Coral Way bilingual school program was initiated in grades 1-3 simultaneously, work in the second language being increased by stages until by approximately mid-year each child was receiving half of his instruction through each of the languages. After the initial year this procedure was followed in the first grade only. As noted above, in grades 1-3 new concepts and skills are learned first through the vernacular and then reinforced by being taught again through the second tongue. This is not slavish imitation of the first teacher by the second one, but rather the presentation of the same content and concepts in a fresh, somewhat different way by a teacher with the varied perspective of another country<sup>8</sup> and another language. In the fourth and fifth grades (the third year of operation of the school) it was found that the pupils' command of the second language was such that they could learn through it alone without need of a duplicate class in the vernacular.


Despite the carefully coordinated dual-perspective double teaching of each subject, the basic methodological principle is that of expecting the instructors in each language to act in the classroom as if that were the only language in the world and the children's entire education depended on it. This means that work in one language is not presented in terms of or with reference to the other one.

One of the most difficult problems at Coral Way arose from the need to provide the same curricular time allotments as in other Miami schools. Although the reinforcing procedure gives maximum second language experience with minimum crowding of the curriculum, some

<sup>8</sup> The Spanish medium teachers at Coral Way were born and educated in Cuba.

time inevitably goes to the second language per se. This reduces the amount of extra-curricular activities during school hours.

## MINUTES IN THE SCHOOL DAY



## TIME DISTRIBUTION PATTERN—Coral Way Elementary School

*Vernacular* and *second language* (S. L.) mean the use of these as mediums of instruction. *Mixed* in grades 1-3 means physical education, art and music only. In grades 4-6 *mixed* also means combined classes of Anglos and Cubans alternating 3 weeks of each grading period working through English only, and 3 weeks working through Spanish only, in all subjects.

The most crucial teaching problem is the proper initiation of pupils (in grades 1-3 during the first year of the school and in grade one thereafter) to the second language. The same problem occurs with late-comers and with transfer pupils who enroll initially above grade one. The Coral Way solution has two special features: (a) close coordination of each day's second language experience with the preceding experience in the vernacular, and (b) careful structuring of the second language experience so that although the teacher-class interaction gives the impression of complete spontaneity, the teacher's portion is

in fact worked out in advance to introduce and review constantly a specified corpus from the form and order systems and from the lexicon of the new tongue. Detailed linguistic sequences for English and Spanish as *second languages* were developed in order to meet the needs of the several content areas of the curriculum. The oral lesson material is supplemented by a great many pictures of objects and activities. As an additional precaution to assure a good second language beginning without detracting from the other curricular areas, the school day is lengthened one hour during the last twelve weeks in grade one, and one hour throughout the year in grade two. In grade one the second language is taught by the regular second medium teacher. Transfer pupils get special help with their second language from the aides. These pupils sit with their grade-mates all day except during the regular class in the second language, when they receive semi-private instruction from the aides. This special help, 30-45 minutes daily, may be required for only a few weeks or it may go on for an entire year.<sup>4</sup>

### *Indications of Success . . .*

There are several indications that the Coral Way bilingual school has been successful. The introduction at the fourth and fifth grade levels of mixed classes in each language without reteaching in the other was based on the teachers' judgment that learning had become equally effective through either language alone.<sup>5</sup> Those Anglo pupils who entered Coral Way in the first grade in September 1963 (and who therefore have been exposed for the longest time to the possibly harmful effects of receiving half of their schooling through a foreign tongue) have been the object of close attention. On the Stanford achievement tests, administered in the spring of 1966, their median percentile ranking was as follows: paragraph meaning, 85; word meaning, 93; spelling, 99; arithmetic reasoning, 93; and arithmetic computation, 60. Their median score on the Otis Alpha test of mental maturity was 89. These pupils are not a selected group. Thus far the scores of the Cubans on these tests (all given in English) are generally lower than those of the Anglos, despite the fact that fluency in English is a prerequisite for taking them. Expert observers have noted that the Anglo children

<sup>4</sup> Similar concern for developing readiness for second language work in the newly-enrolled pupil is reported from the Ecole Active Bilingue (Ecole Internationale de Paris), L'Ecole Internationale SHAPE St. Germain, and the German-American Community School, Berlin-Dahlem. See Stern, *op. cit.*, 58, 59, 61.

<sup>5</sup> Preliminary findings of a three-year doctoral study of pupil achievement at Coral Way, scheduled for completion in 1967, show that on successive administrations of the Cooperative Inter-American Tests (H. Manuel, University of Texas), which have equated forms in English and Spanish, the learning curves for each group in its two language are coming very close together. (Communicated by the researcher, Mrs. Mabel Richardson.)

acquire excellent pronunciation of Spanish, while the English of some of the Cuban children shows interference from Spanish. This is attributed to the fact that the former group hears nothing but native Spanish, while in the homes of the latter one hears a good deal of heavily-accented English spoken by adult immigrants.<sup>6</sup>

It is scarcely surprising that the Cubans' scores on tests of achievement given through the medium of their second language are lower than those of the Anglos. A fair comparison could be made only if both groups were tested through both languages. Extensive testing of Puerto Rican children by the International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University, using comparable Spanish and English forms of the Stanford achievement tests showed this to be true (International Institute of Teachers College, 1926).

### Unequal Time, Unequal Treatment

*Unequal time, unequal treatment* for each of the languages characterizes most bilingual schooling throughout the world. Typically, the added language (i.e., taught in addition to the national, official or regular school language), whether it is the mother or the other tongue, is kept in a subordinate position. This is commonly true of the mother tongue, as when rising nationalism forces the introduction of history through Spanish in Mexican French-language schools, or when African vernaculars are introduced in the early primary grades as a mere bridge to the eventual exclusive use of English. It is true of the other tongue, as in the USSR where several hundred high schools were to teach some academic or scientific subjects—especially physics and mathematics—through English, French, or German, (New York Times, 1964) or in the United States, where there is a movement currently under way in a few high schools and colleges to teach such courses as history and geography through the medium of the second language to advanced students of that language.

One of the most promising unequal time and treatment programs in the United States is for schools where some of the students at each grade level have in common a mother tongue other than English. The program is simple. Instead of ignoring or deplored the children's home language the school provides regular instruction in and through it for something like a period a day in all grades. The course material may be,

<sup>6</sup> These data and much of the other description of Coral Way school were furnished by Mr. Lee Logan, the school principal. His help is here gratefully acknowledged. An incidental fact of interest is that the annual cost at Coral Way attributable to its being a bilingual school is about \$17,000 in excess of what it would cost as a monolingual school. This is a four per cent increase of the school's annual budget. The extra money goes to pay the teaching aides and to buy Spanish language teaching materials.

for example, Spanish language arts and literature<sup>7</sup> or it may be a sampling of all areas of the regular school curriculum. The latter seems better, for it takes virtually no time away from the regular curriculum and has the added advantage of employing the language as a means to ends other than achievement in the language itself. The latter system also contributes more to curriculum-wide literacy in the mother tongue.

The question of time and treatment, equal or unequal, is central to the larger question of the alleged handicap of bilingualism most often reported in the literature in school situations where the mother tongue is the subordinate language, given markedly unequal time and treatment, ignored completely, or even made the object of official censure. There is increasing awareness that the cause of any handicap may not be the existence of bilingualism per se, but school policy regarding the teaching of both languages and sociological factors extrinsic to the school itself (Jensen, 1962; Lambert, 1962).

### Organization as Process

Wherever bilingual education is to be an innovation great care should be exercised to inform and orient all sectors of the community—particularly parents, pupils and all persons officially concerned with the school—to the rationale, procedures and goals of the program. In addition to general meetings of all parents, separate grade-level meetings have been found desirable.

The teachers should have native-like command of the language taught, with academic preparation and experience through that medium. In order to maximize the dual perspective pupils can get from bilingual schooling, the teachers should be native speakers educated in the country where the language is native. A special feature of the Coral Way program commends itself to this writer. During the summer preceding the opening of the school and the two following summers a six-weeks workshop on teaching methods and materials and for program planning was conducted for the Coral Way teachers. The first summer there was a required course in descriptive linguistics and another in the structure of the English language, for all teachers. As noted above, the use of teacher aides frees time every day for the regular teachers to coordinate work in the two languages.<sup>8</sup>

Regarding teaching materials little can be said in the brief space of this essay. In some vernaculars books and other materials are inadequate or non-existent. As for the added second language, if suit-

<sup>7</sup> Such a program, *Spanish-S*, is established in Dade County, Florida. Course of study bulletins may be secured from the Superintendent, Dade County Public Schools, in Miami.

<sup>8</sup> In the opinion of the Coral Way principal, Mr. Lee Logan, the first requisite for success is that the school principal have the privilege of selecting every member of the staff. The second requisite is that aides be employed as noted above.

able texts are available from the language's home country a healthful biculturalism can result from the chance to use them in addition to texts prepared for use in the country where the school is situated, but over-emphasis or exclusive use of books based on a foreign environment can divorce the school from the reality of the child's home and community.

The course of action to be followed to bring a bilingual school into existence should be set with full awareness of the essential differences between teaching the mother tongue and teaching a second language.

### *Deep Grammar*

The native speaker of a language (including the native speaker-teacher) usually has no awareness of the *deep grammar* (Twaddell, 1962) of his own language, i.e., the interdependent systems of phonology, morphology and syntax which comprise it, and the extent to which the native speaker-child brings virtually complete, thoughtless mastery of the systems to school with him at the age of six. As with his own regional accent and the complex body motion which accompanies his own speech, he doesn't know or knows only vaguely that the deep grammar is there and is concerned in the classroom with the niceties of usage (Say "as a cigarette should," not "like a cigarette should."), with grammatical nomenclature (This is a verb, and this is its direct object.) and with orthography (*i* before *e* except after *c*). Usage, nomenclature and orthography, whatever their importance, are of the surface alone; they are applied on top of the deep, thoughtless mastery which the native speaker-child acquired at home.

Grammatical nomenclature and the niceties of usage are at best a sort of polish on the surface of the deep grammar, the language itself. This polish can be applied quite effectively when the pupils speak an acceptable variant of the subject language, especially if theirs is the same variant as the teacher's. The polish is largely ineffective with the speaker of an unacceptable variant; the configuration of his deep grammar is so different that the polish, applied in the traditional ways, doesn't even touch the surface. Finally, there is the situation of the child who is not a speaker of the language to which the teaching is applied. In the sense of the figure used here, he has no deep grammar in the new language, hence no surface to be polished.

The point is that for pupils who speak unacceptable variants of their school language (e.g., English-based Jamaican Creole or Liberian Pidgin English) just as for pupils who are learning a second or foreign language, the normal materials and methods and orientation of the mother tongue class are not very effective.

Another common weakness in the teaching of a second language derives from the assumption that language is composed of words and that teaching is therefore teaching words. The grain of truth in this

assumption gives the child no clue to any of the structural or para-linguistic differences among, for example, these utterances (which would be enormously more complex if presented orally, as they must be to the neophyte):

1. I haven't seen him for five years.
2. Hace cinco años que no lo veo.  
(It makes five years that not him I see.)
3. Seit fünf Jahren habe ich ihn nicht mehr gesehen.  
(Since five years have I him not more seen.)

Yet visits to the classrooms reveal teachers who, irrespective of the materials that are being used, are concerned largely with the *names of things* and word-correspondence from language to language.

Next, there is the teacher who is overly aware of the traps described above, particularly the importance of developing in the child a sense and command of the stuff of language itself, what we are calling deep grammar. Here the most serious weakness lies in over-structuring the course materials at too early an age, i.e., too early and overt dependence upon pattern drills based on contrastive analysis of the two languages, or upon the strict sequencing of the order of presentation of the features of the new language. Such drills and sequencing are not in themselves bad. The harm seems to come when their use requires that children 3-7 years old focus their attention on the language itself rather than beyond language, on their involvement in events or situations. The way out of the dilemma is suggested above in the description of Coral Way. If the child is to acquire the intuitive sense of deep grammar which he lacks, the teacher must know how to give it to him in ways which, however structured and systematized they may be, have the appearance and effect of complete spontaneity. For as Penfield says, speaking of the child's learning of a second tongue, ". . . language is not a subject to be studied nor an object to be grasped. It is a means to other ends, a vehicle, and a way of life" (Penfield, 1956, 257).

Finally, there is the question of whether or not to allow teacher and pupils to use both of the languages of a bilingual school during a given class period (as opposed to confining each to its own class periods or its own part of the day). In the United Nations Nursery School in Paris children three to five years old are mixed without regard to mother tongue and the teachers use both languages, a sentence in one then the same sentence in the other, especially at the beginning of the year with three-year-olds. This practice is implicitly justified on the grounds that two thirds of the school population is transient and that the children need above all security and understanding. Four- and five-year-olds are allowed to hear each language alone for increasingly longer periods of time (Dartigue, 1966). But the weight of opinion seems to favor the one-language-one person principle.

Unquestionably a young child learns a second language quickly and effectively if it is the unavoidable means to his full-time involvement in all the affairs of his life. Much less than full-time involvement will suffice for him to learn the new language. The minimum time, the optimum kind of involvement, and the affairs most conducive to this learning process *in a school* are still largely unknowns. Water falling drop by drop into a bucket will fill it, unless, of course, the conditions are such that each drop evaporates before the next one strikes.

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## The Effects of Instruction in a Weaker Language

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Millions of students throughout the world are being taught subjects such as mathematics, history and geography (i.e., subjects other than languages) in the medium of their weaker language. The reasons for this are as numerous as the reasons for language maintenance and language shift (Fishman, 1964). Many African countries, for example, have made English or French the language of instruction, not only because they have adopted English or French as their *lingua franca*, but also because the native languages have not developed a vocabulary suited to the expression of sophisticated Western concepts and schemata especially in the technological subjects. Furthermore, suitable literature in the native languages is for the most part either insufficient or nonexistent (Unesco, 1953; Bull, 1955). Some countries such as Israel and Ireland have for cultural and political reasons made a dead or a minority language the favored medium of instruction. Immigrant students form another large group who are frequently obliged to follow courses in what is to them a foreign language. Many children, too, who are born in a country like the United States speak Spanish or Italian or Japanese at home, and yet are taught mainly or exclusively in English. Finally, even in essentially monolingual settings, there is a growing tendency to use teaching in a foreign language as a means of teaching that language (Stern, 1963).

For most students the major advantage in taking courses in their weaker language is that they receive an education which they could

not otherwise receive. However, the practice raises several problems. How successful are students' attempts to learn and understand material in a weaker language? Does instruction through the medium of a weaker language improve students' knowledge of that language, and is such instruction associated with losses in their stronger language? I propose to review studies in which these problems have been investigated and also to present for the first time some new data of my own.

## School Achievement and Language of Instruction

Studies of bilinguals' school achievements throw light on the effects of teaching through the medium of a weaker language. Most of such studies were conducted in settings where bilinguals were a minority and could be compared with a monolingual majority. In almost all of these studies (Macnamara, 1966a) bilinguals were found to be weaker than monolinguals in the monolinguals' language which was of course the language of instruction. Thus, whether or not this was the bilinguals' weaker language, the results show up the relationship between grasp of the language of instruction and attainment. The majority of the twenty-two studies in which attainment in arithmetic was investigated (Macnamara, 1966a, Chap. 5) found that bilinguals were inferior to monolinguals in problem arithmetic (reasoning) but not in mechanical arithmetic (computation). The difference between the two sets of findings is probably due to the fact that in mechanical arithmetic the student is simply required to carry out an arithmetical operation indicated by an arithmetical symbol, whereas in tests of problem arithmetic he is required to read and interpret prose passages. Language, therefore, plays a much larger role in the latter type of test.

A further question is whether the retardation in problem arithmetic is found only at the initial stages of being taught in a weaker language. The indications are that it is of longer duration. A careful study conducted by the Department of Education, Manila (1953) revealed such a retardation over the two years of primary schooling investigated. Macnamara (1966a) found a retardation of about one year of problem arithmetic age amongst fifth standard primary school children in Ireland. The Irish children who were native speakers of English with only a school knowledge of Irish had been taught arithmetic in Irish for six years. The International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia (1928) found even greater retardation at the twelfth grade level amongst Puerto Rican children who had been taught arithmetic in English (the second language) from the beginning of the fifth grade. Running counter to these findings is a report of a South African study by Malherbe (1948). He claims that South African children taught arithmetic through the medium of their weaker language, English or Afrikaans, quickly recover from an initial handicap to draw

level with those being taught in their mother tongue. Perhaps the reason for this divergence in findings is that the South African children had a better grasp of the second language than those studied elsewhere. Malherbe suggests that they had. However his report is extremely inadequate, and the study seems to have been poorly controlled. Several other sets of findings are now coming from individual schools which support Malherbe. However, the results of studies conducted in individual schools, with programs which in their setting are exceptional, cannot be extrapolated to more general situations without a good deal of caution.

What of students who in the middle of their schooling change from being taught arithmetic in their mother tongue to being taught in a second language? (There seem to be no studies of children who made the opposite switch.) The Puerto Rican and Manila investigations indicate that such a switch is accompanied by a falling off in attainment, but, as one would expect, there is a good deal of transfer from learning in the mother tongue to learning in the second one.

There is practically no information about the attainment of students who are being taught subjects other than arithmetic in their weaker language. One would expect to find that here, too, retardation results, and, as in the case of arithmetic, that it depends principally on two factors: the extent to which a subject involves language and the extent of the students' weaknesses in the language of instruction. However, there is very little evidence about the second factor. There is no evidence at all about the influence of another possible factor, the teacher's command of the language of instruction; though obviously it could be crucial if the language of instruction is also the teacher's weaker language.

### Problem Solving in Two Languages

The student's difficulty in following courses in his weaker language might seem at first sight to lie solely in his ignorance of certain words, phrases or syntactic structures. However, there is probably more to it than that. Those of us who read a second language poorly will probably from time to time have experienced difficulty in following the meaning of complex passages in that language, even though we could have translated each individual word and expression used. This we may have attributed to inadequate grasp of language. The studies now to be described derive from this observation and attempt to clarify what is meant by the term, *grasp of language*.

Preliminary studies (Macnamara, 1963) revealed that bilinguals take longer to solve written problems when they are presented in their weak rather than in their strong language. In subsequent studies of problem solving no time limits were set; speed of performance was examined separately (see below).

After several attempts the following technique was developed for investigating the difficulties encountered by bilinguals when attempting to solve problems presented in their weaker language (Macnamara and Kellaghan, in press). The crucial thing was to obtain problems which, though involving relatively complex reasoning processes, could be expressed in both languages in terms that were familiar to the subjects. The solution was to devise (or borrow) what appeared to be suitably complex problems, and test for children's ability to understand the language in which they were expressed, by devising in addition a series of simple problems which made use of the same vocabulary and syntactic structures. An example of a problem in complex form was:

If the letters of the word BAD<sup>1</sup> were removed from the alphabet, what would be the fifth letter of the alphabet?

The set of simple questions into which this was broken in order to test children's understanding of each of its components was:

- a What is the fifth letter of the alphabet?
- b What is the eighth letter of the alphabet?
- c If the letter A were removed from the alphabet, what would be the first letter of the alphabet?

In all, eight complex problems and eight sets of appropriate simple questions were devised. The subjects were all children in sixth standard ( $N = 341$ ) in six Irish primary schools. All the children were native speakers of English, but all had been taught Irish for about 37%, and English for about 20% of the school time over their seven years at school. Half the children in each school (randomly chosen) took the tests in Irish, the other half in English. The complex problems were presented first in each case.

Results were analysed separately for each problem. We were interested only in those children who understood a problem, that is, those who answered all the relevant simple problems correctly. The chief interest lay in comparing, of those who understood, the proportion which solved a complex problem in Irish with the proportion which solved it in English. As there were no reliable differences between boys and girls, the data for all children were combined. For all eight problems the results lie in the expected direction. On a two-tailed Chi<sup>2</sup> =  $\chi^2$  test, four of them are significant at the 5% level of probability, while on a one-tailed test, five are significant at that level. It is not clear, however, why some problems yielded significant results, while others did not.

<sup>1</sup> In Irish the letters BAD mean boat.

<sup>2</sup> These problems were taken from the Schonell Essential Problem Arithmetic Test, Form A, which had been translated into Irish for the purpose of the Irish investigation reported in Macnamara (1966a). For details about this translation see *op cit.* Chap. 7.

These findings indicate that in some instances, the problem solving ability of bilingual children is poorer when information is provided in their weaker language, even when the components of the problem are separately understood.

### Speed of Reading in Two Languages

What precisely is the nature of the difficulty indicated in the problem solving studies described above? Where in the process of assimilating and dealing with the information might it occur? From the results of the preliminary study which showed that bilinguals took longer to solve problems in their weaker language it seemed likely that the difficulty could be located, at least partly, in the assimilation of the problem. This idea gave rise to a series of studies of reading.

First (Macnamara, 1966b), primary school children comparable with those who worked on the problems were asked to read lists of numbers and lists of quantities of money (e.g., 5s.-6d.) in each of their languages. The reason for doing so was that several of the problems contained figures or sums of money, and it was necessary to see whether they could name them equally quickly in the two languages. The finding was that they could.

Next (Macnamara and Kellaghan, *in press*), three arithmetical problems expressed in both Irish and English<sup>2</sup> were presented to two groups of sixth standard primary school boys, all native speakers of English. One group consisted of 20 boys who had been taught all subjects in Irish, the other consisted of 20 boys who had been taught all subjects in English. Each boy read aloud each version of the three problems three times, and his time for each problem was recorded. Irish and English versions of a problem never differed in length by more than a single word. The order in which the versions were presented was counterbalanced. For both groups, the first reading of the Irish version took significantly longer than the first reading of the English version. In fact, the Irish version took from 1.4 to 1.7 times as long. Improvement from first to best (usually third) reading was also examined and found to be significantly greater in Irish than in English for both groups on all three problems. The groups did not differ significantly in this respect.

The general finding that reading in a weaker language takes longer than reading in the stronger one is supported by Lambert, Havelka and Gardner (1959) and by Kolers (1966). The finding that reading times improve more in Irish than in English suggests that the boys came nearer on their first reading in English than on their first reading in Irish to the speed at which they could comfortably handle semantic information.

This study of reading yielded overall time differences for reading

aloud in two languages, but did not reveal where in the input and output processes the difficulties which accounted for the overall differences were located. My colleague, Dr. Thomas Kellaghan, and I then began to analyse this process into its components. We thought that on the input side, the difference might be in part at the perceptual level, in part at the syntactic and semantic analyses levels. On the output side the same sort of analysis does not quite apply since the semantic encoding and the syntactic organization are already done for the reader. We felt, however, that a reader might not be able to make as much use of the sequential or transition probabilities in the sentences of his weaker language as in those of his stronger one. We also felt that the articulation of individual words might take longer in the weaker language and that bilinguals might not be able to string words together (catenation in linguistic terminology) as effectively in articulating sentences in their weaker language. We had some success in validating certain sections of our analysis. However, Miss Marie Feltin<sup>3</sup> and I have recently replicated and extended the studies carried out with Dr. Kellaghan, so I shall describe only the recent study, which is presented here for the first time.

### Analysis of Bilinguals' Reading Skills

**Materials.** Eighteen feminine French nouns were selected all naming common objects of which pictures could easily be drawn. In English these nouns are: bulb, car, cow, crown, door, dress, flower, girl, hen, house, lamp, leaf, leg, mouse, queen, tail, wheel, wing. To these were added two other words in each language, *a* and *has*, so that the original words might be combined to form sentences of which half were true and half were false; e.g., *a hen has a wing* and *a hen has a door*. Words and sentences were printed on cards. Filmstrips were also prepared in which the same words were printed beneath pictures. In 50% of the combinations the word named the picture and in 50% it did not. In one filmstrip all the words were French, in the other they were all English. Two other filmstrips were prepared, one containing the French sentences, and one the English sentences.

Finally, the true sentences were combined, by using the word *and*, which in turn were made into two 50 word paragraphs, one English and one French. These were typed on cards. Scrambled versions of each paragraph were also typed on cards.

**Ss and procedure.** The Ss who took part in the experiment were 24 English-speaking girls from Marianopolis College.<sup>4</sup> All had taken

<sup>3</sup> At present a student in the University of California at Berkeley. The research reported here was supported by a generous grant from the French-Canada Studies Programme, McGill University.

<sup>4</sup> Miss Feltin and I are grateful to the authorities of Marianopolis College for helping us to obtain Ss for this study.

high school French and one year of college French. One half of the individual words and sentences, chosen at random, were presented tachistoscopically to each S and perceptual thresholds recorded. The filmstrips were projected on a screen with a Dukane Projector (Model 576-47B) which operates so rapidly that the stimulus is steady on the screen within a twentieth of a second of pressing the switch which operates the projector. Ss were asked to press a key marked (+) if the word matched the picture or if a stimulus sentence was true, to press a key marked (-) if the word did not match the picture or if the sentence was false. A clock was set in motion by the switch which operated the projector and stopped by the key which S pressed. Cumulative times were recorded for each S.

The Ss were asked to read the paragraphs of text and scrambled passages in two ways, aloud and silently, and their times were recorded with a stopwatch. In silent reading they indicated the words they were reading with a pointer.

Eight measures were obtained for each S in each of the two languages: mean perceptual thresholds for (1) words, (2) sentences; mean reaction times for (3) words on the screen, (4) sentences on the screen; times for (5) silent reading of text, (6) reading text aloud, (7) silent reading of scrambled passages, (8) reading scrambled passages aloud.

The order in which the four tasks involved in (1) and (2) were presented was counterbalanced across all Ss. The order of the four tasks involving filmstrips (3 and 4) were presented was counterbalanced in a similar manner. Twelve Ss, chosen at random, completed the tachistoscopic tasks first, and twelve completed the filmstrip tasks first. Tasks (5), (6), (7) and (8) came last for all Ss, and they were counterbalanced in the same way as the earlier tasks.

**Results.** The results are set out in Table 1. In analysing them the

TABLE I  
MEAN TIMES IN MILLISECONDS FOR TACHISTOSCOPE AND FILMSTRIP  
TASKS; MEAN TIMES IN SECONDS FOR READING TASKS

	Tachistoscope Words	Tachistoscope Sentences	Film Words	Film Sentences	Silent Reading Scrambled Passages	Silent Reading Text	Reading Out Loud Scrambled Passages	Reading Out Loud Text
English	69	236	1089	1448	12.01	7.37	17.70	9.64
French	75	270	1230	1704	12.92	10.00	20.54	14.80

method of paired differences was used throughout. That is, each S's time for a task in one language was subtracted from his time for the corresponding task in the other language. From the resulting difference scores has been removed the influence of all factors which contributed equally to scores in the two tasks. Thus, these difference scores are purer measures than the original scores from which they were derived.

of the factor which produces a difference between performance in the two languages. Further, where appropriate one set of difference scores was deducted from another set. The second order difference scores which result provide data for testing the null-hypothesis that the two sets of first order difference scores can be interpreted as measuring the same factor.

The mean difference between perceptual thresholds for English and French words (tachistoscope) is not significant ( $df = 23, t = 1.52, p > .05$ ). Perceptual thresholds for English and French sentences differ significantly ( $df = 23, t = 2.49, p < .05$ ). If, however, they are corrected for individual differences in thresholds for words, the difference for sentences falls far short of significance ( $df = 23, t = .95, p > .05$ ). Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the recognition of sentences brought into play no skill not involved in the recognition of words.

Mean times for matching words and pictures (filmstrip) were corrected for individual differences in perceptual thresholds for words. The resulting mean difference between performance in the two languages is 135 msec which is significant ( $df = 23, t = 4.76, p < .05$ ). Mean times taken to decide whether sentences were true or false were corrected for perceptual thresholds for sentences. The resulting mean difference between performance in the two languages is 243 msec, which is significant ( $df = 23, t = 2.73, p < .05$ ). However when times taken to decide whether sentences were true or false are corrected for times taken to match words and pictures, the resulting mean difference of 115 msec falls well short of significance ( $df = 23, t = 1.13, p > .05$ ). Thus these two tasks can be interpreted as calling into play the same skills.

In analysing the times taken to read the sequences of text and scrambled passages four components were isolated. These may be loosely called: (a) perception of individual words, (b) pronunciation of individual words, (c) use of transition probabilities, (d) catenation. The various reading times contain the following components:

Silent reading of scrambled passages = (a)

Reading of scrambled sentences aloud = (a) + (b)

Silent reading of text = (a) - (c)

Reading of text aloud = (a) + (b) - (c) - (d)

Note that (c) and (d) contribute to a reader's speed and are therefore entered as negative quantities. By simple arithmetic the value of each component can be calculated for each *S*.

Four analyses were carried out. In each, the mean "French" value of a component was compared with its mean "English" value. The mean difference for (a), which is 0.91 seconds, is not significant ( $df = 23, t = 1.57, p > .05$ ). The mean difference for (b), which is 1.94 seconds, is significant ( $df = 23, t = 2.19, p < .05$ ). The mean difference

for (c), which is 1.72 seconds, is significant ( $df = 23, t = 2.58, p < .05$ ). The mean difference for (d), which is 0.59 seconds, is not significant ( $df = 23, t = 0.66, p > .05$ ).

*Discussion.* In interpreting these findings it is important to bear three things in mind. Ss knew all the words used; each S read the same words eight times in each language; only one, very simple, syntactic structure was employed.

It is hardly surprising, then, that no difference in perceptual thresholds for English and French words was observed. Since the order of tachistoscopic and filmstrip tasks was counterbalanced, mean perceptual thresholds represent performance at a stage when, on an average, the words had already been encountered four times in one or other of the languages. It is likely, then, that differences in perceptual threshold are obscured by a considerable familiarity factor. Where in the series of comparisons differences were found to be significant, the factors being investigated must have been robust enough to withstand the effect of such familiarity.

Differences in perceptual thresholds for sentences cease to be significant when corrected for individual differences in perceptual threshold for words. This means that it is reasonable to interpret both tasks as involving nothing but the recognition of words. This ceases to be surprising when we recall that all sentences had the same syntactic structure. Once S had become familiar with this structure he could ignore it and concentrate on recognizing the particular pair of nouns in which alone the sentences differed. The next step in our research program will be to test for a syntactic component with sentences in which the syntax is systematically varied.

It is quite revealing that times taken to determine the semantic values of English words and sentences were significantly faster than those for French words and sentences, even when corrected for individual differences in perceptual thresholds for the same words and sentences. It might at first appear that in matching words and pictures Ss employed different strategies in French and English. When responding to the French series they might, for example, have recalled the French word which named the pictured object and then seen whether it matched the word printed beneath the picture. On the other hand, when responding to the English series, they might simply have read the English word, decoded it, and compared the semantic value thus obtained with their interpretation of the picture. However, the findings for speed in determining the truth or falsehood of sentences makes this interpretation rather improbable. The difference between French and English speeds for the latter task ceases to be significant when corrected for individual differences in speed of matching French and English words and pictures. In other words, the two tasks seem to involve very similar skills. It would be impossible to perform the true-

false task without decoding both nouns in each sentence, French and English, and testing for a part-whole relationship. Because of the close similarity of this and the task of matching words and pictures, it is unlikely that Ss employed different strategies in the two tasks. Thus the most satisfactory interpretation of the data is the one suggested earlier: Ss decoded the semantic values of French words more slowly than those of English ones. This conclusion has the support of some studies carried out by Lambert *et al.* (1955, 1959). They required Ss to press keys in response to written directions in French or in English. They found that response times were slower when the directions were in a S's weaker language.

The first finding in the analysis of times for reading the longer sequences is in keeping with the rest of the study: the perception of individual words, as determined by speed of reading scrambled passages silently, does not differ significantly from French to English. Though the method of timing the movement of a pointer from the beginning to the end of a passage is rough and ready, there is no reason to believe that it differentially affected the measurement of times for silent reading in French and English. The finding that individual French words are articulated more slowly than English ones is not unexpected. It implies, of course, that Ss such as those tested generally take longer to articulate messages in French than in English. However, the observed difference is slight, coming on an average to about 40 msec per word. On the other hand in the simple texts on which they were tested Ss appeared to string words together in articulation as effectively in French as in English. Finally they made less use of the sequential probabilities in French sentences than of those in English ones, thus adding about 30 msec per word to their French reading times.

Can the above analysis be applied to overall reading times in French and English in such a way as to obtain the relative weight of each? It is certainly hazardous to do so in view of the number of times Ss read these words. However if attention is focused on the relative rather than the absolute size of the quantities observed, the danger of being misled is greatly reduced. The largest difference between performance in French and English is that for semantic decoding of nouns, which yields a figure of 110 msec per word. The second largest difference is that for articulation of individual words, which comes to about 40 msec per word. The third largest is that associated with the differential use of sequential probabilities in French and English, which comes to about 30 msec per word. Taken together the three differences come to a sizeable time difference, even when reading simple and much practised words. The likelihood also remains that this difference would have been even larger if a variety of syntactic structures had been introduced.

To return for a moment to the point of departure, the relative difficulty experienced by bilinguals in solving written problems presented in their weaker language, it is interesting to reflect on the fact that of the differences noted the greatest was that associated with the semantic decoding of words. This suggests at least a partial explanation of the bilinguals' problem solving difficulties. Longer decoding times in the weaker language imply greater difficulty with that task and also an added burden on a short-term memory which is extremely limited both in the quantity of information it can store and in the length of time for which it can store it. The normal manner in which persons cope with the limitations of short-term memory is to reduce the amount of information and *chunk* it in such a way that a single stored item stands for several original items (Miller, 1956). For most purposes the most parsimonious way of chunking language is to decode it and store the meaning, or such parts of the meaning as are relevant. The present findings prompt the conjecture that the bilingual has greater difficulty in making out the meaning, and, because of the extra attention he must pay to that task, greater difficulty in recalling other parts of the message while decoding a particular section. Consequently he has greater difficulty in picking out what is relevant to his purpose and discarding the remainder. All this would amount to greater difficulty in solving problems expressed in the weaker language.

### Verbal Interchange in the Classroom

Much remains to be done to complete the analysis of bilingual's reading abilities, yet enough has been done to show which lines are likely to prove fruitful. The results will surely cast light not only on reading but also on linguistic functioning generally. Similar studies of verbal interchange in two languages are urgently required. The indications of the reading study are that articulation, and consequently communication, is slower in the weaker language. It is also likely that bilinguals encode ideas<sup>5</sup> and carry out syntactic organization more slowly in their weaker language. However, the process of oral production needs to be thoroughly investigated before the bilingual's difficulties are clearly understood. Similar investigations of listening comprehension and of writing are needed to complete the picture of what it means to take a course in a weaker language.

One effect of a thorough and comprehensive series of investigations along the lines suggested would be to create understanding for

<sup>5</sup> Ervin (1961), reports that relative speed of naming pictures in two languages is related to degree of bilingualism. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear from the report cited whether she separated time for recalling names from time for articulation.

persons who have to work in a weaker language. As things stand they are frequently made to look stupid, particularly if their accent is reasonably good, because then their deficiencies are not so apparent. Hopefully, a second effect would be to provide indications as to how they might be helped over their difficulties. All that can be said at present is that such students, and their teachers, must resign themselves to a slower pace of work.

Another whole area that requires study is the inner speech employed by the bilingual student. Does he, for example, think in his weaker language when he is given a problem to solve in that language, or does he translate it into his stronger one? I attempted to answer this question (Macnamara, 1965) by asking bilingual primary school children what language they thought in. The children were 24 native speakers of English in sixth standard, and had been taught all subjects in Irish throughout their schooling. I saw them individually and gave them three problems to solve in Irish, and when they had given their answers I asked them, to their surprise, what language they had been thinking in. They all found the question a difficult one, but all replied that to the best of their knowledge they had been thinking in Irish. I noticed three of them muttering to themselves as they worked over the problems, and so far as I could judge they muttered only in Irish. This encouraged me to believe the children's answer to my question.

The assumption that the children I questioned were thinking in Irish, raises further problems. At what stage in their learning of the second language do they begin to think in it, and what are the factors which affect this? What are the effects on their thinking of expressing their thoughts to themselves in a language they grasp only poorly? At present there is no answer to these questions; but a technique similar to that used by psychologists working on computer simulation might prove fruitful in investigating such problems. The technique is to train subjects to vocalize their thoughts. Recordings of such vocalizations might well furnish some answers to questions about inner speech.

### Linguistic Effects of Teaching in a Weaker Language

What effect does teaching in a weaker language have on the bilingual's two languages? The most obvious effect is that he learns the technical terms employed in a subject only in the language in which the subject is taught. But it is quite reasonable to ask whether, apart from this, teaching in a foreign language has a more general effect on language skills. The difficulty in answering this question is that in the majority of studies (Macnamara, 1966a) two factors were confounded: the effect of teaching the language or languages, and the effect of teaching other subjects in the medium of one of these lan-

guages. Malherbe (1946) claims to have isolated the effect of the second factor and that it was beneficial to the second language without impoverishing the first. He also claims that the lower the child's I.Q. the greater the benefit to his weaker language. However, it seems quite unlikely that Malherbe succeeded in isolating the effect of the second factor from that of the first and from those of other factors such as teaching skill, social class, etc. Two other South African reports, Logie (Bovet, 1935) and McConkey (1951) arrive at conclusions similar to Malherbe's without the addendum that the dull child benefits most. In addition to the South African studies there are now numerous reports from individual bilingual schools (see, for example, Gaarder, this issue) that support the South African findings. However, in my own study in Ireland (Macnamara, 1966a) which attempts to control for differences in I.Q., social class and quality of teaching, I found no significant differences in Irish or in English between children who had been taught throughout their six years of primary schooling in Irish and those taught in English. This study differed from the reports from individual schools in two ways: it was a fairly large study in which children in 100 schools, selected at random from all Irish primary schools, were tested and the various bilingual programmes had been in operation in the Irish schools for about 40 years. Thus in the Irish study the Hawthorne effect, which may have had an influence on the individual schools mentioned, had long since disappeared. The Irish study also differs from the South African ones in the type of bilingual setting in which it was conducted. In Ireland, Irish is no more than a school subject for about 97% of the school population; in South Africa, English and Afrikaans are widely used, and it would appear from Malherbe's report that South Africans who attend bilingual schools typically have a far better knowledge of their second language than Irish children have of theirs. It must be admitted that the Irish findings are unexpected. One would predict that extensive teaching in a second language would have some general beneficial effect on the second language and some general detrimental effect on the first one. However, in view of the lack of satisfactory evidence, perhaps the wisest counsel to follow at the present time is to say that the linguistic effects of teaching in a second language are unknown.

### In Conclusion

Considering the magnitude of the problem and the nature of the difficulties involved for students it is surprising that so little work has been done on teaching through the medium of a second language. The topic is surely one of the most neglected in the whole of educational psychology. What is required first of all is a detailed analysis of the four major language skills, speaking, listening, writing and read-

ing, along the lines indicated above. This means that each skill should be examined in each of two languages at the perceptual, syntactic, lexical and semantic levels in the decoding of messages, and at the semantic, lexical, syntactic and motor levels of encoding messages. As a bilingual's difficulties will vary with the pair of languages involved, the whole investigation of his difficulties would be greatly aided by a contrastive analysis of those languages. When the chief difficulties are sufficiently clear the next task is to devise and assess programs of instruction to improve the student's language skills and lessen the burden he has to carry. Hopefully, these programs could be incorporated in existing language programs. After that, several problems of a less pressing nature might be broached. One of these is the effect on language skills of teaching through the medium of a second language. Undoubtedly if the plan of campaign I am outlining were followed, such teaching would be associated with improvement in the weaker language, although the researcher's task of showing a causal link between the two might well increase in difficulty. Another problem which merits attention is the possible effect of teaching in a weaker language on the student's emotions and attitudes. Undoubtedly the student who finds himself being outstripped by his contemporaries who have the advantage of working in their strong language—especially if that student is unaware of the full extent of his deficiencies in the language of instruction—will experience frustration and perhaps grow less confident of his own abilities. Additionally, he may come to feel increasingly cut off from his own family and other members of his own linguistic community if he is unable because of a language barrier to discuss with them his academic studies and interests. Something of this sort happens to many students even without the complication of studying in a foreign language, but the feeling of alienation may well be heightened for the student who does have that complication. There were indications in the Philippine study (Department of Education, Manila, 1953) that children were happier studying in their native Hiligaynon than in English, and that they attended school more regularly. However, so far as I am aware, no investigation has been made of the other emotional aspects which I mentioned. Yet in the long run, these may prove just as important to the welfare of the students I have been discussing as the more obvious cognitive difficulties with which this paper was principally concerned.

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## Biographical Sketches

JOHN MACNAMARA is a graduate of University College, Dublin and the University of Edinburgh. He is a visiting scholar at the Department of Psychology, McGill, for 1966-1967 on a Canada Council post-doctoral fellowship while on sabbatical leave from St. Patrick's College, Dublin where he is lecturer in educational psychology. He is a Catholic priest, and has published a book entitled *Bilingualism and Primary Education: A Study of Irish Experience*.

DELL HYMES is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania, and Curator of Linguistic Anthropology in the University Museum. Born and educated in Portland, Oregon, he received the B. A. in Anthropology and Literature from Reed College, and the M. A. and Ph. D. in Linguistics from Indiana University. He has taught at Harvard, the University of California, Berkeley, and the Linguistic Institute. His main fields of research have been American Indian languages, historical linguistics, verbal art, the history of linguistics and anthropology, and the place of language in social life. He is editor of *Language in Culture and Society* (1964), *The Use of Computers in Anthropology* (1965), and *Studies in Southwestern Ethnolinguistics* (1967).

JOSHUA A. FISHMAN is University Research Professor of Social Sciences at Yeshiva University in New York. He has been a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1963-64) and is currently a member of the Committee on Sociolinguistics of The Social Science Research Council. The senior author of *Language Loyalty In The United States*, Dr. Fishman is author or co-author of several sociolinguistic publications and is currently conducting the "Bilingualism Configuration Project", an attempt to compare different approaches to the measurement and description of bilingualism.

HEINZ KLOSS, sociologist, has worked with the Deutsches Ausland-institut in Stuttgart (Germany); for the Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation; with the "Institut für Auslands-beziehungen" in Stuttgart; and in 1959, became the director of the "Forschungstelle für Nationalitäten- und Sprachenfragen" (founded in 1956), with headquarters in Marburg. Since 1966 he has been visiting lecturer in Marburg University. He is the author of *Die Entwicklung neuer germanischer Kultursprachen* (1952), and received his doctor's degree from Innsbruck University.

JOHN J. GUMPERZ is Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. He is the editor (with Dell Hymes) of the *Ethnography of Communication* and has published a number of papers in dialectology, sociolinguistics and the linguistics of South Asia.

SUSAN M. ERVIN-TRIPP is Associate Professor of Speech at the University of California, Berkeley. She received her Ph.D. in Social Psychology at the University of Michigan, and was trained in linguistics at several summer institutes. Her research has been entirely in psycholinguistics, with particular attention to adult bilingualism, and child language acquisition.

WALLACE E. LAMBERT is currently Professor of Psychology (Social and Experimental) at McGill University and co-ordinator of an informal research group, known locally as The Language Research Group, comprised of interested students and faculty. His current research interests are: psycho- and socio-linguistics, cross-cultural comparisons, and the psychology of thought and language. He studied at Brown University (B.A.), Colgate University (M.A.), The University of North Carolina (Ph.D.), Cambridge University, and The University of Paris. He is the co-author with his brother, William W. Lambert, of *Social psychology* (Prentice-Hall, 1964), and with Otto Klineberg, of *Children's Views of Foreign Peoples: A Cross-National Study* (Appleton, 1967).

A. BRUCE GAARDER is presently chief of the Modern Foreign Language Institute Section of the U.S. Office of Education, where he has also served as chief of the Foreign Language Research Section and as foreign language specialist. He has taught at all academic levels. He is bilingual and has two degrees from the National University of Mexico.

JOSHUA A. FISHMAN, Bilingualism With and Without Diglossia; Diglossia With and Without Bilingualism. *Journal of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 2, 29-38.

Bilingualism is an individual competence. Diglossia is its societal counterpart. Bilingualism and diglossia co-exist in societies that utilize two or more languages for their own, carefully compartmentalized, intragroup purposes and, at the same time, provide for easy role access and code access. Such access is singularly lacking in societies marked by diglossia without bilingualism. These represent instances of imposed political or religious unity with underlying socio-cultural disunity. Widespread individual monolingualism under such circumstances is often due to emphasis on ascribed status coupled with the polarization of rigidly compartmentalized roles. Bilingualism without diglossia is typical of settings in which populations have undergone large scale and rapid social change (industrialization, urbanization, immigration, etc.) to the end that social norms for intragroup language regularities have crumbled or never been established. Both bilingualism and diglossia are absent in small, undifferentiated and isolated societies but even these develop some speech repertoire differences if only metaphorical or stylistic purposes. Social issues concerning bilingualism or diglossia occur in those cases where one is present without the other.

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A. BRUCE GAARDER, Organization of the Bilingual School, *J. of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 2, 110-120.

The article is directed toward sociologists and school administrators interested in bilingual education. It distinguishes carefully between adding the mother tongue and adding a second language, tries to show why more than ordinary teacher training is needed for second language work, and takes the position that the effectiveness of bilingual schooling can neither be assessed nor assured without full consideration of school organization and classroom practices. It describes an American bilingual public school, and gives some information about its pupils' achievement.

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JOHN J. GUMPERZ, On the Linguistic Markers of Bilingual Communication, *Journal of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 2, 48-57.

Any attempt to describe the skills involved in the bilingual's concurrent use of his two languages must face the fact that the speaker's view of what constitutes distinct languages is not always directly related to linguistic reality. Ethnographic field studies of verbal behavior in a number of societies using measures of language distance adapted from machine translation analysis and which are independent of speakers' attitudes, reveal instances where distinct genetically unrelated languages have almost identical grammars. In such cases of near grammatical identity it may be no more difficult for speakers to switch from one language to another, than to change from formal to informal styles of the same language.

The study of bilingualism is a part of the more general study of code repertoires and code-switching. Every community is characterized by a variety of codes and by rules for choosing and switching among them. The study of such variety and such rules is in turn part of the general study of sociolinguistic systems. Such systems, understood as the rules governing speaking in a community, differ significantly cross-culturally in ways that affect the role of language in thought and in social life as a whole. There is need for a taxonomy of such systems and a model, or theory, for their description. The author's present work toward a taxonomy and model is linked to investigation of cross-cultural differences in the acquisition of speaking by children. Among the notions found essential are notions for social units of analysis, such as speech community, speech area, speech field, speech network, speech event, and speech act; and notions for the components of speech events that enter into the statement of rules of speaking. Some of the problems and limitations of the formal statement of rules for speaking are suggested.

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HEINZ KLOSS, Bilingualism and Nationalism, *J. of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 2, 39-47.

The relationship between bilingualism and nationalism is discussed without an attempt to describe the real complexity of either. First the impact of nationalism on the role of link languages is outlined. Nationalism may give rise to an urge to expand a language (e.g., French) as a second tongue in foreign countries. Or it may motivate a nation to reject one foreign language in favour of another (e.g., German in favour of English in the Netherlands), or, finally, it may cause newborn nations to adopt some imported language as a symbol of their nationhood (French and English in Sub-Saharan Africa). In multinational states a distinction is made between (a) countries in which two or three languages enjoy full equality of status (e.g., Switzerland), (b) those which because of the multiplicity of the languages involved are compelled to select one language for national purposes but otherwise treat all languages as equal (India, Imperial Austria), (c) those which in theory make all languages equal but in practice discriminate among them (Soviet Union). Among nation states, genuine nation states where the dominant group forms a clear minority, and minority-based nation states where a minority group either has subjugated the other groups (e.g., Bolivia, Ethiopia, Liberia), or where the minority tongue has acquired its status with the concensus of all major speech communities (Indonesia, Tanzania, Philippines) are distinguished. Genuine nation states are frequently, but not of necessity, bent on imposing their language not merely as a second tongue but also as the sole language of the ethnic minorities. Where the dominant language and the minority tongue are closely related the dominant group often tries not to blot out, but to *dialectize* the minority tongue; e.g., in Spain the government strives to blot out the Basque language but to relegate Catalan to the status of a mere dialect.

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WALLACE E. LAMBERT, A Social Psychology of Bilingualism, *J. of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 2, 91-109.

In an attempt to integrate psychological and social-anthropological approaches to bilingualism, the outline of a social psychology of bilingualism is presented wherein attention is directed to the distinctive behavior of the individual bilingual, to the social influences that affect his behavior, and to the social consequences that follow from his behavior. The outline is illustrated through studies of the changes in reactions of social audiences when bilinguals switch languages or dialects. It is argued that such switches call out dramatically different sets of stereotypes and that these affect the role relationships of a bilingual and his co-actors in various social settings. Likewise, the person progressing toward full bilingual skill is affected by the attitudinal reactions of his co-actors so that his progress toward becoming bilingual is conditioned by his attitudes and orientations toward the two ethno-linguistic groups involved. Although the bilingual consequently encounters social and cultural tugs and pulls, it is argued that he can overcome these annoyances and may be particularly instrumental in creating a totally new, non-ethno-centric form of social interaction.

JOHN MACNAMARA, The Effects of Instruction in a Weaker Language, *J. of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 2, 120-134.

Studies which investigate teaching subjects such as mathematics, history and geography (i.e., subjects other than languages) in a student's weaker language are reviewed. The effects of such instruction on a student's attainment in those subjects is discussed and also its effects on his two languages. Special attention is paid to the student's attempts to learn and understand material in a weaker language even when he knows all the vocabulary and syntactic structures employed. Some new data on such a student's ability to read and understand a weaker language are also presented.

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SUSAN ERVIN-TRIPP, An Issei Learns English, *J. of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 2, 78-90.

The article reports the findings of an investigation of the factors which contribute to the learning of English by Japanese immigrants to the United States. The subjects were thirty-six Japanese women who married U.S. soldiers and came to live with them in the U.S. (they thus are first generation, or Issei). Their skills on a variety of English tests were correlated with a number of psycholinguistic and sociolinguistic variables. It was found that the number of years spent in the U.S. was the strongest predictor of fluency in English. But for mastery of English morphological rules and pronunciation reading was important.

In order to study the effect of language on content, monolingual norms for a variety of tests were determined; the performance of the Issei on these tests was related to these norms. The Issei showed gross shifts in content with shift in language. These findings cannot be explained adequately by self-instructions to give typical responses. In general, subjects' responses when given in Japanese resembled the Japanese monolingual controls; when given in English they resembled the unilingual English controls. However content shift was not simply a function of language, as subdivision of the data showed. Friendship patterns in the U.S. were shown to have a bearing on the results.

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JOHN MACNAMARA, The Bilingual's Linguistic Performance—A Psychological Overview, *J. of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 2, 58-77.

Studies of bilingualism rather than of the effects of bilingualism on intellectual development or school attainment are reviewed. Six topics receive particular attention: the measurement of bilingualism, the distinction between coordinate and compound bilinguals, linguistic interference, language switching and translation. The theoretical implications of the studies which are reviewed are assessed and suggestions made about the possibilities for future research.

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# SOCIAL ISSUES

JULY, 1967

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## STIRRINGS OUT OF APATHY: STUDENT ACTIVISM AND THE DECADE OF PROTEST

Edward E. Sampson

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DONALD R. BROWN  
JUDITH L. CRAISE  
RICHARD W. FLACKS  
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
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# The Journal of **SOCIAL ISSUES**



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JULY 1967 VOL. XXIII No. 3

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## **STIRRINGS OUT OF APATHY: STUDENT ACTIVISM AND THE DECADE OF PROTEST**

Issue Editor: Edward E. Sampson

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## Introduction

In this issue there is assembled a set of articles which provides the reader with the scope and the depth needed to gain an understanding of recent student political activism. They provide a perspective on the picture of student activism as it has appeared at such places as Berkeley, Chicago, Michigan and Harvard. Coverage ranges from survey studies of local and national samples, through in-depth interviews and case analyses of a few selected students, to more generally impressionistic accounts and systematic participant-observer analyses.

As the several articles in this issue indicate, the understanding of so complex a phenomenon as student activism requires a knowledge that cuts across specialities and disciplines. One must be a developmental psychologist, studying the growth of the individual within his family

. . . a social psychologist who specializes in studying and analyzing the formation and change of attitudes (especially political attitudes and ideologies)

. . . a sociologist who studies large scale organizations, institutional atmospheres, mechanisms of organizational change and the relation between the individual and the institution

. . . a clinical psychologist who can differentiate between healthy rebellion and less healthy withdrawal into privatism; a personality psychologist who can measure the variety of traits of personality and intellect that comprise the student activists as a group and who can then interpret the complex profile patterns that emerge

. . . an historian who can look backwards through time and view

contemporary student activism with the kind of perspective that locates it in a much less dramatic pose (or, perhaps much more) . . . a social-critic with a bent towards fortune-telling who can read the signs of yesterday and today, make predictions about the world of tomorrow, and then place the issues of student activism into this mix and come out with a reasonable, though always hunchy prediction.

In various ways, each of the contributors to this issue has taken on one or more of these roles.

Trent and Craise provide a summary, discussion, analysis and interpretation of the personality and attitude data obtained by Paul Heist and others at the Center for Research and Development in Higher Education at Berkeley. These data are based on samples of the Berkeley activists as well as on comparative national samples. Their article presents a concise representation of one of the major *hard* data pools concerning contemporary student activism; these data form one of the essential building blocks repeatedly referred to in both this collection and other articles on student activism.

For Flacks, the family emerges as a key factor in producing the activist-prone individual. The discontinuity between the learnings one acquires in democratically oriented, Spockian reared families and the kind of institutional world of education and occupation one encounters on the "outside", provides a basic source for unrest and activism. Liberal, equalitarian families produce activist-prone children.

Brown emphasizes another, though related, type of discontinuity, that between the expectations for their education which the highly heterogeneous population of today's college-bound students bring with them and the realities of institutional ideology and life which they meet upon entering the world of the university. The stress experienced from this incongruity and the means whereby institutional reorganization, such as the Michigan Pilot Program or Residential College Plan, can redirect the stress-unrest-activism cycle into more educational channels are examined.

Bay picks up on the body of early social psychological literature on attitudes and the growing body of contemporary literature on student attitudes and activism, and develops the thesis that the radical attitudes of the left-end of the political spectrum are associated with a less ego-defensive, more intelligent and reality-oriented approach to life. He develops his argument within the functionalist's model of attitude formation and change. The role of rebellion, in the existential sense as suggested by Camus, is examined in Bay's account of the development of these more radical political attitudes and associated actions.

Keniston's article offers an in-depth analysis of two varieties of activism, their sources, and his assessment of their future directions and possibilities. His key distinction is between the activist and the alienated student. His discussion examines both the differential origins and present status of these two types. In addition, he examines the likely direction of each types' development should there be changes in the degree to which their patterns of response receive institutional or cultural sanction. He suggests that the direction of change for the activist student would be towards a concentration in the world of academics, whereas the alienated student would move more towards withdrawal into privatism and dysfunctional illness. Both Keniston and I have sought to provide a rather broad framework which maps out the terrain one must cover if he is to gain a good understanding of the roots and present status of contemporary student activism.

My own article, based in large measure on observations, impressions, interviews and survey data gathered at Berkeley during the Free Speech Movement of 1964 and the more recent upheavals of December, 1966, focuses on institutional and societal contributions to student activism. Twelve institution-related factors which are seen to trigger and sustain activism are examined. A further discussion of the varieties of activism, an analysis of the role of both the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War, and a look at "the Movement" and its functional and dysfunctional outcomes, rounds out this discussion.

Both as issue editor and contributor and as one who has been less than dispassionately involved in some of the action at Berkeley, I view this issue of the *Journal* as making a contribution both to social science and to contemporary history. For social science, we have the systematic analysis and discussion of contemporary student activism, in which the *who*, *where*, *what* and *why* of journalistic and scientific concern are examined. For contemporary history, we have enough of fact, impression and reasoned speculation both to detail a contemporary social event and to provide an accounting which later social scientists and historians may find of value.

## Student Activism and the Decade of Protest

Edward E. Sampson

University of California, Berkeley

Sometime in the future, when historians write about the domestic scene of the Sixties one of the major themes that will emerge undoubtedly will focus on the related issues of general unrest, dissent, organized activism and mass protest. Somewhat *surprisingly*, a select group of students from a few universities will emerge as having been of major importance. Youth has always been a period of restlessness, of searching, of unbounded energy. When the students on the Berkeley campus of the University of California committed themselves to action in 1964, they became the triggers that released a barely tapped reservoir of national energy. They were fed from a stream which flowed out of the Civil Rights Movement, and they gave impetus, direction and a base of identification for the new and growing force of the under-thirty youth.

### The University as a Vehicle for Activism

The university as a major vehicle of organized dissent is surprising for several reasons.

Given the relatively quiet campus years of the fifties, with the Silent Generation, born in war, bred in war, participants in war, seeking only security in income, home and career, one would not think to look to the university campus for leadership in national protest and dissent. We had become accustomed to the more frivolous outbursts of youth on the rampage in panty-raids, football riots, and

faddish activities such as flagpole sitting, phonebooth stuffing, and hoola-hooping. Silence and seriousness were seen by many to be appropriate behavior for the mature collegian.

The campus activism of the post-depression and pre-World War Two years had faded from our memories. We no longer expected any organized political, headline-grabbing activist movement to emanate from the college community. It was *surprising* when students rose up in protest over their education, their society and their world.

### *The "Subversive" Function of the University*

In this country the subversive function of the university—subversive in that it seeks to bring into its view all manner of thought, questioning the foundations upon which the society is based—had been minimized by comparison to its technical, applied social service functions. The latter, so we are told, will increase as we move into a more technologically demanding social system in which the role of the university involves turning out the students skilled in the running of the complex machinery of our increasingly planned, programmed and rationalized society. It is *surprising* when a university begins to take on the character of a dissent producing and maintaining vehicle. For some it is a surprising state of affairs when the university and some of its occupants appear so blatantly to bite the hand that feeds them. This is especially the case when that food comes from the taxpayer and the dissent is focused on the very society that foots the bill. It is at moments like these that the taxpaying citizen calls for the quashing of what he considers to be extreme dissent and excessive protest. At times, he even calls for a change in the financing structure of the university itself.

Some think of the mind of the intellectual as being incapable of moving from the realm of ideas and abstract thought into the world of power politics and action. It is *surprising*, therefore, to find the university campus housing not only dissenters in thought, but also dissenters in action. The modification of the ivory-tower image of the academician and his growing function in servicing society has placed him in positions of political—that is, action-oriented, program-determining—power. Gradually members of the intellectual and academic community have been getting their hands dirty in arenas far away from the laboratory and the library. The conflict between the two worlds remains with us: the contemplative world of scholarly thought, rooted deeply in history and tradition and viewing a permanence not granted to those who must act with immediacy in that outside world; and the world of policy and decision making, of choice before all the facts are in, and of choice made in terms of values in spite of those facts. The pendulum appears to be swinging toward the side of more active participation in the day-by-day business of

national and international decision making. I shall have more to say on this point and some of its implications for student activism later in this paper.

### *Who Joins "The Movement"?*

Who are these students in the so-called movement? Are they the downtrodden, the oppressed classes which a revolutionary Marxist theory would demand? Surprisingly enough, they do not appear to be. As Flacks suggests, we are not dealing with a group of students who are marginal to the labor market, but rather with the advantaged members of the middle and the upper-middle classes. Furthermore, as suggested in Keniston's article, the content of many of the protests is more altruistic than personal. These more advantaged youth demonstrate not because their own interests are threatened, but rather because they see others as the unwilling victims of societal injustices. The contemporary activist student groups find it almost impossible to get any rise out of the very people they hope to help. Perhaps it is as a hierarchy of motives approach would suggest: when each day's survival is open to doubt, there is little time or inclination to worry about much of anything but one's self and one's immediate situation. However, when each day's existence has a guarantee attached to it, one can pause to examine more profound issues, including the reasons for one's own guarantee. Recent concern by college students who have deferments over the inequities in the draft laws is one immediate example of this process of examining that guarantee.

This is not to deny the very real degree of personal, often immediate and self-interested protest that can and does develop. The issue of free speech at Berkeley with the feeling that personal freedom was being denied when certain stringent campus rules were suddenly enforced, evolved primarily out of the Civil Rights Movement. In addition, the focus on educational reform, which while a relatively minor stimulant to campus activism (Peterson, 1966), nonetheless, has motivated several protests and does have a direct personal concern. Naturally, once the protest bag is opened, grievances which are both personal and altruistic spring forth. The rhetoric of many student protest groups argues that "any man's loss of freedom and dignity threatens my own freedom and dignity".

### **Responses to Contemporary Social and Political Life**

We often talk and write about the student activists as though they were a totally undifferentiated group; it may be more reasonable to consider the activist response as one of a variety of ways of coping with a rapidly changing political, social and economic environment.

The development of a typology of these various responses would lend much clarity to the entire matter of student activism.

As a move in this direction, Keniston distinguishes between a pattern of behavior which is *activist* and one which is *alienated*. The activist youth moves outwards into the arena of social and political life, seeking to introduce and produce change; the alienated youth, by contrast, moves inward seeking to find and develop his own inner world of aesthetically oriented, personal experience.

Several years ago, Robert Merton (1957) distinguished between different modes of individual acceptance or rejection of cultural goals and the institutionalized means to their attainment. *Conformity* involved a pattern in which the individual accepted both the goals and the means. *Retreatism* described the individual who had rejected both the goals and the means to their attainment. Merton describes these people as being *in society but not of it*: "these constitute the true aliens" (1957, 153). In Keniston's terms, these are the alienated youth. In Merton's typology, *innovation* refers to a pattern in which the individual has accepted the legitimate goals of his society but has rejected the institutionalized means to their attainment. *Rebellion*, on the other hand, refers to a pattern in which the system of goals and means as it presently exists has been rejected and replaced with a new system. Both innovation and rebellion can produce activist efforts to change either the entire society (rebellion) or some significant part of the society (innovation).

In a recent paper, Block, Haan and Smith (in press) differentiate between five patterns of adjustment of youth to the contemporary social and political scene. They develop this typology by distinguishing between two dimensions: (a) the degree of involvement with contemporary political and social issues; (b) the degree to which the individual accepts or rejects the traditional values and the institutionalized authority of the society. *Politically apathetic youth* are characterized by their low level of involvement in political matters and their generally high degree of acceptance of the status quo. In Merton's scheme, these are the conformers. *Alienated youth*, a second type, refers to youth who have rejected traditional societal values, are rebelling against the institutionalized structure of authority and are uninvolved in political or social issues. This pattern outlined by Block, *et al* is similar to Keniston's description of the pattern of alienation. A third type is referred to as *individualist youth*. These persons are involved in political matters while generally accepting the status quo. They have been described as obedient rebels, or youth in the style of Ayn Rand. *Activist youth* are involved politically and socially but have rejected the traditional values and structures of authority. *Constructivist youth* are described as overlapping somewhat with the activists but differing primarily in their degree of

rejection of traditional values and authority. The constructivists, like the activists, are highly involved in social and political matters; unlike the activists, however, they seek to work within the existing framework of society to produce change. Block, *et al* view the students who join the Peace Corps or VISTA as falling into this constructivist pattern.

In the language of the university community, distinctions not too unlike the preceding are typically made. Those who appear to be politically apathetic and to follow patterns of conformity are termed "freddies and sallies", a set of terms usually reserved to describe the stereotype of the fraternity and sorority set. The "beats", "provos", "hippies", or "diggers", refer to the more alienated youth, in contrast to the "politicos" or "activists" who fall primarily into the activist or constructivist pattern described above. Perhaps the closest example of the individualist pattern was found on the Berkeley campus during the 1964 Free Speech Movement (FSM) at which time a group opposed to the FSM was formed, calling itself the Students for Law and Order. A more recent version of this pattern was described in an article in a San Francisco newspaper of December 11, 1966. Entitled, "Blue Guard for university loyalty", the article described a small group at the University of British Columbia which calls itself the "Blue Guard", a takeoff on China's "Red Guard". According to a leader of this group, the movement is an effort to counteract the attention given to radical elements of the campus. I quote: "Blue stands for loyalty to the established authority and that is the idea we wish to promote".

As Keniston indicates in his article, these typologies are more ideal descriptions than necessarily correspondent with actual persons. In fact, one may find individuals who cross boundaries from the activist to the alienated or from the activist to the constructivist. More typically, however, one is likely to find a mixture of the activist and alienated. In the recent 1966 upheaval on the Berkeley campus, several observers noted that at long last the hippies and the politicos had joined forces out of a common recognition of their "outlaw" status. To symbolize this joining they wore "Lone Ranger" masks to school and adopted as their new song of protest, "We all live in a Yellow Submarine". This union is described in a leaflet:

The Yellow Submarine was first proposed by the Beatles, who taught us a new style of song. It was launched by hip pacifists in a New York harbor, and then led a peace parade of 10,000 down a New York street. Last night we celebrated the growing fusion of head, heart and hands; of hippies and activists; and our joy and confidence in our ability to care for and take care of ourselves and what is ours. And so we made a resolution which broke into song; and we adopt for today this unexpected symbol of our trust in our future, and of our longing for a place fit for us all to live in. Please post, especially where prohibited. We love (Strike Committee leaflet, 1966)

This union, however, is not always as harmonious as the preceding might suggest. Dr. Timothy Leary, the once "High Priest" of the cult of hippies and acid-heads, talks about the need for everyone to "turn on, tune in, and drop out". Dropping out, as Leary describes it, involves forming one's own small tuned-in community, an island right in the midst of *straight* society, and living by values which center on self-experience, individual expression and an ethic of peace and love. These latter themes have earned this new group of young Americans the titles, "The Love Generation" and "The Flower Children". Theirs is a fusion of Judeo-Christian morality without the achievement-success themes of the Protestant Ethic. A somewhat unusual mixture of "types" is found in the San Francisco hippy scene in which these members of the Love Generation have been joined by the more openly rebellious and aggressive Hells Angels. While these love-hate extremes live in apparent harmony, the Hells Angels were one group to openly and physically assault the more activist student protestors during the 1965 Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee's march from Berkeley to Oakland. Perhaps through understanding such alliances and antagonisms between contemporary youth groups, one can appreciate more fully the meaning of the various typologies.

### *Leary on the Activists . . .*

An even clearer case of these intergroup differences is found in the attitude which Leary expressed in a radio interview. According to Leary, the Berkeley activists and rebels haven't dropped out. Rather, they operate as dupes *within* the system. Anyone who fights for power, argues, debates, protests, seeks to negotiate, strikes, pickets, etc., is really as much a part of the system as are his adversaries. The activists are just politically minded in-system sorts while the heads and hippies try to be totally removed from the system. The hippies and activists are at odds, in characteristically peaceful ways, even with each other. The activists resent the withdrawal that seems to characterize the hippies. In turn, the hippies look upon the activists as fools and dupes who have yet to become tuned in.

Regardless of the manner in which one seeks to slice the pie, the point remains that various responses to the contemporary scene exist, that activism is best conceived as one complex class of differentiable responses, and that the two-category system of activist versus nonactivist overlooks more than it reveals.

Within the activist group, one is likely to encounter a fairly differentiated picture. The activist response can be examined in terms of the motives which underlie it. Some activist behavior is motivated less by high, abstract ideals than by simple need for affiliation, comrade and community. A leader of the Berkeley FSM was ini-

tially brought into the movement's demonstrations not out of some belief in the notion of freedom of speech and advocacy, but rather, because he was new in town and saw a familiar face in the demonstrating crowd. As he put it, he looked around at the demonstrators and suddenly he knew that they were the kind of people he had been looking for. Only later did the issues become important to him. Some participate in demonstrations, especially when there is relatively little personal commitment and risk, for what strikes me as being simply "the fun of it", or because "that's where the action is" for that night. I recall looking over the crowd during the November, 1966 demonstration and noting that as the evening wore on, several young, attractive girls began to arrive, costumed, made-up and coiffured as though they were going to a party. That they were around for ideological reasons I would find a trifle difficult to accept.

One might also provide sub-typologies within the activist group based on the degree and nature of the commitment. Some enter for a brief time and then move out as term papers and exams loom near, while others go so far as to drop out of school in order to serve "the movement". Still another criterion might be based upon the degree to which the activist's behavior is integrated within his total life style. That is, are we talking about a person whose entire life is built around a social movement or about someone who participates seriously, but who has essentially isolated this part of his life. Is he the Sunday churchgoer and the Monday businessman, or does his belief extend throughout much of his life?

Another important basis for differentiation, one which is too often overlooked, involves the distinction between the leadership of the activist groups and their members. It would not be too surprising to find the leaders more committed, more active and more involved with abstract theoretical, moral and ideological issues than the membership. In fact, many members of organized demonstrations are basically the hard core conformists in the context of their subcultural group. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine an organized movement of protest that consisted only of ideologically driven, rebellious individuals. They would never be able to get things off the ground. On the national scene, when the leaders of the various local activist groups meet, this inability to get things going becomes evident. Each local group depends on a large core of conforming followers, who are committed to a lesser degree than the leadership, and in fact, are much less sophisticated in tactics, organizational skills and ideology than the leaders. To lump all of these diverse elements together into the single category of activist, therefore, though useful as a preliminary effort to gain an understanding of the overall phenomenon, provides only a rough picture of the hidden diversity that exists.

## Activism-Inducing Contexts

Any systematic analysis of student activism must come to grips with several different situations which set the stage for the activistic pattern. Each of these situations may be seen as providing the force which acts on the person or group and which motivates their behavior. It also sets the conditions which maintains, enhances or undermines the activistic pattern.

In his article, Flacks focuses upon the context of the family and examines its role in laying the groundwork for the development of the activist pattern. The key to Flacks' argument is that there is an essential disjunctiveness between the values within the families of activist students and the generally ordered, organized, rationalized life and career opportunities which are open to the activist in the university and in society. The data which both Flacks and Keniston present indicate that the activist youth has not rejected the generally permissive, democratic and equalitarian familial values—thus his response cannot be so simply conceived as a striking out against authority—but rather has encompassed them so fully that he runs all too readily into conflict with the less democratically, more bureaucratically structured university and society.

Where Flacks provides a focus upon the context in which the socialization of personality and attitudes has occurred, Trent and Craise draw upon the growing reservoir of data which has examined the collegiate activist and contrasted his personality and intellect with that of the nonactivist. As Keniston suggests, the protest-prone personality is an essential ingredient in the mix that produces the activist. In this same connection, Bay presents an argument based upon several findings obtained across time and across samples which leads him to conclude that the protest-prone type is healthier and more in touch with reality than the conformity-socialized individual. The picture which emerges from these several articles suggests that the activist students come from a permissive family background, are more intellectually oriented, less conventional, more curious and impulsive, more non-authoritarian, and have broad social and human commitments.

## The Role of the Institution

This protest-prone personality however, is not sufficient to account for the development of contemporary activism without the context and triggering mechanism provided by the institution. The role of the institution in this regard is rather varied and complex. Although it would be possible to write an entire chapter which dealt with each component of the institutions contribution to activism, I will address myself to a brief description of each.

*. . . The Gathering of Protest-Prone Students*

One of the contributions of the institution to the occurrence of organized student activism is the congregation of a select group of protest-prone, intelligent persons who share equalitarian familial backgrounds. It is just such propinquity that provides one of the essential bases for the evolution of an activist subculture or counterculture (to use Yinger's term, 1960). These students are able to meet others who share similar feelings about life and the world, and who reinforce and support each other's beliefs, developing values and codes of personal morality and ethics which stand apart and often in sharp contrast to other students' values and to the kind of education which the activists see themselves receiving. Brown reports an effort to redirect these subcultural energies into more educational, academic channels by the University of Michigan.

*. . . Teaching Assistants—The Leaders*

Another institutional factor, also suggested by Keniston, involves the presence in academically select, large institutions, of a ready body of persons of especial leadership caliber, particularly in the perennially disadvantaged graduate teaching assistants. The teaching assistant occupies that awkward and marginal position between the status of undergraduate which he has recently left and the status of faculty to which he often aspires. In some universities, not only is he part of this inbetween generation in which both worlds are unavailable to his full participation, but in addition, he is often cast loose in his role of teacher with few directives or guidelines. After the assistantship has been used to lure him to the university, he is told essentially, "go in there and teach". His contact with the undergraduate student, while serving in the capacity of assistant to the professor, gives him a new, often rather shocking perspective on the entire educational process. He becomes privy to the realities of the professor's role, ambition, concerns—and sometimes lack of concern for his class and his students.

While living in that limbo land between both worlds, the teaching assistant is accorded extreme degrees of responsibility from the professor and often deferent high status from his undergraduate students. He has a flock ready to be led and colleagues who share his grievances. At Berkeley, this group of teaching assistants formed into a labor union after the 1964 FSM. As a legitimate union within the AFL-CIO, this group occupies a somewhat novel position for negotiating with the university administration. Were they to support a student strike over issues involving their working conditions—a legitimate union grievance—and were this strike to gain central union recognition, the power of this body of teaching assistants would become something which could not be taken lightly.

*. . . The Methods of Resolution of The Conflict*

Another factor best included under this institutional rubric concerns the history of relationships and techniques of conflict resolution within the institution. One upheaval soon attracts to the university *both* students who seek further confrontations and administrators who have reputations in the area of conflict resolution. These new members enter a situation in which complaints have been settled by mass action: a setting which fosters paranoia. One could argue that where mass action has proved effective in the past, it will be turned to again. Students know this, administrators know this, and faculty know this. So the students' demands and claims sound to the administrators like blackmail threats—even if they were not intended as such by the students. In turn, the administrators give in to these perceived threats, leading eventually to new demands on a newly escalated level. So upward spirals the threat-counterthreat-give-in sequence until finally the seam in the gas pipe bursts and all hell breaks loose. One thinks most easily of a family that has managed a rough accommodation to one another through mutual threats, retreats and counterthreats, until one day the reservoir of distrust and fear breaks into a volcanic upheaval. Return to normal under such circumstances cannot ignore the history of prior conflict resolution and the vicious cycle of mistrust that lies barely beneath the surface. Of all the institutional characteristics to be discussed, this focus on history has special relevance to the picture at Berkeley, where students and administrators stand poised to overreact at the slightest provocation.

*. . . "Rationalization" of Education*

The *rationalization* of education in the multiversity contributes significantly to contemporary student unrest and activism. Rationalization is used here and elsewhere (i.e. Flacks' article) in the sense in which Donald Michael uses it:

a state of affairs in which "much greater effort will be put into applying the methods of science and engineering to set all sorts of goals and to organize men, work methods and administration so that those goals can be attained by the most efficient means (Michael, 1965, 34)

Flacks points to the conflict which exists when the more democratically socialized student faces the realities of such a rationalized education. If one is trained at home to play an active role in making the decisions which affect one's behavior, how difficult it must be to face up to the impotent life one is asked to lead in many universities. Furthermore, as Bay suggests in his article and as Trent and Craise demonstrate in their data comparing a college educated sample with a comparable group of non-college educated, the process of education

itself, though it may be rationalized, has a certain liberating influence on the individual. The student is taught, even urged by some, to question, to think, to be critical. The mark of the success of his education occurs finally when he focuses his keenly honed mind on the institution that sought to sharpen it.

Upon the horns of a dilemma we sit. As the university increasingly becomes a rationalized tool for producing essential human components for societal functioning, it seems that it must place students (and faculty as well in many cases) into a position of decreased personal power. Yet at the same time, it still seeks to instruct in the classical academic values of inquiry and critical thought. When that critical power is turned toward an examination of one's personally diminished ability to influence outcomes even in the narrow confines of the university, let alone to produce change in the larger society and world, something in the system must give. It is possible to imagine a delicate balance being maintained; but undoubtedly that kind of balance would require a more stable outside world or an entirely closed and cloistered academic world in order to work effectively. Without that, there is little doubt but that upheavals will continue. You cannot socialize democratic, participatory values in the home and teach one to question and to be critical at school, without allowing for the possibility that these values and these learnings will be turned towards the very institutions themselves.

#### *. . . Conflicting Perspectives*

The modern *large* university in this country, having historical roots which can be traced back to the classical academic institutions of Europe, exists today as a complex collage of the new plastered hastily and tenuously over the old. The traditional model of the university as a community of scholars and learners with a common set of shared intellectual values exists side-by-side with the modern big business university of faculty entrepreneurs, administrative managers and scores of pre-professional students, who often have more conflicts of interests than sharing of values. Clark Kerr's description of the multiversity documents this present state of affairs. Through its contractual arrangements with government and business, the university itself has often taken on roles and functions which depart from the usual values of the classic academic tradition. Members of the faculty, particularly in those fields in which federal grants come most easily, are the last surviving small businessmen. Though big grantsmanship is not inevitably at odds with more academic values, large scale projects which demand a visible product (often of the research and development sort) for one's labors often produce interest conflicts between professor and student and professor and professor. In this picture of a large heterogenous academic community, how-

ever, one can still find the "real" scholar of old who wishes to examine enduring truths by methods of inquiry that have changed little from the time of antiquity.

Given these divergent perspectives, communications which issue from both the faculty and the administration have a *double-bind* quality that strikes the students with confusion, ambivalence, frustration and often eruptive episodes of hostility. Discussions build around a theme of shared common values while lives are more apparently and noticeably built around themes of conflicts of interests. The administrator talks about common values shared by all, then enacts his role as mediator between various campus community interest groups, playing more the role of the politician, that he must be, than the academician he claims to be. The faculty tell their students about the pursuit of knowledge and truth as an academic value, then submit a proposal for another research-and-development grant, negotiate over several contracts to write another popular, money-making text, and manifest about as much of the image of the scholar as the president of some mini-corporation. There are certain concrete realities of the modern university. Their denial and the substitution of the verbiage of shared values clouds more than it clarifies, arouses anger more than it pacifies.

Not only do communications have this double-bind quality, but also, the institutions themselves serve as perfect models of archaic organizations surrounded by the best in new business management. Lines of communication and authority frequently have both the surviving features of the old with the realities of the new, sitting in conflict, side-by-side. At Berkeley, the office of the Dean of Students, which once had an important function in student life, has gradually lost that function as student activities have shifted from fraternity and dorm pranks to political action. In this latter arena, which is seen to be a greater threat to the organizational stability of the entire enterprise, decisions must be made at the top. The authority of those in the Dean's Office is thus undercut; they serve in the role of policemen or as sometimes useful agents called on to be the buffer between the students and those who are really in charge of decision making. Much of this institutional struggle with communications and lines of authority has direct personal relevance for the people involved. When students have a grievance, to whom can they turn? Suspecting, that they can only get real answers by going to the top (where other obligations and matters of personal style make direct contact problematical), they find nowhere to turn except to noisy displays of frustration and discontent.

On the reciprocal side of this overall institutional picture, one finds as fully a complex array of conflicting student motivations interests and investments as befits the diverse and often divergent models

of the university itself. Some have come for preprofessional and pre-career training. They want to learn the three-R's, but now at a higher level. Education means getting a degree, and getting a degree means getting more money. They want their institution to give them the straight facts and technical training they will need when they get out. They are often hard and highly competitive workers in class. They learn what the professor wants them to learn; they would memorize the Koran backwards if required for an assignment and give it back verbatim on the final examination. They get upset when the university is in a state of turmoil because it makes studying more difficult (which it does) and threatens the achievement of their own educational goals (which it undoubtedly can do).

Some have come to learn about themselves. They hate courses that ask them to memorize the periodic table, the periods of history, the names and dates of people, places and events. They are seeking a sense of community; really a place in which they will find (or be given) a personal ethic.

Some have come to hear people tell them about the world in which they live, with the hope that they can change that world. Many of them arrive with a bag filled with notions about life and their world and wait to hear them validated or challenged by their professors. They want a campus that is active, community-and-world directed; a platform for both the exploration of ideas and for the generation of action to produce change.

Still others have come out of the more pure, classical motives of the scholar who enjoys playing the games of the intellect whether or not these have any immediately evident results. Peace, tranquility and isolation, mixed with philosophical discussions around a table over beer, have an appeal for them.

The resultant in such an institutional situation comes to look more like a highly complex modern urban community than a simple community of academicians and learners. One part calls for students and others to adhere to rules of thought and to an ethic of common academic values. Another part calls out in many voices for the achievement of many diverse and divergent goals.

#### *. . . The Activists and The Administration*

As implied throughout the preceding discussion, the role of the university administration, especially at the top levels, has changed from one of leadership with new and visionary ideas about education, to one of leadership emphasizing political and organizational skills. There are few dreamers and innovators on top; there are few exciting new ideas in education which they seek to impart through their skillful leadership. Rather, the goals of the administrators appear

to be to maintain the multiversity system as a smoothly running machine.

Where then comes the leadership in the broad issues of education? If administrators are busy mediating conflicting interests within their campus and between their campus and external groups, and if faculty are busy marketing their research and writing, who has the time or the inclination to examine and to work to change higher education? Some of the activist students have taken this role upon themselves. It seems that they have interpreted their first step in this student-led educational campaign to be one of awakening the others in the academic community out of their apparent complacency.

For many of the activist students, to use a phrase which appeared in a recent article in the Berkeley campus paper, the role of the administration is seen to be as the *enemy in residence* (Shechner, 1966). They are given this role as immediate targets of the frustration of students who have sought and repeatedly felt failure in producing quick change in their university and their society. The Administration takes a view of the students as a basic threat to the peace of their campus. They view the students as seeking a total takeover of their campus with the consequent relegation of their role as administrators to groundskeeping and maintenance functions. In their turn, the activist students view the Administration (their enemy in residence) as a group of evil sorts who have no business at all in making any kinds of policies dealing with education, theirs or anyone else's. They tend to see each action of the Administration as being calculated to stifle their freedom and to deny them access to any important decision-making roles. They feel that the Administration doesn't trust or respect them and looks upon them as highly impressionable youth, easily manipulated by outside influences.

One further integral part of this student activist-administrator confrontation concerns the cues used by the activists to gauge the success of their actions. The problem in general is how to determine if one's dissent is effective. Often it is felt that dissent which does not provoke an intense reaction on the part of members of the Establishment is dissent which is in-system and thereby ineffective. One is successful to the extent to which the Establishment is roused to angry reply. In fact, one suspects that several of the activist leaders assume that any action which does not bring on a negative administrative response is by *very definition* a failure. For such persons, the more the Establishment accommodates itself to their activities, the more extreme must their actions become. In simple outline, the preceding describes one significant component of the kind of confrontation politics that marks many of the student activist-administrator contacts on the Berkeley campus and perhaps elsewhere as well.

As one who both watches and participates in this scene, I cannot help but feel that without the Administration, the intensity and at times unbounded energy of the student movement would falter and perhaps fail. It would be foolish in fact to underestimate the important role played by the Administration in helping to maintain a state of student unrest and activism. This student activist—Administrator relationship has a somewhat symbiotic quality about it: if the student activists need an active administration to keep them going, an active administration that would make its importance known and visible for all to see, requires a good core of student activists. With a good group of limits-testing activists around, every administrator, regardless of how generally ambivalent he may feel, can at least sense the importance and meaningfulness of his own administrative role. For after all, without him, who would keep the place in order and running smoothly? A theorist interested in organizational equilibrium could find endless moments of pleasure in examining in more depth and detail this fascinating though perhaps peculiar activist student—Administrator symbiosis.

### *. . . The Activists and the Faculty*

Whereas the administration has taken on a set of managerial functions, the faculty is almost as heterogenous as the students. Their role in the institutional dynamics of student unrest and activism is potent, but complex. If the activist students view the administration as the enemy in residence, they view the faculty as their colleagues in the process of education. The more entrepreneurially oriented faculty view the administration as the saviors of a peaceful working environment and see many of the students (primarily the undergraduates) at best as being mildly annoying when they are around and disturbing when they make their presence vigorously known. Many faculty, through not fitting the modern grantsman image, have the more ivory-towered view of their role as educators, and cannot understand what all the ruckus is about. They are not offended as much as they are confused by what is happening. They sense that the noise from the activist students will be heard out in the community and that their protected status will be jeopardized. Still other faculty view the students as children needing the kind of mature guidance that only they can provide. Their condescending paternalism rankles the early maturing activist and adds fuel to a fire that needs little to make it burn brightly.

One sympathetic group bears especial attention. Part of this group is composed of the old, still disillusioned rebels of the thirties. They see in the present student movement their own life replayed, now life-sized on a screen outside their offices. Though their heart is with the movement, their minds tell them that failure is all that

faces these new activists. Their message is filled with the fond reminiscences of the old guard watching the new young bucks try their hand at this most difficult and failure-filled game of social change. You get the feeling in watching many of them that they wish their professorial position would permit them to walk the picket lines, sit-in and hurl slogansque invectives towards the administration. The other part of this faculty group is composed of the younger, just Ph.D'd, instructor and assistant professor (with a marginal sprinkling of tenured staff as well) who rose from the ranks of the more recent protests and who now come naturally to continue their battles. These are the faculty who can be seen huddled head-to-head with the student activists at every planning session, joining together with them in preparing what they hope will be the groundwork for the wave of tomorrow.

In the scene at Berkeley, the faculty has played a rather interesting role in student unrest. During the 1964 actions, the faculty was the group the students turned to. On December 8, 1964, a set of resolutions was overwhelmingly passed by the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate. Having passed these resolutions, most of the faculty, including the young Turks, returned to their more personal activities of research, writing and teaching and assumed that their job had been completed. Political apathy among the faculty runs at least as high as among the students.

One can, and many do, criticize the students for not recognizing the full responsibility that would fall upon them were their programs of meaningful participation in decision making to become a reality; a similar criticism could be leveled against the faculty who find resolution passing easier than the followup responsibilities that such actions entail. In the more recent events of 1966, the faculty were once again seen by the student activists to be their source of hope and salvation. The Academic Senate failed this time to produce as meaningful a document. In 1964, the students greeted the faculty with rousing applause as they left their meeting; in 1966, they formed a tensely silent gantlet which each faculty member passed through on his way out. The tenuous coalition that had been formed between students and faculty was broken as the students suddenly awakened to the facts that their interests and those of the majority of the faculty were not as completely congruent as they had imagined or hoped. The young, rebel, activist and liberal faculty still exists and still forms a link between the student generation and the rest of the faculty. Yet even this group is split within itself: some wish to work within the existing political framework of the Academic Senate and thus to prepare policy statements that will gain maximum support; others see their roles as lying outside the formal structure of

faculty power and are willing to cast their lots more with the student activists and less with their faculty colleagues.

### *. . . Time Perspective for Change*

It is typical to view the students' apparent impulsivity and eagerness for rapid social change as being a mark of their so-called adolescent immaturity. What is often overlooked is the objective difference in time perspective between the several groups which comprise the university. The generation for the student is only four years, and as one student put it, even a revolution every two years seems like a long wait. For the faculty and for the administrators, the sense of time is extended far longer into the future. When one plans to commit a lifetime to a given university, change is seen as something that can, and one thinks, should come slowly. The student who wishes personally to experience the effects of a new policy has little time to wait. His impulsive actions, his eagerness for immediacy, his unwillingness to participate in a long and drawn out movement, all speak of an understandably briefer view of time.

### *. . . Para-institutional Environment*

An ingredient which is essential to the maintenance of student activism, though not sufficient to explain the phenomenon, involves the underground community of hanger's-on, part-time students and nonstudents that exist within the academic community. Around university campuses, especially those in large metropolitan areas, is a subculture which supports the on campus activists and provides a term-break and study-for-finals permanence to any movement which may start. It is difficult to be both a full time student and an activist organizer, though early in the semester and at slack school-work periods one can devote more time to such activities. (I might add that the quarter system allows for fewer slack periods than the semester system and thus makes a time investment in political activism more costly to the student.)

This para-institutional community provides a refuge for those students who find themselves momentarily rattled by the drudge and drain of academics and who need to drop out for personal stock-taking. With such a community in existence, they can drop out formally but remain in the university culture. During the fall of 1966, a faculty member commented that we must be concerned about our students and *our* nonstudents. At Berkeley, at least, the boundaries of the academic community stretch beyond the land limits of the campus.

*... The Activist and His Public*

The delicate balance between the university and the general public seems shaken whenever events on a campus appear to be getting out of hand. In times of apparent crisis, some citizens, legislators and alumni feel that *their* university is being endangered by a small body of difficult radicals. While the more enlightened are cognizant of the delicate balance that exists between town and gown, others, have fuses as short as the ones they accuse the students of having and are quick to call for legislative investigations and mass purges to cleanse the university of its activist elements. I mention the public as an important institutional element to consider in seeking a fuller understanding of student unrest, in that they can provide a source of pressure that can magnify a situation into a major happening. Administrators, as they must be, are responsive to the demands of the public. Sometimes, however, they base their actions on their anticipation of an angry public response and therefore their response to the students is not a reaction to the students action, but to their anticipation of the public's view of the students action.

Students, faculty and administrators, in their turn, may seek to use public opinion to achieve their own ends for the university. During the 1964 events at Berkeley, the faculty published a document primarily for distribution to the public which was intended to foster more favorable public opinion. Again, and more recently (April, 1967), the Berkeley faculty sponsored a full dress academic convocation whose major face was turned toward the public of the State and whose major message urged this public to support their local university. Administrators, in their turn, phrase their messages and policy statements in a manner more often designed to appease the public than to cope with an internally flammable situation. In a recent T.V. interview, for example, the Berkeley Chancellor confessed that it was a greater problem explaining the university to the outside community than to the inside. Students, by the way, are no slouchers in this matter of working on public opinion. Their own forms of "truth squads" trip around the State seeking to talk with citizen groups in an effort both to tell their side of the complex story and to sway public opinion over to their point of view.

*... The Mass Media*

An often overlooked member of the total academic and community picture of unrest and activism is the communication media. Press conferences called by student groups, by administrators and even by faculty often provide one of the main but least desirable techniques of intracampus communication. A reporter from a large San Francisco newspaper has a permanent desk in the Public Infor-

mation Office of the University—rather than at his paper's office in San Francisco. He is contacted there by all sides as a sort of central clearing house for information to be "leaked" from official, but unnamed sources.

All too frequently during the term one may see the noontime corps of photographers and T.V. camera crews waiting around Sproul Plaza for the action to begin. Eagerly, or so it begins to seem, students, administrators and faculty look forward to seeing, hearing and reading about themselves. The person acts at noon, goes to class until four, then rushes home to watch the five o'clock news to see how he looked on T.V. While the student is watching himself, the administrators and faculty are tuned in as well. Often responding to what they have just seen, one faction gets off a statement to the press which appears in the next morning's paper. This allows the student group about three hours, from 9-12, before their publicized noon rally, to prepare their responses to the morning paper's story: and so on around it all goes again.

It would not be stretching the point to suggest that the mass media significantly perpetuate and escalate various local conflicts both through their accurate reporting and their frequently error-filled, highly selective perspectives. One comes increasingly to respond to what was said about what was said than to what actually was said and in what context.

Apparently this situation is *not* entirely unique to Berkeley. A recent article in *The New Republic* (Sanford, 1967) reports an incident at Wayne State University in Detroit involving a "dope raid", which according to the page-one headlines and story in the *Detroit Free Press*, implicated students and an instructor at WSU. Sanford continues,

From reading the papers, the university thus got the impression that perhaps 28 of its students and an instructor had been caught with narcotics—LSD as well as pot—that there was a dope ring, and that everyone there (i.e. in the 'dope den') was a bearded, booted beatnik . . . None of these things was true . . . Unfortunately, the university did not know these things at the time and in a moment of hysteria issued a hasty press release stating that any university employee involved would be 'suspended immediately', and that students would similarly be subject to 'immediate suspension pending a hearing' . . . Some of the arrested students stopped attending classes for a short time because they had read, in the *Detroit News*, that they had been kicked out of school.

Officials at Wayne have since repented of their too quick response to inaccurate and sensational newspaper accounts . . . At first, Sells (Duncan Sells, Wayne's Dean of Students) says, the university wanted 'to get off the hook that the press had put us on in the public eye' (Sanford, 1967, 12).

These mass media not only serve as one of the few open channels of communication linking various parts of the campus and general community, but in addition, serve to create issues which never existed and to polarize stances and intensify potential conflict. A hasty answer given by someone inexperienced in the ways of handling a news conference can create a sudden and even violent uproar in the campus community. All too easily one gets egged on by eager reporters into making extreme statements and into taking extreme stands. Since the mass media may provide a major channel of communication, we see not only a public airing of complaints and grievances, but also a public display of all or most negotiating and compromising that takes place. Where once gentlemen could gather together and seek to talk reasonably, men now face the cameras and negotiate through the intermediary of the mike and the lens. Performing before the camera somehow makes everyone appear more militant and less reasonable than is possible when sitting around a table in a less public and publicized setting. No longer are there only two parties to events and discussions; the entire community and shortly the entire nation and world know. And knowing, they can and do put in their two cents worth as well.

Parties on all sides begin to play more to their potential audience "out there" than to the people at the negotiating table. Recognition of the worth or even the legitimacy of the arguments of one's opponents, granting concessions, become seemingly impossible in front of a T.V. camera. When the entire public is looking on, how can the Administration feel free to act in a way which might lead one to conclude that they have given in on some point; or for that matter, how can the students feel free to take a stand that would give this same message to the public? Discussions conducted under klieg lights most often get nowhere. Politically vague speeches and pronouncements that shortly solidify into formal policy too often replace reasoned and reasonable positions. This process occurs even when the reporting is minimally selective and fairly accurate. Imagine how more severe is this entire process when events become distorted by error, by intent, by selection.

#### *. . . Participation in Decision Making*

I've included the issue of participation in the section dealing with the institutional context in that, at least in great part, it is within this social context that significant student participation is being sought and often not achieved. I should add, however, that according to Peterson's recent national survey (1966), less than 20% of student activism occurs over this matter of student participation in decision making. On some campuses, however, this is one of the

key themes that appears to hold together the various student action groups with their diverse causes. At Berkeley, this theme has served to join together groups on the far Right with those on the far Left. Although it is always a dangerous and speculative activity to read single goals into so complex a phenomenon as contemporary student activism, if one single *long range* goal were to be selected, I would cast my ballot for this matter of realizing significant and meaningful participation in the processes of decision making.

It is almost a banality to mention today the increased degree to which the individual has been removed from direct access to the machinery of decision making as population, complexity of technology and social planning and control have grown. Responses to this personal ineffectuality are varied, ranging from acute withdrawal and apathy—by far the most common response even around so highly touted an activist campus as Berkeley—through bitter resentment and open warfare, to rebellion which is designed to capture the control that appears to have been significantly reduced. A benevolent dictator who held the values and visions of today's youth would be able to govern without the participation of those governed. However, when those governed feel that the governing are leading them "wrong", the sense of powerlessness becomes painful and efforts toward reshaping the locus of power are begun.

Today's university campus has become for many students the last point in their lives in which they see any hope for exercising significant influence. The activist youth have seen the bureaucratized world make older voices whisper thin. The campus seems the last stronghold for testing ways of influencing their world. They are afraid that when they leave the university, get a job, marry and raise a family, the weight of responsibilities will weaken their impetus for change. Those over thirty are not to be trusted, because of their increasing investment in the system as it exists.

They feel their time is short: their goals of significant participation, almost revolutionary in the modern American academic scene. Their frustrations are of great intensity and very likely to recur again and again. For what is it they are asking, and what are the institutional investments that set up barriers to their achievement?

There are 30,000 people, approximately, that attend in one way or another this University every single day, five days a week. They spend their lives here. They eat here. They learn here. They believe here. They act here. And a community of 30,000 persons cannot be governed by fiat, but must be governed by consent. That is the basic principle upon which this republic was founded. Thirty thousand people is larger than many, many cities in the United States. We are a community and we have a right to govern ourselves and not by some Board of Regents which has proved itself to be irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent to the functioning of this university . . . not

only is it that, but it is bankrupt. And it is bankrupt because the employees, i.e. the faculty, are in opposition to the policies of the board of directors; and the raw materials, i.e. the students, don't like the product into which they're being molded and will not tolerate it. And when the raw material doesn't go into the machine, you can't produce any kind of a product except human beings; and that's what we are, and we are going to govern ourselves. As students, we have certain rights which no agency can legitimately grant or deny. Among these rights: the right to govern our own internal affairs, to set our own standards of conduct, and jointly with the faculty, to determine the form and nature of our education. Those are certain inalienable rights which are ours. To paraphrase it another way, certain inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of knowledge and truth (Aptheker, 1965).

Significant participation in making the decisions that affect their behavior sounds rather simple and straightforward, and is—like mother, God and country something we would all vote aye for. One thinks of the early studies conducted by Lewin and his colleagues with children's groups in which democratic leadership, which allowed member participation in decision making, proved boosting to morale while not destroying productivity (Lippitt and White, 1958). Or the Coch and French study in which the full participation of factory workers in a decision which influenced their personal and financial well being resulted in vastly superior morale and productivity than any other system of decision making examined (Coch and French, 1948). The series of studies in changing food habits that evolved out of the Lewinian tradition are also instructive in showing how participation (even though complicated by the actual process of making a decision in a group setting) was more effective than lectured instruction in altering behavior (Lewin, 1958; Pelz, 1958). In fact, much of the group dynamics tradition, with its origins in the work and philosophy of Kurt Lewin, lends strong support to this goal of the activist movement. The students call for no more sandbox governments in which a few campus leaders, drawn more from the organizational types, make decisions in a setting of mock legislative importance. They call for significant roles in determining the legislation that will influence their lives. This is often more a call for effective participation in establishing the rules which govern political activity than is a concern for the rules which apply to one's apolitical life. This political focus does not yet apply to all university campuses. The call for meaningful participation, however, does appear to have an increasingly widespread appeal.

#### *. . . Decision Making—In the Classroom*

The concern for participation does go beyond the matter of rules governing campus political behavior. It stretches into the class-

room as well. It is in this arena that the queasy alliance between some faculty and the student movement suffers its greatest break.

In the classroom where the professor's own sanctuary exists, even an administrator hesitates to enter. Here student participation in decision making enters a new arena. The students claim that the content of their instruction is arid and is only minimally related to their concerns as citizens in a war-torn, population abundant world. They call for courses that focus on issues of immediate concern:

. . . the education students receive is not relevant to their felt needs. In order to understand these felt needs, it is necessary to appreciate the reality of post World War Two America. We are now involved in a fundamental crisis in American society. The war in Vietnam shows many students that American foreign policy is all too frequently brutal and coercive. The response to the disturbances in our cities points to the fact that many whites in this country are unable to deal with their own racism. A large and growing number of university students are unwilling to live out their lives in the emptiness of middle-class America. And in the midst of all this, most of the books coming out of academia argue that America's major problems have been solved and that all we have to do now is to tie up loose ends. But students feel that America's problems have not been solved and they are searching for ways of understanding these problems and taking action that will solve them. And only in increasingly isolated instances are we receiving any intellectual or moral guidance on how to understand and deal with these issues. We want an education that will help us act; we want an education that will give us some guidance on how to live a decent life in mid-Twentieth Century America (Bardacke, 1966).

Often the faculty who are trained in the more technical fields view such instruction to be of lesser relevance than the learning of details of their specialty. Those of the faculty who were trained in the more classical traditions of scholarly academics often view these immediate concerns to be of a more transient nature than the enduring problems which they trace from the antiquity of man and on which they are fond of doting. Those of the faculty who are in fields which lend themselves more readily to topics of immediate social concern (e.g. sociology, political science, social psychology) try to move half-way in meeting the pressing demands of these students. However they view student demands now, for most faculty, any student say over class content is viewed as a threat to their academic freedom.

Some students call for more significant roles in determining not the content of any specific course, but rather the kinds of courses that are offered. They want some courses of a more topical nature to be established; thus on most campuses, they want some flexible mechanisms of instituting new classes to come into being which does not require long term examination before a new offering is available. As an experiment the student government at Berkeley recently voted the sum of \$13,000 to pay the salary of a visiting professor hired by

the students. This decision was later tempered; they decided to hire someone only if a university department would agree to take the person on the staff to teach regularly scheduled, credit courses. As of this writing, no department has been willing to take on its staff the professor whom the students had selected. Faculty more than administrators appear to be resistant. Many believe the students want the kind of hiring and firing control that exists in some Latin American universities. Others feel that the students are not yet mature or competent enough to be important contributors to course planning and creation. Still others feel that what the students really want is plain and simple: a platform and a fortress from which to wage their war upon the society. On most of our larger university campuses no one is really certain what would happen if in fact students were brought into significant decision making, not just as a token gesture but as an institutionalized arrangement based on faith in the essential maturity and intelligence of students.

### *. . . Participation in Decision Making . . . Differing Concepts of Education*

Perhaps boiled down to its most simple component, much of the confusion involves differing concepts of *education*. For many brought up on the typical grade school and high school formula, education consists simply in one person's telling facts and another person's recording, memorizing and feeding back these facts. Lectures in college, large classes, multiple-choice exams may be a problem then, not because they do not conform to this model of education, but rather because they may make its realization slightly more difficult. For others, education consists primarily of technical, pre-professional and professional specialization. Still others decry the absence to-day of any really excellent general education programs. Even the better liberal arts colleges have somewhat redesigned their own programs in order to enable more of their students to get into graduate and professional schools. For these decriers, education consists primarily of coming to intimate terms with classical studies, humanistically oriented history, philosophy, the arts and so on, so that one may become a more self-conscious, critic-participant of life.

When educators meet to involve themselves in a self-conscious appraisal of higher education, they seem to churn out monographs which either describe what is and what will always be or describe education with such vague, broad strokes that the monograph is filled with sweet sounding slogans that conceal the real diversity in viewpoints that exists. The students are then asked to accept these generalities and to forget about the underlying diversity. Whenever they participate in some vigorous and momentarily disruptive pro-

test, the document is hauled out from its shrine and read aloud for all to hear: "What you people are doing is inconsistent with the goals of education. Go back to your classes and resume your education".

## The National and International Arena

It almost goes without saying at this point that no complete understanding of the roots of campus unrest and activism could be gained without an examination of the contemporary world and the society in which we live.

The decade of the sixties opened with what many saw to be a new dawning of hope, enlightenment, youthful wit and exuberance, with the election of John Kennedy. He symbolized the growing youthfulness of this nation. The decade, hardly through its first three years, witnessed the assassination of the President; for many the response became one of hopeless resignation and embittered cynicism: The decade witnessed first the rapid growth, with the hope of immediate equality, then the slowdown, of civil rights legislation. For many this meant the deferral of their American dream; then came the subsequent shift from nonviolence to civil strife and riot.

It witnessed the quiet growth then the escalation of an unpopular war in Southeast Asia. If any learning develops in time of war, it is a sense of how one resolves conflicts. Like a parent who uses punishment, a nation that wars teaches its youth about the legitimacy of employing violence, coercion and direct action to attain one's ends. Even the rhetoric of war takes over discussions of domestic matters. We have a *war* on poverty which is sometimes escalated, when money is pumped in, or sometimes de-escalated; we have a *war* on crime, a *war* on ignorance, a *war* on disease: the phrase *war on* thus becomes attached all too easily to our thinking about everything.

The decade witnessed the continuation of a numbers game in which the balance of the nation's population shifted perceptibly towards the side of youth. It is against this background that the campuses of several of our larger, colleges and universities saw the upheavals that have made and are still making news headlines.

## Civil Rights Movement and the War in Vietnam

As several articles in this issue indicate, no one could possibly hope to understand the development of student unrest as it now exists nor the future of activism without a careful consideration of both the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War. For many activists, these are not perceived as two distinct events, but rather as part of a larger picture which pits the people against the injustices of the Establishment. In that the student activist sees himself to be

powerless to enter importantly into decisions which affect his own behavior, he feels an empathic twinge for the Negro in this country and the poor peasant in Southeast Asia (and elsewhere for that matter), who for him are kindred spirits all fighting in the same war. It is not their poverty with which he identifies, for the student activist is a part of one of society's more privileged groups; nor for that matter, is it simply a matter of feeling distressed, bearing witness and protesting the injustices he sees others subjected to. He feels that he and they share a *common fate* that cuts across the classic boundaries of social class, race and culture: they are the *victims*, the people, the ones who should count but don't.

Certain specifics of the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War are also relevant to note. The theme and tactic of mass, non-violent action as a form of power used to achieve ends emerges readily from the Civil Rights Movement, as does experience with a cause within which involvement and work are possible, and in which the corruption of some public authorities and the necessity of violating their demands are seen. The view of the police, not as defenders of justice, but as purveyors of violence and as symbols of all that's wrong with the society, comes from the activist student's civil rights field training. I might add that one of the key provocations on the Berkeley campus is the use of off-campus police to deal with disruptive episodes. During the 1964 Free Speech Movement, the presence of the police on campus, removing students from Sproul Hall, brought a sense of deep revulsion to many members of the university community. Again, during the events of 1966, the sight of blue helmeted police charging up the stairs of the Student Union Building, nightsticks in hand, brought students to their feet shouting and faculty instinctively to their defense.

Speaking both for myself and for many observers of the student activists of this decade, it is impossible to gain a real understanding of the passion, the drive, the focus and particularly, the *frustration* of the students without taking into account the *deep* meaning for them of the war in Vietnam. This is not to say that without any war in Vietnam, we would find a sudden end to all outbursts of student action on the college campus. Though perhaps without the war and its far reaching impact, the direction, intensity and nature of such outbursts would change. The war taps the empathic cord of common fate and places these students beside the humble peasant as victims; it creates a climate of personal fear and concern about the draft; it creates a deep sense of revulsion at the mass extermination of people that war brings; it dredges up faint recollections of the Nazi actions in the Second World War. It produces a guns-butter issue in which guns win out and immediate relief for pressing domestic troubles become just another dream deferred. The war produces a setting in

which almost everyday, those opposed to all war or to the present war are confronted with the frustrating realization of their own, personal ineffectuality in thwarting a war or in shaping the future of a nation and a world. For most, this frustration brings withdrawal into privatism and apathy; for others, by far a smaller group, it brings on only added fuel to stoke the fires of their aggression. For how long can they continue to beat their heads bloody against an unyielding wall?

In his article, Keniston suggests the importance of the growing sophistication of the communication media in providing international incidents which provide the triggering device for activists. The coverage on television that is given to the Vietnam war brings the full scope of the bloody battle, with on-the-spot commentary, right into one's own living room. Events of international scope are brought vividly into the awareness. It has become increasingly more difficult to hide from ourselves the conditions under which some men live. Popular rebellions in South America become part of the vital cause that drives the activist student movements when local business has slowed down. Perhaps it is true that the youth of the world are becoming more united through common bonds of understanding and a sense of common fate, made possible both by travel and international communication. One senses that when the students in Ann Arbor conduct a sit-in, the student activists at Berkeley not only send them a telegram to cheer them on, but prepare themselves for battle. In turn, every Berkeley incident brings in hordes of supportive telegrams from across the country and around the world. Thus do campus movements feed each other.

### *Anti-intellectual Intellectuals*

Trends in population, in technology and in urbanization are usually posited to account for a need for a more logical, rationalized approach to shaping and using human resources. An interesting discussion of this move towards rationalization of human behavior can be found in recent books by Bauer (1966) and Donald Michael (1965). Bauer suggests an approach to the development of social indicators which, like the present use of economic indicators, would allow both central social planning and the assessment of its effectiveness.

Reactions of the intellectual community against this entire trend are also evident; one need only examine the literature, drama and art of the day, and some of the foreign films. Theater of the absurd, pop and op art, happenings, being turned-on, sensitivity training, spontaneity, feeling, sensing, intuiting: are all key words of the vigorous, though still minority, move of anti-intellectual intellectuals against the swelling tides of rationalization. The college campuses, as

well as the Village, North Beach and the Haight-Ashbury hangouts are leaders in this trend. Is it so unnatural or unexpected then to find a select group of college youth reacting against the university, one of the most highly rationalized institutions of all? Is it so strange, then, that their models are not taken primarily from the world of the intellectual academician, but rather from the existential writers, the protest poets, the soul music men . . . from the more gutty, less heady representatives of society? This apparent anti-intellectualism which characterizes some of the approaches (i.e. mass marches, strikes, sit-ins, one-sided emotional appeals, etc.) of the student activists that so distress and confuse the academic man, is one manifestation of a much larger theme within the entire intellectual community itself. Perhaps the student activists are the forerunners of the value shift that the intellectual and academic community will eventually come to represent. Signs already point in that direction, especially in the social sciences, where individuals with "value-and-action" orientations mix with those of more "detachment" orientations. Short of establishing an institution of the isolated sort described by Hermann Hesse in, *Magister Ludi*, there is reason to believe that these trends in the general intellectual society will increasingly be reflected in the university.

### "No, Not Here", "No Now Now"

Our society seems to provide many kinds of paradoxes for its citizenry. As Ruth Benedict pointed out many years ago, certain discontinuities in cultural training and in expectation can place the individual into an awkward position with consequent confusion and with problems of role-taking and of identity (Benedict, 1938). The college student of today is placed in the grinding midst of a somewhat basic societal paradox. Extra population and technology are two important ingredients of a mix that make it increasingly essential for the young man or woman, not only to go to college, but to remain there for an extended period of time in order to remain outside of the labor market. A sudden flood of youth into the labor market would endanger an already difficult employment situation. Conditions of the society demand that the young student remove himself for a substantial period of time from full fledged responsible work roles in the society. He is told not to worry about the fact that he will have to withhold participation in the mainstream of the society, for he will be able to spend these years participating in the university instead. The paradox arises when he reaches that school, tries to participate in the ways which would be available to him were he in the mainstream of society, and he is in various ways discouraged.

On the one hand he is asked not to participate in the society but rather to participate in school; yet when he tries to participate there,

especially in political ways and in ways which involve him in more responsible decision-making roles, he's told, "No *not here* either. No, *not now* either". Might he not then try anyway to be significant at age 21 rather than waiting until age 35?

## The Movement

One often sees references to "The Movement" in discussions of the growth and apparent organization of student unrest and activism. But in what sense, if any, is there actually something that could be called a student activist movement? In his book on social movements, Hans Toch suggests several key elements which such movements have: (a) relatively long lasting large groups, (b) arise spontaneously, (c) a clear program or purpose, (d) aimed at correcting, supplementing, overthrowing or in some manner influencing the social order, (e) a collective effort to solve a problem that many people feel they have in common (Toch, 1965, 5). One senses from Toch's analysis that organization is one of the significant ingredients in any social movement as contrasted to sporadic momentary acts.

For some persons, of course, every act of collegiate activism a part of a larger conspiracy organized and run from Moscow or Peking. To move in a somewhat more realistic direction, however, one can find on several college campuses a few enduring organizations which have evolved and which are ready to spring into action whenever the local or general circumstances merit action. On the national scene, an organization such as the Students for a Democratic Society, to which Flacks makes reference, has the key organizational ingredient that may in time produce an organized student activist movement. At present, however, it appears that there exist scattered groups covering several major universities in this country which are only loosely joined into any organized movement. These several scattered groups, which include the various civil rights groups, the peace groups, SDS and others, manage to pool their efforts occasionally for some major protest, as witnessed in recent Vietnam protests, teach-ins and marches. But after the noise and action have subsided, all return home again and no enduring organization is maintained.

It presently seems that the student activist movement is based more on the shared hopes and dreams and the shared feelings of frustration, anger, distrust and dissent of a small number of people than it is upon the existence of an organized movement which meets the several criteria outlined by Toch. What is of particular interest, however, is not the reality or absence thereof of organization, but rather the perception or belief on the part of many of the activist and alienated youth, that a movement does in fact exist. In this regard, they are not too unlike many members of the general public who

maintain a somewhat similar belief. For the activists, this movement provides both the focus and the impetus to their often scattered bits and pieces of protest. One hears frequent references by platform speakers to "The Movement". Its name is invoked whenever there is a desire to make "The Establishment" shake with fear, or to gather people together around several central themes, such as those explored by Flacks in his article. I've talked with students who sincerely believe that the youth of today's world form an underground society based on common values, understanding and respect; and that the wise man over thirty will demonstrate his wisdom by getting "in" while it's still possible. Others talk occasionally about dropping out of school and joining "The Movement" or working for "The Movement". They are not referring to the Civil Rights Movement. Rather, it is some sense of a movement that has its present spiritual headquarters in Berkeley and the Bay Area and has as its cohesive element not *organization* but a shared belief in personal worth and which involves a style of life, of thought and of action. Political analysts speak today of the Third World of the developing nations. In the minds and hearts of many of today's youth, there is a belief in a Fourth World: the individuals.

The long term survival of a large scale social movement of protest, particularly in a democratic society, would be an indication of some definite failure in the mechanisms of the democratic system of government. What seems far more likely to occur, at least with regard to the activist protest movements (as separate from the hippie-beat-Provo-Bohemian cultures) is some form of institutionalization, either within the present two party political system, or slightly to the side and to the left of one. Predictions of this sort are always speculative and depend in great measure on the continuing stability of the social system.

Should the contemporary version of the campus protest movement move towards greater institutionalization and pursue what Toch refers to as the Three P's of prosperity, power and popularity, it is likely to lose much of its more energetic manpower, particularly amongst those who are disinclined to trust anything that has become institutionalized. Perhaps to the extent the movement has more illusory than real properties, it will have more staying power.

### **The Future of Student Activism**

This then brings us to a brief consideration of the future of student activism on the university campus. Keniston suggests that we are likely to see further manifestations of campus activism. He suggests that a changing social climate can shift the activists' energies from politics and social change back to the world of academics. Flacks

sees several possibilities, but for the most part, doubts that an activist movement will be maintained. He suggests that activism may become an institutionalized phase which youth pass through on their way to their adult roles. Somewhat supportive of this possibility is a rather amusing and perhaps revealing quotation made during the 1966 events on the Berkeley campus by one of the very central leaders in the events of 1964. This individual had been away from Berkeley for some time and was just passing through when he noted the large crowd gathered and sitting-in in the Student Union Building and the police buses gathered outside for their annual foray, when he said to himself: "I had done my tour of duty on the campus—so I decided to stay out of it" (Weinberg, 1966). Perhaps then, activism on the campus will become a tour-of-duty through which all future politically concerned youth will pass.

## Functional and Dysfunctional Implications of Student Activism

Implied throughout this paper is an underlying concern with the value to the individual, to the institution and to the society of student activism.

The first sounds of protest at Berkeley in 1964 sent a shock wave reverberating around the circles of higher education whose immediate effect was paralleled in recent history only by the impact of Russia's Sputnik on all aspects of American education. Like the shot once heard round the world, the reports from Berkeley led students at other universities to look on and in with less than dispassionate interest. Administrators called hasty meetings. College and University Presidents notified their Dean's Offices to standby with "arms" ready. Faculty took time away from their research to reconsider their teaching.

There is probably little disagreement about the positive function served by campus activism in focusing attention upon the institutions of higher education. As Brown's article indicates, experimental programs of education are being examined and tried out. New ways of introducing students into important arenas of campus decision making are also in evidence, especially at the small colleges. Students are increasingly being listened to seriously both by faculty and administrators. Painful reexamination of teacher training and teacher techniques at the university level is being undertaken.

How meaningful educational innovation will be is not known at this time. It is likely, however, that the wishes of some students will not be sufficient to produce any radical shift in an educational system that is traditionally responsive to the majority. It is also

likely that educators will endeavor to work within the framework of their multiple demands to institute more enduring changes.

On the dysfunctional side, the increased public attention which the protests have drawn to some university campuses may produce an atmosphere which is not beneficial to academic freedom. The relationship between any university and the public is at best delicate, more so when that university is public supported. Events, such as vigorous protests, which upset this delicate balance and force public or legislative investigations, may have consequences which stifle free exploration and expression of all kinds of thought.

The value for the individual, participating in activist movements on the campus is open to much disagreement. Overparticipation simply in terms of time expended, takes away from regular course time, and thus limits the amount of material which can be learned, the grades made, and the likelihood of later getting into a graduate or professional school. In addition, when such participation leads to arrests, as it has done at Berkeley, the police record may later provide problems for the individual. Participation may only temporarily alleviate some neurotic syndrome which though obscured at the time is not significantly improved and later may crop up suddenly and with increased intensity. It is usually noted, for example, that student use of counselling and psychiatric services declines during peak activist periods, only to return later to a higher level. On the other hand, however, participation appears to provide an excellent training ground for the study of the law and the politics of power. I never cease to be amazed by the legal and political sophistication of many of the students who have been active on the Berkeley scene. This sophistication is shown by their contribution to the 1966 Congressional Primary for Robert Scheer, who lost by a surprisingly small amount to a very popular incumbent liberal candidate. Many students who participate in protests gain, for the first time in their lives, a sense of commitment, of excitement, of importance. One cannot help but be affected by the pure energy and vigor with which they hurl themselves into their activist roles in contrast to the somewhat dull passivity of the nonactivist student, or even the activist student himself in some of the more usual academic settings. Speaking quite personally, to face a lecture hall filled with these students activists is both an exhilarating and frightening experience. How different this is from the experience of lecturing to a group of preprofessionals who take in each word as though it were gospel.

The societal functions and dysfunctions served by contemporary student activism can only be discussed at a rather abstract level. On the one side, we have John Stuart Mill's argument which maintains that approximations to truth and the best solutions to problems emerge only out of an environment which allows and encourages the

clash of disparate points of view. Student protestors, therefore, serve the positive function of rocking the boat, conceivably at a time and in a world in which some boats have slow leaks and require frequent rocking just to bail out enough water to keep them afloat. On the other side, the argument suggests that although active dissent and protest are useful and have their place, too much, and particularly by those who really have little competence to speak out in protest, only serves to disrupt and tear down, not create and build up anew. Though historians will be able to help us discover whether what's happening now is "too much" or "not enough", those who look back on the history of this nation realize that many of yesterday's protests have become today's norms; and much of what we all felt was definitely "too much" in the thirties has become "not-enough" in the sixties.

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## **Commitment and Conformity in the American College**

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The major thesis of this paper is that the intense political activism observed on some campuses recently is not pervasive and is representative of only a small proportion of college students in the United States; and further, that the great majority of students today largely manifest the apathy and conformity that have characterized students of the past, rather than the kind of commitment and autonomy that leads to political activism or serious intellectual involvement. Our position is that what we refer to as political activism is complementary to the whole educational process.

Our procedure for substantiating our major thesis will be first to discuss the extent of activism in colleges across the nation. Following this we will sketch in a brief portrait of the "average" college student based on data at our disposal and then focus on a close analysis of some of the personality characteristics of activists, of their contemporaries in professionally oriented programs, and of a broad sample of college students in the nation at large. This last analysis, which will include data on both college and noncollege peer groups, will be especially pertinent to one of the major themes of this paper: that college can provide the environment for personality growth in just those character traits that distinguish student activists from their more conforming college counterparts. In conclusion, we will discuss

the meanings of activism for the educational system and for student development.

### The Extent of Intellectual Dissent

Activism implies dissent from the *status quo*. But there is more than one form of dissent apparent on the American college campus. First, there is the dissidence and general unrest found among many students who manifest an often unarticulated and uncomprehended anxiety in the face of a rapidly changing, complex, often threatening world. These may become the alienated students of whom Keniston speaks. Second, there is the show of contempt for any social order which is found in the few anarchistic students who have disaffiliated themselves from society. Third, there is the student activist, one who is not interested in bringing down the social order, but in probing it, testing it and changing it. It is with this third group that our concern lies.

#### *Student Activists . . . a Small Select Group*

The results of several studies (Peterson, 1966; Heist, 1965) and data from the Trent and Medsker (1967) study of high school graduates across the nation, all lead to the same conclusion: student activism involves a very few select students in a very few select colleges and universities.

Peterson (1966) found that at most, only 9 per cent of any student body were reported as involved in protest movements, and that the protest occurred disproportionately often at select institutions of high quality. In his survey of the state of activism as viewed by deans of students and equivalent officers at 85 per cent of the country's four-year colleges, only 38 per cent of the deans reported student activism over civil rights, the issue which has evoked the most activism. Twenty-eight per cent of the deans reported student activism over living group regulations, 21 per cent over United States involvement in the war in Vietnam, 18 per cent over student participation in campus policy-making, 9 per cent over rules regarding "controversial" visitors to campus, 7 per cent over curriculum inflexibility and 4 per cent over academic freedom for faculty.

Peterson's findings are compatible with both Heist's comments on the general student scene and his research on student activism on the Berkeley campus. Heist observed that "strong political advocacy" has taken place since 1960 on a few campuses where this activity would least be expected, but then added:

The fact that a few institutions have had a fairly continuous manifestation of such student activity and involvement, often centered in social problems or political issues, is not generally known. On several campuses in the

United States, conflict and a degree of turmoil seem to be taken as a matter of course; these may even be defended as part of the "design" of an effective educational program.

The truth is that the colleges or universities which witness considerable and frequent student activity and committed support of off-campus causes tend to draw a student clientele that is measurably different from the student bodies in the great mass of institutions. In these schools a notable concentration of students of high ability and nonconservative values often tends to set a pattern for activism or some degree of protest (Heist, 1965, 62).

Even at schools of this kind, however, the proportion of activist leadership is very small. In his survey of three liberal arts colleges renowned for their liberal, aware and activist students, Heist found that the combined key leadership groups of the three schools comprised only eleven students. At Berkeley, no more than three per cent of the student body was committed enough to the Free Speech Movement to risk arrest. Moreover, the Berkeley group was selective in background as well as numbers. Heist found that half of the group had transferred from the select colleges and universities identified by him and Peterson as the few institutions whose students were noticeably involved in activism.

### *Most College Students . . . Uncritical Acceptance of the Status Quo*

Our research on a sample of nearly 10,000 high school graduates in 16 communities across the United States shows that of those graduates who went on to persist in college over a four-year period, very few were concerned with any of the current political, social or educational issues that might disturb student activists. Rather their responses to questionnaire and interview items dealing with these areas of concern indicated that most of them had a kind of uncritical acceptance of, and contentment with, the *status quo* not unlike that of the "silent generation" of the past. Before delving further into the important personality characteristics which distinguish student activists from other more representative college students across the nation, we would like first to sketch in a brief portrait, based on responses given to questionnaire items in 1963 by our national sample, of what this more typical college student is like.

### **The National Sample**

Our large sample of high school graduates will hereinafter be referred to as the "national sample". However, it can be considered national only in the sense of its geographical spread (across California, the Midwest and Pennsylvania), and not in the sense of being a statistically representative sample of that age group throughout the

United States. At the same time, it is assumed representative of a large segment of young adults in the country, especially those living in cities with a population of between 30,000 and 100,000. And, very strictly, it is composed of all or almost all graduating high school seniors in the 16 communities originally surveyed in 1959. The scope, sampling and findings of this research are reported elsewhere (Trent and Medsker, 1967).

Out of the original national sample, forty per cent entered college full time in 1959, and attended approximately 700 colleges throughout the United States; about half of this group persisted for four years. When the original sample was again surveyed in 1963, over 72 per cent of the persisters—most of whom had reached senior standing—responded to the questionnaire and scales from the Omnibus Personality Inventory (Center for the Study of Higher Education, 1962) administered to them.

The questionnaire items inquired into the students' vocational, social and personal values. The students did not appear to perceive themselves as activists. They were presented with a list of self-descriptions and asked to check those which they felt applicable to themselves. A majority of the students entirely rejected this list of self-descriptions; furthermore, it is not clear what these terms meant to the students or whether the terms had the same connotations for them as we had intended. Within these limitations, however, we find, for example that 23 per cent considered themselves "nonconformists", whereas 28 per cent described themselves as a "common man". In addition, only a little over one per cent considered themselves "radicals". All in all, and in spite of the limitations mentioned, these data suggest a greater tendency toward commonality than toward any nonconformity and radicalism.

By 1963, a majority of the young adults in the national sample had registered or intended to register in the same political party as their fathers, which in largest proportion was the Republican party. Ten students in the sample considered themselves Socialists. Over 500 of the youths, representative of the entire sample, were interviewed personally and for the most part were found to have very little political interest and astuteness. Typically, the interviewed subjects felt their choice of political party was prompted by the fact that it was their parents' choice, and very few could articulate any political beliefs. Unlike the activists considered later in this paper, most of the youths reported a belief in formal organized religion. But here again, in most cases their religious beliefs were ascribed to their parents, and only in rare instances were the subjects articulate about their faith or able to evince any real understanding of it.

The two factors deemed most important to a satisfying life for

almost all of the subjects were job and family; a majority of the college persisters regarded the main purpose of college to be the development of vocational skills or talents. Forty-three per cent of the persisters saw the gaining of knowledge and appreciation of ideas as the main goal of college. Of this group, 11 per cent expected to get their greatest life satisfactions from interests in community and world problems, science, humanities and the arts, and scholarly pursuits.

Essentially all of the persisters considered the completion of a college education very important, and after four years of college, almost all of these students reported that their college experience had been satisfying. When asked about specific issues relating to their college experiences, a majority of the persisters declared that "most of the faculty are intellectually stimulating" (70 per cent); that "existing rules and regulations regarding student behavior are sensible and necessary" (68 per cent); and that "the faculty and administration are quite successful in developing responsibility among the students" (56 per cent). Half of the students, however, felt "too much bound by course work"; over 40 per cent felt that rules and regulations should be "more permissive"; and over 30 per cent felt that "the administration and faculty generally treat students more like children than adults".

Some students voiced some criticism of their college experience, but most, including those who had some criticism, found college basically satisfying. There was no evidence of general dissension. A utilitarian orientation toward college seemed to prevail over intellectual and social commitment. Concern over social or religious issues was seldom mentioned by the students, and political interests, awareness and involvement were lacking in almost all of them. Very few stressed the importance of scholarly endeavor or interest in the arts and sciences. These data, therefore, seemed to indicate that these students had little of the intellectual, social or political interest and involvement that concern the student activists of this generation.

### Characteristics of the Activists

Various appellations, ranging from "dirty beatniks" to "communist conspirators", have been given by certain segments of the general public to the student activists. This name-calling has never been based on objective appraisal of the students, and it might bring surprise to some quarters responsible for this labeling to learn that many of these students are the most bright and able students to be found on the nation's campuses. For example, research by Heist (1965), Somers (1965), and Watts and Whittaker (1965) showed that the students in Berkeley's Free Speech Movement at the University of California were exceptionally high in measured intellectual

disposition, autonomy, flexibility and liberalism, as well as in level of ability, and that they exhibited marked qualities of individuality, social commitment and intellectuality not observed among more representative samples of college students. They were, in fact, atypical Berkeley students and represented some of the University's most able and intellectually dedicated students.

The Free Speech Movement which erupted at the University of California was one of the most notorious and longlived of current student activist movements. Since its composition was such that it was probably similar in nature and dynamics to student movements elsewhere, the present authors believed it would be of value to make certain comparisons based on Omnibus Personality Inventory data: between a sample of representative Free Speech members who risked arrest and a representative group of Berkeley seniors who were their peers at the time of the demonstrations, as well as between the Free Speech sample and those more typical college students in our national sample who persisted in college for four years. From these comparisons, it becomes apparent that few college students in general can match the positive development of those personality characteristics that distinguish student activists from their college contemporaries.

The standard mean scores obtained in 1963 on the Omnibus Personality Inventory scales by the three groups are shown in Table 1. The 1965 seniors were drawn from a random sample of seniors of

TABLE 1  
MEAN STANDARD OMNIBUS PERSONALITY INVENTORY SCORES OBTAINED BY  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SENIORS, MEMBERS OF THE FREE SPEECH  
MOVEMENT, AND A NATIONAL SAMPLE OF COLLEGE PERSISTERS\*

Scale	National Persisters ('63) (N = 1385)	Berkeley Seniors ('65) (N = 92)	FSM Arrested (N = 130)
Thinking Introversion	52	55	63
Complexity	51	54	66
Estheticism	51	52	61
Autonomy	53	61	67
Impulse Expression	51	54	64
Religious Liberalism	48	58	64
Lack of Anxiety	52	51	48

\*Source of Berkeley Senior and FSM data: Heist (1965).

that year. The members of the Free Speech Movement, surveyed by Heist (1965) two months after their arrest in December, 1964, were considered representative of the entire group of arrested students with the exception of a slight overrepresentation of sophomores and an underrepresentation of graduate students.

The scales on which these groups are compared measure the

students' sensitivity and openness to ideas, beauty and their general environment, together with their freedom from constriction of thought and overt anxiety. The scores have been standardized on the basis of a large sample of public college and university freshmen. For all scales the normative freshman mean is 50, and the standard deviation is 10.

The scores of the Free Speech members on all the traits measured by the Omnibus Personality Inventory were clearly distinguishable from the scores of their own Berkeley classmates and those of the national sample of college persisters. With the exception of the Anxiety scale, the mean scores of the activist group exceeded the 1965 Berkeley senior scores by at least 6 standard points and also exceeded the scores of the national sample by at least 10 standard points. All differences between the Free Speech Movement sample and the other samples were considerably beyond the one per cent level of significance.

The highest scores obtained by the Free Speech members were on the Complexity and Autonomy scales, indicating they had far more interest in intellectual inquiry, tolerance for ambiguity, objectivity, and independence of thought than the members of the other groups. But the Free Speech members compared with the other students were also marked by their much greater interest in reflective abstract thinking in the areas of art, literature, music and philosophy (Thinking Introversion), concern with esthetic matters (Estheticism) and freedom and imaginativeness of thinking (Impulse Expression). Their high Religious Liberalism score indicated independence from long established religious tradition and corroborated Watts and Whittaker's (1966) finding that formal religion was not important or even relevant to the lives of most of the activists.

The Anxiety scale is composed of the 20 most discriminating items selected by Bendig (1956) from the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. The lower scores indicate more anxiety than the other groups of students. This may have been a natural reflection of the stress imposed by the legal predicament the Free Speech students were in at the time they were tested. Or it may represent a price paid for the greater intellectual and social commitment they demonstrated in contrast to other college students of their generation.

But regardless of the reason for the greater manifestation of anxiety among the Free Speech members, their unusually high scores on the intellectual disposition and autonomy scales indicate their involvement with educational as well as political activism. One last point to be made, however, in all fairness to the national sample, is that rather than this group being low in intellectual orientation, it is more a matter of the student activists being high in their degree of intellectualism. When viewed separately the national sample might

be regarded as manifesting the average degree of intellectuality one would expect in a college group. However, there is no formula at present which can determine objectively just what the "average degree of intellectuality" actually is, or ideally is.

## The National Sample, The Activists, and Major Fields of Study

There is evidence that a majority of students today attend college principally to gain professional competence. Keniston (1966, 23) has pointed out that what this kind of student prizes above all is "the expertness of the man rather than the man himself" because this is what really counts in the "bureaucratized and organized society" in which he lives. The implication is that this applies to most students regardless of their field of study, but it must be particularly true of that large segment of students who major in applied professional or preprofessional fields, since these presumably are from the beginning less intellectually oriented than the more academic ones. In the national sample a majority of the persisters majored in such applied subjects as business, engineering and education. It was found that most of these students had little deep involvement in intellectual pursuits or concern with social and political reforms, and tended to be the most authoritarian and intellectually restricted of all college students observed in the sample.

This finding was first observed in a comparison of the proportion of students at different levels of intellectual disposition who majored in the liberal arts, education and technology. For purposes of this comparison, the students' scales on the Omnibus Personality Inventory's Thinking Introversion, Complexity, and Estheticism scales were combined into a single standard scale taken as a comprehensive measure of intellectual disposition. On the basis of the Omnibus Personality Inventory norms, the persisters were then categorized at three levels of intellectual disposition: High—upper 30 per cent of the distribution; middle—middle 40 per cent of the distribution; and low—lower 30 per cent of the distribution.

The representation of the liberal arts majors at the three levels of intellectuality approximates that which would be expected of the normative sample (Table 2). The technical majors (mostly business and engineering) and education majors were consistently lower on all measures of intellectual disposition than the liberal arts majors. Since it is probably fair to say that the low level of intellectual disposition reflects a certain amount of anti-intellectualism, a majority of the technical and education majors who attended college from 1959-1963 must be described accordingly.

TABLE 2  
PERCENTAGE OF STUDENTS IN THE NATIONAL SAMPLE IN VARIOUS  
CURRICULA AT EACH LEVEL OF INTELLECTUAL DISPOSITION

Level of Intellectual Disposition	Major		
	Liberal Arts (N = 1096)	Education (N = 572)	Technology and Business (N = 899)
High	28	11	7
Middle	37	34	25
Low	35	55	68
Total	100	100	100

$\chi^2 = 273.96; p < .001$

From questionnaire responses it is also known that these students in applied fields were, and very significantly so, the least interested in education for the sake of knowledge, ideas and creative development; the least interested in such cultural activities as the theater, book-browsing and artistic activities; and the least concerned about human relations and justice. From the data, a question must even be raised about the dedication of education majors to teaching. Almost all the education majors were more interested in the security of steady employment than in the use of their talents, and almost half of the education majors preferred homemaking or some other occupation to a career in teaching.

In addition, other analyses showed that compared with the liberal arts majors, the technical and education majors were the lowest in autonomy of all the groups under consideration, on all three scales of the Omnibus Personality Inventory which purport to measure independence, openness and flexibility in thinking. For example, on the Autonomy scale, the liberal arts majors obtained a standard mean score of 54.0, compared with a score of 48.4 obtained by the education majors, and a score of 48.7 obtained by the technology majors. The liberal arts groups differed significantly from the education and technology majors (beyond the one per cent level), and this generally held true in separate analyses which controlled for level of ability and socioeconomic status.

In contrast to these findings, student activists were found to possess a high degree of autonomy and intellectual disposition and to come from the fields of the humanities and especially the social sciences in disproportionately high numbers (Heist, 1965; Somers, 1965; Watts and Whittaker, 1966). As the data above indicate, students in these fields in our sample scored higher in these traits than the students in technical and educational fields. But that is not to say they were all activists. Very few were; and the activists were most likely to be students at a few select liberal arts colleges and uni-

versities. Moreover, the liberal arts students in the national sample, considered separately, did not nearly reach the level of autonomy and intellectualism of the activists, as indicated by the Omnibus Personality Inventory scores obtained by the Free Speech members (Table 1). To conclude, then, student activism was associated with curriculum, type of college attended and a uniquely high level of intellectual disposition and autonomy not shared by the vast majority of students.

### College and Noncollege Peer Groups

Up to this point, the demonstration of our major thesis has been quite unfavorable to college students at large. However, now the situation will be reversed. If the activists studied distinguished themselves from the national sample of college persisters on measures of autonomy and intellectual attitudes, we found that the scores of college persisters on these measures distinguished them in turn, from their peers who did not attend college in the first four years following their high school graduation. If the development of such personality traits are seen as ideal goals in our democratic society, then this finding is important to examine for an understanding of student characteristics in general and the role college can play in the development of these characteristics.

The subjects in the national sample were categorized into two major groups for the purpose of making comparative analyses of their Omnibus Personality Inventory scores on intellectual disposition and autonomy scales over the period from 1959-1963. One group was composed of those high school graduates who were consistently in college for these four years; the other group was composed of those who remained consistently employed during this time. The intellectual measures used for analysis for both 1959 and 1963 were the Thinking Introversion and Complexity scales. The then available measures of autonomy were the Nonauthoritarianism scale, related to the California F scale (Adorno, *et al.*, 1950), and an elaboration of this measure, the Social Maturity scale (Center for the Study of Higher Education, 1962).

In 1959, the two groups of men did not differ in their mean Complexity scores, and the women differed by only two standard points. However, by 1963, the differences between the two groups had become quite remarkable. The college men and women gained significantly (well beyond the one per cent level of significance) in both their tendency toward reflective thought (Thinking Introversion) and intellectual inquiry or tolerance for ambiguity (Complexity). The only group gain made by the workers between 1959 and 1963 was made by the men on the Thinking Introversion scale. All other

group means of the noncollege sample decreased significantly in 1963. The employed men's and women's mean decrease on the Complexity scale was particularly marked. The young men and women who entered employment immediately after high school showed considerably less tolerance for ambiguity and less interest in intellectual inquiry after four years than they had initially demonstrated.

The Social Maturity and Nonauthoritarianism scales attempt to measure the degree of open, flexible, critical and objective thinking shown by the subjects. Both scales are highly correlated with the Autonomy scale, which was not available in 1959. And both scales, given in 1959 and again in 1963, differentiated the college and employed youths more than any other personality measurement used.

The 1959 and 1963 Nonauthoritarianism scores of the two groups reflected the same pattern of differences found on the Social Maturity scale (Table 3). The college and employed men differed in

TABLE 3  
COMPARISON OF STANDARD MEAN NONAUTHORITARIANISM SCORES OBTAINED  
IN 1959 AND 1963 BY COLLEGE PERSISTERS AND CONSISTENTLY  
EMPLOYED PEERS IN THE NATIONAL SAMPLE

Sex and Year	Analysis Group		Difference in Mean Differences
	College	Employed	
Men	(N = 723)	(N = 444)	
1959	46.26	43.02	
1963	52.28	42.03	
diff. ( $t$ )	+6.02 (15.84**)	-0.99 (-1.62*)	7.01**
Women	(N = 578)	(N = 478)	
1959	44.52	40.78	
1963	52.60	40.46	
diff. ( $t$ )	+8.08 (18.36**)	-0.32 (-0.60*)	8.40**

\* $p = \text{n.s.}$ ; \*\* $p < .01$

mean scores in 1959 by just over 3 standard points, and the two groups of women differed in mean scores by less than 4 points. But by 1963 the two groups of men—composed of the same individuals—differed by over 10 points, and the two groups of women differed by over 12 points. The  $t$  ratios noted parenthetically in Table 3 confirm the statistical significance of the differences in the mean scores obtained by the college students in 1959 and 1963. A derivation of the  $T^2$  analysis also confirmed the statistical significance of differences in mean differences between the college and employed groups, as noted in the right column of Table 3. (Details of this analysis are reported elsewhere by Trent and Medsker, 1967).

Thus, on the basis of the data above, exposure to and persistence in college is associated with increase in intellectual disposition and autonomy, while exposure to work alone is associated with a tendency toward regression on these two personality dimensions. Even if college students in general do not appear to grow exceptionally in intellectual disposition and autonomy, they nevertheless appear to develop much more in these areas than their peers with no college experience. Therefore, the data indicate that college does have some bearing on personality development, particularly on those traits which, to a more intense degree, characterize student activists.

The observation that college experience is related to some personality development among young adults not achieved by their working peers leads us to consider whether or not college is providing optimally for the development of its students. If the college experience is already associated with some unique change, perhaps it could be the source of still greater change. The contention here is that student political activism could act as both a catalyst and a supplement to the college learning process, contributing to the growth of autonomy and intellectual disposition. Student political activists then, need not be alienated from the educational establishment; they can bring enriched meaning to it.

### Activism and the Role of the College

To suggest that the college should provide the environment for optimum personality development for its students is to suggest that it change the course of students' orientation or value systems. This raises the problem recently and cogently discussed by Dressel (1965) of whether or how much the college should foster change in students' values. The judgment here is that it is the proper function of the college to activate intellectual and social commitment in its students. At least college should make students consciously aware and critical of their values and beliefs in important areas of concern to themselves and society, even when political activism may not be the final outcome of this increased awareness.

If the function of the college is viewed in this context, its role might then be conceptualized as an activating, facilitating and mediating agency for students. It might activate by stimulating intellectual awareness and growth, and an understanding of and concern over social issues. It might facilitate by providing the conditions most conducive to optimum student development. It might mediate by providing a moratorium so that students could be free to act in an attempt to draw meaning from—and bring meaning to—life without fear of reprisals from a more conforming society.

That education, and especially higher education, should act as

a stimulating and challenging agent for young minds seems an idea so indisputable that it hardly appears to bear examination. Yet what is purported in principle often remains unaccomplished in fact. Many graduate from college without ever becoming aware of the satisfactions dedicated intellectual endeavor can bring. And, at least upon the basis of the data presented in this article, what is missing from among current college graduates is the thinking, critical man, deeply aware of his cultural and intellectual heritage, alert to the contemporary problems existing in society, who can bring enriched historical perspective to present day difficulties.

Granted that the gaining of such wisdom is a lifelong process. But for that very reason its nurture should begin early, and college should activate and aid, not hinder its development. However, with our industrial society's emphasis upon narrowly skilled and professional training, such an ideal of what college should begin to develop is being lost except by a very few schools and people. Instead, a generation of professionals is being produced whose major goals are directed primarily to home, job, family and "getting ahead". Such goals in themselves are not to be criticized; the danger exists when they are the *only* goals seen as worthwhile. Then people too commonly become egocentric, narrow and restricted.

### *Activism . . . Extreme Departure from the Norm*

In contrast, the relatively small minority of student activists seems to be providing a healthy, if sometimes extreme, departure from commonly accepted goals and norms. Whatever point of view one may take about the methods of some of their activities, at least these young people are concerned with the major social issues around them and are earnestly engaged in trying to remedy the ills they see in society.

Often coinciding with this concern about social ills is a growing dissatisfaction with the type and kind of education they are receiving. At Berkeley and nationally, the evidence is that the great majority of students are generally satisfied with their education, but that a small, crucial minority are seriously critical. They believe the university has lost its autonomy from the society around it and become part of the system. Perhaps the most overt expression of this disenchantment is directed against the new professionalism—a sign of the growing discontent of some of today's more able and valuable students with the trend of higher education in the United States. Speaking for them, Mario Savio, probably the most renowned student leader of the Free Speech Movement, has said: "The futures and careers for which American students now prepare are for the most part intellectual and moral wastelands" (Savio, 1965, 182).

The important question is what can be done to stimulate both those already highly developed and those so eager to receive a vocational certification in the form of a college degree that they seem impervious to any degree of intellectual stimulation. A few answers to this question have come from some of the more able students themselves.

### *NSA . . . "Redefine 'a Good Education'"*

In a recent conference sponsored by the National Student Association, the discussion focused on the need to redefine a good education for today's youths. The participating students concluded that any viable definition should embrace at least these three elements: (a) relevance to a world of rapid social change; (b) commitment to the individual as the *sine qua non* of value in the educational process; and (c) readiness of the educational system to explore diverse and changing needs of the current college population in order to meet the very different developmental opportunities many of these students require. In regard to the last point, it was emphasized:

. . . that at least a significant segment of current student bodies are demanding a voice in the shaping of their own education—not as a right and not because they feel themselves necessarily wiser than their elders, but because they profoundly believe that exercising this responsible privilege is itself educative. A major challenge to many institutions is precisely that of devising the conditions under which students may properly test this condition (Shoben, 1966, 19).

Other answers are coming from the evaluations, innovations and educational experimentation taking place on many campuses (see Baskin, 1965). Frequently these innovative efforts involve the collaboration of students, faculty and administration, as exemplified in the student-initiated special courses being given at San Francisco State College. Sometimes they also involve collaboration between colleges, at least at the level of sharing ideas and resources, as is the case in the Union of Research and Experimentation in Higher Education.

But whatever the nature of the innovation—whether it involves collaboration of colleges, elimination of grades in order to promote learning for the sake of learning, more flexible and widespread use of seminars and field techniques, emphasis upon independent study, student-oriented and student-taught courses, the creation of special colleges within a large collegiate complex (Brown's article in this issue is especially relevant to this point) or the restructuring of the format of a college—it is to be hoped that it will activate a new spirit of learning and social awareness among the many students previously not disposed to this kind of educational activism. Such activation might provoke the student professionalist to think more

critically from new points of reference even if his basic values have not changed. If college should not necessarily liberalize students in this respect, it should at least make them more libertarian.

### *College Education . . . to Facilitate Personality Development*

It is equally important that these kinds of educational experimentation should also facilitate personality development and growth for those already predisposed to liberal humanistic learning. As the data in this article have shown, colleges do seem to serve this facilitating function much more than the workaday world. Perhaps if students were given a more innovative college program than many educators envision at present, students might begin to reach that level of development and concern for society that is characteristic of the more able activist students at present. At least, colleges should do their utmost to promote this kind of growth, and welcome it when it manifests itself on the campus scene.

If the concept of a liberal education were restored to the meaning behind every college degree, then the idea of the college or university as a mediating agency in the society might also be more adequately fulfilled so that here, too, the student might have an opportunity to grow personally and expand his thought and development. There are several aspects to the mediating role of the college. Perhaps its first and most important function in this sense is to preserve its autonomy as a way of maintaining academic freedom. In this way the college can serve the spirit of truth and free inquiry—ideals which may often, although not necessarily, clash with the more partisan pressures of the rest of society. In making new discoveries, the college must subsequently act as a mediator between new truths and knowledge and the older established values and truths still dominant in the larger society; it does this by providing a way for society to understand, evaluate and eventually accept new findings despite the resistance of the *status quo*.

Another sense, then, in which the college or university could serve as a mediating agency in society is by providing its students a moratorium to rethink their values critically and constructively in light of what they learn, and come nearer to approaching truth and personal meaning. Traditionally, college has served the function of a *rite du passage* for young adult entrance into society. For many young people, the period spent in college provides one of the last opportunities to devote all of their time to their own intellectual, social and moral development before the pressures of adult society and responsibilities turn their attention in other directions. This kind of extended moratorium contains several possibilities: it can give

students a chance to insure and expand the ways in which they have developed, and to establish more firmly the new identities they are trying to forge; it can provide the opportunity for the opening of proper channels for the free expression of students' ideas about their education and the problems of the society around them; and it can enable many students who are professionally oriented, to have a better chance to benefit from a truly liberal education.

It may well be true, as Kerr (1963) maintains, that one of the major functions of college is to prepare people for professional jobs in society, but it is also true that society is frequently in need of revision and change in the light of new ideals and knowledge. Therefore, one of the most important things a student can bring to society is not conformity to its values, but an open, free, critical, thinking mind, dedicated to truth. If the college can act as mediator for the introduction of the spirit of free inquiry into the community, through both its own values and the values of its students, then society can look forward to seeing an enriched, humanistic perspective brought to it.

### In Conclusion . . .

The argument of this paper has been that the intense student activism recently observed on some campuses is not pervasive. Rather such deep commitment to social and political issues is characteristic of only a very few unique students in a limited number of institutions. Although this college generation differs from earlier ones, and although these differences may have produced a form of vague unrest in them, this feeling is quite different from the intense intellectual dissent exhibited by a minority of student activists. This was evident from the way in which the characteristics of the students in Berkeley's Free Speech Movement differed from those in the national sample. Moreover, it was observed that the great majority of students, particularly those in the applied fields such as business, engineering and education, manifest the largely apathetic and practical orientation that has characterized students of the past.

However, in contrast with young people of the same age group who do not attend college, college students as a group do show some indication of a positive change in the development of such traits as autonomy and intellectual disposition. But only in these respects do they begin to resemble the student activists. The need for developing growth in these directions during the college years in a humanistic and democratic society raises questions about the possible roles the college can take in order to foster optimum student development on these important personality dimensions.

The qualities found among student activists suggest that many

of them were not merely banner-wavers of the moment who will live out their lives in comfortable suburban homes, forgetting what they were once so excited about on the steps of the Berkeley campus's Sproul Hall. Many of them will probably become involved with professional and family life, and will doubtless become more mellowed and patient in outlook as they meet their obligations—and the kind of responsibilities that come with the attainment of true adult autonomy. But the chances are that the qualities they brought to their meaningful dissent in college will be enduring, positive and influential, and that they will continue to initiate intellectual dissent and social awareness. They are likely to be heard from, in conversation, in printed word and in public address. The time may be right, and the need urgent, for the college not only to stimulate activism among its students, but to provide the circumstances under which it can flourish.

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## The Liberated Generation: An Exploration of the Roots of Student Protest<sup>1</sup>

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As all of us are by now aware, there has emerged, during the past five years, an increasingly self-conscious student movement in the United States. This movement began primarily as a response to the efforts by southern Negro students to break the barriers of legal segregation in public accommodations—scores of northern white students engaged in sympathy demonstrations and related activities as early as 1960. But as we all know, the scope of the student concern expanded rapidly to include such issues as nuclear testing and the arms race, attacks on civil liberties, the problems of the poor in urban slum ghettos, democracy and educational quality in universities, the war in Vietnam, conscription.

<sup>1</sup>The research reported here stemmed from a coalescence of interests of the author and of Professor Bernice Neugarten of the Committee on Human Development of the University of Chicago. The author's interests were primarily in the student movement and the families and social backgrounds of student activists. Professor Neugarten's interests have been primarily in the relations between age-groups in American society. The plan to gather parallel data from students and their parents accordingly provided a welcome opportunity for collaboration. The research has been supported in part by grant #MH 08062, National Institute of Mental Health; in part by grants from the Carnegie Fund for the Advancement of Teaching and the Survey Research Center of The University of Michigan. I wish to thank Professor Neugarten, Charles Derber and Patricia Schedler for their help in preparing this manuscript; its flaws are entirely my own responsibility.

This movement represents a social phenomenon of considerable significance. In the first place, it is having an important direct and indirect impact on the larger society. But secondly it is significant because it is a phenomenon which was unexpected—unexpected, in particular, by those social scientists who are professionally responsible for locating and understanding such phenomena. Because it is an unanticipated event, the attempt to understand and explain the sources of the student movement may lead to fresh interpretations of some important trends in our society.

### Radicalism and the Young Intelligentsia

In one sense, the existence of a radical student movement should not be unexpected. After all, the young intelligentsia seem almost always to be in revolt. Yet if we examine the case a bit more closely I think we will find that movements of active disaffection among intellectuals and students tend to be concentrated at particular moments in history. Not every generation produces an organized oppositional movement.

In particular, students and young intellectuals seem to have become active agents of opposition and change under two sets of interrelated conditions:

When they have been marginal in the labor market because their numbers exceed the opportunities for employment commensurate with their abilities and training. This has most typically been the case in colonial or underdeveloped societies; it also seems to account, in part, for the radicalization of European Jewish intellectuals and American college-educated women at the turn of the century (Coser, 1965; Shils, 1960; Veblen, 1963).

When they found that the values with which they were closely connected by virtue of their upbringing no longer were appropriate to the developing social reality. This has been the case most typically at the point where traditional authority has broken down due to the impact of Westernization, industrialization, modernization. Under these conditions, the intellectuals, and particularly the youth, felt called upon to assert new values, new modes of legitimization, new styles of life. Although the case of breakdown of traditional authority is most typically the point at which youth movements have emerged, there seems, historically, to have been a second point in time—in Western Europe and the United States—when intellectuals were radicalized. This was, roughly, at the turn of the century, when values such as gentility, laissez faire, naive optimism, naive rationalism and naive nationalism seemed increasingly inappropriate due to the impact of large scale industrial organization, intensifying class conflict, economic crisis and the emergence of total war. Variants of radicalism waxed and waned in their influence among American intellectuals and students during the first four decades of the twentieth century (Aaron, 1965; Eisenstadt, 1956; Lasch, 1965).

If these conditions have historically been those which produced revolts among the young intelligentsia, then I think it is easy to understand why a relatively superficial observer would find the new wave of radicalism on the campus fairly mysterious.

In the first place, the current student generation can look forward, not to occupational insecurity or marginality, but to an unexampled opening up of opportunity for occupational advance in situations in which their skills will be maximally demanded and the prestige of their roles unprecedentedly high.

In the second place, there is no evident erosion of the legitimacy of established authority; we do not seem, at least on the surface, to be in a period of rapid disintegration of traditional values—at least no more so than a decade ago when sociologists were observing the exhaustion of opportunity for radical social movements in America (Bell, 1962; Lipset, 1960).

In fact, during the Fifties sociologists and social psychologists emphasized the decline in political commitment, particularly among the young, and the rise of a bland, security-oriented conformism throughout the population, but most particularly among college students. The variety of studies conducted then reported students as overwhelmingly unconcerned with value questions, highly complacent, status-oriented, privatized, uncommitted (Jacob, 1957; Goldsen, *et al.*, 1960). Most of us interpreted this situation as one to be expected given the opportunities newly opened to educated youth, and given the emergence of liberal pluralism and affluence as the characteristic features of postwar America. Several observers predicted an intensification of the pattern of middle class conformism, declining individualism, and growing "other-directedness" based on the changing styles of childrearing prevalent in the middle class. The democratic and "permissive" family would produce young men who knew how to cooperate in bureaucratic settings, but who lacked a strongly rooted ego-ideal and inner control (Miller and Swanson, 1958; Bronfenbrenner, 1961; Erikson, 1963). Although some observers reported that some students were searching for "meaning" and "self-expression," and others reported the existence of "subcultures" of alienation and bohemianism on some campuses (Keniston, 1965a; Trow, 1962; Newcomb and Flacks, 1963), not a single observer of the campus scene as late as 1959 anticipated the emergence of the organized disaffection, protest and activism which was to take shape early in the Sixties.

In short, the very occurrence of a student movement in the present American context is surprising because it seems to contradict our prior understanding of the determinants of disaffection among the young intelligentsia.

## A Revolt of the Advantaged

The student movement is, I think, surprising for another set of reasons. These have to do with its social composition and the kinds of ideological themes which characterize it.

The current group of student activists is predominantly upper middle class, and frequently these students are of elite origins. This fact is evident as soon as one begins to learn the personal histories of activist leaders. Consider the following scene at a convention of Students for a Democratic Society a few years ago. Toward the end of several days of deliberation, someone decided that a quick way of raising funds for the organization would be to appeal to the several hundred students assembled at the convention to dig down deep into their pockets on the spot. To this end, one of the leadership, skilled at mimicry, stood on a chair, and in the style of a Southern Baptist preacher, appealed to the students to come forward, confess their sins and be saved by contributing to SDS. The students did come forward, and in each case the sin confessed was the social class or occupation of their fathers. "My father is the editor of a Hearst newspaper, I give \$25"! My father is Assistant Director of the \_\_\_\_\_ Bureau, I give \$40". "My father is dean of a law school, here's \$50"!

These impressions of the social composition of the student movement are supported and refined by more systematic sources of data. For example, when a random sample of students who participated in the anti-Selective Service sit-in at the University of Chicago Administration Building was compared with a sample composed of non-protesters and students hostile to the protest, the protesters disproportionately reported their social class to be "upper middle"; their family incomes to be disproportionately high, their parents' education to be disproportionately advanced. In addition, the protesters' fathers' occupations were primarily upper professional (doctors, college faculty, lawyers) rather than business, white collar, or working class. These findings parallel those of other investigators (Braungart, 1966). Thus, the student movement represents the disaffection not of an underprivileged stratum of the student population but of *the most advantaged sector of the students*.

One hypothesis to explain disaffection among socially advantaged youth would suggest that, although such students come from advantaged backgrounds, their academic performance leads them to anticipate downward mobility or failure. Stinchcombe, for example, found high rates of quasi-delinquent rebelliousness among middle class high school youth with poor academic records (Stinchcombe, 1964). This hypothesis is not tenable with respect to college student protest, however. Our own data with respect to the anti-draft protest at Chicago indicate that the grade point average of the protesters

averaged around B-B+ (with 75% of them reporting a B- or better average). This was slightly higher than the grade point average of our sample of nonprotesters. Other data from our own research indicate that student activists tend to be at the top of their high school class; in general, data from our own and other studies support the view that many activists are academically superior, and that very few activists are recruited from among low academic achievers. Thus, in terms of both the status of their families of origins and their own scholastic performance, student protest movements are predominantly composed of students who have been born to high social advantage and who are in a position to experience the career and status opportunities of the society without significant limitations.

### Themes of the Protest

The positive correlation between disaffection and status among college students suggested by these observations is, I think, made even more paradoxical when one examines closely the main value themes which characterize the student movement. I want to describe these in an impressionistic way here; a more systematic depiction awaits further analysis of our data.

*Romanticism:* There is a strong stress among many Movement participants on a quest for self-expression, often articulated in terms of leading a "free" life—i.e., one not bound by conventional restraints on feeling, experience, communication, expression. This is often coupled with aesthetic interests and a strong rejection of scientific and other highly rational pursuits. Students often express the classic romantic aspiration of "knowing" or "experiencing" "everything."

*Anti-authoritarianism:* A strong antipathy toward arbitrary rule, centralized decision-making, "manipulation". The anti-authoritarian sentiment is fundamental to the widespread campus protests during the past few years; in most cases, the protests were precipitated by an administrative act which was interpreted as arbitrary, and received impetus when college administrators continued to act unilaterally, coercively or secretly. Anti-authoritarianism is manifested further by the styles and internal processes within activist organizations; for example, both SDS and SNCC have attempted to decentralize their operations quite radically and members are strongly critical of leadership within the organization when it is too assertive.

*Egalitarianism, populism:* A belief that all men are capable of political participation, that political power should be widely dispersed, that the locus of value in society lies with the people and not elites. This is a stress on something more than equality of op-

portunity or equal legal treatment; the students stress instead the notion of "participatory democracy"—direct participation in the making of decisions by those affected by them. Two common slogans—"One man, one vote"; "Let the people decide".

*Anti-dogmatism:* A strong reaction against doctrinaire ideological interpretations of events. Many of the students are quite restless when presented with formulated models of the social order, and specific programs for social change. This underlies much of their antagonism to the varieties of "old left" politics, and is one meaning of the oft-quoted (if not seriously used) phrase: "You can't trust anyone over thirty".

*Moral purity:* A strong antipathy to self-interested behavior, particularly when overlaid by claims of disinterestedness. A major criticism of the society is that it is "hypocritical". Another meaning of the criticism of the older generation has to do with the perception that (a) the older generation "sold out" the values it espouses; (b) to assume conventional adult roles usually leads to increasing self-interestedness, hence selling-out, or "phoniness". A particularly important criticism students make of the university is that it fails to live up to its professed ideals; there is an expectation that the institution ought to be *moral*—that is, not compromise its official values for the sake of institutional survival or aggrandizement.

*Community:* A strong emphasis on a desire for "human" relationships, for a full expression of emotions, for the breaking down of interpersonal barriers and the refusal to accept conventional norms concerning interpersonal contact (e.g., norms respecting sex, status, race, age, etc.). A central positive theme in the campus revolts has been the expression of the desire for a campus "community", for the breaking down of aspects of impersonality on the campus, for more direct contact between students and faculty. There is a frequent counterposing of bureaucratic norms to communal norms; a testing of the former against the latter. Many of the students involved in slum projects have experimented with attempts to achieve a "kibbutz"-like community amongst themselves, entailing communal living and a strong stress on achieving intimacy and resolving tensions within the group.

*Anti-institutionalism:* A strong distrust of involvement with conventional institutional roles. This is most importantly expressed in the almost universal desire among the highly involved to avoid institutionalized careers. Our data suggest that few student activists look toward careers in the professions, the sciences, industry or politics. Many of the most committed expect to continue to work full-time in the "movement" or, alternatively, to become free-lance writers, artists, intellectuals. A high proportion are oriented toward

academic careers—at least so far the academic career seems still to have a reputation among many student activists for permitting “freedom”.

Several of these themes, it should be noted, are not unique to student activists. In particular, the value we have described as “romanticism”—a quest for self-expression—has been found by observers, for example Kenneth Keniston (1965b), to be a central feature of the ideology of “alienated” or “bohemian” students (see also Keniston’s article in this issue). Perhaps more important, the disaffection of student activists with conventional careers, their low valuation of careers as important in their personal aspirations, their quest for careers outside the institutionalized sphere—these attitudes toward careers seem to be characteristic of other groups of students as well. It is certainly typical of youth involved in “bohemian” and aesthetic subcultures; it also characterizes students who volunteer for participation in such programs as the Peace Corps, Vista and other full-time commitments oriented toward service. In fact, it is our view that the dissatisfaction of socially advantaged youth with conventional career opportunities is a significant social trend, the most important single indicator of restlessness among sectors of the youth population. One expression of this restlessness is the student movement, but it is not the only one. One reason why it seems important to investigate the student movement in detail, despite the fact that it represents a small minority of the student population, is that it is a symptom of social and psychological strains experienced by a larger segment of the youth—strains not well understood or anticipated heretofore by social science.

If some of the themes listed above are not unique to student activists, several of them may characterize only a portion of the activist group itself. In particular, some of the more explicitly political values are likely to be articulated mainly by activists who are involved in radical organizations, particularly Students for a Democratic Society, and the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee. This would be true particularly for such notions as “participatory democracy” and deep commitments to populist-like orientations. These orientations have been formulated within SDS and SNCC as these organizations have sought to develop a coherent strategy and a framework for establishing priorities. It is an empirical question whether students not directly involved in such organizations articulate similar attitudes. The impressions we have from a preliminary examination of our data suggest that they frequently do not. It is more likely that the student movement is very heterogeneous politically at this point. Most participants share a set of broad orientations, but differ greatly in the degree to which they are oriented toward

ideology in general or to particular political positions. The degree of politicization of student activists is probably very much a function of the kinds of peer group and organizational relationships they have had; the underlying disaffection and tendency toward activism, however, is perhaps best understood as being based on more enduring, pre-established values, attitudes and needs.

## Social-Psychological Roots of Student Protest: Some Hypotheses

How, then, can we account for the emergence of an obviously dynamic and attractive radical movement among American students in this period? Why should this movement be particularly appealing to youth from upper-status, highly educated families? Why should such youth be particularly concerned with problems of authority, of vocation, of equality, of moral consistency? Why should students in the most advantaged sector of the youth population be disaffected with their own privilege?

It should be stressed that the privileged status of the student protesters and the themes they express in their protest are not *in themselves* unique or surprising. Student movements in developing nations—e.g., Russia, Japan and Latin America—typically recruit people of elite background; moreover, many of the themes of the “new left” are reminiscent of similar expressions in other student movements (Lipset, 1966). What is unexpected is that these should emerge in the American context at this time.

Earlier theoretical formulations about the social and psychological sources of strain for youth, for example the work of Parsons (1965), Eisenstadt (1956), and Erikson (1959), are important for understanding the emergence of self-conscious oppositional youth cultures and movements. At first glance, these theorists, who tend to see American youth as relatively well-integrated into the larger society, would seem to be unhelpful in providing a framework for explaining the emergence of a radical student movement at the present moment. Nevertheless, in developing our own hypotheses we have drawn freely on their work. What I want to do here is to sketch the notions which have guided our research; a more systematic and detailed exposition will be developed in future publications.

What we have done is to accept the main lines of the argument made by Parsons and Eisenstadt about the social functions of youth cultures and movements. The kernel of their argument is that self-conscious subcultures and movements among adolescents tend to develop when there is a sharp disjunction between the values and expectations embodied in the traditional families in a society and

the values and expectations prevailing in the occupational sphere. The greater the disjunction, the more self-conscious and oppositional will be the youth culture (as for example in the situation of rapid transition from a traditional-ascriptive to a bureaucratic-achievement social system).

In modern industrial society, such a disjunction exists as a matter of course, since families are, by definition, particularistic, ascriptive, diffuse, and the occupational sphere is universalistic, impersonal, achievement-oriented, functionally specific. But Parsons, and many others, have suggested that over time the American middle class family has developed a structure and style which tends to articulate with the occupational sphere; thus, whatever youth culture does emerge in American society is likely to be fairly well-integrated with conventional values, not particularly self-conscious, not rebellious (Parsons, 1965).

The emergence of the student movement, and other expressions of estrangement among youth, leads us to ask whether, in fact, there may be families in the middle class which embody values and expectations which do *not* articulate with those prevailing in the occupational sphere, to look for previously unremarked incompatibilities between trends in the larger social system and trends in family life and early socialization.

The argument we have developed may be sketched as follows:

**First**, on the macro-structural level we assume that two related trends are of importance: one, the increasing rationalization of student life in high schools and universities, symbolized by the "multi-versity", which entails a high degree of impersonality, competitiveness and an increasingly explicit and direct relationship between the university and corporate and governmental bureaucracies; two, the increasing unavailability of coherent careers independent of bureaucratic organizations.

**Second**, these trends converge, in time, with a particular trend in the development of the family; namely, the emergence of a pattern of familial relations, located most typically in upper middle class, professional homes, having the following elements:

- (a) a strong emphasis on democratic, egalitarian interpersonal relations
- (b) a high degree of permissiveness with respect to self-regulation
- (c) an emphasis on values *other than achievement*; in particular, a stress on the intrinsic worth of living up to intellectual, aesthetic, political, or religious ideals.

**Third**, young people raised in this kind of family setting, contrary to the expectations of some observers, find it difficult to accommodate to institutional expectations requiring submissiveness to adult authority, respect for established status distinctions, a high degree of competi-

tion, and firm regulation of sexual and expressive impulses. They are likely to be particularly sensitized to acts of arbitrary authority, to unexamined expressions of allegiance to conventional values, to instances of institutional practices which conflict with professed ideals. Further, the values embodied in their families are likely to be reinforced by other socializing experiences—for example, summer vacations at progressive children's camps, attendance at experimental private schools, growing up in a community with a high proportion of friends from similar backgrounds. Paralleling these experiences of positive reinforcement, there are likely to be experiences which reinforce a sense of estrangement from peers or conventional society. For instance, many of these young people experience a strong sense of being "different" or "isolated" in school; this sense of distance is often based on the relative uniqueness of their interests and values, their inability to accept conventional norms about appropriate sex-role behavior, and the like. An additional source of strain is generated when these young people perceive a fundamental discrepancy between the values espoused by their parents and the style of life actually practiced by them. This discrepancy is experienced as a feeling of "guilt" over "being middle class" and a perception of "hypocrisy" on the part of parents who express liberal or intellectual values while appearing to their children as acquisitive or self-interested.

*Fourth*, the incentives operative in the occupational sphere are of limited efficacy for these young people—achievement of status or material advantage is relatively ineffective for an individual who already has high status and affluence by virtue of his family origins. This means, on the one hand, that these students are less oriented toward occupational achievement; on the other hand, the operative sanctions within the school and the larger society are less effective in enforcing conformity.

It seems plausible that this is the first generation in which a substantial number of youth have both the impulse to free themselves from conventional status concerns *and can afford to do so*. In this sense they are a "liberated" generation; affluence has freed them, at least for a period of time, from some of the anxieties and pre-occupations which have been the defining features of American middle class social character.

*Fifth*, the emergence of the student movement is to be understood in large part as a consequence of opportunities for prolonged interaction available in the university environment. The kinds of personality structures produced by the socializing experiences outlined above need not necessarily have generated a collective response. In fact, Kenneth Keniston's recently published work on alienated students at Harvard suggests that students with similar characteristics

to those described here were identifiable on college campuses in the Fifties. But Keniston makes clear that his highly alienated subjects were rarely involved in extensive peer-relationships, and that few opportunities for collective expressions of alienation were then available. The result was that each of his subjects attempted to work out a value-system and a mode of operation on his own (Keniston, 1965b; and this issue).

What seems to have happened was that during the Fifties, there began to emerge an "alienated" student culture, as students with alienated predispositions became visible to each other and began to interact. There was some tendency for these students to identify with the "Beat" style and related forms of bohemianism. Since this involved a high degree of disaffiliation, "cool" non-commitment and social withdrawal, observers tended to interpret this subculture as but a variant of the prevailing privatism of the Fifties. However, a series of precipitating events, most particularly the southern student sit-ins, the revolutionary successes of students in Cuba, Korea and Turkey, and the suppression of student demonstrations against the House Un-American Activities Committee in San Francisco, suggested to groups of students that direct action was a plausible means for expressing their grievances. These first stirrings out of apathy were soon enmeshed in a variety of organizations and publicized in several student-organized underground journals—thus enabling the movement to grow and become increasingly institutionalized. The story of the emergence and growth of the movement cannot be developed here; my main point now is that many of its characteristics cannot be understood solely as consequences of the structural and personality variables outlined earlier—in addition, a full understanding of the dynamics of the movement requires a "collective behavior" perspective.

*Sixth*, organized expressions of youth disaffection are likely to be an increasingly visible and established feature of our society. In important ways, the "new radicalism" is *not* new, but rather a more widespread version of certain subcultural phenomena with a considerable history. During the late 19th and early 20th century a considerable number of young people began to move out of their provincial environments as a consequence of university education; many of these people gathered in such locales as Greenwich Village and created the first visible bohemian subculture in the United States. The Village bohemians and associated young intellectuals shared a common concern with radical politics and, influenced by Freud, Dewey, etc., with the reform of the process of socialization in America—i.e., a restructuring of family and educational institutions (Lash, 1965; Coser, 1965). Although many of the reforms advocated

by this group were only partially realized in a formal sense, it seems to be the case that the values and style of life which they advocated have become strongly rooted in American life. This has occurred in at least two ways: first, the subcultures created by the early intellectuals took root, have grown and been emulated in various parts of the country. Second, many of the *ideas* of the early twentieth century intellectuals, particularly their critique of the bourgeois family and Victorian sensibility, spread rapidly; it now seems that an important defining characteristic of the college-educated mother is her willingness to adopt child-centered techniques of rearing, and of the college educated couple that they create a family which is democratic and egalitarian in style. In this way, the values that an earlier generation espoused in an abstract way have become embodied as *personality traits* in the new generation. The rootedness of the bohemian and quasi-bohemian subcultures, and the spread of their ideas with the rapid increase in the number of college graduates, suggests that there will be a steadily increasing number of families raising their children with considerable ambivalence about dominant values, incentives and expectations in the society. In this sense, the students who engage in protest or who participate in "alienated" styles of life are often not "converts" to a "deviant" adaptation, but people who have been socialized into a developing cultural tradition. Rising levels of affluence and education are drying up the traditional sources of alienation and radical politics; what we are now becoming aware of, however, is that this same situation is creating new sources of alienation and idealism, and new constituencies for radicalism.

### The Youth and Social Change Project

These hypotheses have been the basis for two studies we have undertaken. Study One, begun in the Summer of 1965, involved extensive interviews with samples of student activists and non-activists and their parents. Study Two, conducted in the Spring of 1966, involved interviews with samples of participants, non-participants and opponents of the tumultuous "anti-ranking" sit-in at the University of Chicago.

#### *Study One—The Socialization of Student Activists*

For Study One, fifty students were selected from mailing lists of various peace, civil rights, and student movement organizations in the Chicago area. An additional fifty students, matched for sex, neighborhood of parents' residence, and type of college attended, were drawn from student directories of Chicago-area colleges. In

each case, an attempt was made to interview both parents of the student respondent, as well as the student himself. We were able to interview both parents of 82 of the students; there were two cases in which no parents were available for the interview, in the remaining 16 cases, one parent was interviewed. The interviews with both students and parents averaged about three hours in length, were closely parallel in content, and covered such matters as: political attitudes and participation; attitudes toward the student movement and "youth"; "values", broadly defined; family life, child-rearing, family conflict and other aspects of socialization. Rating scales and "projective" questions were used to assess family members' perceptions of parent-child relationships.

It was clear to us that our sampling procedures were prone to a certain degree of error in the classification of students as "activists" and "nonactivists". Some students who appeared on mailing lists of activist organizations had no substantial involvement in the student movement, while some of our "control" students had a considerable history of such involvement. Thus the data to be reported here are based on an index of Activism constructed from interview responses to questions about participation in seven kinds of activity: attendance at rallies, picketing, canvassing, working on a project to help the disadvantaged, being jailed for civil disobedience, working full-time for a social action organization, serving as an officer in such organizations.

### *Study Two—The "Anti-Ranking" Sit-in*

In May, 1966, about five hundred students sat-in at the Administration Building on the campus of the University of Chicago, barring the building to official use for two and a half days. The focal issue of the protest, emulated on a number of other campuses in the succeeding days, was the demand by the students that the University not cooperate with the Selective Service System in supplying class standings for the purpose of assigning student deferments. The students who sat-in formed an organization called "Students Against the Rank" (SAR). During the sit-in, another group of students, calling themselves "Students for a Free Choice" (SFC) circulated a petition opposing the sit-in and supporting the University Administration's view that each student had a right to submit (or withhold) his class standings—the University could not withhold the "rank" of students who requested it. This petition was signed by several hundred students.

Beginning about 10 days after the end of the sit-in, we undertook to interview three samples of students: a random sample of 65 supporters of SAR (the protesters); a random sample of 35 signers of the SFC petition (the anti-protesters); approximately 60 students

who constituted the total population of two randomly selected floors in the student dormitories. Of about 160 students thus selected, 117 were finally either interviewed or returned mailed questionnaires. The interview schedule was based largely on items used in the original study; it also included some additional items relevant to the sit-in and the "ranking" controversy.

### *Some Preliminary Findings*

At this writing, our data analysis is at an early stage. In general, however, it is clear that the framework of hypotheses with which we began is substantially supported, and in interesting ways, refined, by the data. Our principal findings thus far include the following:<sup>2</sup>

*Activists tend to come from upper status families.* As indicated earlier, our study of the Chicago sit-in suggests that such actions attract students predominantly from upper-status backgrounds. When compared with students who did not sit-in, and with students who signed the anti-sit-in petition, the sit-in participants reported higher family incomes, higher levels of education for both fathers and mothers, and overwhelmingly perceived themselves to be "upper-middle class". One illustrative finding: in our dormitory sample, of 24 students reporting family incomes of above \$15,000, half participated in the sit-in. Of 23 students reporting family incomes below \$15,000, only two sat-in.

Certain kinds of occupations are particularly characteristic of the parents of sit-in participants. In particular, their fathers tend to be professionals (college faculty, lawyers, doctors) rather than businessmen, white collar employees or blue-collar workers. Moreover, somewhat unexpectedly, activists' mothers are likely to be employed, and are more likely to have "career" types of employment, than are the mothers of non-activists.

Also of significance, although not particularly surprising, is the fact that activists are more likely to be Jewish than are non-activists. (For example, 45% of our SAR sample reported that they were Jewish; only about one-fourth of the non-participants were Jewish). Furthermore, a very high proportion of both Jewish and non-Jewish activists report no religious preference for themselves and their parents. Associated with the Jewish ethnicity of a large proportion of our activist samples is the fact the great majority of activists' grandparents were foreign born. Yet, despite this, data from Study One show that the grandparents of activists tended to be relatively highly educated as compared to the grandparents of non-activists. Most of the grandparents of non-activists had not

<sup>2</sup> A more detailed report of the procedures and findings of these studies is available in Flacks (1966).

completed high school; nearly half of the grandparents of activists had at least a high school education and fully one-fourth of their maternal grandmothers had attended college. These data suggest that relatively high status characterized the families of activists over several generations; this conclusion is supported by data showing that, unlike non-activist grandfathers, the grandfathers of activists tended to have white collar, professional and entrepreneurial occupations rather than blue collar jobs.

In sum, our data suggest that, at least at major Northern colleges, students involved in protest activity are characteristically from families which are urban, highly educated, Jewish or irreligious, professional and affluent. It is perhaps particularly interesting that many of their mothers are uniquely well-educated and involved in careers, and that high status and education has characterized these families over at least two generations.

*Activists are more "radical" than their parents; but activists' parents are decidedly more liberal than others of their status.* The demographic data reported above suggests that activists come from high status families, but the occupational, religious and educational characteristics of these families are unique in several important ways. The distinctiveness of these families is especially clear when we examine data from Study One on the political attitudes of students and their parents. In this study, it should be remembered, activist and non-activist families were roughly equivalent in status, income and education because of our sampling procedures. Our data quite clearly demonstrate that the fathers of activists are disproportionately liberal. For example, whereas forty per cent of the non-activists' fathers said that they were Republican, only thirteen per cent of the activists' fathers were Republicans. Only six per cent of non-activists' fathers were willing to describe themselves as "highly liberal" or "socialist", whereas sixty per cent of the activists' fathers accepted such designations. Forty per cent of the non-activists' fathers described themselves as conservative; none of the activists' fathers endorsed that position.<sup>3</sup>

In general, differences in the political preferences of the students paralleled these parental differences. The non-activist sample is only slightly less conservative and Republican than their fathers; all of the activist students with Republican fathers report their own party preferences as either Democrat or independent. Thirty-two

<sup>3</sup>For the purposes of this report, "activists" are those students who were in the top third on our Activism index; "nonactivists" are those students who were in the bottom third—this latter group reported virtually no participation in any activity associated with the student movement. The "activists" on the other hand had taken part in at least one activity indicating high commitment to the movement (e.g. going to jail, working full-time, serving in a leadership capacity).

per cent of the activists regard themselves as "socialist" as compared with sixteen per cent of their fathers. In general, both nonactivists and their fathers are typically "moderate" in their politics; activists and their fathers tend to be at least "liberal", but a substantial proportion of the activists prefer a more "radical" designation.

A somewhat more detailed picture of comparative political positions emerges when we examine responses of students and their fathers to a series of 6-point scales on which respondents rated their attitudes on such issues as: US bombing of North Vietnam, US troops in the Dominican Republic, student participation in protest demonstrations, civil rights protests involving civil disobedience, Lyndon Johnson, Barry Goldwater, congressional investigations of "unAmerican activities", full socialization of all industries, socialization of the medical profession.

TABLE 1  
STUDENTS' AND FATHERS' ATTITUDES ON CURRENT ISSUES

Issue	Activists		Nonactivists	
	Students	Fathers	Students	Fathers
<b>Per cent who approve:</b>				
Bombing of North Vietnam	9	27	73	80
American troops in Dominican Republic	6	33	65	50
Student participation in protest demonstrations	100	80	61	37
Civil disobedience in civil rights protests	97	57	28	23
Congressional investigations of "un-American activities"	3	7	73	57
Lyndon Johnson	35	77	81	83
Barry Goldwater	0	7	35	20
Full socialization of industry	62	23	5	10
Socialization of the medical profession	94	43	30	27
N	34	30	37	30

Table 1 presents data on activists and non-activists and their fathers with respect to these items. This table suggests, first, wide divergence between the two groups of fathers on most issues, with activist fathers typically critical of current policies. Although activists' fathers are overwhelmingly "liberal" in their responses, for the most part, activist students tend to endorse "left-wing" positions more strongly and consistently than do their fathers. The items showing strongest divergence between activists and their fathers are interesting. Whereas activists overwhelmingly endorse civil disobedience, nearly half of their fathers do not. Whereas fathers of both activists and non-activists tend to approve of Lyndon Johnson, activist students tend to disapprove of him. Whereas activists' fathers tend to disapprove of "full socialization of industry", this item is en-

dorsed by the majority of activists (although fewer gave an extremely radical response on this item than any other); whereas the vast majority of activists approve of socialized medicine, the majority of their fathers do not. This table provides further support for the view that activists, though more "radical" than their fathers, come predominantly from very liberal homes. The attitudes of nonactivists and their fathers are conventional and supportive of current policies; there is a slight tendency on some items for nonactivist students to endorse more conservative positions than their fathers.

It seems fair to conclude, then, that most students who are involved in the movement (at least those one finds in a city like Chicago) are involved in neither "conversion" from nor "rebellion" against the political perspectives of their fathers. A more supportable view suggests that the great majority of these students are attempting to fulfill and renew the political traditions of their families. However, data from our research which have not yet been analyzed as of this writing, will permit a more systematic analysis of the political orientations of the two generations.

*Activism is related to a complex of values, not ostensibly political, shared by both the students and their parents.* Data which we have just begun to analyze suggest that the political perspectives which differentiate the families of activists from other families at the same socioeconomic level are part of a more general clustering of values and orientations. Our findings and impressions on this point may be briefly summarized by saying that, whereas nonactivists and their parents tend to express conventional orientations toward achievement, material success, sexual morality and religion, the activists and their parents tend to place greater stress on involvement in intellectual and esthetic pursuits, humanitarian concerns, opportunity for self-expression, and tend to de-emphasize or positively disvalue personal achievement, conventional morality and conventional religiosity.

When asked to rank order a list of "areas of life", nonactivist students and their parents typically indicate that marriage, career and religion are most important. Activists, on the other hand, typically rank these lower than the "world of ideas, art and music" and "work for national and international betterment"—and so, on the whole, do their parents (see also the relevant data presented by Trent and Craise in this issue).

When asked to indicate their vocational aspirations, nonactivist students are typically firmly decided on a career and typically mention orientations toward the professions, science and business. Activists, on the other hand, are very frequently undecided on a career; and most typically those who have decided mention college teaching, the arts or social work as aspirations.

These kinds of responses suggest, somewhat crudely, that student activists identify with life goals which are intellectual and "humanitarian" and that they reject conventional and "privatized" goals more frequently than do nonactivist students.

## Four Value Patterns

More detailed analyses which we are just beginning to undertake support the view that the value-patterns expressed by activists are highly correlated with those of their parents. This analysis has involved the isolation of a number of value-patterns which emerged in the interview material, the development of systems of code categories related to each of these patterns, and the blind coding of all the interviews with respect to these categories. The kinds of data we are obtaining in this way may be illustrated by describing four of the value patterns we have observed:

### *Romanticism: Esthetic and Emotional sensitivity*

This variable is defined as: "sensitivity to beauty and art—appreciation of painting, literature and music, creativity in art forms—concern with esthetic experience and the development of capacities for esthetic expression—concern with emotions deriving from perception of beauty—attachment of great significance to esthetic experience. More broadly, it can be conceived of as involving explicit concern with experience as such, with feeling and passion, with immediate and inner experience; a concern for the realm of feeling rather than the rational, technological or instrumental side of life; preference for the realm of experience as against that of activity, doing

TABLE 2  
SCORES ON SELECTED VALUES BY ACTIVISM (PERCENTAGES)

		Activists	Nonactivists
(a) <i>Romanticism</i>			
High		35	11
Medium		47	49
Low		18	40
(b) <i>Intellectualism</i>			
High		32	3
Medium		65	57
Low		3	40
(c) <i>Humanitarianism</i>			
High		35	0
Medium		47	22
Low		18	78
(d) <i>Moralism</i>			
High		6	54
Medium		53	35
Low		41	11
	N	34	37

or achieving". Thirteen items were coded in these terms: for each item a score of zero signified no mention of "romanticist" concerns, a score of one signified that such a concern appeared. Table 2 indicates the relationship between "romanticism" and Activism. Very few Activists received scores on Romanticism which placed them as "low"; conversely, there were very few high "romantics" among the nonactivists.

### *Intellectualism*

This variable is defined as: "Concern with ideas—desire to realize intellectual capacities—high valuation of intellectual creativities—appreciation of theory and knowledge—participation in intellectual activity (e.g., reading, studying, teaching, writing)—broad intellectual concerns". Ten items were scored for "intellectualism". Almost no Activists are low on this variable; almost no nonactivists received a high score.

### *Humanitarianism*

This variable is defined as: "Concern with plight of others in society; desire to help others—value on compassion and sympathy—desire to alleviate suffering; value on egalitarianism in the sense of opposing privilege based on social and economic distinction; particular sensitivity to the deprived position of the disadvantaged". This variable was coded for ten items; an attempt was made to exclude from this index all items referring directly to participation in social action. As might be expected, "humanitarianism" is strongly related to Activism, as evidenced in Table 2

### *Moralism and Self Control*

This variable is defined as: "Concern about the importance of strictly controlling personal impulses—opposition to impulsive or spontaneous behavior—value on keeping tight control over emotions—adherence to conventional authority; adherence to conventional morality—a high degree of moralism about sex, drugs, alcohol, etc.—reliance on a set of external and inflexible rules to govern moral behavior; emphasis on importance of hard work; concern with determination, "stick-to-itiveness"; antagonism toward idleness—value on diligence, entrepreneurship, task orientation, ambition". Twelve items were scored for this variable. As Table 2 suggests, "moralism" is also strongly related to Activism; very few Activists score high on this variable, while the majority of nonactivists are high scorers.

These values are strongly related to activism. They are also highly intercorrelated, and, most importantly, parent and student scores on these variables are strongly correlated.

These and other value patterns will be used as the basis for studying value transmission in families, generational similarities and differences and several other problems. Our data with respect to them provide further support for the view that the unconventionality of activists flows out of and is supported by their family traditions.

Activists' parents are more "permissive" than parents of non-activists. We have just begun to get some findings bearing on our

hypothesis that parents of Activists will tend to have been more "permissive" in their child-rearing practices than parents of equivalent status whose children are not oriented toward activism.

One measure of parental permissiveness we have been using is a series of rating scales completed by each member of the family. A series of seven-point bipolar scales was presented in a format similar to that of the "Semantic Differential". Students were asked to indicate "how my mother (father) treated me as a child" on such scales as "warm-cold"; "stern-mild"; "hard-soft"—10 scales in all. Each parent, using the same scales, rated "how my child thinks I treated him".

TABLE 3  
SONS AND DAUGHTERS RATINGS OF PARENTS BY ACTIVISM (PERCENTAGES)

Trait of parent	Males		Females	
	Hi Act	Lo Act	Hi Act	Lo Act
<i>mild-stern</i>				
per cent rating mother "mild"	63	44	59	47
per cent rating father "mild"	48	33	48	32
<i>soft-hard</i>				
per cent rating mother "soft"	69	61	60	57
per cent rating father "soft"	50	50	62	51
<i>lenient-severe</i>				
per cent rating mother "lenient"	94	61	66	63
per cent rating father "lenient"	60	44	47	42
<i>easy-strict</i>				
per cent rating mother "easy"	75	50	77	52
per cent rating father "easy"	69	44	47	37
N	23	24	27	26

Table 3 presents data on how sons and daughters rated each of their parents on each of four scales: "mild-stern"; "soft-hard"; "lenient-severe"; and "easy-strict". In general, this table shows that Activist sons and daughters tend to rate their parents as "milder", "more lenient", and "less severe" than do nonactivists. Similar data were obtained using the parents' ratings of themselves.

A different measure of permissiveness is based on the parents' response to a series of "hypothetical situations". Parents were asked, for example, what they would do if their son (daughter) "decided to drop out of school and doesn't know what he really wants to do". Responses to this open-ended question were coded as indicating "high intervention" or "low intervention". Data for fathers on this item are reported in Table 4. Another hypothetical situation presented to the parents was that their child was living with a member of the opposite sex. Responses to this item were coded as "strongly intervene, mildly intervene, not intervene". Data for this item for

TABLE 4  
FATHER'S INTERVENTION—"IF CHILD DROPPED OUT OF SCHOOL" (PERCENTAGES)

Degree of Intervention	Activism of Child	
	High	Low
Low	56	37
High	44	63
N	30	30

TABLE 5  
FATHER'S INTERVENTION—"IF CHILD WERE LIVING WITH MEMBER  
OF OPPOSITE SEX" (PERCENTAGES)

Degree of Intervention	Activism of Child	
	High	Low
None	20	14
Mild	50	28
Strong	30	58
N	30	30

fathers appears in Table 5. Both tables show that father of Activists report themselves to be much less interventionist than fathers of nonactivists. Similar results were obtained with mothers, and for other hypothetical situations.

Clearly both types of measures just reported provide support for our hypothesis about the relationship between parental permissiveness and activism. We expect these relationships to be strengthened if "activism" is combined with certain of the value-patterns described earlier.

### A Concluding Note

The data reported here constitute a small but representative sampling of the material we have collected in our studies of the student movement. In general, they provide support for the impressions and expectations we had when we undertook this work. Our view of the student movement as an expression of deep discontent felt by certain types of high status youth as they confront the incongruities between the values represented by the authority and occupational structure of the larger society and the values inculcated by their families and peer culture seems to fit well with the data we have obtained.

A variety of questions remain which, we hope, can be answered, at least in part, by further analyses of our data. Although it is clear that value differences between parents of activists and nonactivists are centrally relevant for understanding value, attitudinal and be-

havioral cleavages among types of students on the campus, it remains to be determined whether differences in family status, on the one hand, and childrearing practices, on the other, make an independent contribution to the variance. A second issue has to do with political ideology. First impressions of our data suggest that activists vary considerably with respect to their degree of politicization and their concern with ideological issues. The problem of isolating the key determinants of this variation is one we will be paying close attention to in further analysis of our interview material. Two factors are likely to be of importance here—first, the degree to which the student participates in radical student organizations; second, the political history of his parents.

At least two major issues are not confronted by the research we have been doing. First, we have not examined in any detail the role of campus conditions as a determinant of student discontent (see the introduction by Sampson and the article by Brown for a further discussion of these institutional factors). The research reported here emphasizes family socialization and other antecedent experiences as determinants of student protest, and leads to the prediction that students experiencing other patterns of early socialization will be unlikely to be in revolt. This view needs to be counterbalanced by recalling instances of active student unrest on campuses where very few students are likely to have the backgrounds suggested here as critical. Is it possible that there are two components to the student protest movement—one generated to a great extent by early socialization; the second by grievances indigenous to the campus? At any rate, the inter-relationships between personal dispositions and campus conditions need further detailed elucidation.

A second set of questions unanswerable by our research has to do with the future—what lies ahead for the movement as a whole and for the individual young people who participate in it? One direction for the student movement is toward institutionalization as an expression of youth discontent. This outcome, very typical of student movements in many countries, would represent a narrowing of the movement's political and social impact, a way of functionally integrating it into an otherwise stable society. Individual participants would be expected to pass through the movement on their way to eventual absorption, often at an elite level, into the established institutional order. An alternative direction would be toward the development of a full-fledged political "left", with the student movement serving, at least initially, as a nucleus. The potential for this latter development is apparent in recent events. It was the student movement which catalyzed professors and other adults into protest with respect to the Vietnam war. Students for a Democratic Society, the main or-

ganizational expression of the student movement, has had, for several years, a program for "community organizing", in which students and exstudents work full-time at the mobilization of constituencies for independent radical political and social action. This SDS program began in poverty areas; it is now beginning to spread to "middle class" communities. These efforts, and others like them, from Berkeley to New Haven, became particularly visible during the 1966 congressional elections, as a wave of "new left" candidates emerged across the country, often supported by large and sophisticated political organizations. Moreover, in addition to attempts at political organizations, SDS, through its "Radical Education Project" has begun to seek the involvement of faculty members, professionals and other intellectuals for a program of research and education designed to lay the foundations for an intellectually substantial and ideologically developed "new left".

At its convention in September, 1966, SDS approached, but did not finally decide, the question of whether to continue to maintain its character as a campus-based, student organization or to transform itself into a "Movement for a Democratic Society". Characteristically, the young people there assembled amended the organization's constitution so that anyone regardless of status or age could join, while simultaneously they affirmed the student character of the group by projecting a more vigorous program to organize uncommitted students.

The historical significance of the student movement of the Sixties remains to be determined. Its impact on the campus and on the larger society has already been substantial. It is clearly a product of deep discontent in certain significant and rapidly growing segments of the youth population. Whether it becomes an expression of generational discontent, or the forerunner of major political realignments—or simply disintegrates—cannot really be predicted by detached social scientists. The ultimate personal and political meaning of the student movement remains a matter to be determined by those who are involved with it—as participants, as allies, as critics, as enemies.

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## Political and Apolitical Students: Facts in Search of Theory<sup>1</sup>

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Why do students active in protest movements tend to do better academically, and be more intelligent and intellectually disposed, compared to more apolitical students? There is a wealth of data to show that this is so, but an astounding absence of efforts to make theoretical sense of it. Moreover, for decades we have known that more liberal or radical students have, statistically speaking, been more intelligent or academically able than more conservative students; and similar relationships have been found with a corresponding regularity in studies, though fewer in number, of adult populations. How can we account for this apparent preponderance of intelligence and intellectual resources on the left side of the political spectrum?

In this paper I hope to contribute toward such a theoretical accounting. My main task is to try to make theoretical sense of three categories of data, to be briefly discussed or summarized in the following sections: (a) traditional attitude measurement studies, from the 1920's on, mainly administered to students but at other times to

<sup>1</sup> Revised version of a paper prepared for a symposium on "Protest on the American Campus" presented on September 2, 1966 during the Annual Meeting of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues in New York City. I am most grateful to Joseph Katz and Edward E. Sampson for their constructive criticism of an earlier draft; also to my colleagues at the Institute for the Study of Human Problems at Stanford University, for helpful discussions prior to the first draft.

adults, which almost invariably have found those who are more liberal doing better on intelligence, educational achievement, etc. compared to those who are more conservative; (b) work on authoritarianism and related neurotic tendencies, which again has demonstrated a clear affinity between these tendencies and rightwing views, compared to a much less clear, or more tenuous, affinity with leftwing orientations; and (c) recent work on student political activists, which abundantly shows liberal and leftist militancy to correlate with high academic or intellectual achievement.

The attempted theoretical explanation is based on fairly recent work by social psychologists, whose theory of the functions of attitudes will be extended toward a theory of individual political rationality as an aspect of human development.

### Traditional Studies of Radical versus Conservative Attitudes

The invention and subsequently the continued improvement of techniques for the measurement of attitudes, together with increasingly sophisticated techniques of correlational analysis and the related knacks of applied statistics, have stimulated an enormous number of studies of attitudes and relationships between attitudes, beginning around 1920. A large category of attitude studies dealt with political orientations. Among the latter studies there must have been hundreds reported in the journals of the twenties and thirties which either focussed on or paid attention to characteristics of *radical* versus *conservative* attitudes and their respective correlates.

There is one difference in particular between students (the major population studied) with more radical or liberal and students with more conservative views that shows up in study after study: more radical students kept scoring higher either on intelligence tests or by way of academic grades, compared to more conservative students. There were exceptions, but there is no gainsaying the general tendency. Speaking of the literature reporting research on conservative attitudes on American campuses, Newcomb reports an almost unanimous finding:

Whatever the context of the term 'conservatism', those who show it least on any given campus tend to make higher scores on intelligence tests, or to make better scholastic records, or both, than those who show it most (Newcomb, 1943, 171).

Beginning around 1930, there also have been a good number of studies of attitude change, especially during the college years, and more are being published today. In Newcomb's classic study of Bennington students during the late thirties, published in 1943, the fact

that most students left college considerably more liberal or radical than they had been as entering freshmen is accounted for mainly in terms of peer group influence:

. . . nonconservative attitudes are developed at Bennington primarily by those who are both capable and desirous of cordial relations with their fellow community members (Newcomb, 1943, 148-149).

But why was Bennington a breeding ground for radicals and liberals in the 1930's? Newcomb's explanation is plausible but somewhat atheoretical: Bennington College was founded in 1932, the year FDR took office, and many faculty members were interested in and sympathetic to the New Deal, as were many other American intellectuals at the time. But is there nothing about the educational process itself that should lead us to expect, in the best colleges, a liberal rather than a conservative climate? To this question, Newcomb's otherwise excellent study does not address itself.

Samuel A. Stouffer, in his valuable 1955 volume, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*, finds that community leaders invariably are more tolerant of the freedom of dissent, compared to the bulk of the population. For example, 84% of the leaders would allow a socialist to speak compared to 58% of the general population. For the atheist's right to speak, the corresponding figures are 64 compared to 37; for the communist's, 51 compared to 27. And so on.

Based on composites of replies to all his tolerance questions, Stouffer constructed a scale of tolerance of nonconformists. Stouffer's "more tolerant" respondents, as of May-July, 1954, are younger: 47% of those in their twenties, compared to 18% in their sixties, are "more tolerant"—and there is a linear relationship for the in-between age groups. Secondly, the more liberal respondents are better educated: 66% of the college graduates, compared to 16% of those with grade schools only, and again a clear linear relationship. Further breakdowns indicated, too, that the better educated are more liberal also for matching age levels, while the younger are more liberal also at matching levels of education. Stouffer also found that optimism concerning one's personal future—generally higher for younger than for older people—correlates highly with liberalism (or, in his terms, tolerance).

In addition, Stouffer found a clear relationship between urbanization and liberalism, both nationally and for each region of the United States: West, East, Middle West, South. The degree of liberalism is also related to the region, with descending degrees from West to South in the order listed.

By way of explanation of these and related findings, Stouffer suggests that a factor essential to tolerance may be "contact with people with disturbing and unpopular ideas . . . (schooling) puts a person

in touch with people whose ideas and values are different from one's own" (1955, 125-128). Urban living does this and so, probably, does living in the West, where a higher proportion of the population has lived in other regions. The cities of the Far West "which have grown at such an astonishing rate by recruiting from all parts of this country, are the highest of all in our scale of tolerance", Stouffer has found (1955, 127-128).

But why is it that the younger people, regardless of levels of education, tend to be more liberal than the older people? The only hypothesis Stouffer suggests is that it is easier for the young to be optimistic about their personal future; and degrees of optimism ("my life will be better") are significantly related to youth and also to tolerance, as his data bear out. But why should optimists tend to be tolerant of nonconformists? Stouffer here merely states that "there is substantial psychological theory which would predict a relationship between optimism about personal affairs and tolerance toward nonconformists"; he elaborates only to the extent of suggesting the need for scapegoats for individuals who are very troubled and the availability of communists and other nonconformists as "obvious targets for blame, directly for the world's troubles and indirectly, if sometimes unconsciously, for one's personal troubles" (Stouffer, 1955, 100). Is this all there is to the relationship he demonstrated between youth and liberalism?

## Personality and Political Attitudes

In *The Authoritarian Personality* a number of factors were found to be related to neurotic authoritarianism as measured by the F-scale. Among these were Political-economic conservatism, measured by the PEC scale in its several forms, all of which gave a high score to respondents indicating a high degree of "support of the *status quo* and particularly of business; support of conservative values; desire to maintain a balance of power in which business is dominant, labor subordinate and the economic functions of government minimized; and resistance to social change" (Adorno, et al, 1950, 154-155).

## Rokeach's Critisms

There are serious methodological shortcomings in this work, as is often the case with pioneering ventures. While Edward Shils had charged the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* with a kind of ideological blindness to the phenomenon of authoritarianism on the Left, a charge based on political assumptions of his own rather than substantive evidence (Bay, 1965, 209-10), Milton Rokeach, one of the work's major critics, has made a more specific charge. He has stated

that there was something wrong with the F-scale; it was politically slanted and could tap only rightwing-dogmatism (Rokeach, 1956; 1960). To demonstrate that he could remedy this defect, Rokeach developed not only a Dogmatism scale which claimed to be politically neutral along major conventional right-left dimensions; he also proceeded to substantiate this claim by developing two Opinionation scales, one measuring vehement intolerance of leftist views and the other doing the same for rightist views. Having achieved a reasonably high reliability for both Opinionation scales in several samples, Rokeach proceeded to demonstrate that his Dogmatism scale, *unlike* the F scale, the E scale and the PEC scale, correlated positively not only with his Right Opinionation scale but with his Left Opinionation scale as well.

Strictly speaking there probably is no such thing as a politically neutral scale, unless it be devoid of all social content; what Rokeach showed is that the F scale does not, while his own Dogmatism scale does correlate with the degrees of vehemence (which presumably were symptomatic of the closedmindedness) with which leftist as well as rightist opinions are held, at least in certain populations. As a matter of fact, Rokeach notes that both his Dogmatism scale and his combined Opinionation scale show a weak but consistently positive relationship to conservatism, and also that Dogmatism in all his samples shows somewhat closer affinity to Right than to Left Opinionation. He raises but dismisses perhaps too lightly the possibility that his scales are less neutral than intended; his principal explanation is that communism, unlike fascism, is humanitarian in its ideology (or content, as he puts it), at least; and that the same, to a more modest extent, may be true of liberal versus conservative ideology. In support of his belief that the psychological functions of communist beliefs may differ from those of fascist beliefs he cites the phenomenon of *disillusionment* which, he believes, occurs far more often among former communists than among former nazis or fascists, indicating a sudden awareness of contradictions within the communist creed which may not exist within fascist creeds, whose anti-humanism pertains to ends as well as means, or content as well as structure. He also refers to Robert Lindner's theory that communists more often have neurotic problems, often guilt-related, while fascists more often are psychopaths, or people with an underdeveloped conscience (Linder, 1953).

### *McClosky's Findings*

Another, more massive study comparing conservatives to liberals is reported by Herbert McClosky, whose more than 2000 respondents were drawn from Minnesota population samples. These are his principal findings of relevance here: (a) "By every measure available

to us, conservative beliefs are found most frequently among the uninformed, the poorly educated and so far as we can determine, the less intelligent"; (b) "Conservatism, in our society at least, appears to be far more characteristic of social isolates, of people who think poorly of themselves . . . who are submissive, timid, and wanting in confidence"; and (c) "In the four liberal-conservative classifications, the extreme conservatives are easily the most hostile and suspicious, the most rigid and compulsive, the quickest to condemn others for their imperfections and weaknesses, the most intolerant, the most inflexible and unyielding in their perceptions and judgments. Although aggressively critical of the shortcomings of others, they are unusually defensive and armored in the protection of their own ego needs. Poorly integrated psychologically, anxious, often perceiving themselves as inadequate, and subject to excessive feelings of guilt, they seem inclined to project onto others the traits they most dislike in themselves" (McClosky, 1958, 35-38).

McClosky divided his respondents into four categories: "liberals", "moderate liberals", "moderate conservatives" and "extreme conservatives"; these labels suggest that he felt he had more "extreme" conservatives than liberals in his main samples. The three tables he presented are astoundingly consistent in yielding entirely linear correlations from "liberal" to "extreme conservative", without a single exception; "moderate liberals", for example, are found to be higher on hostility, lower on education and intellectuality, etc., than "liberals"; and McClosky claims that his data "could be buttressed by numerous other related findings" (1958, 38).

McClosky's analysis of these striking findings is couched more in descriptive than in developmental terms. For example: "From whatever direction we approach him, the prototypic conservative seems far more impelled to contain, to reject, and to take precautions against, his fellow creatures" (1958, 38). But why? McClosky is cautious indeed on this score. The closest thing to a suggestion of a causal relationship is his statement that "education is likely to lead to liberal rather than conservative tendencies" (1958, 41). Among his concluding cautionary remarks, he says that conservative doctrines "appear, in some measure, to arise from personality needs, but it is conceivable at least, that both are the product of some third set of factors". Conservatism and a host of undesirable personality traits clearly, in these Minnesota samples, "go together. How they go together, and which is antecedent to which, is a more difficult and more elusive problem" (1958, 44).

There has been a remarkable lack of follow-up of this striking demonstration of affinity between degrees of conservatism and widely disvalued personality and social characteristics. If *The Authoritarian Personality's* findings of affinity between conservatism and neurotic

authoritarianism can be questioned on methodological grounds, and if Rokeach's data only mildly suggested a similar affinity, McClosky's tables appear methodologically solid and of great theoretical import.

## Recent Work on Student Activists

I shall not attempt an exhaustive survey of all available data on student activism or student leftism generally. The reader is referred to several of the articles in this issue for a summary of these data; the articles by Trent and Craise and by Flacks are particularly relevant. Of especial importance to the line of argument which I have been developing are the following findings.

### Berkeley, 1957—Selvin and Hagstrom Findings

Hanan C. Selvin and Warren O. Hagstrom in December, 1957, while things were still fairly quiet on the Berkeley campus, did a study of the views on civil liberties in a sample of 894 Berkeley students (Selvin and Hagstrom, 1965). Anticipating that abstract statements favoring the Bill of Rights would sooner indicate conformism than liberalism, these investigators elicited responses to specific civil liberties issues involving conflicts with other values. On the basis of these responses they constructed a Libertarianism Index. They divided their sample into three groups: highly libertarian (34%), moderately libertarian (46%), slightly libertarian (20%).

Of interest here are the data comparing the highly libertarian students with the Berkeley student body in general. In a linear relationship, again, the proportions of highly libertarian students on the Berkeley campus ascend from freshman to senior and graduate level: 21% - 29% - 34% - 40% - 54%. The relationship between libertarianism and grades is inconclusive in the lower division but clear in the upper division: among A to B+ students 54% are "highly-libertarian", compared to 37% among B to C+ students and 25% among students at C level or below.

Children of blue collar workers among Berkeley students are libertarians more often, by a wide margin, than are children of parents better able to support their offspring financially through college; this is true in spite of the fact that blue collar parents average lower educational attainments than other parents and are likely to be relatively non-libertarian themselves. "Greater economic independence, in the sense of self-support", conclude Selvin and Hagstrom, "is strongly associated with having more libertarian attitudes than one's parents" (Selvin and Hagstrom, 1965, 504).

Among male students the social science and humanities majors were by a wide margin found more libertarian than the rest, with engineering and education (a field that has recruited low achievers in

Berkeley) and business administration at the bottom. Among female students, social welfare majors were most libertarian, while life science majors shared the next level of libertarianism with social science and humanities majors, and with education majors once again at the bottom. And, finally, fraternity and especially sorority students—who are least likely to get to know well people with unorthodox ideas—are least likely to be libertarians, compared to students with other living arrangements.

### *Berkeley, 1964—Somers' Data*

In November, 1964, when the student rebellion at Berkeley was under way, Robert H. Somers interviewed a carefully drawn sample of 285 Berkeley students. He found 63% to favor the goals of the Free Speech Movement, while about 34% approved of the FSM's tactics; clearly favoring goals as well as tactics were 30%, and Somers calls this group the *militants*, while the *moderates*, again 30%, clearly supported FSM's goals but not the means used, and 22% *conservatives* were opposed to the ends sought as well as the tactics used (Somers, 1964).

For my purposes the crucial findings of this study are summarized as follows by Somers: "it is hard to overlook the fact that in our sample there is a strong relation between academic achievement and support for the demonstrators. Among those who reported to our interviewers a grade point average of B+ or better, nearly half (45 per cent) are militants, and only a tenth are conservatives. At the other end, over a third of those with an average of B- or less are conservatives, and only 15 per cent are militants". If the FSM represented a minority of students, Somers concluded, it would be "a minority vital to the excellence of this university" (1964, 544).

### *Berkeley 1965—Heist's Findings*

Early in 1965 Paul Heist did a study of a sample drawn from a list of more than 800 persons said to have been arrested in the Sproul Hall sit-in (Heist, 1965). On advice of their legal counsel, about 50% of the 33% sample refused to return the questionnaire but the rest cooperated, 128 in all; an additional 60 FSM activists were recruited subsequently as subjects for the study. In addition, a random sample of 92 seniors (class of 1964-1965) were given the same two questionnaires. Also, Heist had access to the same attitude inventory data from 340 seniors (class of 1962-1963) and from "2500+" entering freshmen, all at Berkeley. Further details of this study by Heist plus other related work are presented by Trent and Craise in this issue.

Heist developed an Intellectual Disposition Index on the basis of six of the twelve scales in his attitude inventory, and with this

instrument divided his FSM sample and his three general student samples according to eight "degrees", from low to high Intellectual Disposition. Here is what he found:

For the total FSM group we find almost 70 per cent in the top three categories and none in the bottom three, and it is to be remembered that a large proportion, in fact, the majority, of the FSM persons were freshmen, sophomore and juniors. The number of persons in these upper categories in the senior sample amounts to 25 and 31 per cent. The Free Speech Movement drew extraordinarily larger proportions of students with strong intellectual orientations, at all levels (freshmen through graduate) (Heist, 1965, 21-22a).

### *Watts and Whittaker and FSM*

William A. Watts and David N. E. Whittaker's study of FSM activists compared to Berkeley students generally started with this hypothesis: "We expected that FSM members would be more flexible as defined and measured by personality tests of flexibility-rigidity . . . than their counterparts who were less committed, neutral, or even opposed to the Movement" (Watts and Whittaker, 1966, 43).

Their study was based on questionnaires administered to a chance sample of 172 participants among the 1000-1200 students who "sat in" at Sproul Hall in the afternoon of December 2nd, 1964, (and who were on this occasion not arrested, or not yet, except for the two thirds who stayed on all night). In addition, the same questionnaire was given to a random sample of 182 Berkeley students at about the same time; 146 of these cooperated. The instrument included a 27-item rigidity-flexibility scale. The most important result of this study, for present purposes, is its indication of "strong support for the prediction of greater flexibility among the FSM members" (1966, 59). The authors conclude that this latter finding is of particular interest considering the purported rigidity of the FSM members in negotiations with the University administration, and suggests the necessity of distinguishing between a trait of rigidity as psychologically defined and commitment.

Two other findings of the study by Watts and Whittaker should be noted in passing. First, with an additional sample of 181 students drawn from the District Attorney's arrest list for December 3, and 174 names drawn at random from the Student Directory, they failed to establish greater academic achievement on the part of the FSM'ers compared to other students, and concluded that these activists were quite typical or average with respect to grade point averages (1966, 52). While Watts and Whittaker's objective check is more trustworthy than the data on grade point averages re-

ported in the Somers study which were based on respondents' information, I am inclined to discount, until substantiated by further research, this particular finding by Watts and Whittaker, because it appears to run counter to so many other findings discussed in this article. It may well be valid for the 773 who were arrested, though I would have liked to see a replication of the study, which can easily be done; if it is valid for this group, I would still doubt that it is valid for FSM activists generally. It is possible, for example, that the most *academically* as distinct from *intellectually* oriented students among FSM activists felt greater anxiety than the rest about their academic credits, and were more likely to shrink from taking the most extreme risks.

Secondly, the FSM students were far more likely to have parents with advanced academic degrees, compared to the cross-section sample: "approximately 26 per cent of the fathers and 16 per cent of the mothers of the FSM sample possess either Ph.D. or M.A. degrees compared to 11 per cent and 4 per cent respectively in the cross-section" (Watts and Whittaker, 1966, 53 and Table 4). This finding does not contradict Somers' finding that student militants were more likely than the rest to have blue-collar fathers. Among several factors that could be taken into account here, I would emphasize the difference between having militant attitudes and being prepared to jeopardize academic achievements; the value of academic credits may well loom somewhat larger to the self-supporting student from a working class background, than they do to students from families in which academic proficiency or intellectual gifts or future financial safety tends to be taken for granted. The latter category among the militants may be more likely to risk jail and expulsion for their beliefs.

I have confined this brief inquiry to activists on the Left, who are far more significant than those on the Right, both by their numbers (at least in the better universities), and by their tendency to persist in political activities disturbing to the university "image" desired by most administrators and trustees. In so far as rightist student groups, the most important one among them at the moment being Young Americans for Freedom, have staged demonstrations, they have usually been *ad hoc* counter-demonstrations, directed *against* issue-oriented protests by liberal or leftist student activists; there have been no protracted campaigning or even articulate political programs; and while student leftists have tended to be fiercely independent of older leftists, or of the "generation over thirty" generally, there has been no evidence of a corresponding intellectual independence among organized rightist students.

## Toward a Psychological Theory of Radical versus Conservative Attitudes

The most promising approach to theorizing about the psychological nature of liberal and radical *versus* conservative political attitudes, I believe, is to consider what kind of functions political opinions may serve for those who hold them, in terms of their personality and social needs. It is quickly apparent that the function of serving a rational, realistic understanding of the political world is one but only one possible function of a person's "politics".

### *Types of Motives Underlying Political Opinions*

The over-all function of any political or other social opinion, write M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner and Robert W. White, (1960, 275) is to strike a "compromise between reality demands, social demands, and inner psychological demands". Daniel Katz (1960) distinguishes between rationality (or reality-testing) motives, value-expressive motives, social acceptance motives, and ego defense motives. These are suggested analytical categories; specific opinions usually serve a mixture of needs or motives. The relative weight of each type of motive varies from person to person, from attitude to attitude and from time to time; few of us, if any, are free of neurotic ego defensiveness, and none of us are free of social acceptance needs or desires for consistency and for realistic understanding of the world in which we live.

In their 1954 paper, Irving Sarnoff and Daniel Katz applied their three categories of motives in a discussion of a clearly *undesirable* type of attitude, namely anti-Negro prejudice; and one of their main concerns was to show how a better understanding of the motives of attitudes could facilitate processes of attitude change. Thus, to the extent that prejudice is rationally founded,—on the basis, say, of the limited knowledge available to many a Southern American white boy or girl, it presumably can be influenced by new knowledge. To the extent, however, that prejudice is based on social acceptance motives, it will take evidence of an entirely different kind of influence or do away with it,—namely evidence that such a change of opinion would not reduce a person's acceptance in whatever groups he wants to be or become part of. To the extent, finally, that ego defensive motives determine the prejudice, it may take psychotherapy to reduce it.

### *Ego Defensive Motives . . .*

There is evidence, wrote Gardner Murphy more than twenty years ago, "that functional intelligence can be enormously enhanced, first by the systematic study and removal of individual and socially shared autisms, second, by the cultivation of curiosity, and third, by

the art of withdrawal from the pressures of immediate external tasks, to let the mind work at its own pace and in its own congenial way" (Murphy, 1945, 16).

The most fundamental obstacle, of course, to the "freeing of intelligence" is the active presence of ego defensive motives. Severely repressed anxieties about one's worth as a human being, which may well be the result of a childhood starved of affection, may predestine a person to become a "true believer" in Eric Hoffer's sense,—a person who seeks a new collective identity because he cannot live with his own self (Hoffer, 1951). Such anxieties, if unresolved, may predestine a person to become an authoritarian or an anti-authoritarian personality (cf. Bay, 1965, 207-217), a bigot, a rightwinger, or, more rarely, a left-winger. This type of person is not psychologically free; his views may keep his anxieties and fears manageable but contributes no realistic understanding of the external political world.

Some of the data discussed previously can be understood in this light: Adorno *et al.*, Rokeach and McClosky all found right-wing views statistically associated with indices of neurosis of one kind or another. But what of McClosky's finding that, for example, "liberals" appeared less hostile than "moderate liberals", and what of the data on student activists?

### *Social Acceptance Motives . . .*

To account for such data we need to consider the prevalence of social acceptance motives, too, as obstacles to the freeing of political intelligence. To the extent that a person is deeply worried about his popularity, his career prospects, his financial future, his reputation, etc., he will utilize his political opinions not for achieving realistic insight but for impressing his reference groups and his reference persons favorably. These processes of obfuscation may be conscious or, more likely, subconscious, but they are above all pervasive in our society, and in every other society, too,—above all in highly competitive and socially mobile societies, in which the difference between "success" and lack of it may make for vast differences in prospects for the satisfaction of physical and self-esteem needs, and perhaps for many other kinds of needs as well. Social acceptance-motivated political beliefs serve the individual's desired image, status and career, etc., but contribute little toward a realistic understanding of his political world,—at least in so far as it extends beyond his immediate reference groups and persons.

Social acceptance-motivated opinions may well tend to be liberal in some university faculties, as charged by some conservative writers, including conservative students wishing to explain why liberalism increases with amount of education (cf. Naylor, 1966 for a discussion

of this). But by and large, in every stable social order, they tend to be conservative, or at most mildly liberal, firmly within the established framework of constitutional objectives and processes. In every stable society there are rich and poor, strong and weak, privileged and underprivileged; and not only political power and influence but social status and respectability are associated with seeing political problems through the eyes of the former rather than the latter, in each paired category.

Statistically speaking, therefore, *more conservative views, among students or adults generally, are likely to be less rationally, less independently motivated, compared to more radical-liberal views.*

I am by no means arguing, of course, that liberal and radical views cannot be neurotically motivated. The point is a more modest one: the frequency of neurotic motivations—now including not only deeply repressed anxieties about the individual's own worth but also milder ego deficiencies such as constant worry about popularity or career prospects—is probably higher the further away the politically active person is from the left side of the political spectrum (I did not say *left end*).

The statistical data surveyed make good sense if viewed in this perspective. With reference to the Berkeley data, surely one should expect ego defensiveness to be manifested by a fear of anarchy and equality, and lead the individual to detest both the style and the objectives of FSM-type movements. And the more intensely or neurotically one is preoccupied with career worries, the less one would be disposed to mingle with the student rebels; these students, more typically, appear to have decided that certain values are more dear to them than conventional career prospects. The articles by Keniston and Flacks make this same point. As rebels they are more likely to have made a choice and to have marshalled the intellectual and emotional resources, at some point, to stick to it, also in situations of severe stress. Obviously, some will for spurious or chance reasons pursue neurotic social acceptance needs with FSM-type groups as their reference systems; but this happens in almost every group, and is likely to occur with less frequency in a rebellious political action group than in less demanding and socially more homogeneous groups like, for example, fraternities and sororities.

### *"Only Rebellion Can Expand Consciousness"*

As Albert Camus saw, only rebellion, on some level, can expand consciousness; "with rebellion, awareness is born". Awareness of being human,—of being more than an aspiring carpenter, merchant, lawyer, educator or military officer. Or dutiful son or daughter.

In our daily trials rebellion plays the same role as does the '*cogito*' in the

realm of thought: it is the first piece of evidence. But this evidence lures the individual from his solitude. It finds its first value on the whole human race. I rebel—therefore we exist (Camus, 1958, 15 and 22).

Camus' portrait of the rebel presents a normative ideal in persuasive terms: to become fully human, a constant tendency to be revolted by and to rebel against oppression and injustice is required. While I admit to sharing this normative position, my present argument is empirical, though speculative: I submit that it will help make sense of all the data reviewed in this paper if we consider Camus' rebel a developmental model,—a *probable* type of person to develop to the extent that not only ego defensive but more mildly neurotic social acceptance anxieties are resolved or successfully faced up to.

This kind of theory is bound to be speculative if only because such social anxieties are so pervasive. Yet it is possible to argue that the various data associating leftism with academic competence, intelligence, psychological and socio-economic security, etc., may be seen as tending to support this theory. Further research in this area is desirable and feasible, and can be usefully focused by this kind of theory.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>One Polish study by Hannah E. Malewska, for example, ought to be followed up: she found that children's notions of moral norms become more responsible (less formal and superficial) the less severely disciplinarian their parents and the more urbanized their surroundings (Malewska, 1961). Work on children's politics is on the increase, but often restricts itself unduly to cognitive aspects. An exception is the work of Fred J. Greenstein (1965).

Patricia Richmond and I a few years ago found that among liberals in a pacifistically oriented organization, the more "extreme" supporters of rights of specific unpopular minorities tended to be somewhat less dogmatic in Rokeach's sense, than the more moderate supporters of such rights (Bay and Richmond, 1960). More work is needed to improve on instruments like Rokeach's Dogmatism scale, and to develop additional instruments to measure neurotic obstacles to rationality in the general population, so that we might discover how widely and in what types of contexts it is true that resolution of anxieties and reduction of other psychological burdens stimulate tendencies toward rationality, political activism, leftism and related phenomena.

Let me in conclusion mention the valuable, still small but apparently growing literature that seeks in-depth understanding of the political views and their motivations in particular individuals, whether prominent or humble, and whether dead or still living. A masterly political biographical study in psychological terms is *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* by Alexander and Juliette George (1956). Justly famous is Erik H. Erikson's *Young Man Luther* (1958). Arnold A. Rogow's *James T. Forrestal* is particularly valuable for its searching analysis of the issues associated with possible mental disorder in high office (1964). Among psychological studies of the politics of humbler individuals, who are left anonymous, reference has been made to *Opinions and Personality* by M. Brewster Smith et. al. (1960), a study limiting its scope to attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Three other very useful works are Robert E. Lane's *Political Ideology*, a study of fifteen "average" New Englanders, mostly working men; David Riesman's *Faces in the Crowd*, dealing with "average" Los Angeles; and an excellent Australian study of five more or less politically active individuals,—*Private Politics*, by Alan F. Davies (1966).

The more secure and sheltered a person's infancy and childhood, and the more freedom that educational and other social processes has given him to develop according to his inner needs and potentialities, the more likely that a capacity for political rationality and independence will develop, simply because the likelihood of severe anxieties is relatively low. In addition, again converting Camus' ideal into empirical-theoretical currency, the better the individual has been able to resolve his own anxieties, the more likely that he will empathize with others less fortunate than himself. A sense of justice as well as a capacity for rationality is, according to this theory, a likely development in relatively secure individuals, whose politics, if any, will therefore tend toward the left,—toward supporting the champions of the underdog, not the defenders of established, always unjust, institutions. And young people, with the proverbial impetuosity of youth, are likely to seek extremes of social justice, or militant means, simply because their emotions, and more particularly their sense of elementary morality and justice, have not yet been dulled by daily compromises and defeats to the extent that most older persons' emotions have been.<sup>3</sup>

Let me sharpen my own position as follows: *Every new human being is potentially a liberal animal and a rebel; yet every social organization he will be up against, from the family to the state, is likely to seek to "socialize" him into a conveniently pliant conformist.*

Many parents and some schools are child-oriented to the extent of trying to give children the security and freedom to develop according to their own inner needs and potentialities. With a good start of this kind, such children may, when they approach adulthood, be able to resist the socializing of privilege-defending states, universities and other established institutional pillars of the *status quo*; if so, they become the student rebels, the civil rights workers, and the peace

<sup>3</sup> Now there are some older persons, too, who for all the toll of many years of practical experience, seem to have remained able to share the basic moral and political outlook (if not necessarily the views on tactics) of militant student activists. As I read some of Erik H. Erikson's recent work, he appears to conclude that man's sense of social responsibility and his degree of social sensitivity depend on his maturation beyond the Freudian psychosocial stage of genitality; he calls this hypothetically higher developmental stage *generativity*: "I refer to man's *love for his works and ideas as well as for his children*, and the necessary self-verification which adult man's ego receives, and must receive, from his labor's challenge. As adult man needs to be needed, so—for the strength of his ego and for that of his community—he requires the challenge emanating from what he has generated and from what now must be 'brought up', guarded, preserved—and eventually transcended" (Erikson, 1964, 130–132). Erikson describes parenthood as "the first, and for many, the prime generative encounter" but argues that those who approach or reach the generative stage of psycho-social development to that extent need to teach, to instruct and influence, and in other ways actively work for the good of not only their own children but of their community and their society, or mankind, as well.

activists: a small minority, but a growing one in terms of influence among young people.

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## Student Stress and the Institutional Environment

**Donald R. Brown**

**The University of Michigan**

Spencer Brown, whose recent article in the *New York Sunday Times Magazine* has helped many of us over thirty to recover enough perspective to hold our heads almost high again, reports a confrontation between television interviewers and Robert Frost:

Or we say, as did a group of reporters interviewing Robert Frost on television, that this is the worst or most dangerous or most difficult time Man has ever lived through. They kept trying to badger the octogenarian poet into saying what they wanted him to say; but at last he succeeded in out shouting them and making himself heard: "Yes, yes, yes, it's a terribly difficult time for a man to try to save his soul—about as difficult as it always has been" (Brown, 1966, 57).

Frost, who in his youth went through a protracted period of what we would now term alienation (see, for example, Keniston's discussion), brings, I think, a much needed balm to the troubled contemporary scene. There is student stress and unrest. There has always been unrest and considerable stress amongst university students. The upset follows in part from the nature of growth during late adolescence and therefore we should hope there always will be such unrest. The real question is not if student discontent is new, but rather what accounts for it as a natural phenomenon of growth and what new features of the present educational scene in America can account for its current manifestations and greater visibility.

## Today's Visible Student

Consider the following quasi-descriptive statements which seem to me to account for the greater visibility on the national scene of students and their concerns.

. . . The college student population has grown astronomically since 1946. More students—more visibility.

. . . College attendance is increasingly seen as a necessity in present-day America. Student population has increased faster than the general population.

. . . Students come from a wider range of the population on all demographic dimensions than they previously did and, consequently, present new challenges to the colleges as socialization agencies.

. . . The post-Sputnik emphasis on the meritocracy and the seller's market consequent to the increased numbers has put students under great competitive stress for admission even to the less prestigious institutions.

. . . In purely visibility terms, the news hungry media tend to fan the sparks of unrest by massive and immediate publicity which has no trouble in finding its own performers. Sampson's discussion of this factor, especially with reference to the events at Berkeley, is a good case in point.

. . . The increased sophistication of students, as in all other groups in our society, has produced greater concerns over issues of individual rights, both in the university and in the society.

. . . The better academic preparation in the secondary schools following the massive curricular reform movements which started in the middle '50's has resulted, in part, in students who have tasted good teaching and want more of it.

. . . A society in which affluence and freedom exist side by side with poverty and the enslavement of ignorance, discrimination and hopelessness, has produced contradictions and hypocrisies which all can see.

. . . An increased emphasis on the existential view of self-determination, responsibility and meaningful personal communication is gradually replacing the older pragmatism in action and privacy in personal matters as the mass ethic of the younger intelligentsia.

. . . The inherent loneliness of youth, as it seeks self-definition and clarity, has been increased by the rise in anonymity accompanying the moral blandness of a society in which guilt is hard to define and therefore impossible to expiate.

. . . The increasing technical mechanization of the societal means of dealing with large numbers, as personified in the phobia of the IBM card, threatens the less stout-hearted with an overwhelming crisis of depersonalization.

. . . The changing image of college life from the social to the intellectual has caused increasing numbers of entering students to have high expectations of the curriculum, the faculty, their peers and of the intellectual life itself, which are unfortunately rarely fulfilled.

## Student Conceptions of Education as Viewed Historically

It is always helpful before one views with alarm the present situation, as outlined briefly in the preceding set of twelve statements to look back with Robert Frost and try to understand the alarming situations of the past. Let me start by reference to a statement, called to my attention by Professor George Stern, written by one of the great Eton masters in the 1860's—a period when education of any sort, higher or otherwise, was reserved for the social, cultural and economic elite.

You go to school at the age of twelve or thirteen; and for the next four or five years you are not engaged so much in acquiring knowledge as in making mental efforts under criticism. A certain amount of knowledge you can indeed with average faculties acquire so as to retain; nor need you regret the hours that you have spent on much that is forgotten, for the shadow of lost knowledge at least protects you from any delusions. You go to a great school, not for knowledge as much as for arts and habits; for the habit of attention, for the art of expression, for the art of assuming at a moment's notice a new intellectual posture, for the art of entering quickly into another person's thoughts, for the habit of submitting to censure and refutation, for the art of indicating assent or dissent in graduated terms, for the habits of regarding minute points of accuracy, for the habit of working out what is possible in a given time, for taste, for discrimination, for mental courage and mental soberness. Above all, you go to a great school for self knowledge (Cory, 1938, 208).

While what Cory described as the goals of a liberal arts education hold today as they did in the 1860's in upperclass England, nonetheless, the sociological derivations of our students in the university and college of the 1960's differ considerably, and twenty-five years from now will differ even more.

For many years our students came from much the same social class as those that Cory was describing; but sometime shortly after World War I the proportion of Americans attending high school increased astronomically, and this desire for education burst into the college scene about the time of World War II. It has been increasing ever since so that today we find it necessary to think at least twenty-five years ahead in order to be prepared for the ever-growing onslaught of students. This trend is bound to have far reaching consequences on the nature of education and the needs that students bring to our institutions of higher learning. How has this manifested itself since World War II?

### *After the War . . .*

Immediately following the war, enrollments bulged with veterans flocking to our campuses. These were young men and women of above average college age who had been brought up during the great

depression and then tempered in the fiery inferno of World War II. Their values and goals were clear. They knew who their enemies were. First, there were the problems of economic inequity and irresponsibility which could be defeated by the "new economics". Later there were the evils of totalitarianism and fascism over which they had waged a long and bitter struggle ending in total victory, or so it seemed. They retreated to the security of alma mater, with the help of a benevolent G. I. Bill, to prepare themselves for the fruits of a better life for which they had made so many sacrifices.

This is the generation of the "over thirties". They knew what they were doing in college; their devotion to their studies and pragmatic approach to the curriculum had profound effects on the university. Practically overnight the Hollywood rah-rah culture of the campuses was dealt its death blow and was ultimately finished off by the rise of the meritocracy following the launching of Sputnik. They had seen society marshall its resources and solve, at least for the time, economic and political problems of life or death proportions. Faith in an ordered and continued use of intelligence and sustained effort within the social mechanism was the lesson which they brought out of their experience. By contrast, the present generation, suffering from the benefits of affluence, has been insulated from the opportunity (delusional as it may seem) to see society solve problems at first hand.

### *Children of an Affluent Society . . .*

Following this post World War II generation on the campus, there came the children of the newly affluent society. They came to college in numbers larger than ever before and from much more diverse educational and cultural backgrounds. Our attention was called quite forcibly to their appearance and to the disparity from the good old days at "City College" when, as memory had it, no one but first class intellects with real commitment and social concern manifested on every side populated the campuses. Philip Jacob (1960), in his study on value change in college students, summarizes the orientation of this group of the new affluents as (a) an absorbing self-interestedness, directed essentially toward satisfying the desires for material well-being, privacy within one's own male-oriented family domain, and relief from boredom; (b) group dependence, which causes students to bring personal conduct and standards into line with the expectations of groups to whom they turn for a sense of belongingness or look upon as vehicles to self-advancement; (c) social and political indifference and irresponsibility; and (d) an instrumental approach to reason and morality which pulls both reason and moral code into the service of present personal goals rather than acknowledges them as guides of verity and controlling

rules of conduct. Jacob was, of course, describing what we all came to think of as the age of student apathy—in many ways a most confronting age during which to be a member of the establishment. Contrast this description with a quote from an article which appeared in the University of Michigan student newspaper. *The American Student is Breaking Out of His Cocoon* is the lead.

The eruption started in the late 50's when students (where older brothers and sisters had thought the smooth move was to mind one's own business) were stirred by the civil rights movement and began to emerge from their study carrels and fraternity houses to make their dent on the world.

They were a new generation bred in prosperity. These students did not know the depression, they did not remember the war. To seek material reward—the house in Scarsdale, the pretty wife, and the steady job—was not enough because it was so obtainable. To be satisfied with a return to normalcy was not enough because normalcy was already the way of life.

They took their tactics from Gandhi, their idealism from philosophy class, their money from Daddy. They worked hand in hand with civil rights groups such as CORE, NAACP, SNCC and SCLC.

The results of the movement were civil rights acts, the voting rights bill, and the emergence of the American student.

Realizing they had the power to influence events, students broadened their involvement so that it ranged from criticizing foreign policy to organizing the poor.

Thus, the idealism of the civil rights movement led to an alienation from the multi-university and the hope for an idyllic "community of scholars" as the wave of the future. The democratic nature of the movement led students to hope that they could have a meaningful voice in governing their own affairs at their universities; and the success of the movement made students realize that they could implement their goals (*Michigan Daily*, February 20, 1966).

One is aware, naturally, that any attempt to describe all students at all institutions is a task fraught with folly. The above quote from the *Michigan Daily* makes it appear that the vast majority of students were caught up in the rising activism of the civil rights movement and ultimately in the concern about the nature of the university. We know from the work of Katz and Sanford (Katz, 1965) that at most only about 15 per cent of the students on an extremely active campus are so involved. These descriptions, which are applicable to historical periods over the last one hundred years, refer not to the modal situation but rather to the salient situation. They tend to represent the highly visible peaks of student behavior in the mass rather than individual students on the one hand or the majority of students on the other. These are the dominant images that characterized the periods, not necessarily the dominant behavior.

## Pluralistic Society . . . Pluralistic University

If we take a frankly sociological view of the matter and attempt to understand these seeming changes in the value orientation of university students as reflections of the population from which they are recruited, we must admit that from this view college going has not only increased numerically but has increasingly attracted segments of our population with different "life expectancies" from those to which the more traditional liberal arts curriculum was originally attuned. We are dealing here with what Joshua Aaron Fishman (1960) referred to as a population change rather than a value change. For example, the increasing numbers of veterans attending college on the G. I. Bill and its various revisions since World War II, working class children attending on government loans or state scholarship programs, the meritorious attending on National Merit Scholarships and similar competitive awards for students with outstanding high school attainment, Negro youth attending on the various new grants directed toward their recruitment, children of immigrants located by the nationwide searches—all of these groups bring new value constellations to our colleges, and the realities of their post-college lives will undoubtedly be different from those of the classical liberal arts college student who could postpone his vocational plans until graduate school and even sometimes forever.

It is interesting to speculate on the differences in the atmosphere of universities which follow from the obvious fact that, not only have the sources of students changed, as the well established universities have increasingly culled off the cream of admissions and thereby gotten a much broader geographic representation in their student bodies and the large state universities have dipped much further down to sample the real sources of intellectual quality in their states, but at the same time, the recruitment of faculty has been very much influenced by these previous population shifts in college attendance. It is not idle speculation to propose that a large per cent of faculty just now entering into senior positions come from the G. I. Bill crop which flooded graduate schools with the sort of Ph.D. material that rarely aspired to such educational heights before. As I look back on my own college experience, I am struck by how much more similar in social economic background current faculties are to their students than was my faculty, which tended to represent a kind of upper class, traditional, scholarly gentleman with considerable family wealth. All of this is bound to make for profound changes in our universities, in student roles and student stress.

The above merely indicates to me the striking pluralism of American society and the consequent pluralism that we can expect in universities.

## Student Stereotypes of Education and of the University

For the sake of argument, I will maintain that at present, students come to the university holding to varying degrees one of the following often mutually exclusive stereotypes about the process of education and the university's role in this process.

### *The Question is of "Being" or of "Doing"*

In the first case, the emphasis is upon broadening one's intellectual horizons and consequently maturing and stabilizing the personality. The liberal arts curriculum as classically defined is accepted as the road to these goals and the product is hopefully "cultured". The stress in this type of education is on *being* and not only on *doing*. The image is best represented by the statement quoted from the Eton schoolmaster. This image is today still represented by some of the prestigious colleges—particularly by some of the members of the Seven Women's College Conference, which are prestigious not so much because of their lofty educational aims but because these aims are generally supported by the upper classes, and in particular, for women.

### *College . . . to Acquire Occupational Training*

Secondly, there is the much more widely held image of the college as a place to acquire occupational training. As a society becomes both affluent and technologically advanced, the demand for highly trained personnel increases. The university, particularly the public university, experiences great pressure from its constituents to fulfill the demands of the occupational marketplace. At the same time, these pressures heighten the demand for a college degree and cheapen it as a symbol of professionalization. The degree comes to cover a multitude of sins committed in the name of education. All sorts of occupational groups join in and demand college programs in their fields. The emphasis in this kind of education is on *doing* and on being able to *do* rather than on *being*. Students holding this point of view tend not to be attracted by movements espousing social change since their purpose is to join the mainstream at a step up the ladder.

### *College . . . a Place to "Have Fun"*

The third dominant image relates to the collegiate fun culture which is the one most often portrayed in the mass media image of college, particularly before the rise of the meritocracy. The idea of the college embodied in this viewpoint sees it as a never ending series of increasingly romantic social events. Perhaps this image never did exist to the extent that Hollywood and college fiction would have it.

The students, coming as they do from the larger society, bring with them one or another of these three views of higher education. Therefore, they start their college experience with views that are to varying degrees incongruent with the generally held values of the faculty and the high sounding official ideology of the institution. The faculty see themselves as seekers of knowledge in specialized areas and privileged critics of the culture. Indeed, they demand special privileges of tenure and academic freedom in order to permit the unhampered pursuit of these goals. In recent years because of the nature of the market, they have indeed demanded almost complete freedom even from teaching. At the same time they're asked to educate a semicaptive audience which holds values often widely discrepant from their own views and very often widely variant within any given classroom. Here are certainly then the seeds of conflict, and the resolution of conflict is often stressful. The students are not without resources of their own for avoiding the issues of this conflict. They can create a "peer culture" which largely perpetuates the general societal values held outside the college and turn to this subculture for their goals and for their rewards. Or, they can create a "peer-culture" which openly challenges the state of society and provides a comforting way to engage in social and individual revolt.

The society and, indeed often the university, are not completely clear about the goals of higher education. It is not surprising that the students, unable to face the multiplicity of challenges to their self-image and the incongruity between their stereotypic expectation and the institutional ideology, find themselves forced to seek clarity in group identifications which reinforce the old and familiar or set new and often rebellious goals.

## The Entering Freshman

Sanford, in *The American College* (1962), has put it well when he describes the freshman as follows:

The freshman tends to be like a convert to adulthood, an enthusiastic supporter and imitator of adult ways who knows what it is to backslide—which he sometimes does. The achievement of flexible control, the arrangement in which there is genuine freedom of impulses because there is little danger of their getting out of hand lies ahead; nevertheless, impulses are not inhibited or contained with sufficient effectiveness so that the young person can turn his attention to other matters. He is now ready to concentrate upon his relations with the external world—to improve his understanding of that world and to find a place within it (Sanford, 1962, 260).

Upon arrival at college, to some extent, the immediate support of family and community are withdrawn or at least become more distant, often as contact is made with a new set of values. On today's

educational scene, the student faces considerable threat and consequent distress from several different sources: (a) highly selective admissions policies place the student into competition with a homogeneously intelligent group of peers in which doubt may be cast on his own academic competence; (b) the relative lack of structure or of the externally imposed structure, to which the student had become accustomed in high school, places him into a new and ambiguous situation; (c) the seemingly sophisticated environment of the university may cast doubts upon the student's own sense of social confidence; (d) the rapidly apparent discrepancy between the student's expectations about university life and its reality provides one further, especially important source of student stress.

The freshman understandably seeks new sources of support in the face of all these assaults. Easier than trying to go it alone is the choice of the readily available support of peers who can minimize the threat by offering subcultures in which the student can more readily determine his own stake in this new venture. If this identification with the peer culture which can exist within and on the periphery of an institution persists for four years in an unaltered form, education is apt to be a failure. It will fail because the student either keeps a value structure which developed before college and which will remain untested against the broader horizons of the university, or because, in his anxiety to avoid rejection by the valued group, he will adopt a set of values by simple imitation. It is important that the institution provide an open channel for its students to switch identities often during their college careers, both to avoid too narrow a range of choices and too early a commitment which will hamstring the individual for life.

### **The Institution and Student Growth: A Challenge**

I would suggest that the problem that faces the university of today and one which will increase in the future is how can an increasingly diverse body of students, drawn more and more widely from all areas of the population as the economic wherewithall for education becomes more available, be brought together in the common pursuit of intellectual and personal goals.

To accomplish this challenging task, the university must bring student groups and their peer-cultures into the service of their own education and development. Colleges must begin to operate on several levels at once. For example, it has long been assumed by the better residential colleges that students largely educate one another. While this may still be true in the small residential colleges, unfortunately with the rapid expansion and increasing specialization of knowledge and the cafeteria-like offerings of our universities, it is rare to find

two students coming together outside of class who have a common academic experience to share.

A situation which throws people together in a university but provides little shared intellectual experience will quite naturally lead the students to seek ways of interacting that are not necessarily congruent with the purposes of the university. Therefore, the university should consider new ways of grouping students in the curriculum, in the residential arrangements and in scheduling so that larger numbers will have some common shared intellectual life which will serve as a foundation for intellectual and social interaction. Very often students are forced in their noncurricular groupings into nonintellectual areas of concern by denying them easily integrated experiences which stem from the academic content of their institutional endeavor.

### The Michigan Projects

Two current projects at the University of Michigan are relevant here. Both of these projects owe a great deal in their original inception and in their ongoing administration to Professor Theodore Newcomb, who throughout his professional career has contributed so significantly to the area now known as the social psychology of higher education.

The first project is the "Pilot Program". It was conceived as a way of reducing the stresses inherent in the divorce between intellectual values and the residential life of a large campus. This was most manifest in the lack of intellectual life in the residence halls at the University. The "Pilot Program" then is a community in revolt against the forces of anonymity and alienation which threaten to undermine the educational objectives of a large University. The program consists of approximately six hundred volunteer entering freshmen of both sexes in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. They are assigned to houses (subunits) within the larger dormitories, known as Pilot Houses. These students are permitted to register for sections of regular introductory freshmen courses which are reserved for members of the Pilot Program only. Thus the student might conceivably find himself in as many as three of his freshmen courses along with his immediate dormitory mates. There is no infringement in any way on the right of the student to choose his curriculum within the structure of the college rules. In addition, the instructors of these sections are made aware of the nature of the Pilot Program and are encouraged to have meals in the Pilot Houses with their students and, indeed, if at all possible, to schedule class meetings within the dormitory as well. A further aspect of the Pilot Program involves the selection of specially selected Resident Fellows who act as counselors and tutors to the students. These Fellows are se-

lected from amongst the graduate students on the basis of their intellectual commitment and ability to serve as intellectual mentors rather than as disciplinarians in the dormitories.

The program is the responsibility of a committee of faculty from the College of Literature, Science and the Arts, and of representatives from the residence halls personnel of the University. This committee is somewhat unusual in that it attempts to institute policies in almost every area of undergraduate education, including staffing of residence halls, design of undergraduate courses, academic counseling, as well as registration and classification procedures. The committee reports directly to the Dean of the College.

So far the program does not sound startlingly different from what has occurred at other institutions in recent years. The program, however, does have some unique features. The program is considered frankly experimental and therefore is being continuously evaluated from a variety of points of view. The one that is of the most interest is the evaluation of the development of students and the implications for student stress and unrest. A study of a small number of pilot students with comparison students in the Literary College as a control shows that the pilot students tend to self-select themselves into the program on the basis of a greater need for contact with faculty. This need for contact with faculty seems to be based upon their recognition of a greater sense of dependency and requirement of intimacy on their part. They tend more often to come from smaller high schools and small towns than from large urban centers. They recognize before coming to the University the threat of size and consequent anonymity. The Pilot Program students at the end of the year express far greater satisfaction with the nature of residential life at the University and, in particular, with the quality of the residential staff. They are more critical and demanding of faculty and faculty performance but are also more satisfied with the progress they have made in the freshman year and the overall quality of the University.

### *The Pilot Program . . . a Test for a Residential College*

Continuing longitudinal studies of these students are now in progress and very detailed data will be available in the near future. Aside from the evaluation of the effects on students, another unique aspect for the Pilot Program is that it is serving as a pilot test, in the literal meaning, for the opening of a residential college for 1200 students this fall (1967) at the University of Michigan. In its capacity as a pilot, special courses designed to be included in the core curriculum of the residential college have been developed and tried out in the pilot program. These courses have been evaluated as well by the committee.

One of the most striking conclusions from the evaluation of the pilot program so far is the amount that can be accomplished in reducing student stress and loneliness while increasing student dignity and competence, as measured by standardized instruments such as the Student Activities Index (Stern, 1958) and College Characteristics Index (Stern and Pace, 1958), by such relatively simple and inexpensive devices as the grouping and scheduling of students. Perhaps the major implication is the obvious working of a Hawthorne effect. If so, then along with Nevitt Sanford, I would say that we should maximize the new and the exciting in our educational arrangements, in order to increase this kind of involvement on the part of the faculty and students.

### *What Freshmen Expect*

One reason for emphasizing techniques such as these for reducing stress can be found in the data which we at the Center for Research on Learning and Teaching at the University of Michigan have collected on nine hundred entering freshmen in fall 1966. In the course of a large number of paper and pencil questionnaires and inventories, the students were asked to complete the College and University Environment Scales (Pace, 1963). Our students filled out the CUES battery before they arrived at the University and were asked to complete the inventory as a description of the University as they expected and hoped it would be. The students under these instructions described their expectations about the University on the five scales which Pace has developed from the instrument as follows:

They do not see the University as a place where practicality will be greatly emphasized. The practicality scale consists of a . . . combination of items which suggests a practical, instrumental emphasis in the college environment. Procedures, personal status and practical benefits are important. Status is gained by knowing the right people, being in the right groups and doing what is expected. Order and supervision are characteristic of the administration and of classwork. Good fun, school spirit and student leadership in campus social activities are evident (Pace, 1963, 24).

Interestingly enough those items which the students do choose in the scaled direction refer with great agreement to good fun, school spirit and student leadership in campus social activities. Other data from upper classmen would indicate that this part of the entering student's perception of the University is quite unrealistic in terms of present student life.

Similarly, the students score much higher than one would expect on the community scale, which consists of items portraying "a friendly, cohesive, group-oriented campus. The environment is supportive and sympathetic. There is a feeling of group welfare and group loyalty which encompasses the college as a whole. The campus

is a community. It has a congenial atmosphere" (Pace, 1963, 24).

While it is true that there is a sense of community to be found on a campus such as that in Ann Arbor, it is almost a caricature to describe it in the above terms. Any student who seriously expects to find this kind of small college and small town atmosphere is bound to have to make some serious readjustments in his expectations, with consequent distress and unrest.

Pace's awareness scale is practically a description of my three dimensions of student growth mentioned above. The items included reflect

. . . a concern and emphasis upon three sorts of meaning—personal, poetic and political. An emphasis upon self-understanding reflectiveness, and identity suggest the search for personal meaning. A wide range of opportunities for creative and appreciative relationships to painting, music, drama, poetry, sculpture, architecture, etc., suggest the search for poetic meaning. A concern about events around the world, the welfare of mankind and the present and future condition of man suggests the search for political meaning and idealistic commitment. What seems to be evident in this sort of environment is a stress on awareness, an awareness of self, of society and of esthetic stimuli (Pace, 1963, 23).

On this scale the entering students see the University as being an environment totally of this sort. Of the thirty items on the scale, these pre-freshmen see their prospective campus in this light at least 70 per cent of the time or more on each item. Since the instructions ask the students to describe the University as they hoped and expected to find it, one can assume that the students are committed to the notion of self-development and intellectual growth, albeit, perhaps unrealistically or even romantically. While it is true that the University strives to be this sort of place and, as a function of the self-selection of students who share these expectations, is to a large extent such an environment, it falls far short of the hopes and aspirations of these entering students. Take, for example, the item which is agreed to by 99.7 per cent of the sample, "tutorial and honors programs available to qualified", or the near unanimous agreement with the expectation that "a noted philosopher-theologian would always draw a capacity crowd at a lecture". It seems unlikely that a student who shared the expectations on this scale would not find some disappointment and consequent unrest before the end of the freshman year.

On the other hand the students do seem to be aware of the general lack of conventional propriety on such a campus, since they score extremely low on this scale measuring "an environment that is polite and considerate".

And finally, on Pace's scholarship scale the entering students again score extremely high, agreeing over 75 per cent of the time with

twenty-six out of the thirty items. These items are descriptive of the state of scholarship they expect on the campus. They

describe an academic scholarly environment. The emphasis is on competitively high academic achievement and a serious interest in scholarship. The pursuit of knowledge and theories, scientific or philosophical, is carried out rigorously and vigorously. Intellectual speculation and interest in ideas as ideas, knowledge for its own sake, and intellectual discipline—all these are characteristic of the environment (Pace, 1963, 25).

Here again one can't help but wonder whether those 80 per cent who expect most professors to be thorough teachers who will probe fundamentals, or those 97 per cent who expect that lectures by famous scientists will always be very well attended, or those 80 per cent who hope that class discussion will typically be vigorous and intense will find their hopes realized.

One cannot help but be impressed by the stress which may well arise in students holding these expectations for their education, when they come up against the realities of academic life on a large, albeit good and exciting campus. Indeed, one wonders if any faculty could live up to the image that these students see as their hope for the next four years.

### *The University of Michigan's Residential College*

The Pilot Program described above is one attempt by the University to find ways of maximizing its realization of this image for the students. Another such attempt at the University of Michigan is the planned residential college for 1200 students in the liberal arts. Here a faculty committee has had the opportunity to plan during a leisurely period of three years a total college complete with its own physical plant. The unique feature of this college, as compared to any other existing small residential college, is that this college is an integral part of a large university with all of the resources of a large university at its service. To maximize these resources, this college will not have a separate faculty but will draw upon the regular faculty of the University for its staff on a part-time basis.

In addition, this plan is unique in that the living arrangements and their relationship to the intellectual environment of the college were designed by faculty in complete coordination with the structure of the curriculum before the college started. Furthermore, there was the opportunity to pretest certain of the new core courses in the Pilot Program described above. Finally, its uniqueness stems from a concerted effort to apply the knowledge of student development and evaluational techniques directly to the continuing evolution of this institution.

As the results of these studies become available, it is assumed

that changes will be fed back, not only into the Residential College and the Pilot Program, but into the life of the University itself.

### *Unrest . . . a Discrepancy Between Expectation and Reality*

The implication of these educational experiments for student unrest is quite clear. My assumption has been that a large part of student stress and unrest comes from the discrepancy between students' expectations and preparations for college today and the reality of our institutions. Hopes for intimate contact with faculty and peers, the expectation of a sense of community, the existential hope for deep inter-personal and intra-personal communication, and the need for true intellectual stimulation can make for an exciting student body, but it can also make for a restless college if the institution is not ready to meet these hopes for any other than a small segment of the student body.

It is interesting that in an earlier study (Brown, 1960) in which the faculty's perception of the ideal student was probed, it was found that what the current students seem to expect in terms of the nature of their university experience and of their own development at the university in this day and age was precisely what faculty responded to in their nominations of ideal students during the senior year at Vassar. If we could somehow arrange the mechanisms inherent in large complex environments such as ours so that these two sets of expectations and desires could be better matched, perhaps a very important source of student stress could be eliminated.

### **In Conclusion . . .**

I have tried to focus on some of the causes of student stress and unrest. These are seen to follow directly from the incongruity between the students' desires and expectations—based in large measure on the changing nature of the student population—and the increasing impersonality and anonymity associated with growth in the structure and organization of the American university. Students are seen as undergoing major reorientations in their values as a natural consequence of growth and development within their four years at college. Such growth itself provides a ready source for stress and conflict which is further heightened by the typical incongruity between what the student expects and the reality of his education.

It is only through a thorough understanding of the range and patterns of student hopes and expectations and their ways of dealing with the stress and conflict produced in these four years, that educators can hope to devise the variety of educational environments

that will help rather than hinder the emotional and intellectual development of their students.

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## The Sources of Student Dissent

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The apparent upsurge of dissent among American college students is one of the more puzzling phenomena in recent American history. Less than a decade ago, commencement orators were decrying the "silence" of college students in the face of urgent national and international issues; but in the past two or three years, the same speakers have warned graduating classes across the country against the dangers of unreflective protest, irresponsible action and unselective dissent. Rarely in history has apparent apathy been replaced so rapidly by publicized activism, silence by strident dissent.

This "wave" of dissent among American college students has been much discussed. Especially in the mass media—popular magazines, newspapers and television—articles of interpretation, explanation, depreciation and occasionally applause have appeared in enormous numbers. More important, from the first beginnings of the student civil rights movement, social scientists have been regular participant-observers and investigators of student dissent. There now exists a considerable body of research that deals with the characteristics and settings of student dissent (see Lipset and Altbach, 1966; Block, Haan and Smith, forthcoming; Katz, 1967; Peterson, 1967 for summaries of this research). To be sure, most of these studies are topical (centered around a particular protest or demonstration), and some of the more extensive studies are still in varying stages of incompleteness. Yet enough evidence has already been

gathered to permit tentative generalizations about the varieties, origins and future of student dissent in the nineteen sixties.

In the remarks to follow, I will attempt to gather together this evidence (along with my own research and informal observations) to provide tentative answers to three questions about student dissent today. First, what is the nature of student dissent in American colleges? Second, what are the sources of the recent "wave of protest" by college students? And third, what can we predict about the future of student dissent?

## Two Varieties of Dissent

Dissent is by no means the dominant mood of American college students. Every responsible study or survey shows apathy and privatism far more dominant than dissent (see, for example, Newsweek, 1965; Katz, 1965; Reed, 1966; Peterson, 1966; Block, Haan and Smith, forthcoming). On most of our twenty two hundred campuses, student protest, student alienation and student unrest are something that happens elsewhere, or that characterizes a mere handful of "kooks" on the local campus. However we define "dissent", overt dissent is relatively infrequent and tends to be concentrated largely at the more selective, "progressive", and "academic" colleges and universities in America. Thus, Peterson's study of student protests (1966) finds political demonstrations concentrated in the larger universities and institutions of higher academic calibre, and almost totally absent at teachers colleges, technical institutes and non-academic denominational colleges. And even at the colleges that gather together the greatest number of dissenters, the vast majority of students—generally well over 95%—remain interested onlookers or opponents rather than active dissenters. Thus, whatever we say about student dissenters is said about a very small minority of America's six million college students. At most colleges, dissent is not visible at all.

Partly because the vast majority of American students remain largely uncritical of the wider society, fundamentally conformist in behavior and outlook, and basically "adjusted" to the prevailing collegiate, national and international order, the small minority of dissenting students is highly visible to the mass media. As I will argue later, such students are often distinctively talented; they "use" the mass media effectively; and they generally succeed in their goal of making themselves and their causes highly visible. Equally important, student dissenters of all types arouse deep and ambivalent feelings in non-dissenting students and adults—envy, resentment, admiration, repulsion, nostalgia and guilt. Such feelings contribute both to the selective over-attention dissenters receive and to the often

distorted perceptions and interpretations of them and their activities. Thus, there has developed through the mass media and the imaginings of adults a more or less stereotyped—and generally incorrect—image of the student dissenter.

### *The Stereotyped Dissenter*

The "stereotypical" dissenter as popularly portrayed is both a Bohemian and political activist. Bearded, be-Levi-ed, long-haired, dirty and unkempt, he is seen as profoundly disaffected from his society, often influenced by "radical" (Marxist, Communist, Maoist, or Castroite) ideas, an experimenter in sex and drugs, unconventional in his daily behavior. Frustrated and unhappy, often deeply mal-adjusted as a person, he is a "failure" (or as one U. S. Senator put it, a "reject"). Certain academic communities like Berkeley are said to act as "magnets" for dissenters, who selectively attend colleges with a reputation as protest centers. Furthermore, dropouts or "non-students" who have failed in college cluster in large numbers around the fringes of such colleges, actively seeking pretexts for protest, refusing all compromise and impatient with ordinary democratic processes.

According to such popular analyses, the sources of dissent are to be found in the loss of certain traditional American virtues. The "breakdown" of American family life, high rates of divorce, the "softness" of American living, inadequate parents, and, above all, overindulgence and "spoiling" contribute to the prevalence of dissent. Brought up in undisciplined homes by parents unsure of their own values and standards, dissenters channel their frustration and anger against the older generation, against all authority, and against established institutions.

Similar themes are sometimes found in the interpretations of more scholarly commentators. "Generational conflict" is said to underly the motivation to dissent, and a profound "alienation" from American society is seen as a factor of major importance in producing protests. Then, too, such factors as the poor quality and impersonality of American college education, the large size and lack of close student-faculty contact in the "multiversity" are sometimes seen as the latent or precipitating factors in student protests, regardless of the manifest issues around which students are organized. And still other scholarly analysts, usually men now disillusioned by the radicalism of the 1930's, have expressed fear of the dogmatism, rigidity and "authoritarianism of the left" of today's student activists.

### *Activism and Alienation*

These stereotyped views are, I believe, incorrect in a variety of ways. They confuse two distinct varieties of student dissent; equally

important, they fuse dissent with maladjustment. There are, of course, as many forms of dissent as there are individual dissenters; and any effort to counter the popular stereotype of the dissenter by pointing to the existence of distinct "types" of dissenters runs the risk of oversimplifying at a lower level of abstraction. Nonetheless, it seems to me useful to suggest that student dissenters generally fall somewhere along a continuum that runs between two ideal types—first, the political activist or protester, and second, the withdrawn, culturally alienated student.

*The activist.* The defining characteristic of the "new" activist is his participation in a student demonstration or group activity that concerns itself with some matter of general political, social or ethical principle. Characteristically, the activist feels that some injustice has been done, and attempts to "take a stand", "demonstrate" or in some fashion express his convictions. The specific issues in question range from protest against a paternalistic college administration's actions to disagreement with American Vietnam policies, from indignation at the exploitation of the poor to anger at the firing of a devoted teacher, from opposition to the Selective Service laws which exempt him but not the poor to—most important—outrage at the deprivation of the civil rights of other Americans.

The initial concern of the protester is almost always immediate, ad hoc and local. To be sure, the student who protests about one issue is likely to feel inclined or obliged to demonstrate his convictions on other issues as well (Heist, 1966). But whatever the issue, the protester rarely demonstrates because his *own* interests are jeopardized, but rather because he perceives injustices being done to *others* less fortunate than himself. For example, one of the apparent paradoxes about protests against current draft policies is that the protesting students are selectively drawn from that subgroup *most* likely to receive student deferments for graduate work. The basis of protest is a general sense that the selective service rules and the war in Vietnam are unjust to others with whom the student is identified, but whose fate he does not share. If one runs down the list of "causes" taken up by student activists, in rare cases are demonstrations directed at improving the lot of the protesters themselves; identification with the oppressed is a more important motivating factor than an actual sense of immediate personal oppression.

The anti-ideological stance of today's activists has been noted by many commentators. This distrust of formal ideologies (and at times of articulate thought) makes it difficult to pinpoint the positive social and political values of student protesters. Clearly, many current American political institutions like *de facto* segregation are opposed; clearly, too, most students of the New Left reject careerism and familism as personal values. In this sense, we might think of the

activist as (politically) "alienated". But this label seems to me more misleading than illuminating, for it overlooks the more basic commitment of most student activists to other ancient, traditional and credal American values like free speech, citizen's participation in decision-making, equal opportunity and justice. In so far as the activist rejects all or part of "the power structure", it is because current political realities fall so far short of the ideals he sees as central to the American creed. And in so far as he repudiates careerism and familism, it is because of his implicit allegiance to other human goals he sees, once again, as more crucial to American life. Thus, to emphasize the "alienation" of activists is to neglect their more basic allegiance to credal American ideals.

One of these ideals is, of course, a belief in the desirability of political and social action. Sustained in good measure by the successes of the student civil rights movement, the protester is usually convinced that demonstrations are effective in mobilizing public opinion, bringing moral or political pressure to bear, demonstrating the existence of his opinions, or, at times, in "bringing the machine to a halt". In this sense, then, despite his criticisms of existing political practices and social institutions, he is a political optimist. Moreover, the protester must believe in at least minimal organization and group activity; otherwise, he would find it impossible to take part, as he does, in any organized demonstrations or activities. Despite their search for more truly "democratic" forms of organization and action (e. g., participatory democracy), activists agree that group action is more effective than purely individual acts. To be sure, a belief in the value and efficacy of political action is not equivalent to endorsement of prevalent political institutions or forms of action. Thus, one characteristic of activists is their search for new forms of social action, protest and political organization (community organization, sit-ins, participatory democracy) that will be more effective and less oppressive than traditional political institutions.

*The culturally alienated.* In contrast to the politically optimistic, active, and socially-concerned protester, the culturally alienated student is far too pessimistic and too firmly opposed to "the System" to wish to demonstrate his disapproval in any organized public way.<sup>1</sup> His demonstrations of dissent are private: through nonconformity of behavior, ideology and dress, through personal experimentation and

<sup>1</sup> The following paragraphs are based on the study of culturally alienated students described in *The Uncommitted* (1965). For a more extensive discussion of the overwhelmingly anti-political stance of these students, see Keniston (1966) and also Rigney and Smith (1961), Allen and Silverstein, 1967, Watts and Wittaker, 1967, and Wittaker and Watts, 1967.

above all through efforts to intensify his own subjective experience, he shows his distaste and disinterest in politics and society. The activist attempts to change the world around him, but the alienated student is convinced that meaningful change of the social and political world is impossible; instead, he considers "dropping out" the only real option.

Alienated students tend to be drawn from the same general social strata and colleges as protesters. But psychologically and ideologically, their backgrounds are often very different. Alienated students are more likely to be disturbed psychologically; and although they are often highly talented and artistically gifted, they are less committed to academic values and intellectual achievement than are protesters. The alienated student's real campus is the school of the absurd, and he has more affinity for pessimistic existentialist ontology than for traditional American activism. Furthermore, such students usually find it psychologically and ideologically impossible to take part in organized group activities for any length of time, particularly when they are expected to assume responsibilities for leadership. Thus, on the rare occasions when they become involved in demonstrations, they usually prefer peripheral roles, avoid responsibilities and are considered a nuisance by serious activists (Draper, 1965).

Whereas the protesting student is likely to accept the basic political and social values of his parents, the alienated student almost always rejects his parents' values. In particular, he is likely to see his father as a man who has "sold out" to the pressures for success and status in American society: he is determined to avoid the fate that overtook his father. Toward their mothers, however, alienated students usually express a very special sympathy and identification. These mothers, far from encouraging their sons towards independence and achievement, generally seem to have been over-solicitous and limiting. The most common family environment of the alienated-student-to-be consists of a parental schism supplemented by a special mother-son alliance of mutual understanding and maternal control and depreciation of the father (Keniston, 1965a).

In many colleges, alienated students often constitute a kind of hidden underground, disorganized and shifting in membership, in which students can temporarily or permanently withdraw from the ordinary pressures of college life. The alienated are especially attracted to the hallucinogenic drugs like marijuana, mescaline and LSD, precisely because these agents combine withdrawal from ordinary social life with the promise of greatly intensified subjectivity and perception. To the confirmed "acid head", what matters is intense, drug-assisted perception; the rest—including politics,

societies. Bohemians, "beatniks" and artistically-inclined undergraduates who rejected middle-class values have long been a part of the American student scene, especially at more selective colleges; they constituted the most visible form of dissent during the relative political "silence" of American students in the 1950's. What is distinctive about student dissent in recent years is the unexpected emergence of a vocal minority of politically and socially active students.<sup>3</sup> Much is now known about the characteristics of such students, and the circumstances under which protests are likely to be mounted. At the same time, many areas of ignorance remain. In the account to follow, I will attempt to formulate a series of general hypotheses concerning the sources of student activism.<sup>4</sup>

It is abundantly clear that no single factor will suffice to explain the increase of politically-motivated activities and protests on American campuses. Even if we define an activist narrowly, as a student who (a) acts together with others in a group, (b) is concerned with some ethical, social, ideological or political issue, and (c) holds liberal or "radical" views, the sources of student activism and protest are complex and inter-related. At least four kinds of factors seem involved in any given protest. First, the individuals involved must be suitably predisposed by their personal backgrounds, values and motivations. Second, the likelihood of protest is far greater in certain kinds of educational and social settings. Third, socially-directed protests require a special cultural climate, that is, certain distinctive values and views about the effectiveness and meaning of demonstrations, and about the wider society. And finally, some historical situations are especially conducive to protests.

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<sup>3</sup>Student activism, albeit of a rather different nature, was also found in the nineteen thirties. For a discussion and contrast of student protest today and after the Depression, see Lipset (1966a).

<sup>4</sup>Throughout the following, I will use the terms "protester" and "activist" interchangeably, although I am aware that some activists are not involved in protests. Furthermore, the category of "activist" is an embracing one, comprising at least three sub-classes. First, those who might be termed *reformers*, that is, students involved in community organization work, the Peace Corps, tutoring programs, Vista, etc., but not generally affiliated with any of the "New Left" organizations. Second, the group of *activists proper*, most of whom are or have been affiliated with organizations like the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, Students for a Democratic Society, the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee or the Congress on Racial Equality or the Vietnam Summer Project. Finally, there is a much publicized handful of students who might be considered *extremists*, who belong to doctrinaire Marxist and Trotskyite organizations like the now-defunct May Second Movement. No empirical study with which I am acquainted has investigated the differences between students in these three sub-groups. Most studies have concentrated on the "activist proper", and my remarks will be based on a reading of their data.

## The Protest-Prone Personality

A large and still-growing number of studies, conducted under different auspices, at different times and about different students, presents a remarkably consistent picture of the protest-prone individual (Aiken, Demerath and Marwell, 1966; Flacks, this issue; Gastwirth, 1965; Heist, 1965, 1966; Lyonns, 1965; Somers, 1965; Watts and Whittaker, 1966; Westby and Baungart, 1966; Katz, 1967; and Paulus, 1967). For one, student protesters are generally outstanding students; the higher the student's grade average, the more outstanding his academic achievements, the more likely it is that he will become involved in any given political demonstration. Similarly, student activists come from families with liberal political values; a disproportionate number report that their parents hold views essentially similar to their own, and accept or support their activities. Thus, among the parents of protesters we find large numbers of liberal Democrats, plus an unusually large scattering of pacifists, socialists, etc. A disproportionate number of protesters come from Jewish families; and if the parents of activists are religious, they tend to be concentrated in the more liberal denominations—Reform Judaism, Unitarianism, the Society of Friends, etc. Such parents are reported to have high ethical and political standards, regardless of their actual religious convictions.

As might be expected of a group of politically liberal and academically talented students, a disproportionate number are drawn from professional and intellectual families of upper middle-class status. For example, compared with active student conservatives, members of protest groups tend to have higher parental incomes, more parental education, and less anxiety about social status (Westby and Braungart, 1966). Another study finds that high levels of education distinguish the activist's family even in the grandparental generation (Flacks, this issue). In brief, activists are not drawn from disadvantaged, status-anxious, underprivileged or uneducated groups; on the contrary, they are selectively recruited from among those young Americans who have had the most socially fortunate upbringings.

### *Basic Value Commitments of Activists*

The basic value commitments of the activist tend to be academic and non-vocational. Such students are rarely found among engineers, future teachers at teachers colleges, or students of business administration (see Trent and Craise's article in this issue). Their over-all educational goals are those of a liberal education for its own sake, rather than specifically technical, vocational or professional preparation. Rejecting careerist and familist goals, activists es-

pouse humanitarian, expressive and self-actualizing values. Perhaps because of these values, they delay career choice longer than their classmates (Flacks, this issue). Nor are such students distinctively dogmatic, rigid or authoritarian. Quite the contrary, the substance and style of their beliefs and activities tends to be open, flexible and highly liberal. Their fields of academic specialization are non-vocational—the social sciences and the humanities. Once in college, they not only do well academically, but tend to persist in their academic commitments, dropping out *less* frequently than most of their classmates. As might be expected, a disproportionate number receive a B.A. within four years and continue on to graduate school, preparing themselves for academic careers.

Survey data also suggest that the activist is not distinctively dissatisfied with his college education. As will be noted below, activists generally attend colleges which provide the best, rather than the worst, undergraduate education available today. Objectively then, activists probably have less to complain about in their undergraduate educations than most other students. And subjectively as well, surveys show most activists, like most other American undergraduates, to be relatively well satisfied with their undergraduate educations (Somers, 1965; Kornhauser, 1967). Thus, dissatisfaction with educational failings of the "impersonal multiversity", however important as a rallying cry, does not appear to be a distinctive cause of activism.

In contrast to their relative satisfaction with the quality of their educations, however, activists *are* distinctively dissatisfied with what might be termed the "civil-libertarian" defects of their college administrations. While no doubt a great many American undergraduates distrust "University Hall", this distrust is especially pronounced amongst student protesters (Kornhausen, 1967; Paulus, 1967). Furthermore, activists tend to be more responsive than other students to deprivations of civil rights on campus as well as off campus, particularly when political pressures seem to motivate on campus policies they consider unjust. The same responsiveness increasingly extends to issues of "student power": i.e., student participation and decisions affecting campus life. Thus, bans on controversial speakers, censorship of student publications, and limitations on off-campus political or social action are likely to incense the activist, as is arbitrary "administration without the consent of the administered". But it is primarily perceived injustice or the denial of student rights by the Administration—rather than poor educational quality, neglect by the faculty, or the impersonality of the multiversity—that agitates the activist.

Most studies of activists have concentrated on variables that are relatively easy to measure: social class, academic achievements,

explicit values and satisfaction with college. But these factors alone will not explain activism: more students possess the demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the protest-prone personality than are actually involved in protests and social action programs. Situational, institutional, cultural and historical factors (discussed below), obviously contribute to "catalysing" a protest-prone personality into an actual activist. But it also seems that, within the broad demographic group so far defined, more specific psycho-dynamic factors contribute to activism.

### *Activists . . . Not in Rebellion*

In speculating about such factors, we leave the ground of established fact and enter the terrain of speculation, for only a few studies have explored the personality dynamics and family constellation of the activist, and most of these studies are impressionistic and clinical (e.g. Coles, 1967; Ehle, 1965; Draper, 1965; Fishman and Solomon n.d., 1964; Gastwirth, 1965; Newfield, 1966; Schneider, 1966; Solomon and Fishman, 1963, 1964; Zinn 1965). But certain facts are clear. As noted, activists are *not*, on the whole, repudiating or rebelling against explicit parental values and ideologies. On the contrary, there is some evidence that such students are living out their parents' values in practice; and one study suggests that activists may be somewhat closer to their parents' values than nonactivists (Flacks, this issue). Thus, any simple concept of "generational conflict" or "rebellion against parental authority" is clearly oversimplified as applied to the motivations of most protesters.

### *Activists . . . Living Out Parental Values*

It does seem probable, however, that many activists are concerned with *living out expressed but unimplemented parental values*. Solomon and Fishman (1963), studying civil rights activists and peace marchers, argue that many demonstrators are "acting out" in their demonstrations the values which their parents explicitly believed, but did not have the courage or opportunity to practice or fight for. Similarly, when protesters criticize their fathers, it is usually over their fathers' failure to practice what they have preached to their children throughout their lives. Thus, in the personal background of the protester there is occasionally a suggestion that his father is less-than-"*sincere*" (and even at times "*hypocritical*") in his professions of political liberalism. In particular, both careerism and familism in parents are the objects of activist criticisms, the more so because these implicit goals often conflict with explicit parental values. And it may be that protesters receive both covert and overt support from their parents because the latter are secretly proud of their children's eagerness to implement the ideals they as parents

have only given lip-service to. But whatever the ambivalences that bind parents with their activist children, it would be wrong to over-emphasize them: what is most impressive is the solidarity of older and younger generations.

### Activists . . . Family Structure

While no empirical study has tested this hypothesis, it seems probable that in many activist-producing families, the mother will have a dominant psychological influence on her son's development. I have already noted that the protester's cause is rarely himself, but rather alleviating the oppression of others. As a group, activists seem to possess an unusual *capacity for nurturant identification*—that is, for empathy and sympathy with the underdog, the oppressed and the needy. Such a capacity can have many origins, but its most likely source in upper-middle class professional families is identification with an active mother whose own work embodies nurturant concern for others. Flacks' finding that the mothers of activists are likely to be employed, often in professional or service roles like teaching and social work, is consistent with this hypothesis. In general in American society, middleclass women have greater social and financial freedom to work in jobs that are idealistically "fulfilling" as opposed to merely lucrative or prestigious. As a rule, then, in middle-class families, it is the mother who actively embodies in her life and work the humanitarian, social and political ideals that the father may share in principle but does not or cannot implement in his career.

Given what we know about the general characteristics of the families of protest-prone students, it also seems probable that the dominant ethos of their families is unusually equalitarian, permissive, "democratic", and highly individuated. More specifically, we might expect that these will be families where children talk back to their parents at the dinner table, where free dialogue and discussion of feelings is encouraged, and where "rational" solutions are sought to everyday family problems and conflicts. We would also expect that such families would place a high premium on self-expression and intellectual independence, encouraging their children to make up their own minds and to stand firm against group pressures. Once again, the mother seems the most likely carrier and epitome of these values, given her relative freedom from professional and financial pressures.

The contrast between such protest-prompting families and alienating families should be underlined. In both, the son's deepest emotional ties are often to his mother. But in the alienating family, the mother-son relationship is characterized by maternal control

and intrusiveness, whereas in the protest-prompting family, the mother is a highly individuating force in her son's life, pushing him to independence and autonomy. Furthermore, the alienated student is determined to avoid the fate that befell his father, whereas the protesting student wants merely to live out the values that his father has not always worked hard enough to practice. Finally, the egalitarian, permissive, democratic and individuating environment of the entire family of the protester contrasts with the overcontrolling, over-solicitous attitude of the mother in the alienating family, where the father is usually excluded from major emotional life within the family.

These hypotheses about the family background and psychodynamics of the protester are speculative, and future research may prove their invalidity. But regardless of whether *these* particular speculations are correct, it seems clear that in addition to the general social, demographic and attitudinal factors mentioned in most research, more specific familial and psychodynamic influences contribute to protest-proneness.

### The Protest-Promoting Institution

However we define his characteristics, one activist alone cannot make a protest: the characteristics of the college or university he attends have much to do with whether his protest-proneness will ever be mobilized into actual activism. Politically, socially and ideologically motivated demonstrations and activities are most likely to occur at certain types of colleges; they are almost unknown at a majority of campuses. The effects of institutional characteristics on protests have been studied by Cowan (1966) and Peterson (1966), and by Sampson and by Brown in this issue.

In order for an organized protest or related activities to occur, there must obviously be sufficient numbers of protest-prone students to form a group, these students must have an opportunity for *interaction* with each other, and there must be *leaders* to initiate and mount the protest. Thus, we might expect—and we indeed find—that protest is associated with institutional size, and particularly with the congregation of large numbers of protest-prone students in close proximity to each other. More important than sheer size alone, however, is the "image" of the institution: certain institutions selectively recruit students with protest-prone characteristics. Specifically, a reputation for academic excellence and freedom, coupled with highly selective admissions policies, will tend to congregate large numbers of potentially protesting students on one campus. Thus, certain institutions do act as "magnets" for potential activists, but not so much because of their reputations for political radicalism as

because they are noted for their academic excellence. Among such institutions are some of the most selective and "progressive" private liberal arts colleges, major state universities (like Michigan, California at Berkeley and Wisconsin) which have long traditions of vivid undergraduate teaching and high admissions standards (Lipset and Altbach, 1966) and many of the more prestigious private universities.

Once protest-prone students are on campus, they must have an opportunity to interact, to support one another, to develop common outlooks and shared policies—in short, to form an *activist subculture* with sufficient mass and potency to generate a demonstration or action program. Establishing "honors colleges" for talented and academically-motivated students is one particularly effective way of creating a "critical mass" of protest-prone students. Similarly, inadequate on-campus housing indirectly results in the development of off-campus protest-prone sub-cultures (e.g., co-op houses) in residences where student activists can develop a high degree of ideological solidarity and organizational cohesion.

But even the presence of a critical mass of protest-prone undergraduates in an activist sub-culture is not enough to make a protest without leaders and issues. And in general, the most effective protest leaders have not been undergraduates, but teaching assistants. The presence of large numbers of exploited, underpaid, disgruntled and frustrated teacher assistants (or other equivalent graduate students and younger faculty members) is almost essential for organized and persistent protest. For one, advanced students tend to be more liberal politically and more sensitive to political issues than are most undergraduates—partly because education seems to have a liberalizing effect, and partly because students who persist into graduate school tend to be more liberal to start than those who drop out or go elsewhere. Furthermore, the frustrations of graduate students, especially at very large public universities, make them particularly sensitive to general problems of injustice, exploitation and oppression. Teaching assistants, graduate students and young faculty members also tend to be in daily and prolonged contact with students, are close enough to them in age to sense their mood, and are therefore in an excellent position to lead and organize student protests. Particularly at institutions which command little institutional allegiance from large numbers of highly capable graduate students (Lipset and Altbach, 1966) will such students be found among the leaders of the protest movement.

### *The Issues of Protest*

Finally, issues are a necessity. In many cases, these issues are provided by historical developments on the national or international scene, a point to which I will return. But in some instances, as at

Berkeley, "on-campus" issues are the focus of protest. And in other cases, off-campus and on-campus issues are fused, as in the recent protests at institutional cooperation with draft board policies considered unjust by demonstrating students. In providing such on-campus issues, the attitude of the university administration is central. Skillful handling of student complaints, the maintenance of open channels of communication between student leaders and faculty members, and administrative willingness to resist public and political pressures in order to protect the rights of students—all minimize the likelihood of organized protest. Conversely, a university administration that shows itself unduly sensitive to political, legislative or public pressures, that treats students arrogantly, ineptly, condescendingly, hypocritically or above all dishonestly, is asking for a demonstration.

Thus one reason for the relative absence of on-campus student protests and demonstrations on the campuses of private, non-denominational "academic" colleges and universities (which recruit many protest-prone students) probably lies in the liberal policies of the administrations. As Cowan (1966) notes, liberal students generally attend non-restrictive and "libertarian" colleges. Given an administration and faculty that supports or tolerates activism and student rights, student activists must generally find their issues off-campus. The same students, confronting an administration unduly sensitive to political pressures from a conservative board of regents or State legislature, might engage in active on-campus protests. There is also some evidence that clever administrative manipulation of student complaints, even in the absence of genuine concern with student rights, can serve to dissipate the potentialities of protest (Keene, 1966).

Among the institutional factors often cited as motivating student protest is the largeness, impersonality, atomization, "multiversitification" etc., of the university. I have already noted that student protesters do not seem distinctively dissatisfied with their educations. Furthermore, the outstanding academic achievements and intellectual motivations of activists concentrate them, within any college, in the courses and programs that provide the most "personal" attention: honors programs, individual instruction, advanced seminars, and so on. Thus, they probably receive relatively *more* individual attention and a *higher* calibre of instruction than do non-protesters. Furthermore, protests generally tend to occur at the best, rather than the worst colleges, judged from the point of view of the quality of undergraduate instruction. Thus, despite the popularity of student slogans dealing with the impersonality and irrelevance of the multiversity, the absolute level of educational opportunities

seems, if anything, positively related to the occurrence of protest: the better the institution, the more likely demonstrations are.

Nor can today's student activism be attributed in any direct way to mounting academic pressures. To be sure, activism is most manifest at those selective colleges where the "pressure to perform" (Keniston, 1965b) is greatest, where standards are highest, and where anxieties about being admitted to a "good" graduate or professional school are most pronounced. But, contrary to the argument of Lipset and Altbach (1966), the impact of academic pressure on activism seems negative rather than positive. Protest-prone students, with their superior academic attainments and strong intellectual commitments, seem especially vulnerable to a kind of academic professionalism that, because of the enormous demands it makes upon the student's energies, serves to cancel or preclude activism. Student demonstrations rarely take place during exam periods, and protests concerned with educational quality almost invariably seek an improvement of quality, rather than a lessening of pressure. Thus, though the pressure to perform doubtless affects all American students, it probably acts as a deterrent rather than a stimulus to student activism.

### *Deprivation of Expectations*

What probably does matter, however, is the *relative deprivation* of student expectations (see Brown, this issue). A college that recruits large numbers of academically motivated and capable students into a less-than-first-rate education program, one that oversells entering freshmen on the virtues of the college, or one that reneges on implicit or explicit promises about the quality and freedom of education may well produce an "academic backlash" that will take the form of student protests over the quality of education. Even more important is the gap between expectations and actualities regarding freedom of student expression. Stern (1967) has demonstrated that most entering freshmen have extremely high hopes regarding the freedom of speech and action they will be able to exercise during college: most learn the real facts quickly, and graduate thoroughly disabused of their illusions. But since activists, as I have argued above, are particularly responsive to these issues, they are apt to tolerate disillusion less lightly, and to take up arms to concretize their dashed hopes. Compared to the frustration engendered by disillusionment regarding educational quality, the relative deprivation of civil libertarian hopes seems a more potent source of protests. And with regard to both issues, it must be recalled that protests have been *fewest* at institutions of low educational quality and little freedom for student expression. Thus, it is not the absolute level

either of educational quality or of student freedom that matters, but the gap between student hopes and institutional facts.

### The Protest-Prompting Cultural Climate

Even if a critical mass of interacting protest-prone students forms in an institution that provides leadership and issues, student protests are by no means inevitable, as the quiescence of American students during the nineteen fifties suggests. For protests to occur, other more broadly cultural factors, attitudes and values must be present. Protest activities must be seen as meaningful acts, either in an instrumental or an expressive sense; and activists must be convinced that the consequences of activism and protest will not be overwhelmingly damaging to them. During the 1950's, one much-discussed factor that may have militated against student activism was the conviction that the consequences of protest (blacklisting, F.B.I. investigations, problems in obtaining security clearance, difficulties in getting jobs) were both harmful to the individual and yet extremely likely. Even more important was the sense on the part of many politically-conscious students that participation in left-wing causes would merely show their naiveté, gullibility and political innocence without furthering any worthy cause. The prevailing climate was such that protest was rarely seen as an act of any meaning or usefulness.

### Academic Support . . .

Today, in contrast, student protesters are not only criticized and excoriated by a large segment of the general public, but—more crucial—actively defended, encouraged, lionized, praised, publicized, photographed, interviewed and studied by a portion of the academic community. Since the primary reference group of most activists is not the general public, but rather that liberal segment of the academic world most sympathetic to protest, academic support has a disproportionate impact on protest-prone students' perception of their own activities. In addition, the active participation of admired faculty members in protests, teach-ins and peace marches, acts as a further incentive to students (Kelman, 1966). Thus, in a minority of American colleges, sub-cultures have arisen where protest is felt to be both an important existential act—a dignified way of "standing up to be counted"—and an effective way of "bringing the machine to a halt", sometimes by disruptive acts (sit-ins, strikes, etc.), more often by calling public attention to injustice.

### Universalism . . .

An equally important, if less tangible "cultural" factor is the broad climate of social criticism in American society. As Parsons

(1951, 1960), White (1961), and others have noted, one of the enduring themes of American society is the pressure toward "universalism," that is, an increasing extension of principles like equality, equal opportunity, and fair protection of the law to all groups within the society (and in recent years, to all groups in the world). As affluence has increased in American society, impatience at the slow "progress" of non-affluent minority groups has also increased, not only among students, but among other segments of the population. Even before the advent of the student civil rights movement, support for racial segregation was diminishing. Similarly, the current student concern for the "forgotten fifth" was not so much initiated by student activists as it was taken up by them. In this regard, student activists are both caught up in and in the vanguard of a new wave of extension of universalism in American society. Although the demands of student activists usually go far beyond the national consensus, they nonetheless reflect (at the same time that they have helped advance) one of the continuing trends in American social change.

A contrasting but equally enduring theme in American social criticism is a more fundamental revulsion against the premises of industrial—and now technological—society. Universalistic-liberal criticism blames our society because it has not yet extended its principles, privileges and benefits to all: the complaint is injustice and the goal is to complete our unfinished business. But alienated-romantic criticism questions the validity and importance of these same principles, privileges and benefits—the complaint is materialism and the goal is spiritual, aesthetic or expressive fulfillment. The tradition of revulsion against conformist, anti-aesthetic, materialistic, ugly, middle-class America runs through American writing from Melville through the "lost generation" to the "beat generation" and has been expressed concretely in the bohemian sub-cultures that have flourished in a few large American cities since the turn of the century. But today, the power of the romantic-alienated position has increased: one response to prosperity has been a more searching examination of the technological assumptions upon which prosperity has been based. Especially for the children of the upper middle-class, affluence is simply taken for granted, and the drive "to get ahead in the world" no longer makes sense for students who start out ahead. The meanings of life must be sought elsewhere, in art, sentience, philosophy, love, service to others, intensified experience, adventure—in short, in the broadly aesthetic or expressive realm.

### *Deviant Views . . .*

Since neither the universalistic nor the romantic critique of modern society is new, these critiques affect the current student gen-

eration not only directly but indirectly, in that they have influenced the way many of today's college students were raised. Thus, a few of today's activists are children of the "radicals of the 1930's" (Lipset and Altbach, 1966); and Flacks comments on the growing number of intellectual, professional upper middle-class families who have adopted "deviant" views of traditional American life and embodied these views in the practices by which they brought up their children. Thus, some of today's activists are the children of bohemians, college professors, etc. But in general, the explanation from parental "deviance" does not seem fully convincing. To be sure, the backgrounds of activists are "atypical" in a statistical sense, and thus might be termed empirically "deviant". It may indeed turn out that the parents of activists are distinguished by their emphasis on humanitarianism, intellectualism and romanticism, and by their lack of stress on moralism (Flacks, this issue). But it is not obvious that such parental values can be termed "deviant" in any but a statistical sense. "Concern with the plight of others", "desire to realize intellectual capacities", and "lack of concern about the importance of strictly controlling personal impulses"—all these values might be thought of as more normative than deviant in upper middle-class suburban American society in 1966. Even "sensitivity to beauty and art" is becoming increasingly acceptable. Nor can the socio-economic facts of affluence, freedom from status anxiety, high educational levels, permissiveness with children, training for independence, etc. be considered normatively deviant in middle-class America. Thus, the sense in which activists are the deviant offspring of sub-culturally deviant parents remains to be clarified.

### *Psychological Flexibility . . .*

Another explanation seems equally plausible, at least as applied to some student activists—namely that their activism is closely related to the social and cultural conditions that promote high levels of psychological flexibility, complexity and integration. As Bay (1966) has argued, social scientists may be too reluctant to entertain the possibility that some political and social outlooks or activities are symptomatic of psychological "health", while others indicate "disturbance". In fact, many of the personal characteristics of activists—empathy, superior intellectual attainments, capacity for group involvement, strong humanitarian values, emphasis on self-realization, etc.—are consistent with the hypothesis that, as a group, they are unusually "healthy" psychologically. (See also Heist, 1966 and Trent and Craise in this issue). Similarly, the personal antecedents of activist—economic security, committed parents, humanitarian, liberal and permissive home environments, good education, etc.—are those that would seem to promote unusually high levels of psycho-

logical functioning. If this be correct, then former SDS president Tom Hayden's words (1966) may be a valid commentary on the cultural setting of activism:

Most of the active student radicals today come from middle to upper middle-class professional homes. They were born with status and affluence as facts of life, not goals to be striven for. In their upbringing, their parents stressed the right of children to question and make judgments, producing perhaps the first generation of young people both affluent and independent of mind.

In agreeing with Bay (this issue) that activists may be more psychologically "healthy" as a group than nonactivists, I am aware of the many difficulties entailed by this hypothesis. First, complexity, flexibility, integration, high levels of functioning, etc. are by no means easy to define, and the criteria for "positive mental health" remain vague and elusive. (See Jahoda, 1958). Second, there are obviously many individuals with these same "healthy" characteristics who are not activists; and within the group of activists, there are many individuals with definite psychopathologies. In any social movement, a variety of individuals of highly diverse talents and motivations are bound to be involved, and global descriptions are certain to be oversimplified. Third, the explanation from "psychological health" and the explanation from "parental deviance" are not necessarily opposed. On the contrary, these two arguments become identical if we assume that the preconditions for high levels of psychological functioning are both statistically and normatively deviant in modern American society. This assumption seems quite plausible.

Whatever the most plausible explanation of the socio-cultural sources of activism, the importance of prevailing attitudes toward student protest and of the climate of social criticism in America seems clear. In the past five years a conviction has arisen, at least among a minority of American college students, that protest and social action are effective and honorable. Furthermore, changes in American society, especially in middle-class child rearing practices, mean that American students are increasingly responsive to both the universalistic and romantic critique of our society. Both strands of social criticism have been picked up by student activists in a rhetoric of protest that combines a major theme of impatience at the slow fulfillment of the credal ideals of American society with a more muted minor theme of aesthetic revulsion at technological society itself. By and large, activists respond most affirmatively to the first theme and alienated students to the second; but even within the student protest movement, these two themes coexist in uneasy tension.

## The Protest-Producing Historical Situation

To separate what I have called the "cultural climate" from the "historical situation" is largely arbitrary. But by this latter term I hope to point to the special sensitivity of today's student activists to historical events and trends that do not immediately impinge upon their own lives. In other nations, and in the past, student protest movements seem to have been more closely related to immediate student frustrations than they are in America today. The "transformationist" (utopian, Marxist, universalistic or democratic) aspirations of activist youth in rapidly developing nations often seem closely related to their personal frustrations under oppressive regimes or at "feudal" practices in their societies; the "restorationist" (romantic, alienated) youth movements that have appeared in later stages of industrialization seem closely connected to a personal sense of the loss of a feudal, maternal, and "organic" past. (See Lifton, 1960, 1963, 1964). Furthermore, both universalistic and romantic youth movements in other nations have traditionally been highly ideological, committed either to concepts of universal democracy and economic justice or to particularistic values of brotherhood, loyalty, feeling and nation.

### *Anti-ideological . . .*

Today's activists, in contrast, are rarely concerned with improving their own conditions and are highly motivated by identification with the oppressions of others. The anti-ideological bias of today's student activists has been underlined by virtually every commentator. Furthermore, as Flacks notes, the historical conditions that have produced protest elsewhere are largely absent in modern America; and the student "movement" in this country differs in important ways from student movements elsewhere. In many respects, then, today's American activists have no historical precedent, and only time will tell to what extent the appearance of organized student dissent in the 1960's is a product of locally American conditions, of the psychosocial effects of a technological affluence that will soon characterize other advanced nations, or of widespread changes in identity and style produced by psycho-historical factors that affect youth of all nations (thermonuclear warfare, increased culture contact, rapid communications, etc.).

### *Sensitivity to World Events*

But whatever the historical roots of protest, today's student protester seems uniquely sensitive to historical trends and events. In interviewing student activists I have been impressed with how often they mention some world-historical event as the catalyst for their

activism—in some cases, witnessing via television of the Little Rock demonstrations over school integration, in another case, watching rioting Zengakuren students in Japan protesting the arrival of President Eisenhower, in other cases, particularly among Negro students, a strong identification with the rising black nationalism of recently-independent African nations.

Several factors help explain this sensitivity to world events. For one, modern means of communication make the historical world more psychologically "available" to youth. Students today are exposed to world events and world trends with a speed and intensity that has no historical precedent. Revolutions, trends, fashions and fads are now world wide; it takes but two or three years for fashions to spread from Carnaby Street to New York, New Delhi, Tokyo, Warsaw, Lagos and Lima. In particular, students who have been brought up in a tradition that makes them unusually empathic, humanitarian and universalistic in values may react more intensely to exposure via television to student demonstrations in Japan than to social pressures from their fellow seniors in Centerville High. Finally, this broadening of empathy is, I believe, part of a general modern trend toward the *internationalization of identity*. Hastened by modern communications and consolidated by the world-wide threat of nuclear warfare, this trend involves, in vanguard groups in many nations, a loosening of parochial and national allegiances in favor of a more inclusive sense of affinity with one's peers (and non-peers) from all nations. In this respect, American student activists are both participants and leaders in the reorganization of psycho-social identity and ideology that is gradually emerging from the unique historical conditions of the twentieth century (Liston, 1965).

A small but growing number of American students, then, exhibit a peculiar responsiveness to world-historical events—a responsiveness based partly on their own broad identification with others like them throughout the world, and partly on the availability of information about world events via the mass media. The impact of historical events, be they the world-wide revolution for human dignity and esteem, the rising aspirations of the developing nations, or the war in Vietnam, is greatly magnified upon such students. Their primary identification is not their unreflective national identity, but their sense of affinity for Vietnamese peasants, Negro sharecroppers, demonstrating Zengakuren activists, exploited migrant workers, and the oppressed everywhere. One of the consequences of security, affluence and education is a growing sense of personal involvement with those who are insecure, non-affluent and uneducated.

## The Future of Student Activism

I have argued that no single factor can explain or help us predict the future of the student protest movement in America: active expressions of dissent have become more prevalent because of an interaction of individual, institutional, cultural and historical factors. Affluence and education have changed the environment within which middle-class children are raised, in turn producing a minority of students with special sensitivity to the oppressed and the dissenting everywhere. At the same time, technological innovations like television have made available to these students abundant imagery of oppression and dissent in America and in other nations. And each of these factors exerts a potentiating influence on the others.

Given some understanding of the interaction of these factors, general questions about the probable future of student activism in America can now be broken down into four more specific questions: Are we likely to produce (a) more protest-prone personalities? (b) more institutional settings in which protests are likely? (c) a cultural climate that sanctions and encourages activism? and (d) a historical situation that facilitates activism? To three of the questions (a, b and d), I think the answer is a qualified yes; I would therefore expect that in the future, if the cultural climate remains the same, student activism and protest would continue to be visible features on the American social landscape.

Consider first the factors that promote protest-prone personalities. In the coming generation there will be more and more students who come from the upper middle-class, highly educated, politically liberal professional backgrounds from which protesters are selectively recruited (Michael, 1965). Furthermore, we can expect that a significant and perhaps growing proportion of these families will have the universalistic, humanitarian, equalitarian and individualistic values found in the families of protesters. Finally, the expressive, permissive, democratic and autonomy-promoting atmosphere of these families seems to be the emerging trend of middle-class America: older patterns of "entrepreneurial-authoritarian" control are slowly giving way to more "bureaucratic-democratic" techniques of socialization (Miller and Swanson, 1958). Such secular changes in the American family would produce a growing proportion of students with protest-prone personalities.

Institutional factors, I have argued, are of primary importance in so far as they bring together a critical mass of suitably protest-predisposed students in an atmosphere where they can interact, create their own subculture, develop leadership and find issues. The growing size of major American universities, their increasing academic and intellectual selectivity, and the emphasis on "quality" educa-

tion (honors programs, individual instruction, greater student freedom)—all seem to promote the continuing development of activist sub-cultures in a minority of American institutions. The increasing use of graduate student teaching assistants in major universities points to the growing availability of large numbers of potential "leaders" for student protests. Admittedly, a sudden increase in the administrative wisdom in college Deans and Presidents could reduce the number of available "on-campus" issues; but such a growth in wisdom does not seem imminent.

### *Cultural Climate May Change*

In sharp contrast, a maintenance of the cultural climate required for continuation of activism during the coming years seems far more problematical. Much depends on the future course of the war in Vietnam. Continuing escalation of the war in Southeast Asia will convince many student activists that their efforts are doomed to ineffectuality. For as of mid-1967, anti-war activism has become the primary common cause of student protesters. The increasing militancy and exclusivity of the Negro student civil rights movement, its emphasis on "Black Power" and on grass-roots community organization work (to be done by Negroes) is rapidly pushing white activists out of civil rights work, thus depriving them of the issue upon which the current mood of student activism was built. This fact, coupled with the downgrading of the war on poverty, the decline of public enthusiasm for civil rights, and the increasing scarcity of public and private financing for work with the underprivileged sectors of American society, has already begun to turn activists away from domestic issues toward an increasingly single-minded focus on the war in Vietnam. Yet at the same time, increasing numbers of activists overtly or covertly despair of the efficacy of student attempts to mobilize public opinion against the war, much less to influence directly American foreign policies. Continuing escalation in Southeast Asia has also begun to create a more repressive atmosphere towards student (and other) protesters of the war, exemplified by the question, "Dissent or Treason"? Already the movement of activists back to full-time academic work is apparent.

Thus, the war in Vietnam, coupled by the "rejection" of white middleclass students by the vestigial black Civil Rights Movement is producing a crisis among activists, manifest by a "search for issues" and intense disagreement over strategy and tactics. At the same time, the diminution of support for student activism tends to exert a "radicalizing" effect upon those who remain committed activists—partly because frustration itself tends to radicalize the frustrated, and partly because many of the less dedicated and committed activists have

dropped away from the movement. At the same time, most activists find it difficult to turn from civil rights or peace work toward "organizing the middle-class" along lines suggested by alienated-romantic criticisms of technological society. On the whole, activists remain more responsive to universalistic issues like peace and civil rights than to primarily expressive or esthetic criticisms of American society. Furthermore, the practical and organizational problems of "organizing the middle-class" are overwhelming. Were the student movement to be forced to turn away from universalistic issues like civil rights and peace to a romantic critique of the "quality of middle-class life", my argument here implies that its following and efficacy would diminish considerably. Were this to happen, observations based on student activism of a more "universalistic" variety would have to be modified to take account of a more radical and yet more alienated membership. Thus, escalation or even continuation of the war in Vietnam, particularly over a long period, will reduce the likelihood of student activism.

Yet there are other, hopefully more permanent, trends in American culture that argue for a continuation of protests. The further extension of affluence in America will probably mean growing impatience over our society's failure to include the "forgotten fifth" in its prosperity: as the excluded and underprivileged become fewer in number, pressures to include them in American society will grow. Similarly, as more young Americans are brought up in affluent homes and subcultures, many will undoubtedly turn to question the value of monetary, familistic and careerist goals, looking instead toward expressive, romantic, experiential, humanitarian and self-actualizing pursuits to give their lives meaning. Thus, in the next decades, barring a major world conflagration, criticisms of American society will probably continue and intensify on two grounds: first, that it has excluded a significant minority from its prosperity, and second, that affluence alone is empty without humanitarian, aesthetic or expressive fulfillment. Both of these trends would strengthen the climate conducive to continuing activism.

#### *World Wide Protest-Promoting Pressures . . .*

Finally, protest-promoting pressures from the rest of the world will doubtless increase in the coming years. The esteem revolution in developing nations, the rise of aspirations in the impoverished two-thirds of the world, and the spread of universalistic principles to other nations—all of these trends portend a growing international unrest, especially in the developing nations. If young Americans continue to be unusually responsive to the unfulfilled aspirations of those abroad, international trends will touch a minority of them

deeply, inspiring them to overseas activities like the Peace Corps, to efforts to "internationalize" American foreign policies, and to an acute sensitivity to the frustrated aspirations of other Americans. Similarly, continuation of current American policies of supporting anti-communist but often repressive regimes in developing nations (particularly regimes anathema to student activists abroad) will tend to agitate American students as well. Thus, pressures from the probable world situation will support the continuance of student protests in American society.

In the next decades, then, I believe we can foresee the continuation, with short-range ebbs and falls, of activism in American society. Only if activists were to become convinced that protests were ineffectual or social action impossible is this trend likely to be fundamentally reversed. None of this will mean that protesters will become a majority among American students; but we can anticipate a slowly-growing minority of the most talented, empathic, and intellectually independent of our students who will take up arms against injustice both here and abroad.

### **In Summary . . .**

Throughout this discussion, I have emphasized the contrast between two types of students, two types of family backgrounds, and two sets of values that inspire dissent from the Great Society. On the one hand, I have discussed students I have termed alienated, whose values are apolitical, romantic, and aesthetic. These students are most responsive to "romantic" themes of social criticism; that is, they reject our society because of its dehumanizing effects, its lack of aesthetic quality and its failure to provide "spiritual" fulfillment to its members. And they are relatively impervious to appeals to social, economic or political justice. On the other hand, I have discussed activists, who are politically involved, humanitarian and universalistic in values. These students object to our society not because they oppose its basic principles, but because it fails to implement these principles fully at home and abroad.

In the future, the tension between the romantic-alienated and the universalistic-activist styles of dissent will probably increase. I would anticipate a growing polarization between those students and student groups who turn to highly personal and experiential pursuits like drugs, sex, art and intimacy, and those students who redouble their efforts to change American society. In the past five years, activists have been in the ascendant, and the alienated have been little involved in organized political protests. But a variety of possible events could reverse this ascendancy. A sense of ineffectuality, especially if coupled with repression of organized dissent, would

obviously dishearten many activists. More important, the inability of the student protest movement to define its own long-range objectives, coupled with its intransigent hostility to ideology and efficient organization, means that *ad hoc* protests are too rarely linked to the explicit intellectual, political and social goals that alone can sustain prolonged efforts to change society. Without some shared sustaining vision of the society and world they are working to promote, and frustrated by the enormous obstacles that beset any social reformer, student activists would be likely to return to the library.

How and whether this tension between alienation and activism is resolved seems to me of the greatest importance. If a growing number of activists, frustrated by political ineffectuality or a mounting war in Southeast Asia, withdraw from active social concern into a narrowly academic quest for professional competence, then a considerable reservoir of the most talented young Americans will have been lost to our society and the world. The field of dissent would be left to the alienated, whose intense quest for *personal* salvation, meaning, creativity and revelation dulls their perception of the public world and inhibits attempts to better the lot of others. If, in contrast, tomorrow's potential activists can feel that their demonstrations and actions are effective in molding public opinion and, more important, in effecting needed social change, then the possibilities for constructive change in post-industrial American society are virtually without limit.

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## Biographical Sketches

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EDWARD E. SAMPSON. Student Activism and the Decade of Protest. *Journal of Soc. Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 3, 1-33.

Although both the role of the family and of the individual's values and personality are discussed, major emphasis is given to the two social contexts of the institution and of contemporary society. Twelve classes of institution-related variables are presented and discussed. Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War are presented as two essential societal ingredients which have contributed significantly to triggering, intensifying, and sustaining student activism. Several other societal variables are briefly considered. Two final topics which are discussed involve the nature of social movements and the extent to which contemporary student activism can be considered an actual social movement, and some of the features of activism which are functional or dysfunctional to the individual, to the institution and to the society.

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JAMES W. TRENT and JUDITH L. CRAISE, Commitment and Conformity in the American College. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 3, 34-51.

Although different forms of discontent may be observed among current college students across the nation, the committed and informed intellectual dissent that takes the form of student activism characterizes only a small minority of students in a few academically elite colleges and universities. Educational and political activism may enrich the educational experience and foster personal development. Political and social apathy and conformity to established norms appear to be as characteristic of most college students of this generation as of students in the past. However, despite this general apathy and conformity, college students do seem to possess more autonomy and intellectual disposition than do their peers who do not attend college. Since these are precisely the traits which to a more intense degree distinguish student activists from other college students, questions are raised concerning the role colleges can play in the further development of these traits among their students.

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RICHARD FLACKS, The Liberated Generation: An exploration of the Roots of Student Protest. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 3, 52-75.

The student movement in the United States may be viewed as an organized expression of disaffection among the most highly advantaged sector of the youth population. Of particular interest is the fact that highly privileged students have organized around such themes as egalitarianism, populism and the refusal of conventional adult roles. The emergence of this movement suggests that substantial numbers of American youth are affected by serious value conflicts which have, up until now, received little attention from social scientists. Data collected in a study of student activists and their parents and in a study of participants and nonparticipants in a large-scale campus revolt, support the view that activists' parents are affluent and highly educated, and extremely liberal in their politics. They tend to transmit to their offspring values and life styles which emphasize intellectual, aesthetic and humanitarian concerns and de-emphasize occupational and material achievement. An important concomitant of this type of family is a democratic and "permissive" authority structure. This pattern of socialization sensitizes offspring to resist acts of authority which they perceive to be arbitrary or "hypocritical".



CHRISTIAN BAY, Political and Apolitical Students: Facts in Search of Theory.  
*Journal of Social Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 3, 76-91.

Why do students active in protest movements tend to do better academically and be more intelligent and intellectually disposed, compared to more apolitical students? The validity of this statement is tested firstly by examining some work on the social psychology of attitudes, especially the work of Newcomb and of Stouffer; secondly, by examining work on the authoritarian personality, on dogmatism and on personality and political attitudes; and thirdly, by examining the more recent work on student political activists. The explanation offered for this relationship between intelligence and radical-liberal political attitudes and behavior is based on a functional theory of attitudes which concludes that statistically speaking, more conservative views among students or adults generally are likely to be less rationally and less independently motivated as compared to more radical-liberal views. This theme is examined further in a developmental context in which Camus' statement, "in our daily trials rebellion plays the same role as does the '*cogito*' in the realm of thought . . . I rebel—therefore we exist", provides a provocative, though speculative basis for developing the outlines of a theoretical explanation of radical-liberal political attitudes and behavior.

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DONALD R. BROWN, Student Stress and the Institutional Environment. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 3, 92-107.

Some of the causes of student stress and unrest are seen to follow directly from the incongruity between the students desires and expectations—which have undergone change as the student population has become more heterogeneous—and the increasing impersonality and anonymity associated with growth in the structure and organization of the American university—based on its rapid growth in size, complexity and mission. Students are seen as undergoing major reorientations in their values as a natural consequence of growth and development within their four years at college. Such growth itself provides a ready source for stress and conflict which is further heightened by the typical incongruity between what the student expects and the reality of his education. Thorough understanding the range and patterns of student hopes and expectations (and their ways of dealing with the stress and conflict produced during the college years) educators can hope to devise the variety of educational institutional environments that will help rather than hinder the emotional and intellectual development of their students. Some efforts at this form of institutional change which are presently undergoing a trial period at The University of Michigan are examined.

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KENNETH KENISTON, The Sources of Student Dissent. *Journal of Social Issues*, 1967, XXIII, No. 3, 108-137.

Several accounts of contemporary student dissent tend to confuse two distinct ideal types: the political activist who participates in demonstrations and attempts to take a stand on political and social issues; the culturally alienated student who opts out of fighting the system and turns more towards privatism. At least four kinds of factors seem involved in any given protest. First, the individuals involved must be suitably predisposed by their personal backgrounds, values and motivations. Second, the likelihood of protest is far greater in certain kinds of educational and social settings. Third, socially-directed protests require a special cultural climate, that is, certain distinctive values and views about the effectiveness and meaning of demonstrations. Fourth, some historical situations are especially conducive to protests. Active expressions of dissent have become more prevalent because of an interaction of individual, institutional, cultural and historical factors. In the future, student activism and protest should continue to be visible features on the American social landscape.



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
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
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The Journal typically publishes a whole number on a single theme or topic. Proposals for new thematically integrated issues should be sent to the General Editor. In addition, the Journal welcomes manuscripts for possible inclusion in an occasional issue devoted to separate articles of general interest to its readers, but with no necessary relationship to each other. Single manuscripts should be sent to the Singles Editor.

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
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
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# The Journal of **SOCIAL ISSUES**



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## FAMILY PLANNING IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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## Editorial Notes

### JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES WILL ACCEPT "SINGLES"

The *JSI* Editorial Board plans to depart somewhat from the current policy of organizing each number of the *Journal of Social Issues* around an integrating theme or topic. In the future, some *JSI* issues will consist of "singles," i.e., of separate articles that bear no necessary relationship to each other. The single-theme-per-issue policy will still predominate since it provides for comprehensive coverage of the vital social concerns addressed by the Journal. However, there are matters of broad public concern to which social scientists have contributed relatively little theory or research—certainly not enough to fill an entire *JSI* number. The Editorial Board feels that if the topic is important enough, and a single paper written on it is compelling enough, some future *JSI* issues ought to be designed to accommodate such "singles."

*SSPSI members and their friends and colleagues in the social sciences are therefore invited to submit manuscripts for review and possible inclusion in forthcoming "singles" issues. The editors suggest the following guidelines for preparing "singles":*

(a) In keeping with the *JSI* tradition, a "single" should deal with a broadly conceived critical issue. The titles of past *JSI* numbers suggest that the *Journal* has always addressed itself to topics that have breadth and scope rather than those that are conceptually circumscribed, even if their implications are vast. "Singles" submitted for consideration by the *JSI* Editorial Board ought to follow in that spirit.

(b) As in the case of *JSI* numbers planned around one topic, a "single" article should be a contribution growing out of the professional work of the social scientist and should therefore, reflect theory or research in his field. It should not be simply a personal essay that would be more suitable for a journal on public affairs.

There is no way of determining as yet how frequently a "singles" issue of *JSI* appear. Wherever possible, a paper that is acceptable to the editors will be published along with other papers on the same topic in order to preserve the current format of topical issues. The "singles" format will appear only when there is not enough social scientific material that can be assembled on the topic to fill an entire *Journal* number.

Please address all contributions to Dr. J. Diedrick Snoek, Singles Editor *JSI*, Department of Psychology, Clark Science Center, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts 01060.

### COMMENTS AND REJOINDERS

Readers wishing to discuss or comment upon any of the articles in this or subsequent issues of *JSI* may submit their reactions or criticisms to Dr. Joshua A. Fishman, General Editor, *JSI*, Yeshiva University, 55 Fifth Ave., N.Y., N.Y. 10003. Criticisms or observations of general interest will be published in a *Comments and Rejoinders* section of *JSI*.

## **Family Planning in Cross-National Perspective: An Overview**

**Lee Rainwater**

**Washington University**

Technology multiplies choice at a bewildering rate, so that increasingly the potentiality is available to us of creating society rather than simply adapting in terms of the constraints of physical, biological and social givens. Nowhere is this potentiality more subtly, and at the same time more powerfully, apparent than in the area of population control. Within as yet only dimly discerned limits man moves to control death, and within just the past fifty years to an ever more precise control over the events and timing of birth. It has proved possible, however, to disseminate more rapidly the techniques for controlling death than those for controlling birth, so that in most of the world today population growth threatens from year to year to outstrip the growth of resources to sustain population. The processes of family planning have proved infinitely more complex than those of death avoidance.

During the 1950's the growing awareness of the threat which uncontrolled population growth can represent to the underdeveloped nations of the world led to a tremendous amount of social science research on problems of family planning and birth control. In the last few years it has seemed that this research, coupled with the development of a simpler contraceptive technology, would shortly pay off in readily institutionalized ways of making control over birth available almost anywhere in the world given relatively modest re-

sources. Without modern birth control techniques individuals and societies have only the grossest and socially most costly of mechanisms available to them to control their population growth; with such techniques control, the ability to command the birth events of their own lives, becomes simple and straightforward.

Yet in some countries, such as the United States and Canada, where this ability is widely diffused, population growth continues at a very high level. It becomes obvious, then, that the dissemination of contraception technology does not necessarily lead to a stable population or even to a relatively slow rate of population growth.

These facts emphasize the twin aspects of population dynamics once the death rate is under control. The first has to do with the extent to which individuals in a population have available to them means of birth planning, and the second with the way they use available means. The aggregate statistics of population growth, decline or stability will be the resultant of the operation of both of these factors. With much cruder and more difficult contraceptive methods at their command European countries sustain a much lower birth rate than do the countries of North America. In previous decades most research in the area of family planning has paid primary attention to knowledge about, attitudes toward and use of contraceptive methods. As time goes on these matters are likely to become less and less problematic and instead the emphasis will shift to a concern with the dynamics of family size preference and staging.

### **Population Control—a Multifaceted Social Problem**

Population control may be a social problem, then, in one of several ways. The most widely acknowledged social problem in this area has to do with rapid population growth to such an extent that either economic progress for a nation's citizens is slowed or there is actual retrogression. Thus, if the birth rate is so great as to not keep up with the rate of growth of the gross national product, population growth interferes with modernization and development. (See Table I for comparative data on national rates of population growth.) In some countries, India for example, the birth rate is actually such that despite tremendous growth from year to year in the economic potential of the country the per capita gross national product hardly grows at all. In particularly bad times, there could even be a retrogression with all of the consequent desperation and violence that is likely to result when national economic affairs go badly.

The other kind of readily apparent social problem involving population growth involves simply the inability of some families in a society, or many families, to control the size of their families in

**TABLE I**  
**NUMBER OF YEARS REQUIRED TO DOUBLE THE POPULATION**  
**FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES (USING 1966 BIRTH AND DEATH RATES)**

	Years to Double Population
<i>Population Doubles in Approximately One-Quarter of a Century</i>	
Venezuela	21
Phillipines	21
Columbia	22
Mexico	22
Pakistan	22
Syria	22
Brazil	23
Kenya	24
Egypt	26
<i>Population Doubles in About One-Third of a Century</i>	
Chile	31
Congo	33
Switzerland	33
Australia	33
Tunisia	35
Burma	35
Canada	35
<i>Population Doubles in Half a Century or Less</i>	
United States	44
Argentina	44
Angola	50
Liberia	50
Uruguay	50
Netherlands	50
Poland	54
<i>Population Takes over Fifty Years to Double</i>	
France	54
West Germany	54
Japan	70
Spain	88
United Kingdom	100
Czechoslovakia	100
Italy	100
Sweden	117
Hungary	175

line with their desires, quite apart from any consideration of the national impact of the birth rate. Thus, in this country we know that poor people often do not have access to adequate birth control information and techniques and therefore have more children than they want or can afford. Here the problem is quite comparable to the social problem of other kinds of medical care for the poor. However,

the consequences of poor birth control facilities for people who already live below or on the edge of poverty are in some ways much greater than the consequences of the problems in the medical area with which we are more familiar.

Finally, there is the much less obvious social problem connected with population growth in seemingly prosperous nations. Here the problem is that even where economic productivity is sufficient to sustain a high level of population growth there is the question of how large a population can be sustained without negatively affecting the quality of life of the people. Thus, in the United States at current growth rates the population will double every 44 years (that means a population of 400 million in the year 2000). The issues here are not so much whether in overall terms it would be possible to sustain continuing growth in national income and so on, but rather whether the quality of life would be so affected that however prosperous a nation might be it would not be a very pleasant place to live.

Unfortunately, this is a subject about which very little careful research and thinking has been done; instead we have a collection of dire predictions and philosophizing which in turn is opposed by the optimistic views of those who believe there will always be room on the earth for however many human beings are born. At this point we have really no more to go on than the rather vague feeling that there can be too many Americans around and that the costs, non-economic as well as economic, of continued population growth might turn out to be very great. Probably the basic belief here is that there is no particular virtue in sheer numbers of people; instead, it is the quality of their lives that is of value, and a population probably should grow no larger than some optimum which maximizes the various elements that go into whatever we want to call quality of life. Given the skills that are now available in systems research it should be possible to make much more concrete some of the assumptions involved in this vague feeling there can be too many people. It should also be possible to work out some of the consequences of different rates of population growth and different levels of population. That is, we could simulate what the nation might be like in the year 2000 with a population of 400 million or in the year 2050 with a population of 800 million.

Suppose this were done and we did not like what we saw? At that point we could begin to pose for ourselves some very difficult and complicated questions about the social and psychological meaning of family sizes larger than are necessary for population stability, and we would enter into an area in which almost no solidly grounded information now exists.

## Two Separate Aspects of Population Dynamics


Let us say, then, that there are two conceptually separable but highly interrelated aspects of population dynamics, one having to do with birth control and one having to do with the family size and staging goals sought by use of birth control. With respect to each of these factors there is a range of social and psychological conditioners from the most intimate aspects of family life and individual personality and to broadly public and societal variables of normative and institutional constraints. The interactions between these private and public sectors are mediated by mass communications and the concrete social networks in which individuals participate. These relationships are indicated in a highly schematic way in Figure I.

### *The Aspects in This Issue*

Research concerned with population dynamics could obviously concentrate on any of the five sectors in the diagram with some hope of contributing to better understanding of the total complex.

**FIGURE I**

Sources of Factors Affecting Population Dynamics at the Family and Societal Levels.



In this volume, after Pohlman's bibliographic review of literature in all of these areas, we present first a series of papers that deal primarily with the private sector and then a set of papers that deal primarily with activities in the public sector. Our emphasis in the private sector is rather heavily on the family size and staging level, an indication of the fact that social scientists working in this area are increasingly taking family size to be the most problematic issue. Cicourel raises some important and knotty questions of methodology from a background which emphasizes the central importance of understanding family size and family planning behavior within the context of the negotiated character of day-to-day family life. Wyatt seeks to bring some order out of the vague and varied theories dealing with motivations to have a child, and proposes a more specific theory of these motivational processes. Bumpass deals with an issue which has been of concern for a long time, that of the relative stability of family size preferences. Kahl takes up, in the context of Brazilian and Mexican cultures, the relationship between values and family size ideals. Stycos continues our interest in family size ideals with a comparative study of cities in Latin America and carries this comparative focus on to an examination of contraceptive behavior.

We have no studies to represent the public sector of family size preferences and staging; it is to be hoped that this area will soon attract the attention of social scientists interested in testing empirically some of the very interesting hypotheses that are present in more speculative works on the relationship of culture and society to the population growth.

Increasing emphasis is being given to the public sector by those interested in family planning problems. In this volume such interest is represented by Farley and Leavitt's paradigm for studying the relevance of the private economy sector for contraceptive distribution. Jaffe examines in considerable detail the current status of public family planning programs in the United States and indicates some of the impediments to and facilitators for more comprehensive programs. Demerath takes as his focus the organizational and bureaucratic problems of India's national family planning program and discusses the problems involved when a nation as a whole seeks to move rapidly toward wide dissemination of family planning goals, knowledge and techniques. Finally, in the papers of the Taiwan experiments, Ronald Freedman and Pan Lu, Chen and Chow describe one particular experiment in the dissemination of knowledge about contraception and the prescription of contraceptive devices which has proved perhaps more successful than any such experiment to date.

It is our hope that together these articles will introduce

psychologists to the wide range of issues involved in population dynamics and suggest to them the many ways in which interesting research opportunities can be turned towards producing knowledge for socially important goals. Already, social scientists have played a key role in the development of knowledge that makes it possible to design and put into the field effective family planning programs in developing areas and in the United States.

## The Birth Rate Can Be Lowered

The problems of rapid population growth and absolute population size are both clearly within the range of control once birth control information and techniques are widely diffused. A sufficient number of experiments in underdeveloped countries have been carried out now to make it reasonably certain that once technical and organizational problems are solved the birth rate can be dramatically lowered. Up until the development of the oral contraceptive and the intra-uterine device, family planning programs in such areas were highly discouraging, but these methods seem to have the simplicity required for success for any kind of rapidly diffusing public health method. It is important to note, however, that the developments along this line are quite recent and that despite a good many years of much hard labor by medical and social scientists it is only in the past five years that it has been possible to be genuinely optimistic about bringing birth rates down to western levels. Much work needs to be done, on a country-by-country basis, but the general outlines of exactly what is to be done are by now fairly clearly laid out. We know that while with the old methods there was a very strong social class gradient in the ability to use contraceptive methods, this is less likely to be true with the newer methods. The "learning problems" of becoming efficient contraceptors have been tremendously simplified as have the logistic problems of the older chemical and mechanical methods.

## *Once People Are Able to Limit Family Size—What Then?*

With respect, however, to population growth once people are able to limit their families, we have relatively little knowledge, and we just do not know how far toward the low birth rates required for a stable or only very slowly increasing population people in countries now experiencing a highly destructive population explosion are going to go once the methods are a reality for them. Judging by the American and Canadian experience, it is quite possible that they will stop short of a sufficient reduction in family size. On the other hand, if people in these nations were to respond to the availability of contraception as Europeans did we could expect a much

more rapid movement toward more stable population. It is clear that a range of social, economic, political, religious and other factors are going to be involved in the transition from high to lower birth rates. In the next generation there will be many challenging opportunities for social scientists to investigate the effects of social-cultural factors and of planned intervention by governments on the individual decisions of prospective parents. This challenge demands a great deal of careful analytic work oriented toward the development of testable theories, and a tremendous amount of descriptive and experimental research directed toward documenting exactly what is going on and discovering why it is going on. Because there has been a technological revolution in contraception the small amount of previous work along these lines will not be particularly helpful because the changes in technique dramatically affect the importance of social and cultural factors as they have been described in previous literature. On the other hand, the simplicity of the current major contraceptive methods for large scale programs has one advantage in that it tends to make attitudinal factors directly connected with the methods and with the actual use of those methods less salient and highlights broader questions of motivation at the individual level, and of social process and social organization at the family and community level.

### *In Developing Nations . . .*

The research which social scientists have carried out dealing with the population problems of the developing nations has had two kinds of impact that were crucial for the development of effective programs. First, by the use of sample surveys in many different countries it became possible to demonstrate that in most areas large family sizes and rapid population growth were not the result of the desires of the individuals involved but rather stem from their inability to limit their families. Over the years it has become increasingly apparent that, at least apart from tribal situations, couples are able to assess their situations reasonably and to know that they and their children would be better off if the couple had fewer children than they are likely to have. The results of sample surveys suggest that relatively small family ideals (ranging from two to five in different areas) are the rule rather than the exception even in nations which are only just beginning industrial development. Having broken the stereotype that the average Indian or Mexican or Egyptian or Thai or Turk wants a very large family, "as many as God will give", it becomes much more possible for governments to take up the question of an organized family planning program to bring to their citizens the technologies for limiting their families in terms of their own desires. In this area, too, social scientists have played a key

role, first at the level of experiments dealing with the effectiveness of clinic setups, later with experiments on large scale public information campaigns, and more recently with studies of management of large scale organizations that must be created to carry out national family planning programs. It is interesting that although Demerath writes about India and Jaffe about the United States, some of the organizational problems of the two nations' family planning programs appear quite similar. It may be that this rather well-developed area of applied social science specialization will make increasing contributions to family planning programs in the years to come. There is, in short, a vast job of social engineering that will have to be repeated over and over as nation after nation in the developing world undertakes the creation of a national family planning program and organization. Social scientists have been key figures in the design of these programs to date and they will continue to be so in the future, perhaps, as suggested by the articles on the Taiwan experiments, becoming increasingly concerned with ways of maximizing the efficiency of such programs and the speed of their adoption.

### *In the United States . . .*

In the United States the most pressing social issue connected with family planning is that of the extension of family planning services to disadvantaged portions of the population. It has long been clear that the vast majority of Americans have the knowledge and the ability to control the number of their children pretty much in terms of their own desires. The pioneering work of Freedman, Whelpton and Campbell demonstrated, for example, that because of subfecundity more American couples suffer from not having as many children as they would like than from having more children than they want. Nevertheless, it has become increasingly clear that poor people do not have this ability to command the events of their lives; publicly supported programs of family planning are becoming a standard part of the "war on poverty" package. Here again social scientists have played two crucial roles: first, by demonstrating through research that poor people have as many children as they do not because they want them but because they are unable to prevent conception, and, second, by guiding the design of facilities and encouraging their maximum penetration into lower class communities. Again, there is much room for further research and program participation in the pursuit of these social goals both at the concrete level of the "delivery system" for services and at the higher level where political and organizational factors become crucial for a maximum dissemination of knowledge and services.

These, then, are the "frontline areas" where social scientists can make available their knowledge and research skills toward the

goal of assisting men and women to control these crucial events of their lives.

## Maintaining Optimum Populations

Behind these fairly straightforward issues which involve simply making available to more and more of the world's population the resources for family limitation and staging which the major portion of European and North American peoples already possess lies the much more difficult question of maintaining optimum populations once the techniques for doing so have been disseminated. Like most other social issues it has proved very difficult to think about population dynamics except in the context of an impending crisis. There is a strong temptation to treat, for example, the problem of population growth in the United States as a crisis of similar order to that of population growth in India or Latin America. However, there is no population explosion in the United States in the sense of the rate of population growth which yearly, or even over the course of the immediate future decades, threatens to outstrip the resources of the country. Rather, there is the problem of a rate of population growth which in the distant future will outstrip the resources of the society, social as well as physical.

Some commentators already discuss America's population growth in terms of a crisis and point to our difficulties with space and recreation, the economic costs of population growth, pollution of various kinds, the difficulties of providing social services, and the seeming increasing restrictions on individual freedom. Yet, one can argue with equal validity that the very real problems to which these commentators point are indications of our inability to organize resources in the public sector rather than of a too rapid population growth. Even with a stable population the country has shown remarkably little ability to handle such public sector problems—problems of land use, transportation, housing, public services, education, medical care, etc. Perhaps these problems would be somewhat less acute without rapid population growth but the basic problems would remain. In the present political context, arguments about America's population explosion perhaps provide an alibi more than anything else in that they tend to obscure the basic problem of the country's unwillingness to devote the necessary resources to public investment and public service. Further, as Jaffe demonstrates so well in his paper in this volume, the very effort to do something about excess fertility is frustrated by our outmoded ways of thinking about public services.

Almost totally unexplored in any empirical way are the less-than-crisis effects for the society as a whole of slow but steady pop-

ulation growth, and the dynamics of such growth. We really know very little about why Americans have, mainly by choice, as many children as they do; we have interesting speculations but we do not have either careful efforts at a theory of the interaction between family size preferences and social structural and social psychological characteristics of American families or empirical researches which might seek to test such hypotheses. If we can foresee now that in the long run our current rate of population growth, even should we be able to manage our society more sensibly, will have deleterious effects, there would seem to be a *prima facie* case for social scientists to become interested long before the crisis level is reached in the subtle interrelations of social and psychological variables which are producing this growth in the United States, but not in Europe. By the time the crisis is upon us it will be too late for any practical application of an understanding of why it happened.

And it is important to note that the challenge posed by this kind of social issue is a very great one for social science because it involves dealing with the subtle issue of why families should decide to have four children instead of two, and the even greater subtlety of seeking to provide functional alternatives for whatever gratifications come from the relatively large family size ideals which Americans, in contrast to Europeans, share. In the long run, probably nothing less than a very thorough understanding, grounded in a comparative method, of the meaning of marriage and parenthood as a way of living life in modern society will suffice to provide the knowledge that will be needed to bring long term population growth under control.

## A Psychologist's Introduction To the Birth Planning Literature

Edward Pohlman

University of the Pacific

If additional platoons of social scientists are to begin research on birth planning, they might be helped by having some idea of relevant earlier studies.<sup>1</sup> This review is intended to save psychologists (and other social scientists and related researchers) some of the stumbling and blind alleys the writer experienced in trying to get an idea of the literature.

### Some Major Research Projects

*Growth of American Families Study (GAF).* In 1955 and 1960 two samples were selected by comparable criteria, although they involved completely different interviewees (Freedman, 1959, 94). Each included over 2,400 wives, a national probability sample of currently married white women in the main child-bearing years. The 1960 study also included a national probability sample of com-

<sup>1</sup> The investigations upon which this review is based were supported by the Planned Parenthood Federation of America. Comments and criticisms on earlier versions of this manuscript were provided by Drs. James R. Adams, Dudley Kirk, Clyde V. Kiser, Esther Milner, Steven Polgar, Lee Rainwater, J. Mayone Stycos, Christopher Tietze, Charles F. Westoff, P. K. Whelpton and Charles D. Windle. Financial support and critical reader help are appreciated; responsibility for errors, inadequacies and opinions rests with the writer.

parable nonwhite wives. Interviews with these wives provide cross-sectional data for 1955 and 1960, and for the past and expected future child-bearing of interviewees. Also, the comparable samples permit some attention to historical changes over the five years. Topics included wives' contraceptive knowledge, attitudes and practices (*KAP*), and family-size desires, ideals and expectations. The report of a *GAF* study in 1965, under the leadership of Westoff and Ryder, is in preparation. On a few of the *GAF* questions, somewhat comparable cross-sectional data are now being gathered every year (Freedman, Goldberg and Bumpass, 1965).

The primary interest of these demographically oriented studies is in the broad survey of population trends. Religion, education, occupation and the like are conceived as demographic categories. The aim is not to ask *why* these variables are related to individual fertility behavior. There is much material of particular interest to the psychologist, but often included somewhat incidentally. The appendices include summaries of several important earlier studies.

*Family Growth in Metropolitan America Study (FGMA).* Sometimes called the "Princeton Study", this research involves longitudinal study of the same couples. The original sample was drawn from a nationally distributed population, residents of seven of the eight largest "metropolitan areas", and couples with exactly two children apiece. In 1957, shortly after the birth of a second child, 1,165 couples were studied by interviews and questionnaires (Westoff, Potter, Sagi and Mishler, 1961). In 1960, 905 of these were studied again, and the predictive value of data gathered in 1957 was checked (Westoff *et al.*, 1963). One dependent variable of particular interest was the possible occurrence of an additional pregnancy during the three years that had elapsed. A third interview with the same couples was scheduled at approximately the completion of most child-bearing.

This research differs sharply from the *GAF* studies in that a demographic interest is here combined with a social psychological perspective. The researchers keep asking "why"; and their work is more oriented toward hypothesis testing than description. The independent variables studied included some "motivational" ones (the term as used includes personality). Personality questionnaires and a short intelligence test were given to respondents. Incidentally, both reports find the personality measures of little value in predicting the family size (dependent) variables. The psychologist should find this research especially interesting and the many bibliographical leads of particular value.

*The Indianapolis Study and its Influence.* This study originally appeared in 33 separate articles in the *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, entitled "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting

Fertility". These articles are included in five volumes of the same title (Whelpton and Kiser, 1946-1958). Summaries of the study are available (Freedman, et. al, 1959, 406-410; Kiser, 1962, 149-166).

The "Indianapolis Study" began with a survey of "all" Indianapolis white households. On this basis a stratified random sample of about 1,000 couples was drawn, from a population of white, Protestant couples of at least eighth grade education who met certain other criteria. Structured interviews were held.

One criticism of the Indianapolis Study stressed the lack of a consistent theoretical framework; Hill, Stycos and Back (1959) chose such a framework but were not limited completely by it; the *FGMA* studies decided it was too early in the game of studying fertility to be narrowed into any one theory (Westoff et. al, 1961, 7, 8).

The Indianapolis Study was the parent of the *FGMA* studies, and less directly an ancestor of the *GAF* studies. The Indianapolis and *GAF* studies, especially, seem to focus on two broad questions: (a) What is the picture of fertility and contraception, and (b) what factors make for differences between people in fertility and contraception. Several of the hypotheses which the psychologist may find occurring readily to him as reasons "why" couples have more or fewer children were tested in the Indianapolis Study, and the more promising hypotheses were carried over for study in the *FGMA* research. All three studies show a basically demographic concern in much of their work, used structured interviews in respondents' homes and were vast, expensive, team projects. The *GAF* and *FGMA* studies, building on the earlier experience, represent years of planning and effort and are sophisticated in sampling, design, statistical procedures and interpretation of data.

Birth planning in America seems to be changing so swiftly that even the more recent *GAF* and *FGMA* surveys are somewhat out of date, particularly with the unknown impact of new contraceptive procedures. Yet they are obviously much more recent, representative and comprehensive than the Indianapolis Study, or several other studies, published before 1945, that tried to ask similar questions with less adequate samples.

*Rainwater's Research.* Rainwater (1960) reported a pilot study of 96 working class men and women, and a more extensive study (1965) of 409 urban residents, including those from the first study. The larger sample included 152 couples, and also 50 men and 55 women not married to one another. By a quota sampling procedure groups of upper-middle and lower-middle class whites, and of upper-lower and lower-lower class whites and Negroes, were interviewed. About half the white and almost all the Negro couples were Protestants. The first book (1960) was written primarily for medical personnel and other non-social-scientists; the 1965

publication is geared to the social scientist reader, giving extensive tabular and statistical support for the hypotheses and tentative conclusions emerging from the study. Rainwater has not duplicated himself appreciably in the discussions, ideas and insights of the two books.

Rainwater is a social psychologist with strong roots in both psychology and sociology, especially family sociology; he has a background of research in working class family life. His research stands in contrast to the studies mentioned above in several ways. It is much more oriented to "clinical" insights, and less to "statistical" ones. Indeed, Rainwater refers (1965, 277) to a need to crack the "overly quantitative mold" into which the Indianapolis and Princeton studies appear to have cast our thinking. Rainwater had to be confined more closely to hypothesis development, and could venture less into hypothesis testing. Statistical procedures focus primarily on the existence of significant relationships, rather than on amount of relationship (emphasized by the *FGMA* studies). Interviews included some projective pictures and questions; data are often analyzed qualitatively. The quota sampling procedure used was in contrast to more elegant probability samples. All these differences were appropriate to the fact that Rainwater worked with a number of previously untried hypotheses. His is the first research to place heavy emphasis on family sexual relations as being related to contraception. Also, the 1965 book shows considerable success in relating "conjugal role relationships" to family size desires.

*Studies in the Caribbean.* Research in the Caribbean has been extensively oriented to planned social change. Much of this research was summarized by Stykos (Kiser, 1962, 305-316) and includes Stykos' own 1955 book on Puerto Rico (1955). Hill, Stykos and Back (1959) report a planned, controlled experiment which tried to affect birth planning behavior. This is not only action research; the study includes several stages with the careful development of hypotheses which are then systematically tested. The validation stage includes experimental manipulation, whole communities, and controls. Several stages of this study were then replicated in Jamaica (1964). Blake (1961) provides a report of initial phases of this research in Jamaica. A distinctive feature of the work of Stykos and his colleagues (Hill *et. al.*, 1959) is the strong emphasis on a marriage and family perspective, in research design and discussion. The unit of study is the couple, rather than the individual or a larger social group. One hypothesis emphasized by the study is that husband-wife communication is a factor which affects success in birth planning; *FGMA* research (Westoff, *et al.*, 1963; 1961) and that of Rainwater (1965) are relevant to this hypothesis.

## Leads to Finding Material

*Bibliographies.* Freedman (1963) provides an extensive and systematic bibliography of social scientists' research on fertility. Continued preparation of bibliographies on basic topics has been announced by Tietze's office in the National Committee on Maternal Health (addresses of such organizations are provided later). These include bibliographies on contraception, sterilization, and fertility control generally (Tietze, 1962, 1950-1965, 1965); supplements are prepared periodically.

The U.S. National Institute of Child Health and Human Development is planning to publish an abstract journal on family planning, and to have a computerized bibliography in connection with this. Both the Population Council and the University of North Carolina are working on large-scale bibliographies.

Adams (1963) prepared a bibliography on "psycho-social aspects" of birth planning. The present writer has a mimeographed hodge-podge of references available on request. A selected, topically organized bibliography for professionals is available on request from Planned Parenthood (n.d.).

The Milbank Memorial Fund Catalogue (1955) covers publications supported by the Fund or closely related to the interests of the Fund. A mimeographed supplement covers subsequent publications and is revised occasionally. Article reprints may be obtained free and book-length publications at a nominal price.

*Abstracts and Indexes.* The *Population Index*, published by the Office of Population Research of Princeton University, indexes a variety of areas related to population problems including much of interest to psychologists (Volume 1, 1938). Adams (1963) found this index to be his most valuable single source. *Sociological Abstracts* contains longer abstracts than either *Population Index* or *Psychological Abstracts*. Sections on Demography and on Marriage and the Family are especially valuable (Volume 1, 1953). For *Psychological Abstracts* (Volume 1, 1927), a cumulative index for all the years of its publication is under construction.<sup>2</sup>

## Publications Touching on Special Topics

*History.* The classic history of contraception in various times and cultures, by Himes (1963), has been reprinted. Tietze (1965) gives a short, concise history of contraception. No comprehensive history of birth control movements and the battles and warriors involved has appeared. The closest thing to it is Lader's out-of-

<sup>2</sup> Personal Communication from Dr. Morgan, editor.

print biography of Margaret Sanger (1955). See other references under "Historical Aspects" of Tietze (1965).

*Nonwestern Cultures.* Writing from a psychoanalytic perspective, Devereux (1955) deals with contraception and abortion in pre-industrial societies. An earlier discussion of the same topic is that of Aptekar (1931). More anthropological in perspective are the works of Nag (1965) and Ford (1952). Also see Lorimer (1954) and a Milbank Memorial Fund publication (1952).

Books reporting research in Japan (Koya, 1963), India (Chandrasekhar, 1961) and Great Britain (Lewis-Faning, 1949, 37) are examples of reports from many countries.

*Religion and Birth Planning.* Roman Catholic thinking related to contraception appears to be in a period of great re-examination and perhaps rapid transition. The topic has been examined in the world meetings of the church. Rock (1963) seems to be both a result and a partial cause of this re-examination. As a Catholic physician whose research helped develop the first oral contraceptive procedures, he takes both Catholics and nonCatholics to task for the friction between them over contraception. The work edited by Archbishop Roberts (1964) is also relevant here.

Sullivan (1959) makes an attack on the Roman Catholic Church's stand on birth planning. He argues that the Church was opposed to all methods, including the rhythm approach, and then did an about-face to consider that method as an acceptable procedure with sometimes beneficial results. The bibliography includes many Catholic publications.

Several pages of quotations from official Roman Catholic statements on birth planning are reprinted (Freedman *et al.*, 1959, 415-418). Summaries of the Catholic position at mid-century were prepared by Father Gibbons (1949, 1956a, 1956b). Book-length discussions of birth planning and population problems from a Catholic perspective include the translation of Lestapis' treatise (1961) and a book by Zimmerman (1961). Rock (1963) expresses respect for the former's position but finds the latter's unacceptable. The Catholic demographer Burch (1963) concludes that Zimmerman made no contribution either theologically or demographically.

Fagley's book (1960) sprang from the author's position as advisor to Protestant churches on their stance concerning social issues. He includes chapters on a variety of major Christian groups and their relations to birth planning. Fagley argued the need for an organized body of pressure in favor of birth planning, to counteract Catholic pressure against it. Rehwinkel (1959) discusses birth planning from an ethical point of view for Protestants. In 1954, *Pastoral Psychology* devoted an issue to birth control.

The empirical relationships found between religious preference and contraceptive practice and other aspects of birth planning are treated in the *FGMA* and *GAF* reports (Freedman *et al.*, 1959; Westoff *et al.*, 1963, 1961; Whelpton *et al.*, 1966).

*Legal Aspects.* In 1965 the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Connecticut statute making it a crime in that state for anyone to use contraceptives. This decision will have far-reaching implications in the U. S. Williams (1957) discusses British and American law; most of his book is concerned with birth planning, if in that term we include infanticide and abortion. The summer, 1960, issue of *Law and Contemporary Problems* (Vol. 25, no. 3) is devoted to population control. See also the relevant section of Tietze (1965).

*Population Growth.* The books edited by Hauser (1963) and by Freedman (1965) are distinctive in that they are written by professional demographers, but for lay edification. A book by the Days (1965) is also for lay readers. The scholar who wishes to gain an understanding of demography as a background for appreciating the population avalanche will find the work edited by Hauser and Duncan (1959) valuable. Several standard texts on population problems are available (e.g., Thompson and Lewis, 1965). The annual *United Nations Demographic Yearbooks* are a valuable source. Glass and Eversley (1965) present the relatively new field of historical demography. No attempt is made here to cite the many books on the population of specific countries or the popular warnings of population explosions.

Population problems have often been thought of primarily in economic and food-supply terms. But there may be much more direct psychological consequences of crowded living (Flugel, 1947). Research with animals suggests that crowding may have undesirable consequences (Calhoun, 1962; Keeley, 1962; Thiessen and Rodgers, 1961). An informative review of this topic is that of Hoagland (Greep, 1963, 5-20).

*Effects of Unwanted Conceptions.* Much of the social science research involving birth planning has considered conception as a dependent variable; the present writer has focused on conception, especially unwanted conception, as an independent variable (Pohlman, 1967c). He has attempted to clarify the definition of "unwanted" and related terms (1965b); has systematized hypotheses springing from the general prediction that unwanted conceptions tend to have less desirable effects (1965a); and has reviewed the scant research bearing on these hypotheses (1967a). Another paper (1968) notes evidence of the widespread change from "unwanting" feelings around the time of conception to "wanting" feelings as pregnancy advances. Possible explanations are weighed; it appears

that rationalization is the most plausible explanation in many cases.

*Preferences for Sex of Child.* A mass of evidence attests that parents in the United States tend to have preferences: (a) for boys, and (b) for at least one child of each sex. Freedman, Freedman and Whelpton (1960) present their own data, based on the first *GAF* study (1959), and cite other studies. They note that we know little about the personal reasons behind sex-of-child preference. Some research they do not cite follows: (Dinitz, *et al.*, 1954; Westoff *et al.*, 1961, 293-295; 1963, 205-207; Whelpton, *et al.*, 1966, ch. 3; deLestapis, 1961, 451; McMahan, 1951; Rainwater, 1965, 131; Rauf, 1958; Weiler, 1959; Winston, 1932).

Tables presented by Clare and Kiser (1951) show a strong tendency for parents to claim that they would prefer to have the sex-of-child composition that they actually do have. It would appear that rationalization is an appropriate explanation in many cases. One might speculate that birth of a child whom parents perceive initially as of an undesired sex might tend to lead to mental health problems for parents and children, somewhat similar to problems hypothesized to follow unwanted conceptions (Pohlman, 1965a). Suggestive case study evidence is provided by Sloman (1948). Ability to control sex of conception would seem to be a possible step in birth planning in the future, with widespread implications. Shettles (1961) discusses a method which may affect the probability of conceiving children of a given sex. Pohlman (1967b) has reviewed literature on sex of offspring.

*Birth Timing and Spacing.* Mimeographed copies are available of a book in preparation (Pohlman, 1967d). It reviews literature on the effects of timing and spacing of births, on population, health, economic, family and socio-psychological variables.

*Particular Contraceptive Methods.* Tietze's bibliography on contraception (1960), and sections such as those dealing with intra-uterine, oral, vaginal and rhythm methods in his more comprehensive bibliography (1965), are essential. A manual has been edited by Calderone (1965). The *GAF* and *FGMA* reports discuss frequency of use of various contraceptive methods, the relative effectiveness of methods as typically used, and reasons why particular methods are chosen. Rainwater (1960) stresses the need to distinguish between the reasons people readily give and the deeper reasons; he presents an insightful, extensive discussion of psychological reasons for reacting to particular contraceptives in particular ways.

*Abortion and Sterilization.* Tietze's recent bibliography (1965) has extensive and valuable material on abortion and on surgical sterilization, tubal ligation and hysterectomy and vasectomy. Rosen (1954) and Calderone (1958) edited symposia; Devereux (1965) has

a psychoanalytically oriented discussion of abortion in nonwestern societies. Gebhard, *et al.* (1958) present data on abortion in the United States, but also review material on abortion in other cultures, including Japan and Sweden. Tietze and Lehfeldt (1961) review extensive data from Eastern Europe leading to the conclusion that if an abortion is performed in a hospital by an experienced physician during the first three months of pregnancy, the risk to the mother's life and health is "far" less than risks associated with a pregnancy allowed to run its course.

Rodgers *et al.* (1965) provide original data and references. Extensive research on vasectomy in India has yet to be summarized.

"*Psychological*" Discussions. A book by Flugel (1947) and a number of articles bear titles which somehow relate psychology to birth or population control (e.g., Bhandari, 1957; Centers and Blumberg, 1954; Devereux, 1955; Ellis, 1959; Hoffmeyer, 1953; Kelman, 1937; Kroger, 1963; Menninger, 1943; Rauf, 1958; Tietze, 1965a, 104-112). Most of these are thoughtful discussions that report no research. In research that is deliberately focused on birth planning, psychologists have been conspicuous by their absence (with the outstanding exception of Rainwater), a fact that puzzles some observers (Freedman, 1963, 67; Rainwater, 1965, 17-20). Flanagan (1942) reported a pioneering prewar study of factors influencing family size in a group of Air Force officers. One major study (Centers and Blumberg, 1954) that apparently died in infancy was born with little demonstrated awareness of key earlier research. A dissertation (Adams, 1961) involved attitudinal ambivalence and contraception. Mishler was a psychologist on the FGMA team (Westoff *et al.*, 1961), although he changed responsibilities before the second phase of the study (Westoff *et al.*, 1963) began.

A comprehensive book summarizes psychological aspects of birth planning (Pollman, 1967c).

Hoffman and Wyatt (1960) asked why American women's family size preferences had increased. They suggested several hypotheses based on socio-psychological theory; most involved changes in the feminine role. To over-simplify one hypothesis, in recent years women may have been faced with more leisure time than their earlier counter-parts, at the time when their first two children reach an age when they are less demanding. With idleness generally disapproved, the woman may have more children so as to continue her mother role, as an alternative to the employed woman role. Rainwater (1965) applied these hypotheses to this data, and found apparent support for some of them. They were tied into a central concept of his study, "conjugal role relationship", which showed impressive relationships with variables related to family size.

"Psychological" factors of birth planning can be studied by those whose formal training is not as "psychologists", of course. Nevertheless a group with such training might tend to have some distinctive perspectives, and getting such a group involved in birth planning research would seem to have value. Following an open discussion at the 1961 American Psychological Association Convention, an informal "interest group" was formed, chaired by Esther Milner. Organization was formally under the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. In a sense the plan for the present journal issue originated with this interest group. A symposium at the 1962 APA convention was followed by another at the 1962 American Association for the Advancement of Science convention, and one at the 1964 APA convention.

*Miscellaneous Other Important Publications.* Davis and Blake (1956) have systematized theoretically some intermediate variables through which social factors influence family size. Lorimer (1954) presents hypotheses to attempt to account for some of the differences in this variable. Meier (1959) draws on several disciplines. Five edited volumes, including the proceedings of some key conferences, contain some contributions of special current value (Greep, 1963; Hardin, 1964; Kiser, 1962; Mudd, 1965; Sheps and Ridley, 1966). A sixth (Berelson *et al.*, 1966) reports the first of a series of international conferences.

The physician's role in birth planning has been discussed (Cornish, 1963). Birth planning also occupies most of the February, 1963, issue of *Marriage and Family Living* and several articles in the November, 1964, issue of the *Journal of Marriage and The Family*.

An extensive study in Taiwan (Berelson and Freedman, 1964) included an action program to get people involved in birth planning, and systematic research on the effectiveness of various "publicity" procedures. One interesting comparison has been between giving publicity material to both husbands and wives as opposed to wives only. Preliminary data raise some question about the necessity of contacting both spouses. Intra-uterine devices were among the contraceptive procedures offered.

Several recent U. S. studies involve programs of social change. Bogue (1965) mailed a simple pamphlet on birth planning to Chicago slum dwellers. Large proportions of those interviewed in a follow-up study reported reading it; there was no support for the generalization that mass communication has little direct effect on the behavior of the masses. Individuals who received information tended to pass it on; but another generalization that Bogue's data question is that a relatively few "opinion leaders" wield extraordinary influence. Instead, in the area of birth planning, it seemed likely that any in-

formed, sociable, eligible individual could spread information and influence action. This even occurred from lower to higher status individuals. Perhaps well planned mass communication may be rapidly effective; it may not be necessary to begin by locating "opinion leaders".

Polgar (1965) is comparing a program in six "poverty area" locations in three different boroughs of New York City with six control locations. Independent variables include a birth control service operating a half-day a week on the premises of a community center or church, with equipment and staff brought in by station wagon; an intensive educational campaign including direct mailings; and nonprofessional "neighborhood workers". There is an emphasis on "coitus-independent" e.g., oral pills, intrauterine device as versus "coitus-connected" e.g., condom, diaphragm, rhythm, etc. contraception. Dependent variables include births as recorded by city records, the volume of contraceptives sold in a sample of drug stores, and interview data from a sample of physicians and from household surveys.

## Sources of Funds and Information

This list is neither systematic nor complete. The January-February, 1964, special issue of *Intercom* (\$1, Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 345 E. 46 St., New York, N. Y. 10017) has an excellent discussion of U. S. Government, United Nations, voluntary, university, and other organizations and their role and publications as related to population control.

*Sources of Funds.* For psychologists, the National Institute of Mental Health, the newly created National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, and the National Science Foundation are major possibilities for financial support. Private organizations include the Rockefeller Foundation (111 W. 50 St., New York, N. Y. 10020), the Ford Foundation (477 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10022), the Milbank Memorial Fund (40 Wall Street, New York, N. Y. 10005), and the Population Council (230 Park Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017). The Planned Parenthood Federation of America (address below) and the Pathfinder Fund (Tremont St., Boston) have more limited funds.

*Sources of Information.* For up-to-date bibliographies (e.g., Tietze, 1960; 1962; 1965a) and for a list of available publications on an amazing variety of topics, write Dr. Tietze, Director of Research, National Committee on Maternal Health (2 E. 103 Street, New York, N. Y. 10029). The Population Council (address above) puts out a newsletter, *Studies in Family Planning*, which is unusually current and deals with action research and other research in

various parts of the world. A bibliography (n.d.), newsletter, and variety of other useful items are available from Planned Parenthood (515 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10022) by writing the Director of Research, Dr. Steven Polgar. The Population Reference Bureau (1775 Mass. Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036) is an information program on population growth.

Research on psychological effects of sterilization has been emerging from the Scripps Clinic and Research Foundation (476 Prospect Street, La Jolla, California).

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## Clinical Notes on the Motives of Reproduction

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The aim of this paper is to consider the motives for having children. The point of view will be that of clinical observation, the frame of reference mainly that of psychoanalytic theory. Several characteristic positions concerning the nature of these motives will be reviewed and conclusions drawn from clinical observations will be added to them. The most detailed studies of the psychology of reproduction have so far been contributed by psychoanalysis. They were drawn from the study of needs and images in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, then organized into relatively coherent theories. By way of introducing the subject it will be in order, therefore, to reflect first on psychotherapy as a source and an instrument of observation.

Apparently reproduction is not experienced as a manifest process nor a clearly defined need, but as an event on several psychological levels and as a hierarchy of needs. The more decisive needs are usually the ones hardest to apprehend, concealed as they are behind attitudes and convictions pertaining much more to collective social roles than to the experience of individuals. Reproduction even more than sexuality is overlaid with attitudes the individual considers appropriate because he has been learning them ever since early childhood. It is a long and laborious process to advance from these socially instilled convictions to the discovery of more authentic and indigenous motives. To be sure, the separation of social from subjective

motivation implied before suggests the sleight of hand that is always present when we envisage what would be left if we could deduct from manifest behavior the impact of social definition and social expectation. The separation of indigenous from social motives surely is a heuristic trick. In real life the two are so closely interwoven that one never occurs without the other. This artificial isolation does not keep concepts from providing us, as in the case of psychoanalysis, with fruitful hypotheses. However, they will continue to be fruitful only to the degree that we acknowledge the as-if quality inherent in them. The rambling and erratic progress of psychotherapy offers the only means at present for uncovering the sequential complexity of motives behind, and before, reproduction. In spite of a greater phenotypical variety among them than is commonly accepted, regular patterns occur and provide a prospect for discovering the principles in all the complexity.

### *The Freudian View . . .*

In describing the psychosexual development of the female, Freud pointed to some of the elementary reasons why women want children. The validity of Freud's sequence in the development of this wish has been confirmed over and over again by clinical observation. This, of course, holds true only if the observation was guided by the same methodological principles—that is, if the women were studied in a therapeutic setting over a sufficiently long period of time, and with appropriate attention to transference and resistance. Later observers have stressed, filled in and conditionally limited aspects of the earlier theory, but saw no need to depart from the fundamental pattern (Freud, 1950a, 1950b, 1950c, 1953). Within our own culture this sequence deserves to be called universal, and with the necessary modifications it may well be found to apply to any human situation.

Nevertheless, both as a source and an instrument, psychotherapy has its own obvious problems. The purpose of therapy is relief and rehabilitation: to help the client cope with what troubled him and brought him into therapy to begin with. The therapist, who wants to grasp the principles underlying his client's problems—in addition to relieving them—still must submit to the rules of the game and wait until the subject in which he is interested comes up at its own good time. Even then he cannot concern himself with it as fully as he wants to but has to keep his eye on the main purpose, always mindful of the complicated side-effects that his own interest might cause the therapeutic process. In the course of an extended therapy a great deal of material regarding the client's past and present concerns will inevitably emerge. If therapy can also be carried to its natural conclusion *lege artis* the subject under study may well have been examined in sufficient depth to allow the hope that no major aspect

of his problem has been omitted and that no startling new facet would reveal itself *even if* therapy could have been continued for another six months. It cannot be denied, however, that exactly the condition which makes psychoanalytic psychotherapy such an incomparable source of data also makes these data ambiguous. It is always impossible that they are *incomplete* because they are *intractable*. By the nature of the method the analyst can never know whether what he has learned of a given subject is all there is to it, even though it is likely that in the course of extensive therapy he will have become acquainted with most of it.

Data do not arrange themselves into a pattern spontaneously and the most prolific data still need to be placed into the framework of a theory. The clinical viewpoint can add a certain realistic vigor to it by stressing complexity and continuous self-transformation, the qualities of on-going, real-life behavior. The subject of reproduction is tinged with awe and charged with the anxieties of childhood. Traditional and collective attitudes affect it when we least expect it. By including popular notions into the discussion we shall do no more than acknowledge the peculiar condition of the subject.

In the investigation of the motives of reproduction one can at present distinguish five different approaches: (a) A relatively small body of studies which one might call "genuinely psychological" are flanked by (b) the extensive literature of demographic research including the more recent use of survey methods. By method and basic conceptual approach these investigations belong more to sociology than psychology. Nevertheless, if the task of demography is to account for the fluctuations in the growth of populations demographers can never get away from the question of motivation. The sociological orientation of demography (focused, that is, on social systems and institutions) should be distinguished from (c) the emphasis on social learning and role-taking, on historical prototypes in Erikson's sense, and on culture. This point of view is implicit in many studies (DuBois, 1963; Hoffman and Wyatt, 1960; Riesman, 1964) but has not been worked out consistently in and by itself. I shall refer to it as the *social* point of view in order to distinguish it for the moment from the *sociological* one. There also exists (d) a large body of studies on reproductive behavior in animals. Some of it is oriented toward the experimental analysis of behavior and is interventional in character. Other studies directed to the unfolding of behavior in a natural environment belong to ethology. More recently there has been a gratifying increase of interest in the systematic observation of animals in their natural habitat, with fascinating results for the contingencies of reproduction in man and for many other aspects of personality development. Some of these data will be highly relevant for the study of motivation in human reproduction once they can be

meaningfully linked with developmental and clinical observations. Finally, (e) the physiological approach to reproduction attributes to the hormonal cycle in women—the ever-recurrent motive for motherhood.<sup>1</sup>

All these approaches are obviously germane to the inordinately complex motivation of reproduction. If we limit ourselves to how it is experienced, that is, to its psychological dimension, continuity-in-change will turn out to be its regular condition, baffling us with the endless allegorical transformation of certain basic themes in the light of new contacts and new situations. Theories of any kind present us with neat capsules of motives promising to reveal everything once and for all. In the course of this paper I shall have to be concerned with the liabilities of any motive-concept that has so far been applied to the subject under discussion.

### The Nature of the Reproductive Need . . . Is It Elementary?

The assumption could, of course, be made that the wish for the child is determined by social expectations and by the woman's conception of what she should be and do. Women, especially, have always been convinced that the desire for offspring is elementary. It is affected neither by fashion nor custom, nor will it brook any interference in asserting itself. However, many studies point explicitly to the fact that the fluctuations of collective attitude do have something to do with the motivation for reproduction in individuals. The size of families has changed only recently (Petersen, 1964; Vance, 1964; Westoff, 1964) and presumably will change again in the future. This should be plain enough to any observer. Still, there is evidence everywhere for the deep-rooted belief in the elementary quality of the wish for children, and a vast array of examples from fiction, folk-song and autobiographical comment could be cited to support it. *It's basic*, people will assert, and at the same time shrug off the subject leaving the impression that this must be a curiously forbidding topic to think about.

What then is the nature and genesis of the reproductive need? Why does a woman want a child before she can possibly know what it will do to her? Why does she, for very different reasons perhaps, want more children? The data of observation are at once overwhelming and scant. Women desire a child and are frustrated when conception is not possible—for social and practical reasons (as in the

<sup>1</sup>I am indebted to Mrs. Judith Bardwick (University of Michigan) for a very useful annotated bibliography on feminine psychology.

case of single woman); for physiological reasons (as in the numerous incidents of sterility); and for many psychological reasons. We also see the woman who became pregnant without intending to but who then becomes quickly involved with the baby as if she had wanted him from the beginning, or the one who insists on becoming pregnant again even though she cannot cope with the children she already has. In a clinical context we see particularly often, women who have large families but never get over resenting what they are missing of life because of the demands the children impose upon them.

Clinical observation deepens the picture and surely disavows the position that the wish for the child could be a matter of social imitation and obligation *only*. Clearly, there must be more to it, but we are far from knowing exactly the kind and composition of these other motives. Most women want to have children but their needs are not as uniform as they are usually presented. Let "motherhood" be the official paradigm of that wish: then we shall quickly find that the term hides a multitude of motive-combinations some of which have little to do with bringing up and caring for a child. Women are usually not aware of the highly idiosyncratic quality of their wishes. On becoming conscious of their more authentic aims, as in therapy or by the cumulative experience of motherhood, women will often modify their aims. The reasons for wanting children also change over time. Psychoanalysis has an elaborate theory about the precursors of the wish in early childhood, but motivation does not remain fixed once fecundity has been reached. There must be a difference for a woman wanting a child before she has ever had one, and wanting, and deciding for, a second or third child. Considerable differences also exist in subjective attitude and self-experience at conception and during the several stages of the reproductive process. In short, reproduction as a psychological event will best be thought of in pluralistic terms. It is not *one* act and attitude as the popular idea of "motherhood" would persuade us to believe; but a sequence whose stages may differ vastly in the challenges they imply and the gratifications they provide.

Not being able to have children is a shattering experience for many women, and leaves them with a gnawing, perpetual want, a feeling of having been cheated of an elementary right. "Is it not the most normal thing in the world?", they ask, "to have a family and raise children"? Most survey data support the notion that this is indeed the basic attitude of most people. Yet clinical observation shows beyond any doubt that below the level of publicly expressed opinion the attitude is neither as uniform nor as free from ambiguity as public sentiment would have it. Some of this follows from the nature of the inquiry (Wyatt, 1965). The motives for having children are too complex even for a broad-gauged, open-ended interview.

The private, covert reasons for or against having children cannot well be asked even though we know what some of them might be. In any case, they are not easily articulated though they may not always be unconscious.

One only has to ask: Why are there changes in the birthrate? What do they mean?, in order to cast some doubt on the validity of the sentiment mentioned before. Unless these changes were demonstrably caused by economic factors alone, one would have to assume some kind of reorientation in the sentiments about having children. Comparative data do not support a belief in the changeless quality so often attributed to the reproductive drive. For instance, the urban middle class in Central and Western Europe before the war rarely had families of more than two children. Psychiatric observers believe that in Germany right now the disposition is against large families, and relate this to a more emancipated attitude among young German women. This is noteworthy because West Germany is manifestly affluent and of all the European countries most approximates the urban mass civilization characteristic of the United States, but it also has a proverbial tradition of consigning woman to motherhood and the home. Why should there not be a new wave of maternal aspiration as we had and still have in this country, especially in the middle class (Petersen, 1964; Riesman, 1964)?

### *How Does the Wish Develop?*

One can argue that the wish for the child, like all our other wishes, has a history. Earlier needs and fantasies prepared for it. In the process it was transformed so that the manifest appearance of the present wish has little in common with the need-images from which it came. The paradigm of this motivation is obviously Freud's classical derivation of the wish for the child from the female castration complex. This wish, however, may be a consequence of the convergence of biological and social maturation. From the dawn of her own consciousness, the little girl sees herself defined as a woman-to-be, and the chief attribute of that role is, of course, motherhood. In the psychoanalytic approach, shifts of the wish on the continuum conscious-unconscious will be stressed, as well as defensive concealment of that wish in relationship to conflict and to biologically fixed stages of growth. The proponent of social learning, on the other hand, will stress role-taking which becomes more specific at each stage of development. He would also stress, as indeed he should, changes over historical time and in cultural tradition.

There are obviously significant differences between the psychoanalytic point of view and that of social learning. The concept of identity links the two together, however, and integrates them. The two points of view complement each other and, as an attempt at

explaining the wish for a child, they belong structurally together. Both involve *anticipation* and *learning* even though the manner differs in which both processes are defined in each camp.

Before entering upon other characteristic explanations of the wish for the child, we should consider at this point a pertinent injunction. Why should the need-images of the fecund young woman not be sufficient to account for the intensity of her desire for a child? We also yearn for sexual union long before we have any direct experience with it. The answer is, of course, that both sexes have been prepared by experiences of arousal, manipulation and release. Had it not been for these experiences and their unending elaboration in fantasy, no primal scene in the world would ever induct the young into the business of propagation. But no comparable experience can be adduced for the little girl's or for the young woman's wish for a child. A similar question could also be asked of the motive of social learning. Why should the girl's wish to realize herself through motherhood not be enough? We would be ill advised to underrate the relevance of role, of learning and of identity. Adult identity is rooted in the identifications of childhood. The female learns early that it is right and proper to be a mother, and the image holds for her wonderfully opaque promises of prestige and power and of a mysterious bliss. But in the real world of tired mothers and no maids the little girl would have been exposed also to many complaints about the burdens of motherhood for they regularly come up as disparaging memories in almost any therapy. All other identifications are partial even though they may be extremely consequential. Why should this one be taken over in its entirety and remain unchanged when it becomes fused with so many other elements in the self? Nobody would seriously suggest that young men pursue sexual conquest only because it is the thing to do. Behind the wish to impress their peers and themselves, which certainly can go to great extremes, we still take for granted the sexual drive as a basic motive force. Doing what is expected must have great importance as we can see when we study the effect of the prompting and prodding that go on among women who have already experienced motherhood toward having another child. But the realization of one's own expectations and those of the others would hardly suffice if there were not an intense drive, need or impulse behind it. Psychoanalytic explanation has tried to combine such dynamic propositions with formal and structural ones.

### *Does Propagation Depend on Instinct?*

Whenever the individual's indigenous needs and society's molding of him are not deemed sufficient to account for his dispositions, the motive-force of instinct seems to recommend itself as an explanation. Propagation in animals evidently proceeds largely on the basis

of instinctual regulation. What would be more consistent than to conclude that behind all the prolixity of psychological needs, man's reproductive behavior is urged upon him by his biological heritage? The idea of an instinct behind the vicissitudes of individual development has had a special appeal for psychoanalytic investigators: the biological point of view has always been a basic tenet and the study of reproduction has provided opportunities to extend it. Most investigators lean heavily on the physiological or instinctual substratum of motivation. Even though instinct, in the sense ethologists use it, is not often invoked, it is frequently alluded to; in psychoanalytic writings on this subject, *instinct* forms a general platform.

In recent psychoanalytic writing both the physiological and the instinct hypotheses have entered quite naturally into alliances with more specifically psychological concepts of motivation. The effect of the estrogen-progesterone cycle on woman's psychology has been the subject of numbers of publications.<sup>2</sup> Among recent authors T. Benedek (1952, 1960) has stressed it most systematically and within the framework of psychoanalysis has developed it into a bio-physiological theory of reproduction.

But now to the merits of letting instinct account for reproduction. It appears an inescapable conclusion. Do not animals give countless examples of faultless maternal behavior? They mate and reproduce by the dictates of nature and go to extraordinary lengths to provide for their young. Some even insist on mothering the young of other species (Wiesner, 1933). The continuities of behavior seem a particularly promising source of hypotheses about the elementals of behavior in man. But it is a different thing to conclude from the observation of animals that human reproduction *must* be regulated by instinct. Man's response to what he perceives of his environment and his own state is mediated by an elaborate system of symbolization. Man complements, anticipates and, in fact, duplicates the perceived world in his fantasies. He can reflect upon his experiences and recognize meaningful connections by remembering the past and by anticipating the future. He can reason and generalize and in consequence lives among the immaterial prescripts of culture as much as among the tangibles of nature, and at all times he is involved in complex social systems. Corresponding behaviors, such as reproduction instinctive in animals, must be considered in an infinitely more complex and, therefore, entirely different context in man.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Some of the literature is referred to in Benedek's paper (1960). For more recent publications, see footnote 1.

<sup>3</sup> A fine essay could be written about shifts and changes in the comparison of man's behavior with that of animals. Sometimes we are exhorted to take our bearings from them because they are guided by natural instincts; while at other times we are supposed to rise above their brutishness and get away from it as far as we can. For a succinct statement of the difference between animal and human societies, see Sahlin (1960).

Let us for a moment compare the behavior of primates with that of human beings. According to Jay (1963a, 1963b) it is exclusively the female among Langur monkeys who induces sexual behavior and the provocation depends on her being in estrus. Mothers of this species spend most of their adult life in being pregnant or in nurturing their offspring. Sexual relationships take place in only 3% of their days; if their lives were reckoned in hours the rate would be even less. DeVore relates similar data on baboons (1963). All this seems to be rather far away from the human situation. To say that adults are commanded by an instinct to want children is equal to saying that instinct drives people on toward having three square meals a day. Admittedly there are subtle correspondences between the behavior of animals and that of men which we have not yet grasped; but it is doubtful that we will apprehend them if we use *instinct* indiscriminately and in a broad and rather unsophisticated manner.

The strongest argument against the proposition that the need for having children is rooted in the biological or physiological substratum of femininity is that this need so obviously limits itself. If motivation for reproduction were the same as that observed in other mammals, reproduction would have to go on until the individual's fecundity is exhausted. At least in our time and in the Western World, women, as a rule, stop having children long before their reproductive capacity has been spent. A woman of 30, who decided that she has the family she wants and will have no more children, has not come to the end of her reproductive capacity. Fertility is for her a matter of choice and deliberation, not only in respect to having children, but also to terminating reproduction. Such deliberateness however is incompatible with the idea of an elementary, instinctual or physiological motivating force. What happened to it after the woman decided not to have any more children? If it is as compelling as is claimed, then the social and interpersonal consequences of having children—strained budget, chores and obligations, and the restrictions of time and freedom—could not possibly alter it as they so obviously do. The fact is however, that the most common reason for limiting the size of families derives from the experience of having children and of having to bring them up.

In other words the motives of reproduction in woman are subject to modification by experience. This makes it very likely that their subjective awareness and social expression are affected as much by their personal history and by their social learning as by the instinctual drive of physiological cause.

### *How Does a Woman "Know"*

Let us now consider some of the answers psychoanalysts have proposed to that basic question: how does woman know to what she

is aspiring? Freud suggested the basic sequence according to which the girl proceeds from her dismay at finding herself without a penis, to wanting to receive it from her father, to equating it with the child that she wants to get from him. Under favorable conditions this wish eventually detaches itself from its original object, her father. It complies with the incest barrier and affirmed by a successful repression of the Oedipal attachment, it will eventually reappear as one of the basic needs to be realized in an adult heterosexual relationship. This explanation does not exclude awareness of the conscious expectations of maturity which social psychologists assign to social learning and role. Psychoanalytic writers take them for granted but as a rule consider them secondary motives and a more ephemeral consequence of the instinctual transformations described before.

One could extrapolate the basic sequence by presenting it as follows: troubled by the recognition of the anatomical difference, but stimulated by random observations of the sexual relationship of adults, the little girl develops a set of fantasies. Paradigmatically she would say: something needs to be put where it is missing on my body, but once I have it I can keep it and then it will grow and get bigger and more wonderful, and in the end it will become everything I have envied Mother and Father for. One of the problems of this argument is that of the female castration complex: the little girl is supposed to draw all the anguish and envy attributed to her from noticing the anatomical difference. Even if we assume that other frustrations merge with her disappointment into a general mood of deprivation centered on the image of the missing genital, the explanation is still not quite satisfactory. Either there is no such lasting dismay<sup>4</sup> or something else not dependent on observation alone must have happened. How can the sight of a body at variance with her own mean so much when she has no first-hand knowledge of the sensations the missing genital can provide. We may be sure that any little girl will have opportunities to notice what distinguishes the other sex, though with great differences in the frequency of such observations and in the familiarity they convey. But don't we have to assume a *readiness* in her to respond with envy if, as we sometimes learn from case histories, a single exposure affected all later development. In other words, the motivation of penis envy has exactly the same problems as that of its final result, the wish for the

<sup>4</sup>For an incisive criticism of psychoanalytic propositions concerning the castration complex in the female, see Erikson (1964). His observations on the imagery of inner space in women point to an important insight. I find them in many ways concordant with the mechanism of inner duality which will be discussed in this paper but cannot agree with Erikson on some of the conclusions he draws from his concept.

child. Those who investigated the subject after Freud have therefore taken their critical departure almost universally from this point.<sup>5</sup>

Helene Deutsch concluded that the girl is already disappointed with her vagina before the Oedipal period and then retreats from the sensations and images connected with her sexual organ. Deutsch links the origin of the wish for the child to diffuse vaginal sensations merging with other pressures inside the girl's body which are related to the experiences of eating, holding food inside, and finally expelling it. This proposition has the advantage of extending both scope and continuity of motivation. Deutsch finally develops the idea that the little girl's need to control those vaginal sensations (and one might add here: to integrate them with other ongoing processes of orientation and thought) leads to their shift onto, and accretion around, the image of a baby (1945). Kestenberg in two very stimulating papers (1956a, 1956b) developed this idea further. She assumes a period of early motherliness long before the Oedipal crisis. At that time the diffuse feelings arising from the internal genitalia together with other undiscriminated body sensations are projected onto a "toy-baby", commonly a doll. The toy-baby has all the qualities Winnicot (1958) attributed to *transitional objects* (usually a doll or a blanket), namely, that they represent something for the child halfway between reality and fantasy. Kestenberg follows the development of maternal feelings both in girls and boys through several stages until past the Oedipal period and stresses the continuity and relevance of such fantasies in girls.<sup>6</sup>

Deutsch, Kestenberg, and other observers (summarized by Kestenberg) have in common that they move the origins of the child-wish back to long before the basic sequence. Penis envy is thereby tacitly modified from a primary, prototypical experience into the transformation of older concerns and their adaptation to a new stage of growth. All observers stress the contribution and lasting, albeit covert, relevance of imagery derived from oral, anal and phallic experiences and their final synthesis when maturity is reached. Edith Jacobsohn convincingly outlined some of the vicissitudes of the child-wish in a case study much earlier (1936) and also stressed the role of aggressive fantasies as Helene Deutsch did later in relationship to feminine passivity and masochism (1945). Jacobsohn's

<sup>5</sup> It may be of interest to note that Jacobsohn in one point of her argument relies on the child's observation of mother's next pregnancy. She attributes great motive-force to the child's envy of her mother's condition and to her jealous fear of a future rival. But here we run again into the stricture of incomplete experience. Even if she is told in so many words she can hardly imagine what it will mean to have a new baby in the house before she has really lived through it.

<sup>6</sup> For an elaboration of Kestenberg's position and an attempt to support it with linguistic and historical material, see Bradley (1962).

case shows that the events of which she speaks must be fairly typical: they return in the cases of other observers, such as Kestenberg, with amazing similarity. Jacobsohn also proposed stages in the development of the child-wish which later observations affirmed with only minor variation. Her little patient first wants to incorporate (literally, eat up) her mother lest she be separated from her. Then she fantasied giving birth to her mother to make restitution for the previous act, adding to it, in accordance with the stage of her development, the pleasure-gains associated with anal elimination. In the course of this fantasy the little girl treats her mother as her own baby. Before this sequence reaches the regular conclusion of wanting a child from Father two earlier stages are passed through: that of active, phallic fantasies with regard to Mother as passive and receptive partner; and that of rapacious, oral fantasies directed toward Father. In another paper Jacobsohn sums up what one might consider the essence of the development since Freud: "The wish for the baby is historically older than the wish for or pride in the penis" (1952).

Benedek's point of view is in some respects decisively different. Without disavowing the basic sequence and some of the later theories she perceives the reproductive wish as determined by the menstrual cycle. Benedek (1952, 1960) derives the psychological disposition for motherhood, and the modalities of coping with it later on, from the identification of the little girl with her mother. She follows the convergence of these two lines of motivation in some detail: it is clear that identification provides a pattern of orientation which the hormonal cycle triggers off and upon which it works with almost impersonal force. Benedek makes many specific suggestions about the alternating effects of estrogen and progesterone phases. "Ovulation is the signal to which the psychic apparatus responds with a directional change of drive energy". She equates ovulation with IRM, the *Internal Releasing Mechanism*, to which ethologists refer as the integrating factor in reproductive behavior. Even when she deals with psychological processes alone Benedek has no doubt about the predetermination of the female toward reproduction. One is bound to conclude that nature grooms woman early for her essential function and has no room for variations and alternatives. "The innate femaleness of the girl directs her development toward motherhood through step-by-step identification with her mother". Interestingly enough, Benedek distinguishes motherliness from the wish, or need, for motherhood and regards it as independent of hormonal influence. In spite of some retrenchment toward the end of her paper, she clearly thinks motivation for reproduction issues from the bio-physiology of the body and from a somewhat vaguely conceived set of instincts. How the individual will respond to the challenge depends

on her history and personality; but the impetus is as inescapable as it is benign. In interaction with the hormonal cycle the ego matures and eventually reverses the passive wishes of the child to be fed and nurtured into the ego ideal of the adult woman to feed and take care of others ". . .as her most significant aspiration, the wish to be a mother".<sup>7</sup>

### The Genesis of the Child-Wish

What should we make of these more recent theories about the genesis of the child-wish? The observing clinician will be able to affirm many of them from his own experience. Even when they derive from the reconstruction of childhood events in the course of therapy with an adult, they tally well with the direct observation of children. Most of the conjectures drawn from these two sources seem plausible when they concern psychological processes: needs, images, effects. All these theories stress drive and affect more than structure, cognition and organization; I have commented before on the affinity for the impersonal promptings of instinct behind the idiosyncrasies of individual development which can be discerned in them. Psychoanalytic investigation has proceeded by and large as if it expected to uncover a single, specific pattern according to which the child-wish unfolds.

Yet it is quite possible that the wish may derive from different components of experience, in the same manner in which adult sexual behavior is tied to the limited capacities of the body for erogenity and tumescence, and to the special significance the genitals have attained thereby; while the conscious and unconscious fantasies realized during the sexual act may vary greatly among individuals. The plurality of motives uncovered by psychoanalytic observers in their quest for the genesis of the child-wish suggests poignantly that the early components of this motive, too, can be different yet will manifest themselves in the same *wish for the child*. One comes away from these studies with the impression that the investigators (women themselves with very few exceptions) tend to record the behavior of children with a view to making it fit the conscious needs of the fecund woman. What the children really *thought* (inasmuch as this term applies to their imagery at all) may have been quite different. Because of the great plasticity of reference it may have meant

<sup>7</sup>For alternatives to this position see Mannes (1963) and Rossi (1964). The latter essay also contains an excellent summary of the strains in woman's role which transition has been causing it for some time. In this connection see also Riesman's interesting comparison of two generations (Riesman, 1964). There is a large body of anthropological data showing very clearly the variations of which maternal aspirations are capable. For an extensive discussion, see Margaret Mead (1949).

several things, and only new combinations of experience would determine, through conflict and adaptation, *what* meaning will prevail.

The state of psychoanalytic propositions<sup>8</sup> allows no conclusive answer to the precious distinction between innate and acquired motives. Kestenberg reports in some detail her little clients' activities with dolls and offers persuasive interpretations of them. But it is still uncertain *what* would happen if little girls were not, as a matter of course, given dolls to play with; or if instead, the dolls were given to little boys; or if girls and boys had not been confronted with role expectations entirely different from each other. Anatomical distinctions *are* significant and so are the effects of the menstrual cycle. The anatomical difference may lead to a great variety of adaptations within a definable range of possibilities. That children in the pre-Oedipal period have elaborate fantasies or producing babies cannot be seriously doubted. (Freud, 1950, 1953; Jacobsohn, 1936, 1952; Deutsch, 1945; Kestenberg, 1956) One only has to refrain from wearing blinders, then listen and look long enough in order to see them. Exactly how these fantasies function with regard to motivating adults toward having children remains unclear. It seems plausible enough that the succinct wish of the fecund woman should have

<sup>8</sup> Engel (1962) offers a clear and precise summary of the psychoanalytic point of view. His chapter on reproduction also demonstrates one of the characteristic problems of psychoanalytic reasoning on this subject—the interloping from one logical plane to a heterogeneous one. The argument veers from that which is subjectively experienced to behavior which can be observed in others. By way of inference the viewpoint may then suddenly shift back to that which can only be experienced “from inside”; and from either of the two it may move next to the level of physiological or biological concepts. Even the last-mentioned two classes are not quite as homologous as some of the authors assume. Motivation on the physiological level refers to specific physio-chemical processes while biological explanation of behavior rests on more comprehensive assumptions about growth and adaptation. On the other hand, *adaptation* in psychoanalysis has an unmistakable flavor of the meta- or perhaps para-biological. Yet, either concept has its purpose. The fact that biological assumptions in psychoanalysis have the quality of postulates rather than of established principles does not detract from their heuristic usefulness. However, the shift from one conceptual level to the next occurs frequently just when we sense that link is missing. The shift from the level of the experienced (or that which in principle can be experienced) to the physiological merely dodges the issue. We do not really explain anything that way but create epistemic confusion if we try to combine the psychological experience of urge and the physiological process (which may well be a condition of the former) into one explanation, without being able to say how they connect. In our awareness the entire event registers as a *need* and is inevitably connected with images of an object (the sexual partner), of means (foreplay and intercourse) and of a goal (orgiastic release). These images obviously do not come from physiology and can be properly explained only in their own psychological continuity. A good example for the kind of conceptual interloping of which I am speaking here is Benedek's theory of the biological origins of the wish for the child (Alexander, 1952; Benedek, 1960).

been prepared by any number of transformatory images on several stages of development. That is how it would be with any other major event of adaptation, e.g. the individual's relationship to others. But can we take elementals of imagery and cognition occurring many years prior to the possibility of reproduction for the explicit and exclusive motive of it?

Kestenberg and Benedek take it for granted that the sequence of images and adaptive acts in the child consistently and coherently refer to the real thing, i.e. to reproduction when biological maturity has been attained. Yet the fantasy of "having a baby" (and what the child takes for it—feces, for instance—he often identifies with the mother) is common for both girls *and* boys. We know that boys soon abandon and, as a rule, repress it. It is startling, however, how common this fantasy is. It may have more to do with the fluid, not yet unified, organization of the child's ego than with reproduction. At one moment these fantasies assert his self-ness while at the next he may align that self with another person (or that person's outstanding attributes) by identifying with him. Still later he may in fantasy separate and extrude what he had taken in before and subsequently realign himself once more with what had been extruded.

The exercise looks as if the child were working over his identifications, trying them out and, in the end, as if he were striving to organize and unify them. Thus, the fantasies of the *doll baby* and of Kestenberg's *early maternal phase* may have more to do with the growth of the self as center of experience than with "having babies". That these fantasies still sound like reproduction has to do with the inclusiveness of primitive concepts. All "taking in" and all "putting forth" or "expelling" represent the same metaphor of elementary experience. The metaphor becomes more specifically "reproduction" when it is guided by hints and clues of the adult world which the children pick up and use as building material for their own fantasies. In other words, children's birth-and-baby fantasies help us understand the composition of the wish for the child in the fecund woman, but they neither fully explain it nor account for its urgency or its variability.

### *Some Tenets of Psychoanalytic Investigations*

In concluding this section some of the tenets inherent in psychoanalytic investigations of reproduction should be extracted. Psychoanalysis made it possible to study the vicissitudes of these motives as an integral part of the unfolding of personality. However, psychoanalysis has taken a rather conservative stand concerning the part culture and society play in shaping the child-wish. The fact is, however, that culture itself is an evolutionary force, as Dozhansky put it. One can see why such a conservative position is derived from

the theory of the basic sequence which provided the premises for the study of the reproductive motive.

If the basic sequence is interpreted in an overly circumscribed manner, the wish for the child is simply the necessary result of a developmental process and therefore applies to all women in the same way. To do them justice, however, these propositions must be understood in their proper historical context. They were formulated at a time when nobody worried about over-population. In fact, propagation and the instincts guiding it were still thought of as the most elementary condition of survival and were, in a way, beyond questioning. A set of quasi-mandatory conclusions resulted from this. These conclusions are usually stated as if they were principles whereas they have the quality of values that ought to be realized:

... Every woman wants to have children because this is the essence of her self-realization. It follows that she cannot be quite normal if she is undecided or does not care to have children.

... The theory can also be interpreted to suggest strongly that reproduction is a single event. Some investigators (Deutsch, Benedek) have explicitly stressed the phases of the reproductive cycle and have pointed to the adaptive problems peculiar to each phase. Reproduction, motherhood, parenthood are obviously convenient abstractions comprising not only a series of processes over decades but a variety of heterogeneous events and attitudes. Man's perpetual inclination for conceptual realism tempts him to believe that what is called by one name must also be of one piece. It is hardly necessary to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, there is a tendency in psychoanalytic writing to treat reproduction as if it were *one* psychological enterprise.

... Another consequence is the dichotomy of "good" versus "bad", or "right" versus "wrong" motives—as if the "good" mother cherished her child in exactly the same way at every step of the reproductive process. It seems much more plausible, however, to assume that motherhood has several distinct phases varying sharply in the demands they impose as well as in the gratifications they provide. The elementals of motivation seem equally varied. In this instance as in all others they have primarily to do with gratification and self-protection rather than with the giving and caring which may nevertheless be their result (Bibring, 1959; 1961; Coleman, 1953).

The child wish is neither as definite nor as persistent as one would conclude from Kestenberg's and Benedek's writing. It varies not only from one individual to the next, but within the individual from one phase of life to another and shows the influence of collective attitudes on individual motives. It will not do to explain all this by taking recourse to neurotic ambivalence. Women simply are more concerned with having children when they are in a setting which encourages that wish, albeit by means of a diffuse, multiple identification with other women. This is surely a trivial insight; yet it is

enough to disown the claim that the desire for motherhood is entirely indigenous.

Benedek speaks of the dynamics of the reproductive drive as if it were entirely independent not only of the progress of culture but of its very existence. This poses the question of the relationship of sexual desire to the reproductive drive. We know that they are closely coordinated in animals. Contrary to Huxley's vision in *After Many A Summer*, sex among primates claims an amazingly small amount of their time (Devore, 1963; Jay, 1963b) while human beings are extravagant in the time and energy they spend on sexual fantasies if not in sexual acts. There is every evidence that human beings have always known how to make the most of the pleasure premium of sexuality. Yet, it appears also that the reproductive consequences of love making were taken for granted implicitly. One might say that man had no power over fertilization, but that is not quite correct either. From the vast array of instances in history and fiction, one concludes that sexuality and procreation were not, and perhaps could not be, separated in the minds of those involved in them. This seems to have been the case even when impregnation was socially disastrous for either or both of the couple involved. It would, however, be risky to relate this undividedness to the strength of the reproductive wish; nor can subsequent separation be related exclusively to the control man gained over fertility through effective contraception, as sociologists suggest. It seems plausible that there is now in individual and social awareness a progressive split between the reproductive and the pleasure function of sexuality. Children obviously suggest different values and imply different problems in different ecological and economical circumstances. The situation of the peasant and subsistence farmer contrasts sharply with that of the landholder who will market his product for profit, or with that of the wage earner in a metropolis. The argument of the preservation of the species looks different when the encroachments of civilization present as many problems as those of nature. The roles of the sexes are changing and with them the goals and patterns of conduct which are the visible manifestations of identity. In the course of this development sexuality and reproduction will become further separated as subjects of individual experience. Each will be understood to belong to a line of motivation involving different goals and different responsibilities. At earlier ages reproduction was everybody's business. In fact, the stern wisdom of natural selection cast out him who withheld his participation, although in this context the individual gender can only be used in an allegorical sense. It is no longer so necessary to maintain the species as it is to prevent its deterioration, by limiting the population to the resources available and checking overpopulation, which would inevitably cause large-

scale pathology (Calhoun, 1962a, 1962b; Dubois, 1963; Petersen, 1964). One can envisage people enjoying the comforts of an industrial civilization (especially when they are not too crowded), associating with each other primarily for closeness and companionship. Reproduction would then be a separate endeavor backed by the parents' tested desire to bring up children, not just to have them; and as it involves society in innumerable ways it should also be compatible in scope with the well-being of that society.

### The Principle of Inner Duality

There is still another type of experience which prepares both men and women for their reproductive aims in adulthood. It is a psychological modality which has been referred to many times before and is continuously invoked when process and change of infantile fantasies are described (for instance by Deutsch, Kestenberg and Benedek). However, as far as I know, the principle has not been extracted yet from innumerable incidents cited in the literature in which the working of this adaptive move has been mentioned. I shall loosely classify it as a "mechanism" and as a form of coping and shall refer to it as the *principle of inner duality*.

*Inner duality* pertains to our capacity for splitting the self into two prototypical roles so that it can re-enact and revise certain elementary relationships. The pregnant woman who speaks to her yet unborn child is both mother and child at the same time. She has turned back upon herself, and the narcissistic self-absorption of this phase has a great deal to do with the closed circle of giving and receiving love which in her fantasies she has elaborated as a result of her awareness of the changes in her body. She experiences herself from both sides: she can be alternately mother and child, thereby giving and receiving affection without reserve. She can make up for the past when she wanted love but didn't receive enough of it. She is not only mother and baby but, by dint of her identifications also the image of her own mother and the image of herself as a child (Benedek, 1960). In this way she can reconcile the inevitable ambivalence toward her own mother and can temporarily free herself of guilt and self-restriction, the regular consequence of ambivalence (Benedek, 1960; Bibring, 1959, 1961).

I have on another occasion referred to this process as the *psychological mitosis of pregnancy*.<sup>9</sup> The term points to the splitting-in-unity which also characterizes the mechanism of inner duality. The images of that fantasy solution usually represent aspects of the elementary roles of life, like those of parent and child, compounded by various elaborations in the preconscious privacy of the individual.

<sup>9</sup>On Second Thought: A Clinical Notebook. (in preparation)

In pregnancy the working of inner duality is supported by incisive changes and new sensations. Its effects are more impressive than they could be under any other condition and point directly to the special aura of pregnancy proceeding from inner duality. The psychological bliss of this period is a significant incentive to have more children. Observation of this bliss provides the model for girls to transform a series of diffuse fantasies into a very definite aspiration; and it motivates women, who have already had children, to want another child. Last but not least it is a source of envy and inferiority for men.<sup>10</sup>

### *The Origin of Inner Duality*

What is the origin of our capacity for inner duality? It seems to come from the pluralities of the yet inchoate self and, in a way, perpetuates it. Inner duality is also a consequence of the elementary use of fantasy. Its aim is to soothe frustration, settle tensions, bring about closures, and integrate a welter of perceptions and need-promptings. That fantasy functions along the lines of inner duality comes from the elementary events of introjection and identification from which the child constitutes his self. The appearance of that self as being "of one mind" all the time seems to be less definite, constant or complete than is usually assumed. That we can play different roles in our fantasies at the same time and act out dialogues on an inner stage shows that the vaunted "unity of the self" is forever liable to break up temporarily into the elementals or proto-identities of which it was built. The functioning of bad conscience as an "inner voice" is one of many examples of this liability.

Certain dispositions for adaptive and maladaptive behavior have their origin in the mechanism of inner duality. In our fantasies we do not necessarily crave affection for ourselves: the pleasure is often in the giving as much as in the receiving. In fact, both of them are so inextricably fused that they are usually experienced together. The little girl playing house with her dolls provides a simple example: the covert aim of her play is to be both the mother and the child. She

<sup>10</sup> This envy shows itself in the metaphors men habitually employ when they speak of their own creative endeavors: fertilized . . . pregnant with an idea . . . gestation . . . brain-child, and many others. Man's ideas of pregnancy come from fantasies and identifications in early childhood which are worked over and modified at successive stages of development. When the adult male has occasion to observe how much the pregnant woman can be absorbed with herself he often has to cope with a new wave of ambivalence and envy. The most effective means of coping seems to be through renewed identification which may either follow the line "by sharing this experience with you I can take part in it myself"; or he may go the other way and set himself off from the female along the line "I have something better than you have; I will out-do you at your own game", which is the counterpoise of creativity, but, of course, only one of its motives.

relishes both roles for the needs they gratify and uses them to integrate experiences and to resolve a variety of tensions. Her next step in the development of inner duality is to extend it to another person who is then not only the "object" of wishes but, much less visibly, also the one to whom a part of one's self has now been assigned.

In this way all of us re-enact and qualify many needs in very different settings. Love relations afford us many examples. Another less auspicious, but quite telling, occasion for the display of inner duality is the relationship to pets. The owner endows them, usually without being aware of it, with an image of his own childhood-self and, by virtue of this arrangement, acts out a variety of needs on his pets. The desire for having affection lavished upon oneself like the child who is fondled and cuddled seems to be foremost in this relationship. Of all our wishes this one is most prone to linger on past childhood, disguised but unchanged, and now seeks opportunity to be lived out again. At the same time, the need to be active where one had been passive before, which accompanies development as an elementary disposition, affects the yearning for love and, above all, for physical affection. Inner duality comes about as a kind of constructive compromise on the one hand between striving to re-orient one's whole behavior from the mode of *being-done-to* to that of *doing-to*, and on the other from the untiring search for affection. Inner duality is both realized and temporarily resolved when it is extended to an object outside the self, a person or a pet.

Why should this shift take place at all? The answer does not differ much from the rather limited answers we would suggest if the question had been: why do we need love objects at all? The need for them is inherent in the process of growth itself. The turning of the child from a passive receptive attitude to an increasingly active one is especially significant for the need for love and objects. The self strives for objects even more than for gratification as Fairbairn (1952), Guntrip (1961), Sutherland (1963) and Wisdom (1963) have shown.

### *The Shift From Fantasy*

In the absence of a more precise explanation the proposal could be made that the shift away from fantasy, restricted to the inner world of the individual, has to do with over-loading: the desire to give as well as receive affection becomes too strong to be contained in the autistic recess of the self.<sup>11</sup> The mechanism of inner duality combines the need to be loved with the need for an object. The need to

<sup>11</sup> Freud (1950b) observed implicitly the same principle in his analysis of hypochondriasis.

give affection to others, which is so easily overlooked when we use terms such as *striving for gratification* and *seeking love* always involves an element of inner duality. The one whom I seek and love is always the secret lessee of *my own need* for affection, whatever the nature of object-seeking and object-finding may be.

It is important to remember at this point that the experience of inner duality, when it is still my fantasy and not yet a modus of the relationship to somebody else, will increase the narcissistic excitement to the point of discomfort. Perhaps this will explain the great urgency that often characterizes the wish to lavish affection upon somebody else, take care of him and caress him. The closer the relationship comes to that ineffable image of giving and receiving love in one closed circle, the greater will be the urgency—and there we have returned to the motivating power of inner duality and the wish for the child. This mechanism, as suggested earlier, issues from the child's elementary experience of his parent. It perpetuates the parent-child relationship from one generation to the next, and provides that quality of "mothering" and "fathering" one can discern in all relationships in which affection has any part.

The mechanism of inner duality may also be the vehicle of pathological adjustments, notably in character and instinct disorders. The pederast, in his relationship to the boy to whom he feels drawn, unconsciously plays the role of the mother. He assigns his own former child-self to his youthful love-object whom he then treats as he once wished to be treated by his own mother (Freud, 1953).

Inner duality as a modality of fantasy provides a pattern both for temporary gratification and tentative organization. It becomes a universal arrangement for giving and receiving affection and continues in this capacity after development has been completed. The expression of tender emotions always shows the effect of inner duality mediating between the narcissistic pull of the self's untiring demands for affection and the reaching-out for *the other*, the love-object, or *socius*. Hence the conclusion that it is also the structural origin of motherliness.<sup>12</sup> This does not imply that there is no more to motherliness than caring for a version of self, assigned to another person. Nor does it suggest that tenderness is self-love split up into two roles and attached to a convenient dummy. Either of these behaviors is transformed in many ways by maturation and changes in the ego, dependent in large measure on external opportunities. In time tenderness, the need to care for somebody else, and the wish for the child all become *autonomous* in G. W. Allport's sense—they become relatively succinct, articulate and explicit motives in their

<sup>12</sup> It seems to me that Helene Deutsch (1945) in discussing the origin of motherliness comes by a different line of reasoning to a rather similar result.

own right. But their origins can be as clearly discerned—if properly looked for—as those of other motivational strands contributing to the child-wish.

The part inner duality plays in the genesis of the child wish should once more be specified here. In the course of development other experiences will have been arranged according to that modality: vague intestinal pressures, concern with the expulsion of body content, identification with the mother, phallic and acquisitive wishes of sadomasochistic coloring, and fantasies of restitution, as Jacobsohn and others have described them. Inner duality provides the modus for organizing all these discrete strivings into the explicit child-wish.

### *Inner Duality in Female Development*

This brings us to the special significance of the inner duality in female development. We have reason to speak of the girl's wish to have a child only at the end of the Oedipal period, but it can not be derived from the unspecific and amorphous quality of earlier fantasies. The authors who studied such fantasies have good reason to regard them as the elementals of the more specific desire that asserts itself after puberty, but *not* as the wish for a baby in and by itself. To put it sententiously: the fantasy of "having a baby" does not yet imply the wish for a child. During the Oedipal period the various prototypical images appear fused for the first time, resembling the wish for a child in the fecund woman. The succession of states, for which the basic sequence is the paradigm, brings about this fusion. By then, the child also has observed enough to understand what it means to have children. Motherhood represents the cumulative status of many things the little girl admires and wants, including her mother's relationship to her father. At this stage the girl has recognized motherhood as the central feature in the identity of her gender. In other words, she has had opportunity to learn about the role of woman and about the expectations the world has with regard to her own future role.<sup>13</sup>

Why should inner duality have special significance in the development of the female? Freud's ideas on the female character (1950a, 1950b, 1950c, 1965) were first expanded by Hanns Sachs

<sup>13</sup> The identification with mother of which Benedek speaks (1960) is continued in the girl's identification with other women, especially after fecundity has been reached. In other words, later observations of mothers who are happy with their children must enhance her wish of becoming such a mother herself. The disposition for all this, however, was established much earlier. The paradigm: I want to act like my mother because my mother was *good* and that's why I really *am* my mother now—also suggests inner duality which derives itself from the elementary events of early identifications.

(1928), then by Jacobsohn (1937), Deutsch (1945) Greenacre (1952), and others (Sarlin, 1963; Erikson, 1964). In schematic outline the differential features of female personality may be described in terms of a structure less firm than that of the male. It remains modifiable for a much longer period of affiliation and identification, and is quite capable of its own brand of rigidity which often reveals itself as a protection against the wish to be recast or enveloped and absorbed by another person. The therapist has opportunity to observe that the feminine ego is more even or less pointed, explicit, manifest, and less determined on having a purpose than the male.

The one exception to this condition is the forceful wish in woman to find somebody who will help determine her. Much in the female is latent and waiting to be called upon, while man's energy is more often deployed to specific external goals. The female superego remains more subjective, a condition which does not make it any less capable of instigating guilt. But that subjectivity also keeps it from attaining the principle-oriented quality the male superego so often exhibits. Women tend to use identification as a way of adaptation more than men and take on the interests and orientation of that person—usually a man—to whom they look for affection and narcissistic supplies. Receiving affection is even more closely related to self-regard in women than it is in men. To be loved means to be endorsed. Women view themselves more often as the object of action rather than the subject; not as doers but as the ones to whom things are being done. The qualities of which I have been speaking can be summed up under the headings of *narcissism*, *passivity* and *masochism*. None of these concepts is free from internal contradictions; yet, they highlight characteristic modalities of woman's personality. Masochism in particular points to a special relationship between pain (or unpleasure) and arousal; though it also indicates a turning inward of impulses, such as aggression, originally intended for another person. Masochism in this context broadly denotes a tendency for discharging tension toward the self, or a predominance of autoplasic rather than alloplastic solutions.

All these qualities seem to converge in giving inner duality a special significance among the adaptive modes of the feminine ego. It was shown before why this mechanism lends itself so well to restoring in fantasy the fulfillment of wishes which, in relationship to their original objects, had to be disappointed and frustrated. This of course, applies to both sexes. However, the peculiar disposition of the feminine character seems to give greater scope to the mechanism of inner duality. It cannot be called a motive in the strict sense of the term. Yet the part inner duality plays in the genesis of the child-wish is so prominent that the content-and-image oriented motives discussed before could not have their effect without it. If we

are correct in assuming that woman's identity involves a certain ambiguity in matters of *doing* and *being-done-to*, of *relating-to* and *identifying-with*, then fantasy solutions along the lines of inner duality would seem eminently fitting. To put it differently, the mechanism of inner duality is likely to converge with other themes of feminine character, and as an adaptive move is specially suited to integrate eventually a multitude of heterogeneous motives into the aspirations of the fecund woman. If this is so, inner duality will also account for the direction, or the "readiness" assumed if we want to explain the continuity and the cumulative effect of a wide array of psychological events in feminine development.

### Motives of Reproduction

It remains only to offer some comments on motives of reproduction which have not been mentioned in this paper or were touched upon only in passing. The possibility of physiological motivation has not been pursued beyond the criticism of Benedek's hypothesis, nor have we been able to do justice to sociological and socio-psychological parameters of motivation. To propose that affluence or religious affiliation determine the rate of propagation and that they are therefore psychological motives would be incorrect. But how economic and social conditions affect individual motivation, *how they feed into it*, is a question of the utmost importance for the whole motive-constellation of reproduction. In fact, the question goes far beyond that particular problem and refers clearly to the basic problem in any theory of motivation (Erikson, 1959).

If there has been no discussion of certain time-honored motives which are frequently mentioned when this subject is discussed, it should not be inferred that such motives are necessarily spurious and do not belong in a scientific discourse. Far from it—the idea, for instance, that men and women have children in order to continue themselves and to live on in their offspring seems entirely plausible. It is really a composite of ideas collective in origin and part of a cultural tradition which is transmitted from one generation to the next. Yet such a collective idea must also have an effective relationship to the contingencies of individual needs. The wish to live in the children must have to do with the nature of self-love or narcissism of which we do not know enough to make an explicit statement. The motive of survival, a composite, cannot be evaluated until its heterogeneous elements have been isolated.

Two other motives should now be mentioned because they come up frequently in clinical observation. The first one, the motive of the *try-out*, has been mentioned before: "I should like to have a baby so that I will know how it is, and that I can prove to myself I can do

it, too". Even though such a statement often labels other aims and needs, it certainly has a relevance of its own. This motive refers to the realization of subjective potential as well as to the accomplishment of a social role. It has to do with *competence* and *mastery* (Hendrick, 1942; White, 1960, 1963) and has considerable import for practical decisions. As an item of empirical observation it is a stricture to Benedek's and Kestenberg's argument. The *satiation* of the desire to have children, and even of mothering and its distinct phases, is one of the many aspects of reproduction for which we have no adequate explanation.<sup>14</sup> The *try-out* motive pertains to the ego more than other motives do. It might be regarded as a normal part of that larger complex of motivation concerned with the affirmation of identity. No doubt, identity means different things to different individuals just as it meant different things at different times and in different places. With this reservation in mind, the quest for identity, at least from the viewpoint of clinical observation, seems to be the over-all motive that will most frequently account for the insistence on having children when repetitious conflicts or external circumstances would seem to speak against it (Wyatt, 1965). Woman's role has been in a state of transition as has that of mother and housewife. It is much easier to declare that women should be happy in these traditional roles, or to argue why they cannot be, than to comprehend the many tensions which have been perplexing women for some time.

But we cannot be satisfied with attributing the increase in the birth rate since the war to the quest for identity and let it go at that. There is a tendency among some writers, as we have seen, to justify as well as to explain the wish for the child by the motives underlying it. Judging by the outcome, the wish does not tell us much of the mother's inclination to care for the child once it is born. Rather, the manifest wish for a child turns out to derive from different, often contradictory, motives which one could expect to interfere with child-rearing more often than help it. This brings us to two questions of considerable scope which can only be touched upon here. The first concerns the distinction of the "right" from the "wrong" motives. The second refers to the relationship of reproduction to society—the presumed connection between identity and the rate of reproduction is a case in point. In this context we usually equate *right* with healthy and well-adjusted, *wrong* with maladaptive and neurotic. This distinction, however, is incompatible with the succession of motives observed in the course of the reproductive process,

<sup>14</sup> Benedek concludes that it is the distinction of the human species "that in this process man may disguise the sexual drive, may distort its meaning and function" (1960). But that could, of course, also mean that man isn't as much determined by his physiology and "natural function" as Benedek proposes.

and should be replaced by a more subtle assessment of personality factors determining the explicit wish for a child. In fact, we can be certain that reproduction always will involve an extensive social commitment far beyond the parents' obligation to care for the child and prepare him for his place in society. Obviously every new individual adds to the adaptive tasks with which society as a whole has to cope; it makes no difference that his weight is infinitesimal, or that society was neglectful even before its rapid and planless expansion. It is impossible therefore to evaluate the motives of reproduction without reference to their social context. In the past reproduction has been considered acceptable socially when it appeared to meet three prerequisites: a stable arrangement between the parents (marriage); the absence of hazards which would endanger either the health of the mother (as in gestation) or that of the child; and the means sufficient for the parents to feed and take care of the child properly. In our age it has become necessary to add a new condition—to weigh the consequences of rapid overpopulation. It confronts us with a problem about to outrun all others. It cannot but affect the adaptive meaning of reproduction and compels us to revise it. The time has come, in other words, to distinguish clearly when the reproduction of life adds to and continues man's well-being, and when it threatens to choke it with mindless proliferation.

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## Fertility, Family Planning and the Social Organization of Family Life: Some Methodological Issues<sup>1</sup>

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The concern with fertility and family planning invariably is linked to the "population problem"; "excessive" population vis-a-vis the resources to support a given density. It is difficult to analyze this problem, and demographers in countries like the United States, where presumably fairly good information is available and several studies have been done,<sup>2</sup> are still unable to understand the so-called "temporary" postwar baby boom, or its apparent irregular decline since 1957.<sup>3</sup> For any academic or professional audience, therefore, "crowding" is a problem, and such factors as "low or high fertility attitudes", knowledge about contraceptives, accessibility of family planning advice and assistance, age at marriage, physiological and nutritional problems involved in conception and child birth and many

<sup>1</sup>The larger study upon which this paper is based, was supported by many groups. I want to acknowledge the support of the Social Science Research Council; The Institute of Sociology at the University of Buenos Aires; The Population Council; The Institute of International Studies and the International Population and Urban Research Center, University of California, Berkeley. I am grateful to Judith Blake Davis, Kingsley Davis, Gino Germani and William Petersen for their encouragement and support, even though they would not necessarily subscribe to the views expressed in this paper.

<sup>2</sup> See especially Freedman, Whelton, and Campbell (1959).

<sup>3</sup> Coale (1963) makes this point.

more conditions should be studied and viewed as significant in describing the "population problem". Yet despite presumed "hard" data and elegant technical devices for manipulating information, demographic or population theories remain, as do most social scientific theories, *ad hoc* or improvised attempts to articulate theory and research findings.

Without denying the relevance of standard economic, demographic, biological and attitudinal factors, the present paper argues for a shift in method and perspective.<sup>4</sup> The "shift" suggests a re-examination of the articulation between social process and social structure implied in demographic or population theories about fertility and population growth.

I assume that everyday family existence consists of routine social interaction that is self-contained and "independent" of (proscriptive and prescriptive) normative constraints of formal kinship. The practiced and enforced ways in which families maintain viable, stable order, are dissolved and/or are reconstituted, can be described as bounded self-contained sequences of interaction based upon differentially stated and unstated rules binding upon all parties. Yet this semi-autonomous system of action simultaneously articulates, in formally prescribed ways, with publicly acknowledged kinship rules generally recognized in the society and supported by legal statutes and/or tradition. It is important, therefore, to distinguish general values and norms attributed to the family as a basic social institution, and the extent to which actual families can be depicted as reflecting formal prescriptions and proscriptions. The social relationships that produce births differentially, therefore, are not to be fused directly with structural conditions of kinship, societal "problems" of population growth and economic development, unless a broader conception of families as self-contained "games" is linked conceptually and empirically with practical internal family problems.

There are two problems here: (a) the link between practical family problems (e.g., a desire for children but a concern for more freedom on the part of wives, a desire for more income by both husband and wife to spend on fewer children and/or consumer goods, religious beliefs taken for granted vis-a-vis the production of children, and so forth) and family relationships as a self-contained "game"; and (b) how practical family problems and social organization are connected with demographically defined problems of "population growth". The demographic definition of the problem assumes a social parallel to the notion of the demographic transition

<sup>4</sup>Something of a shift is evidenced by Lee Rainwater's (1960, 1965) recent works.

emerges that might loosely be called a societal "awareness" at the level of the family that provides a kind of "take-off point" for action that would reduce fertility through family planning, lead to action seeking information about contraceptives, and the like. The economic "take-off stage" is linked first to the family "take-off stage" and then related to organized efforts on the part of government (and/or health, church, private citizens and the like) to support these parallel developments. The argument is that the "society" rewards the actor(s) who have learned to behave (produce children) in socially acceptable ways, numbers, spacing, etc.<sup>5</sup>

But studies and action programs seeking to understand, evaluate and modify directly the reproductive outcomes of families have assumed that the practical problem at hand, like the seemingly objective demographic data, can be handled under the assumption that our information permits us to be "reasonably" accurate about what is going on within the family, and that what we know is adequate for understanding differential fertility, as discerned by a sample survey study in the field, and using standard census and vital statistics information. Data from sample surveys, census materials and vital statistics reports are generated by methods that presuppose a "rational" solution to "underlying behavioral dynamics" and practical population and economic problems. The actors in the society are assumed to be educable to family planning and oriented to societal "goals". It is assumed that "successful" family and societal planning leads to "successful" economic development and to still further rational planning in such areas as housing, transportation, health and so forth.<sup>6</sup>

We cannot take for granted that the focal point of family life revolves around not being able to conceive, a desire for male off-springs, having "too many" children, still-births, and the like, although these issues certainly intrude upon some part of a family's existence. As an empirical problem, the issue of the general social context of family life and its articulation with family planning, or the absence of planning, or objections to planning, has not been examined seriously by social scientists. Instead, there have been increasing efforts to stop the growth of population with "crash" programs on family planning, rather than raising basic issues about how do we "know" what we claim "to know" about population growth and control. An interest in implementing practical action on family

<sup>5</sup> See Freedman (1963).

<sup>6</sup> For an instructive discussion of welfare planning that raises doubts about the coordinated planning of economic development, population growth and general urban planning that would include everything from housing to medical services, see Wilensky (1965).

planning requires careful attention to basic issues. We are all agreed that a "problem" exists, but in the dark over what we "know" and how to study the problem.

### Structure and Process

One important sociological approach for studying population problems might be termed the "table of organization" view as contrasted with a variant of the "social interaction" perspective. The table of organization view stresses the actor's social position in society as molding his dispositions to behave in predictable ways. Role taking in everyday life is a function of position in the social structure.<sup>7</sup> Rewards and punishments are meted out according to a two-fold type of rationality whereby those activities that are highly valued in society are also likely to contribute most to the society's survival over time. Hence, on the one hand, we have the generation of activities functionally necessary for survival creating a table of organization that comes to be valued, and on the other hand, that which is valued provides an orientation to the actor-members of the society for guiding their conduct and generating abstract rules which will insure a system of rewards and punishments that contribute to the control of individuals and groups. Oral and/or behavioral and/or written traditions (i.e., "mutual expectations") serve as constant reminders of the values and norms of the society and form a kind of idealized order to which everyone tends to subscribe.

Societies undergoing economic development go through a demographic transition whereby high death and birth rates are lowered and the important question revolves around how quickly birth rates are lowered after a fall in the death rate occurs. Some writers assume a parallel rationality is involved in the development of the economic system, and the emergence of an "awareness" in the population regarding the rewards and importance of family planning and lower fertility. This line of reasoning assumes there are "good reasons" (an understandable rationality) why families desire large and then small families. Hence, if males are important to carry on existing traditions considered valuable to the maintenance of the society, then families will "overproduce" until such time as it is possible to demonstrate that a small number of children (that include males) will survive with improved health conditions. Hence, attempts to lower fertility are not recommended until death rates

<sup>7</sup>Recent views stress the idea that roles are less institutionalized statuses, where that which is "institutionalized" is based upon "third party" consensus in the community about norms and values (See Goode 1960).

have been lowered and general health conditions improved. The rationality of the argument is of interest because it links kinship structure with societal values and norms, and the problems of population growth and economic development. The problems associated with transforming the "developing" or "underdeveloped" areas of the world into industrialized societies, or problems associated with making the lives of people in industrial societies "happier" or more "worthwhile", or "richer", and so forth, are not viewed as conceptual problems of theory and understanding about what is going on, but primarily "technical" problems solvable in "due time".

The source of most of the information on fertility and family planning is to be found in some variant of social or sample surveys whereby standard questions are posed and asked orally or written for persons to answer with pre-coded answers. This methodological strategy is particularly suited to the rationality of the theory proposed above concerning kinship, development, population growth and the survival of society over time. The individual responds to that conception of the world, with whatever alternatives that the researcher presents him, and hence to a conception of himself and his way of life that enables the researcher to decide where the individual stands in the general scheme of things that links kinship with economic development and population growth. The methodology has built into it measurement, theory and substance and the actor's interview participation remains somewhat passive and divorced from his actual day-to-day activities.

The table of organization view stresses the actor's location in the social order vis-a-vis others, e.g., his familial, occupational, educational, religious affiliation or experience, as stable properties in accounting for the actor's expected behavior. The alternate perspective proposed here focuses upon the routine, common sense, expected, background features of everyday life. This essential feature of everyday life was described by Alfred Schutz as the "world known in common and taken for granted".<sup>8</sup> What is missing from conventional theories, therefore, is the familiar, common, routine, and usually unnoticed "background expectancies" as invariant features of all social interaction. The actor achieves stability in his perception and interpretation of his environment by necessarily invoking these background expectancies. The field researcher is faced with the same problem. Hence when we seek to obtain information from subjects, and enter into some kind of social relationship necessary for an interview, then pose questions, record answers, interpret the answers as a basis for further questions, and the like, we necessarily invoke assumed but unstated common knowledge.

<sup>8</sup> See the collected works of Schutz (1962, 1964), and a paper by Garfinkel (1964).

It is not enough to say, as symbolic interactionist theorists do, that the actors employ a set of mutual expectations, that if the other's action differs from the expected, the situation is redefined, and the expectations are connected to norms applying to a given situation.

What are the properties of everyday expectations as seen by the participants?<sup>9</sup> What are the background expectancies that members take for granted but which inform each with a sense of "what is happening"? What methods do members of a group employ for making sense of an environment of objects? How do the actors assign factual status to any features of an event? How do actors decide that the presented appearance of an object is the *intended* object as it appears in a particular instance? How are discrepancies in the appearance of objects handled? normalized? redefined? rejected as the intended object? What are the socially standardized properties of labeling of events? How are the labels identifiable as products of a known language? How are present evaluations of an event viewed as indicative of past events and assumed to be intended of future occasions? How do we decide that a given event is understood in common by members of a society? The scheme of interpretation used in common and a stock of knowledge held in common, that permits members to assume they are entertaining the same object or event, remains empirically untouched in sociology.

The observer and respondent both employ methods for making the social structures of everyday life observable. The observer's task is complicated by his own use of an assumed but unstated common knowledge in entering the respondent's environment, sustaining the social relationship, posing questions, receiving answers, evaluating the respondent's environment, and interpreting the findings to others. The observer must also take into account how the respondent evaluates the interviewer, the questions posed, how he formulates answers, all within the background expectancies that operate for the respondent.

If the family is viewed as a semi-autonomous system of interaction, continually preoccupied with its own problems of sustaining some kind of viability, or coming to terms with an essentially difficult form of social organization viewed as incompatible, then general and abstract basic values and norms of the society are not necessarily relevant for understanding how families emerge through marriages of some type, sustain themselves over time, or dissolve and/or become reconstituted in different arrangements. Basic or ideal values may be invoked by others or the marriage (divorce) partners, but often as a means of rationalizing or normalizing or justifying what has happened. Hence values about family size and

<sup>9</sup>The questions raised in this paragraph are discussed by Garfinkel (1964).

family planning or about any other facet of societal existence and practice are not very useful if conceived as general and abstract entities "internalized" by the actor in the course of socialization. The values and norms are "out there" in the sense that certain organized rituals, organizations, governmental propaganda, provide a context within which the actor periodically is reminded and reminds himself of more sacred moments in history and his allegiance to certain valued traditions and practices and beliefs.

A social interaction conception of the family suggests an ambiguous relationship between the family's social organization and its articulation with problems of population growth.<sup>10</sup> A source of confusion here stems from the observer's failure to separate the intended rationality of scientific theorizing and research, from the actor's common sense reasoning in everyday life.<sup>11</sup> The rationality of everyday life, the rationality of the "man on the street", is not to be confused with the scientific rationalities implied in the scientist's construction of a model. Everyday rationality relies upon a world of appearances and folk notions of achieving practical solutions to practical problems.

In the remainder of the paper I want to question the link, assumed to be clear by experts in this area, between standard demographic or population analyses of such variables as age, age at marriage, number of live births per woman of child-bearing age, occupation, education, residence and the like and attitudes toward family size and family planning as part of a rational enterprise that can be controlled.<sup>12</sup> I assume that pinpointing the difficulties in this articulation is basic to any program of practical action in family planning.

### Combining Methodological Strategies

My Argentine study sought to utilize the general framework of a survey design with a small sample, and open-ended questions designed to provide the respondent with a minimal "definition of the problem" at hand. Rather than assume the actor was familiar with the intent of a question, the statement was employed as an initial thrust so as to "test" the actor's perception of what was going on, and to give some direction to the intentions of the interviewing. The interviewers were instructed to allow the respondent to use his or her own words, encouraging free association. A few questions

<sup>10</sup> See Petersen's (1961) discussion of family planning, and chapter v of Cicourel (1964).

<sup>11</sup> See Schutz (1943) and Garfinkel (1960) for further details of the problem of rationality in everyday activities.

<sup>12</sup> See the articles and references in Greep (1963).

were designed to serve as screening devices to elicit spontaneous remarks about problems of routine family life and particularly any problems in the husband-wife relationship. Although essentially a replication of work done by Judith Balke (1961) in Jamaica, the present study differs in that the interviewers were told:

- (a) there was no necessary connection between stereotyped or "pat" answers given in response to standardized questions, and problems related to the research project that the respondent might mention spontaneously in the course of the interview;
- (b) a serious part of the study consisted of seeking linkages or discrepancies between what is being asked formally, and what might be revealed by probing and spontaneous remarks by the subject during the course of the interview, and
- (c) a description of the initial and changing social context should be included that enabled the interviewer to make sense of the respondent's utterances.

The interviewers were paid extra to sit down after the interview and describe the general atmosphere and problems about general or particular questions, their feeling the subject was lying or evading the issue, did not understand the question, and problems in their relationship to the respondent.

The methodological strategy was dictated by theoretical assumptions about the nature of family life. When the interviewer knocks or rings the doorbell there is no telling what kind of family predicaments he will encounter. The couple (or one of them) may be on the verge of a divorce, in the middle of an argument, suspect each other of infidelity, be annoyed with the interruption, fear the police (or some official agency) may be investigating them, etc. Even when there is apparent readiness by respondents to submit to the interview, this is not a guarantee that the subjects have no objections to the interview, or that we can successfully "question people about matters social scientists are often reluctant to probe", and assume the material obtained is a valid indication of everyday practice and belief.<sup>13</sup> I assumed that the most important factor was the social relationship between the interviewer and respondent during the course of the interaction. Further, two or more visits would more likely lead to fruitful probing and spontaneous remarks about

<sup>13</sup> In addition to general suspicion of strangers urban dwellers have in very large metropolitan areas, the situation in Buenos Aires and Argentina in general was rather unstable politically. Many interviewers were taken as municipal or federal officials interested in making trouble for the respondents. A more serious implication, however, is that interview procedures in the field are not only crude approximators of the information we seek, but that such procedures cannot be viewed as providing the necessary information for cross-tabulating information about a representative sample of the population because the responses within and across subjects and topics are not of the same order and meaning.

family routines and problems. Hence the interviewers were told to begin with the face-sheet or seemingly objective material, and seek a second or third interview for those parts considered delicate and from which probing and spontaneous remarks might reveal persistent problems of family life. Better relations were often established because many appointments had to be set and reset several times. The frequent contact enabled us to become acquainted with our subjects long before we arrived at the more "delicate" or "difficult" questions. There were times, obviously, when the interviewer seemed to "hit it just right" on the initial encounter, but such occasions were not in the majority. Each interview proved to be a "problem" of some sort in itself and had to be negotiated at every step. It was common for all of us to feel that at different points during the interview we might "lose" the case. Several interviews were started and then lost at various stages of the schedule.

The "problems" we label methodological are not merely "technical" obstacles to "ideal" interviewing that will be achieved in the future, but natural or inevitable problems of field research. The probing and spontaneous qualitative material is not merely a supplement to the "objective" quantitative data we obtain from surveys and censuses and vital statistics reports, where the qualitative material is seen as problematic because of the difficulties of coding such information, not to mention obtaining it. The qualitative material enables us to assign meaning to presumed objective information. The negotiated character of field research is itself a documentation of the structure of social interaction, i.e., the difficulties inherent in negotiating the first appointment, each stage of the interview, the various social types of actors encountered, the resistances to specific questions or blocks of questions, convincing the respondent of completing the interview, motivating the interviewer to regard each interview as an important case, and so forth.

## The Research Context

Throughout the field research I assumed that the choice of interviewers, like the use of stooges in experimental research,<sup>14</sup> is subject to limited control. Therefore, some way of accounting for the influence of the interviewer's presence regarding what passes as "data" becomes a critical part of reported "findings".

Quotations from interviews require a theory of social interaction if the material is to have more than anecdotal or illustrative significance. The quotations cannot "speak for themselves", but require a commitment by the researcher as to the theoretical ideas

<sup>14</sup> For discussion of this problem see Leik (1965).

guiding their interpretation and generation from the subjects. Consider the following remarks:

. . . The "collision" of two sets of actors, interviewers and subjects, can be known only after the fact unless some partial control is possible. Interviewers were instructed to terminate the first visit after the "face-sheet" or objective section was completed if they felt that they could not "get along with" the subject or felt uncomfortable with the household or one or both spouses. In consultation with the principal investigator, some attempt was made to characterize the respondent so that another interviewer sent might work better with the social type characterization reported by the initial interviewer. The "mesh" between interviewer and respondent will never be perfect under the best procedures available; therefore, details about recurrent problems are essential if the researcher is to evaluate adequately how the communication network developed between interviewer and respondent influences questions, responses, and outcomes labeled as data. The researcher discussed this problem of the "mesh" so that it would be easy for the interviewer to admit to such problems as a natural part of the research situation. Many interviewers were concerned lest they lose many interviews and hence diminish the amount of money they would earn. Hence I allowed for another possibility: the interviewer could spend the equivalent lost time, with adequate (agreed upon in advance) compensation, describing in writing, the problems encountered with the respondent with respect to the usefulness or uselessness of the questions, communication problems, perceived social difference in background that might have hindered the interview, what was felt as deliberate withholding of information, and so forth.

. . . Five general types of respondents seemed to emerge: (a) those refusing to begin an interview; (b) those who consented to begin the interview, but would stop before completion; (Note: there were a few cases where the one spouse was interviewed and the other refused during some part of their interview.) (c) those interviews where the interviewer felt the respondent was "honest" in his remarks, but truncated in the extent to which details and subtleties were given, so that the informational content appears to be managed throughout; (d) those interviewees whose answers appeared to vacilate between something describable as "sincere" or "honest" at times, and "evasive" or "contrived" at other times, yet where all of the answers seemed to be truncated and, of course, managed; and (e) those cases where the interviewees appeared to be "sincere" in giving most answers in depth with little or no encouragement, thus providing many spontaneous reactions to questions and independent remarks about their responses to the standard questions or probes. In all cases there were occasions when the respondent was apparently

ignorant of the practice or circumstances referred to by the questions, or not sure what was intended by the question or explanations given by the interviewer. Further, none of the five types described above occurred in any "pure" sense; the descriptions are ideal-typical. For example, there were refusals that were preceded by as much as three hours of discussion and wine-drinking and friendly conversation.

. . . Interviewers were instructed first to present the question in the standardized way in which it was written on the schedule. If the subject did not appear to comprehend the question then this was to be noted before attempting to explain what was intended. In addition to the ignorance factor operating at any stage of the interview, there is also the linguistic problem of not being able to formulate any question in such a way that a wide spectrum of the population would be able to interpret its intended meaning in identical ways.

. . . The interviewer-respondent "mesh" carries still another assumption: each employs linguistic styles and other socially relevant body movements, gestures or facial expressions that communicate a variety of meanings and bits of information about each other's social character, social background, political views, and the like. Such communication may serve to inhibit or to facilitate the interview *per se* as a comfortable social exchange, manage its duration, etc., where each seeks to bargain with the other implicitly about what will be tolerated, how each seeks to convey or blur some image of themselves, their relative interest in each other as persons, and so on.

. . . The extent to which the interviewer-respondent "mesh" can be termed "successful", "tolerable", or a "failure", requires some indication as to how the interviewer decided he or she "communicated" or "touched base" with the respondent. Many interviewers might be afraid to admit a failure to establish good relations with the respondent, or that the informational yield is inadequate in places. While a few "doubtful" interviewers were employed, the three women who did most of the interviewing not only had considerable experience, but were not afraid to admit to problems, and called me frequently during contacts with the same respondent to consult about the way in which the exchange was unfolding.

. . . Maintaining a constant, high, motivational level when interviewing intensively over time is difficult. After a number of interviews it is easy to develop a perfunctory routine for going through the motions. Many studies have difficulty keeping the interest high over time. I found that constant communication with the interviewers throughout the study was critical for motivating them to share routine and special problems about each case. Inasmuch as I was also doing interviews it was easy to refer to my own difficulties and obtain immediate responses from the interviewers about their

problems. I sought, whenever possible, to tape record or take detailed notes on exchanges with interviewers about particular cases and the problems that emerged. Whenever I paid the interviewers we would review the particular cases. When there seemed to be an unusual number of rejections or resistance in a particular district, a special strategy was planned for seeking additional information about the difficulties. One plan offered payment to the prospective interviewee and a kind of saturation schedule of interviews in the area. This particular occasion led to the discovery of a "witch", according to families refusing to be interviewed, who told the neighborhood they would become victims of a hex if they participated. Our presence was described as a bad omen for the area.

### *An Alternate Strategy to the Conventional Survey*

While problems described above are common to field research, the type of interviewing conducted was intended as an alternative strategy to the conventional survey. Specifically, I sought to avoid the use of fixed-choice questions couched in language assumed to be universally understood in identical ways by a representative sample of the population. Instead, I stressed the following:

. . . The routine grounds for making sense of an utterance carries with it a general social context, a background of unstated meanings, that enable the participants to decode and encode verbal and nonverbal messages.<sup>15</sup>

. . . At least two codes might be invoked, a public language, and a private code.<sup>16</sup> (In the case of a language like Spanish the structural distinctions between the familiar and polite forms of grammatical usage made this problem fairly obvious.) The particular code provides specific background expectancies in the form of language usage by which the participants become oriented to each other.

. . . The routine grounds for making sense of communication is couched in the language of everyday life, and not subject to a "checking out" unless the interviewer is willing to run several risks. Hence the use of probes that keep pressing the respondent (e.g., "could you tell me more about that", "could you explain that a little more", "how's that", etc.) are intended to induce a kind of "behaviorizing"<sup>17</sup> of the respondent's environment so as to strip it, as much as possible, from the kind of vague or taken for granted terms and phrases the respondent characteristically uses as a competent member of the society.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>15</sup> An elaborate theoretical and empirical statement of this essential property of social interaction is contained in Garfinkel (1964).

<sup>16</sup> The distinction between a public language and a private code is taken from Bernstein (1959).

<sup>17</sup> The present use of "behaviorizing" is taken from Garfinkel (1964).

<sup>18</sup> See the paper by Garfinkel (1963).

. . . The actor's remarks in the interview, even when termed "spontaneous", are often the product of a managed kind of presentation, save, perhaps, under extreme circumstances like a kind of uncontrolled rage, excitement and the like. Open ended questions are also likely to be managed by the researcher. Therefore, the content of the respondent's communication cannot be divorced from his choice of words, tone of voice, gestures, facial expressions.

. . . Both the interviewer and respondent are likely to be "taken in" by the same efforts to manage their utterances so as to make them acceptable to each other, while minimizing remarks that make "trouble" for either. Each will seek to "figure out" what the other intends by certain phrases, gestures, voice intonations, and the like, in an effort to categorize better those utterances to which they are exposed. Formal notions of status and role expectations, therefore, do not account for such properties of communication. The researcher cannot justify his questions (open or fixed-choice in construction) unless he is prepared to indicate how the respondent's answers are managed products negotiated with the interviewer over the course of the interview.

Problems of sampling have little meaning unless the researcher is prepared to make explicit the connection between structural types of families and respondents differentially distributed in a population, the ways in which such structural features bound and orient the social process he is studying, and elements of social interaction that cross-cut the structural conditions. Social class, religious, educational, ethnic (and other) differences are considered necessary in sociological research, even though their demonstrated character is often *ad hoc*, based upon after-the-fact cross-tabulations, because we have no explicit theory about the types of actors, families and interviewers we should be taking into account when we research a substantive topic.

The pretest often provides semi-ethnographic material that gives the researcher some "feel" of how the respondents interpret the questions, and provide him with some rules of thumb for eliminating or revising items. Hence the researcher moves from implicit sociological theory to personal theories of "human nature" from his own stock of knowledge about typical respondents, typical situations and typical responses. Survey researchers clearly recognize the importance of semi-ethnographic material, coder flagging of special problems in subsuming the material to some final set of categories, but the coder is likely to be guided by his common sense or folk notions of what was intended both by the respondent and the coding rules. Hence conventional tables cannot be viewed as adequate demonstrations of findings unless the researcher can reveal the grounds for their assembly.

Shortly before the study in Argentina terminated, a sample survey on fertility and family planning with fixed-choice questions was initiated with a partial overlap in the interviewers employed. The questionnaire of this new study could be completed in approximately forty-five minutes to one hour, yet covered essentially the same material of my interview schedule. The following summarizes the problems of this survey:

- (a) The fixed-choice questionnaire discouraged or simply cut off spontaneous comments by the respondent. Problems of ignorance or misunderstanding the questions often led to no responses or what appeared to be arbitrary choices.
- (b) The questions permitted little information about family organization except in truncated structural terms.
- (c) The attitudinal questions did not permit any independent evaluation by the interviewer regarding the evasiveness or "honesty" of the respondent, the general social context of the interview.
- (d) Clarificatory exchanges between the respondent and interviewer were discouraged and even when they occurred seldom appeared on the questionnaire. Many times the interviewer felt impelled or was asked by the respondent to "educate" them vis-a-vis the intent of the question, but this information did not appear on the report.
- (e) The interviewer frequently had to explain a question and then try to decide or improvise the significance of the respondent's answer within the context of the choices available. Hence both the respondent's interpretation and response were managed, but often so was the interviewer's marking of a particular response category based upon a more extensive interpretation of the respondent's answer than the questionnaire itself permitted.

The fixed-choice questionnaire eliminated the common sense knowledge and activities employed by the interviewer in obtaining the material. The problematic features of the interview were eliminated by the nature of the instrument. The instructions given about repeating questions three times and then going on, precluded the possibility of including interviewer impressions and remarks about his or her doubts about answers, and the respondent's observations about what was not understood or other comments suggesting the irrelevance or differential meaning of the questions.

### **Substantive Problems and Theoretical Consequences**

The research experiences of the Argentine study revealed that the social context of the family at the time of the first contact is like walking into a theater somewhere in the middle of an unknown picture and trying to decide what is going on.

Two general problems must be disentangled here: (a) the substantive issue of what kinds of problems the interviewer could walk

into when he first rings the doorbell, e.g., a recurrent family argument about the husband's infidelity or disinterest in the wife and children, negotiations for a divorce, an unemployed husband, a sick child that seems to make everyone and everything appear depressing to the family members, etc.; and (b) the basic research problem of identifying language and interactional categories that inform the researcher of how family interaction is motivated, how the language takes cognizance of particular structural features of the society, and the routine grounds for decision-making during family interaction. The researcher must know something of (b) in order to address the problems in (a).

Conventional role theory views common sense meanings as obvious and does not specify the typical categories that family members use for depicting their problems to each other and to the researcher. Hence interview material can be deceptive unless the researcher is prepared to suggest how the categorization devices<sup>19</sup> employed by the respondent reveal specifiable conceptions of family life and the general environment even when member qua member categories are not available as they would be if tape-recordings of natural conversation were available. Specifically, what is viewed as typical by the respondent? What is typical and "acceptable" conduct for husbands, children? What sorts of boundary conditions define the wife's notion of adequacy vis-a-vis the husband's occupational activities, his income, his attention to her, their sexual relations, the desirability of children, the number of children, and so forth? What are "justifiable" grounds for being "angry", divorce, starting an argument, "making up", demanding an apology, etc.? This system of interaction is an integral part of issues about family planning and fertility and problems of population growth and economic development.

<sup>19</sup> The phrase "categorization devices" refers to the concept of "Membership Categorization Devices" used by Sacks (1966). Sacks' work suggests how any population can be classified via the communication categories its members use. The researcher is provided with a basis for determining the rules governing the members' selection and interpretation of classes of relationships when deciding the relevance of their mutual affairs, and understanding and arriving at courses of action. The membership categorization devices provide the researcher a point of departure in seeking invariant meaning structures in everyday life. The use of this concept can be viewed as analogous to the analysis of syntactic structures in linguistics or componential analysis by anthropological linguists, or what Birdwhistell aspires to do with body motion. In the same tradition of a linguist who seeks to generate a grammar for an unwritten language, the sociologist can utilize the membership categorization devices of a population to generate and construct both the theory and method by which utterances of native users of a language can be mapped into a theory of social interaction.

The relationship between process and structure can be conceived as an ecology of games<sup>20</sup> whereby different, semi-autonomous, and interdependent socially organized activities produce outcomes not always intended. But the outcomes may be rationalized or historicised, so as to be understandable within different or similar referential schemas, otherwise labeled as products of ideologies or value systems. A second way of relating process and structure is to delineate the structural referents contained in the utterances of members of specifiable groups, where these structural categories provide both the actor and observer grounds for explaining, recommending and understanding a behavioral environment that includes socially defined ecological features, facial and other physical gestures, voice intonation and structured language.

### Some Interviews . . .

Space does not permit a detailed account of interviews to demonstrate how contingencies conceal the respondent's views, indifference to the topic, and the like. This will be done in the final report where responses will be coded (a) by taking the family organization and interviewer-respondent "mesh" into account, and (b) conventionally where responses are viewed as having self-contained and obvious meaning. The brief descriptions that follow, therefore, are intended merely to underscore the kinds of problems mentioned above and encountered in a few families. They are not to be viewed as "typical" or "representative".

#### *Family A*

A low-income family living in a poor suburb of Buenos Aires. Two children and the parents living in a three room house built by the husband. The husband is employed as a traffic policeman in a near-by suburb and supplements his income with odd jobs such as cooking barbecues at a private club. The wife is arthritic at 37 and requires the help of her husband to complete the daily tasks of living under difficult circumstances.

The youngest child, a girl of three, has been ill with what has been defined as psychologically induced petit mal seizures. The husband frequently "exploded" after the girl would fall from a seizure. His "explosions" revolved around her illness, the cost of living and inflation, and the problems of maintaining the household. Like many Argentine families, any municipal, state or federal job does not pay enough to keep the family going during present inflationary problems, and second jobs are a routine part of the breadwinner's daily activities.

It was difficult to induce the wife to discuss any of the questions in depth; she appeared to be both ignorant of the issues and indifferent to my many

<sup>20</sup> The notion of an ecology of games is taken from Long (1958).

probes, yet concerned that she was probably not "helping" me. She was quite willing to discuss family planning and the use of contraceptives, and did not hesitate when answering that she and her husband engaged in sexual intercourse two or three times a week, but added that there was little choice but to comply with his demands lest he look elsewhere. Her answers suggested that she wanted two boys and two girls, but noted that her physical condition would make it difficult, and then added that the husband preferred none—that she was afraid to use contraceptives for they were too costly, and that the husband was the one that sought to prevent pregnancies. The wife indicated that the husband wanted her to abort the second child and a physician gave her some "injections" for that purpose but without success.

Her responses suggested that whatever the husband wanted was adequate grounds for action, but she seemed interested in communicating her differences of opinion. The husband, on the other hand, enjoyed discussing some questions merely as a way of digressing from the issue and taking advantage of a captive audience (the interviewer), but truncated his remarks about family planning and fertility, indicating that times were "too hard" to be able to afford many children. The woman seldom leaves the house, nor is she active politically or religiously, though the woman was at one time a very active supporter of Peron.

The general atmosphere of the house and the climate made interviewing difficult; it was exceptionally hot and humid with seemingly thousands of flies everywhere. The children fought often, the wife frequently continued her work while answering questions, and many responses suggested that she did not want to be probed about most of the questions. Their participation in the interview appeared reluctant, yet they seemed quite interested in continuing general conversation and insisted I have more tea or another drink.

For both husband and wife it was necessary to explain ("educate") them after presenting the question so as to clarify its intended meaning. I visited the home many times over a several month period, went out for a beer with the husband, met the wife and child at the children's hospital so as to help them obtain additional medical care for the girl, yet the questions seemed "wooden", inappropriate, misunderstood, or to open up areas that seemed to be strange because they did not seem relevant to their problems. It was difficult to press either of them to discern how deeply they felt about having more children or to what lengths they would go to prevent more children. The wife kept saying "isn't that so" after many responses as if to inquire if she had answered properly, or to put off a probing comeback by the interviewer.

Both spouses indicated that life before marriage was more exciting and involved more social activities, money, while their present situation permits little or no entertaining, outings or material possessions. The husband seemed to want to put me off by responding "we talk about it, we talk about it", or by saying "things are the same, the same, its all the same, its all the same", as if to say that he was not interested in answering such questions but did not want to be rude to me.

### *Family B*

A young couple (husband 23, wife 21) living with her parents in a middle income area. One child 8 months old. Only the wife was interviewed. I was unable to arrange a second meeting with the husband after many attempts and completing an initial part of the schedule, because of his presumed odd working hours as an appliance repairman. I spoke to the husband on three separate occasions; while he was busy repairing his car, just as he was to leave for work and shortly after returning from work for lunch. There was a telephone in the house and it was therefore possible to make many contacts, and though the response always appeared to be friendly, it is difficult to know if my being put off was not intentional.

The wife's responses were polite, abrupt, apparently based on complete comprehension of the material, but almost always given in quick, short phrases, frequently with a "no" that seemed quite final. She appeared anxious throughout the interview, sitting on the edge of the chair, and often looking to see how far away her mother was. I became uneasy and would continually explain the study to her as a way of hopefully setting both of us at ease.

She was trained to teach elementary school but became pregnant before really beginning to work full time. Both she and her husband wanted the first child immediately, but she wanted to wait until the present child was older before having another. She stated that three children was an ideal figure, spaced two years apart. She seemed to be aware of contraceptive devices, but kept avoiding any commitment as to her use of them, stating that her husband had been using condoms since the baby was born. The woman gave a picture of comfortable living, active social life, but acknowledged that "life was hard" because of inflation and political instability. It was difficult to probe any question so as to establish some kind of wider family context, and I often stopped asking questions in some areas because of her apparent anxiety and short, somewhat frightened "no's". Her responses were always truncated, yet concise, but she often claimed not to have an opinion, designed to close off further comments.

It would not be difficult to code the information provided by Families A and B and perhaps end up with similar classifications regarding attitudes on family planning and the control of family size. It would be easy to find a basis for justifying the use of a standard code, under the assumption that the questions and answers can be viewed as addressing the same topics and understood by respondents in identical ways. But the standard questions impinge upon different environments, and the acknowledgment of the interviewer's skills as problematical here, does not alter the fact that standard coding procedures do not clarify how the researcher's tables eliminate the contingencies generated by the variations in interviewer success with the respondent, how the particular family setting forms part of the background expectancies, and the ways in which truncated or negative responses obscure the possible alternative meanings that can be attributed to the utterances.

The wife of Family B, therefore, is of interest precisely because it would be easy to ignore the setting, the truncated, managed responses, and then proceed to code the answers as if they had the same significance as the responses given

by the husband and wife of Family A. Separating the families by social class does not resolve the basic problem of the meaning of the questions in particular social settings, administered by particular interviewers, and coded by procedures that wittingly or unwittingly obscure precisely those conditions that would make the answers take on meaning according to an explicit understanding of the background expectancies that inform the interpretation of responses.

### *Family C*

A sixty year old widow living alone in an old house in a working-class suburb, makes do by selling roosters and working a small garden. Her husband was killed after being hit by an automobile. She described her life as miserable from the day her mother died when the respondent was seven years old. She was born in Spain and grew up in a foster home with a foster mother whom she hated and who hated her. She married her husband because he seemed like a decent person, was about to buy their present house, had a skill, and seemed like a good provider. They were married young (she was 20, he was 24) and they both worked hard making bricks in their back yard. Her husband treated her badly soon after they were married and was always out of the house when not working. They had one daughter, and though she wanted more, was unable to have them because of "physical reasons".

When her daughter reached eleven or twelve years of age, her neighbors kept telling her that her husband was having sexual relations with her daughter. She didn't believe them until she realized that her husband would keep her daughter home from school, send the respondent away on errands, so as to be with the girl more often. She stopped having sexual relations with her husband after that. Her husband treated her very badly to the point of using his mother's name on official forms, thus making it difficult for her to claim his retirement pay.

She evaded questions about the use of contraceptives, saying there were "natural ways" of preventing children, and that one could not ignore one's religion in such matters. Yet she feels that it is best not to have more children than one can raise adequately, feeding them properly, educating them and the like. She continually cried at different points of the interview, lamenting her miserable life, lack of education, lack of knowledge of even the pretty parts of Buenos Aires that she has never been able to visit.

Her answers to questions were managed, difficult for the interviewer to probe, because the answers were circuitous and guarded. The problem of deciding how to treat such information, how historicized or retrospective it becomes because of present conditions raises the question of whether only including women of child-bearing age is even an optimal solution.

The general problem is how the respondent, at any age, reconstructs his or her past views for the interview in light of present circumstances, and how the future (e.g., family planning) is affected in a similar fashion when any number of changes could occur to change any existing plans. Therefore, if we code the responses of this woman in Family C with standard interpretive rules that would be used for Families A and B, there is no way of entertaining the notion of family planning, sexual relations, use of contraceptives, conceptions about marital happiness, and the like, as time objects. Social objects and

events as constitutive of experience cannot be equated to the chronological time of their occurrence.

The actor's present circumstances provide the basis for retrospectively re-interpreting the past, and projecting future experiences and expectations. Taking a chronological time slice via a survey, particularly when fixed-choice questions are employed, makes estimations of changing conceptions about fertility and family planning difficult. Extensive probes designed to elicit "behaviorized" versions of past stages in family organization can elicit from the actor typical views on fertility and family planning during earlier periods of marriage.

### *Family D*

A lower middle income family living in an upper middle income area with three boys ages 8, 16 and 18. The husband drives a truck delivering wine, is 41 years of age and the wife is 37. The husband and wife have differed as to how many children each wanted over the course of the marriage. The wife has had four abortions. The woman has wanted to use contraceptives but believes present methods would be injurious to her. The husband has used condoms sporadically over the course of their marriage, but tends to rely upon the withdrawal procedure. He seems indifferent to the consequences of not "being careful" always, although he commented that too many children make the woman's job difficult and increase the husband's responsibility for support.

The husband's responses did not indicate any concern with sexual relations, family planning and the use of contraceptives; his answers were always direct, short, and gave the impression that there were more important problems he would rather discuss such as finding work, building a house in the country to get away from the city. The wife's remarks on the use of contraceptives, family planning and sexual relations contrasted sharply because she has always regarded sexual relations as a problem in and of itself, fears the use of contraceptives, though wants to prevent future pregnancies, and feels that two children would have been the ideal size but wanted the third in hopes of having a girl. The husband didn't want the third but after it arrived wanted more. The husband likes boys because they can help him with his work. The woman stated flatly that her husband was like an animal when it came to sexual relations and would like it every night, while for her once a month was more than enough. That she often went to bed early, pretending to be asleep or feigning a headache or other minor discomfort in order to avoid sexual activity. She now lives in terror of becoming pregnant again and feels that he does not control himself adequately to prevent another pregnancy. She would be happier if sex was eliminated from their marriage.

The woman appeared to be quite tense and would remark about her "nervousness" frequently. The husband seemed quite cheerful and outgoing. She noted that he preferred to stay at home watching television or go to the country to work on the other house he is building (he also built their present house), rather than go out to the movies or to downtown Buenos Aires.

The husband was born in Italy and came to Argentina when he was twelve, while the mother's family was born in Italy but she was born in Argentina. She regards him as an "old fashioned" immigrant type, and feels that she is a "modern" American. (Where "American" is used in the same sense that we use it in the U. S. in distinguishing between "old country" and "American" ways of living.) For the husband life should be oriented around one's work, saving for the future, the family should contribute to the husband's work, the wife should be in the kitchen and accessible in bed.

The woman feels that one should try and increase the children's chances of getting ahead in the world by giving them more schooling opportunities rather than having them work at the same occupation as the father, and that parents should be close to their children and not treat them as "workers".

The woman felt that they should have more social life, read more, become more active politically. She was an ardent supporter of Peron; he was not. She gave me a copy of one of Peron's books and told me how she used to light candles for "Evita" (Peron's wife when he was president), but was afraid the police would find out and cause trouble. She indicated that they talk about very little vis-a-vis family planning, and only manage to discuss financial problems at bedtime.

Her husband casually stated that they discuss "many things". I spent many afternoons and weekends with this family and felt that most of the time the husband and wife were talking past each other. They often started arguments in my presence and she would say "see how he is", while he would shrug his shoulders and say "women are always getting excited about the unimportant things". For the wife the interviewer represented a professional audience to whom she could unload problems that could not be discussed with others. She did not like her husband's family and had few friends of her own with whom to confide. The interviewer represented someone with expert training who would understand her predicament. It would be difficult to say that any other interviewer would have encountered the same reception because in my case there was an important added ingredient that I had helped her obtain medical advice at the children's hospital where I was conducting another study. She asked me for advice about contraceptive devices and her youngest child. I did not hesitate to give advice, but only after the formal interviewing was completed.

### *Family E*

The woman was divorced from her husband and lived in a middle income suburb with two sons and one daughter in a modest, well furnished house. She had two married daughters. Her former husband is a professional man who married his assistant. For this woman life has been transformed from an upper class existence in one of Buenos Aires most fashionable districts, in a large house with many servants, many parties, a summer home, and the like, to a life becoming more and more difficult and she is embittered because she cannot live as before and give her children what she feels they deserve.

She describes her younger years in glowing terms, her marriage and life with her former husband as proper, exciting and fashionable. She has always been a staunch Catholic, was opposed to the divorce (and is still bewildered by it), would never use contraceptives (nor would her husband), feeling that as many children as would come were welcome, and noting that she and her husband did not discuss sexual activities, family planning, and the like, because such topics were viewed as "natural" and something they took for granted. Her children, ages 20, 22, 25, 27, and 30, have been caught in the middle of this downwardly mobile experience and have had to change their plans regarding future occupational aspirations and marriage plans.

This woman's answers were always direct, she was always quite poised when responding, and though apparently surprised by the questions on the use of contraceptives, did not evade them, but did exhibit reticence in discussing frequency of intercourse, preferring to state that she and her husband always "got along" with each other privately. Then she would launch into a somewhat bitter commentary on "that woman" who ruined everything for her.

The interpretation of questions about sexual relations and the use of contraceptives cannot be taken literally, because the former was, in effect, no one's business but her own, and the latter was not something she felt qualified to discuss since she took the position that she knew nothing about their availability or use and did not care to know, claiming they were never relevant to her life. This woman followed a kind of orthodox Catholic religious view of family planning but did not seem offended by the questions.

She seemed quite interested in speaking to someone about her life circumstances and appeared to brighten considerably when describing what for her was a "glorious" past. Coffee and cookies were served during each of several visits, and every attempt was made to accommodate her schedule so as to fit that of the interviewer, yet in spite of all the appearances of excellent "rapport", responses were managed, truncated or avoided when areas were discussed that she regarded as "private".

## In Conclusion

The five families were not chosen after examining the entire sample of 298, but used because they were known to this writer, usually (except for Family C) because I did the interviewing. An attempt to become acquainted with the general family context via the use of open-ended questions and extensive probes, provides the researcher with some kind of backdrop against which questions can be interpreted. Cross-tabulation, and the construction of scales, generate meaning structures imposed by the method of analysis, and such procedures do not seek to understand the respondent's utterances as employed and intended by the users within the socially organized context of the family interviewed, and the relationship of the interviewer and respondent. The correspondence between question, response, and coding rules is not only improvised

or *ad hoc*, but divorced from the social reality of everyday communication and life experiences.

Some researchers who employ survey procedures are willing to encourage or demand probes about attitudes toward fertility control by asking the respondent to comment directly, yet generally, and then specifically, on their views of large and small families.<sup>21</sup> The material, coded by a set of pre-listed categories, guides the researcher in his evaluation of the content of the responses, locates families with "low and high fertility" orientations and evaluates experiments on family planning. The assumption made is that all families must be oriented toward one or the other pole even though such categories as "ambivalent", "illogical", and "inconsistent" are used to describe respondents. But there is no particular commitment to a theory of interaction which would be applied to family social relationships, only some vague notions about how certain attitudinal complexes are generated. It is assumed that expressed attitudes are accurate predictors of past and future action. The researcher's categories are assumed to be in correspondence with the actor's views about his family existence such that the same categories will fit all views revealed by the sample. The sociologist, presumably can identify families most susceptible to low fertility and then move in with the practical advice to remedy the situation. The procedure may be practical and labeled "workable", though the degree of success may not overcome adequately more general requirements for reducing the population growth.<sup>22</sup> But its practical success cannot be linked to our theoretical and methodological knowledge. Consider the following:

. . . The best designed questionnaire or interview schedule, even in the hands of the most skilled interviewer, can never eliminate the uncertainties of the "mesh" between types of interviewers and types of respondents. The interview is at best a negotiated sequence of social interaction.

. . . The family organization that the interviewer "falls into" must be made problematic so as to provide the researcher with a contextual basis for interpreting responses to particular questions that may or may not touch areas relevant to the respondent's life circumstances. The interviewer is not a passive agent, nor is the immediate respondent. The meaning of the illusive term "rapport" here, therefore, is that we must minimize the confounding character of interviewer-respondent interaction by seeking a "good mesh" and attempting to record faithfully those problems, as they occur,

<sup>21</sup> See, for example, recent work by Bogue (1965).

<sup>22</sup> This point is made in Petersen (forthcoming).

that could have influenced a response, or problems that appear to be relevant when evaluating a response.


. . . The impact or constraints of social structure cannot be assessed by merely imposing independent and abstract theories and coding devices. What is needed is a conceptual way of showing the extent to which the actor's actions are guided by his perception and interpretation of structure. The actor's utterances, particularly when spontaneous, provide the researcher with categories of measurement and the routine grounds for his action.

. . . The coding operations and tabular presentation of findings become a sociological self-fulfilling prophecy unless practical decision-making in family settings is articulated with the particulars of actions scenes, their ecological arrangements, linguistic and paralinguistic properties, and the rules members use for making sense of their activities. Comparative analysis of fertility and family organization is not possible until we can establish equivalence classes based upon members' daily activities and their decision-making procedures.

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## Stability and Change in Family Size Expectations Over the First Two Years of Marriage

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Are the family size expectations of recently married couples a meaningful variable for the study of fertility?<sup>1</sup> Since 1955, questions about expected number of children have been asked in sample surveys of the childbearing population.<sup>2</sup> The data reported here indicate that over a two year interval expected family size is as stable for recently married couples as it is for women who have already borne one, two or four children.

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<sup>2</sup>The 1955 Growth of American Families study *GAF* is reported in Freedman, Whelpton and Campbell, 1959; and the 1960 *GAF* is described in Whelpton, P. K., Campbell, A. A. and Patterson, J. E., 1966. Data on expected family size comparable to the *GAF* studies have been obtained from national samples of married women in 1962, 1963 and 1964 in studies originating from the Population Studies Center of the University of Michigan and have been reported in a number of articles in *Population Index*. See, for example, Freedman, Goldberg and Bumpass, 1965. For studies using more specialized samples see Westoff, Sagi and Potter, 1961; and Westoff, Potter and Sagi, 1963.

The nature of the stability over time of family size expectations has important implications for population research. Yet, only in the last decade has serious attention been directed toward the use of expectation data in projecting completed cohort fertility for cohorts of women still in the childbearing years. Family size expectations expressed in 1955 by a national probability sample of white married women in the childbearing years were remarkably accurate in predicting the actual aggregate fertility of the cohort for the period 1955-1960 (Campbell, Whelpton and Tomasson, 1961). However, because the 1955-1960 comparison was made between independent samples, we cannot determine to what extent this close correspondence was the result of counterbalancing changes. Since aggregate stability may be fortuitous, it is essential that we examine more closely the nature of the stability of expectations of individuals and subgroups, and that we direct our attention to the trends in the relative size and mean expected fertility of strategic groups.

Whatever the causes, a number of studies report aggregate stability of family size expectations (Goldberg, Sharp and Freedman, 1959; and Westoff, Mishler and Kelly, 1957). For example, aggregate stability in expectation distributions is supported for national probability samples of the childbearing population in 1955, 1960, 1962, 1963, and 1964 (Freedman, Goldberg and Bumpass, 1965). Moreover, this stability was maintained over a nine year interval of considerable economic and political variation. Birth cohorts whose history can be traced in these data also exhibit considerable stability of expectations.

In order to assess more clearly the relationship between aggregate and individual stability in expectations, and the relationship of these to other factors, a longitudinal study was conducted in the Detroit Metropolitan Area. Responses about expected number of children were obtained in January-March, 1962, from a probability sample of wives who had just been married (zero parity), or who had borne a first, second or fourth baby in July, 1961 (first, second and fourth parity). A second set of expectations was obtained from the same women in October-December, 1962 and a third set in September-October, 1963.<sup>3</sup>

The stability and change of the family size expectations of zero parity women will be compared throughout this paper to that

<sup>3</sup>The zero parity sample was drawn in two panels from the marriage records of June and October, 1963. The over-representation of Catholics results from the fact that the second panel was drawn during an important month for Catholic marriages, and constitutes a bias against the finding of aggregate stability. The sample was restricted to white, married women living with their husbands, and we excluded cases in which the mother had a child who died before the initial interview, cases of multiple births or cases in which the most recent birth involved a serious congenital birth injury. Extremes of age were also excluded at each parity so we excluded

of the expectations of the "higher parity" women. For these higher parity women there was remarkable stability in the average number of children expected, both for the whole sample and for the three parities separately, even though such stability resulted from a large number of small, overlapping and compensating changes (Freedman, Coombs and Bumpass, 1965).

The discovery of aggregate stability in several different studies hints that such stability may not be wholly fortuitous even though it emerges from many compensating changes. Perhaps an underlying reason why changes made by individual couples tend to be compensating in the aggregate is that these changes are made relative to a norm about acceptable family size. Previous research indicates that for the majority of Americans such a norm is two to four children, and that numbers above and below this range are regarded as undesirable by a large proportion of the population (Freedman, Coombs and Bumpass, 1965).

The existence of such a family size norm would have varying consequences for the stability of expectations of various subgroups within the population. For, insofar as a subgroup's values differ from the general norm, members may experience cross pressures which lead to less stability in their expectations. Such instability was found to be particularly true for Catholics (Freedman, Coombs and Bumpass, 1965). Yet the modern convergence of fertility values and beliefs for major socioeconomic strata suggests that stability may vary little between these strata, except insofar as there exists a differential ability to control family size.

Since family size expectations require long run predictions on the part of individual couples, the effects of short run changes on their life situation should be small or compensating if such predictions are to be meaningful. It is from this perspective that the unique character of the family size expectations of recently married couples becomes evident. Future changes promise to be sufficiently large to make qualitative differences in the life situation of these recently married couples and perhaps most important will be their experience of fertility. In fact, Mishler and Westoff contend that fertility expectations must be analyzed by parity since each birth alters the family situation and thus the probability of future births (Mishler

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wives under 15 or over 34 years of age at zero and first parity, wives under 15 or over 39 years of age at the second parity, and wives under 20 and over 39 at the fourth parity. These exclusions affect only a very small proportion of the white couples in the indicated parities. The response rate for the first interview was 84 per cent for zero parity and 96 per cent for the higher parities. The third interview response rate was, for zero parity, 97 per cent, and, for the higher parities, 96 per cent of the respondents on the first interview who had not in the intervening period become ineligible by reason of the death of either spouse, divorce or separation.

and Westoff, 1955). Zero parity women have had no childbearing experience against which to measure their family size expectations and the step from having no children to having one or more constitutes a qualitative change in the family situation and life style. In addition, for recently married couples there probably has not been stabilization of other factors related to family building—e.g. income or housing. While anticipation of these changes is undoubtedly built into a couple's expectations, one might suspect that family size expectations built largely on the anticipation of future events will be unrealistic and consequently will be very unstable as concrete changes in the situation occur. In contrast, a substantial proportion of higher parity women, settled in their life situation, have already borne most, or all, of their expected children (Freedman, Coombs and Bumpass, 1965).

Over the first two years of marriage the couples included in this study did in fact experience major changes in their life situa-

TABLE 1  
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EXPECTED WHEN FAMILY  
IS COMPLETED, BY PARITY, BY INTERVIEW

Expected Number and Interview	Parity				
	0	Total	1	2	4
<b>Mean number:</b>					
First interview	3.56	3.84	3.36	3.36	4.79
Second interview	3.59	3.83	3.38	3.32	4.76
Third interview	3.51	3.83	3.30	3.34	4.85
Difference in mean number minus first interview	-.05	-.01	-.06	-.02	+.06
<b>Number of cases:</b>					
First interview	191	1099	365	367	367
Second interview	187	1063	359	353	351
Third interview	182	1045	354	344	347

tion as two-thirds had their first child. In light of the magnitude of these factors working against stability, the data indicate surprising aggregate stability for zero parity, comparable to that of the higher parities.

### Aggregate Stability

The only observable difference between the aggregate expectations of zero and higher parity women over the three interviews is that at each interview zero parity women expect on the average .2

more children than first or second parity women. This higher value may be a result of the fact that those who will have difficulty in conceiving have not yet discovered this fact and reconciled their family expectations to it.

When a wife is not certain of her expected family size, she may respond with a range of values e.g., "2 or 3 children". If recently married zero parity women have less crystalized family size expectations one would expect their responses to include more answers covering a range and wider ranges than the responses of the higher parity women; however, there are only slight differences, and the proportion giving exact responses is, in fact, higher for zero parity women (79 per cent) than for women of either the second (76 per cent) or fourth parity (71 per cent). Among the range responses the more frequent occurrence of ranges of 2 or more children at zero parity (8 per cent as compared with 2 per cent for higher parities) indicates that zero parity women who do not give an exact response are less certain than comparable women in higher parities.

By comparing for each respondent the expected family size reported at the first interview to that reported at the third, we can see the types and frequencies of discrepancies which occur between the responses. Table 2 indicates that zero parity stability is strikingly comparable to that of the other parties. The third response was identical to the first for 46 per cent of the respondents and was either identical to the first or completely overlapping with it (e.g. the first response was "3 or 4", and the third "3") for 70 per cent of the respondents. It is also somewhat surprising to find no greater incidence of indeterminate answers from zero parity women. These data suggest that ideas about family size are formed at a very early stage in the family life cycle. Goldberg and Coombs offer a different kind of support for this early formulation in their analysis of the perceived distances between different numbers of children in terms of the "problems and satisfactions" associated with each number. They report that "Recently married women expect to find a set of 'satisfaction and problem distances' associated with having children that are almost identical to the experience of women who have already had four children" (Goldberg and Coombs, 1962).

The size of the change made between the first and third response can be measured between the mean values of these responses, i.e., if the answer was "2 or 3" the response is considered to be 2.5. Table 3 indicates that although zero parity women are not more likely to alter their expectations, those who do alter them tend to make larger changes than women of the higher parities. Twelve per cent of zero parity women give third responses which differ from their first response by two or more children, whereas 7 per cent of the higher parity women do so.

TABLE 2  
TYPES OF DISCREPANCY ON EXPECTED NUMBER OF CHILDREN  
BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD INTERVIEWS, BY PARITY, BY  
RELIGION: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION:

Discrepancy of response	Total			Religion		
	0 parity		Higher parities	NonCatholic		Catholic
				0 parity	Higher parities	0 parity
Identical or complete overlap	70	70	75	72	67	69
Identical	46	44	54	47	41	42
Complete overlap*	24	26	21	25	26	27
Incomplete overlap	2	1	—	—	4	1
No overlap	26	27	22	27	28	27
Indeterminate	2	2	3	1	1	3
Total: Per cent	100	100	100	100	100	100
No. of cases	182	1045	74	494	108	551

\*First response included in range of third response or vice versa. For example, the response was "2 or 3" at the first interview and "3" at the third.

TABLE 3  
NUMERICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXPECTED NUMBER OF CHILDREN REPORTED  
AT THE FIRST AND THIRD INTERVIEWS, BY PARITY: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

Average value of third response is*	Parity at First Interview			
	Higher Parities			
	0	Total	1	2
Higher than first by				
2.0 or more	5	5	6	4
1.5	4	3	3	3
1.0	7	8	10	11
0.5	6	14	13	14
Equal to first	47	45	39	47
Below first by				
0.5	11	10	11	9
1.0	11	11	14	10
1.5	2	2	1	1
2.0 or more	7	2	3	1
Total: Per cent	100	100	100	100
Number	182	1045	354	347
All cases:				
Equal to first or different by 0.5	64	69	63	70
Equal to first or different by 1.0	82	88	87	91
Equal to first or different by 1.5	88	93	91	95
Different from first by 2.0 or more	12	7	9	5

\*When the response was in a range it was given the average value of the range (E.g., "2 or 3" is 2.5, "2 to 4" is 3.0.).

## Perceived Reasons for Change

All who changed their expectations between the second and the third interview were asked why they had changed. While we should not assume that respondents can isolate the real causes underlying their changes in expectations, the responses to this question are nonetheless informative. It is significant that a considerable number of those who reported different family size expectations at the two interviews did not see their responses as different in any meaningful sense. Zero parity women who changed their expectation were much more likely than such women of higher parities to report that they felt they had not changed. In fact, 44 per cent of zero parity changers either felt that they had not really changed, or were unable to give an explicit reason for the change. The aggregate stability of this group is all the more impressive in light of this fact.

## Religious Differences

Since 1955, religious differentials have become increasingly important to the study of fertility. Although the 1955 Growth of American Families Study (*GAF*) found large Catholic-nonCatholic differentials in expected fertility, but essentially no difference in actual fertility, it has become clear since then that these young couples were quite realistic in projecting a large actual fertility differential. Data for 1962-64 comparable with the 1955 *GAF* show that Catholics now have substantially higher actual and expected fertility than nonCatholics, and that this is true in various social and economic categories (Freedman, Goldberg and Bumpass, 1965).

There are important differences by religion in the stability as well as in the size of completed family size expectations. Insofar as the Catholic subgroup has a higher family size norm, they may experience cross pressures between this value on larger families and the smaller family size norm of the general population. One would expect that Catholics who are least integrated into their subgroup, and therefore more in contact with the values of the larger society, experience these cross pressures most. At zero parity, as well as at the higher parities, the expectations of Catholics were less stable than those of nonCatholics, and Catholics who were least integrated into the Catholic community (as measured by frequency of church attendance) had the least stable expectations (Freedman, Coombs and Bumpass, 1965). It can be seen from Table 2 that the religious differential in stability is greatest at zero parity.

Zero parity Catholic-nonCatholic differences in mean expected family size increase over the time-interval of the study and the continuing importance of subgroup norms is evident from the two

TABLE 4  
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EXPECTED WHEN FAMILY IS  
COMPLETED AT FIRST AND THIRD INTERVIEWS, BY PARITY,  
BY RELIGION.

Expected number and interview	Parity at First Interview			
	0	1	2	4
NonCatholic				
Mean number:				
First interview	3.16	2.99	3.08	4.34
Third interview	3.00	2.89	2.94	4.48
Difference in mean number third minus first interview	-.16	-.10	-.14	.14
Number of cases*	74	182	181	131
Catholic				
Mean number:				
First interview	3.88	3.84	3.90	5.09
Third interview	3.86	3.74	3.79	5.08
Difference in mean number third minus first interview	-.02	-.10	-.11	-.01
Number of cases*	108	172	163	216

\*Cases for which there was no third interview have also been removed from the first interview calculations for this table.

patterns. The net downward revision of zero parity aggregate expectations is attributable almost wholly to the nonCatholics. The aggregate expectations of zero parity nonCatholics, higher at the first interview than those of first and second parity nonCatholics, are revised downward by the third interview. On the other hand, zero parity Catholic expectations are comparable to Catholic first and second parity expectations at the first interview, and net change is negligible over the two-year interval. The dynamics of this religious difference may be revealed in the following discussion.

### Experience During the Interval

The occurrence of an intervening pregnancy was found to be a most important variable for the expectation changes of the higher parity women (Freedman, Coombs and Bumpass, 1965). Since parities one, two and four include progressively more couples who are at or near their expected family size, higher parity pregnancies include a substantial proportion of unexpected pregnancies; and consequently there was net upward revision for those pregnant during the interval. At the same time, aggregate stability was maintained by the compensating net downward revisions of those who did not become pregnant during the interval. These compensating downward revisions may be the result of a short childspacing

TABLE 5  
 CHANGES IN EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD  
 INTERVIEWS, BY WHETHER THERE WAS A PREGNANCY BETWEEN  
 JULY 1, 1961 AND THE THIRD INTERVIEW, BY PARITY.

Pregnancy experience	Per cent changing expectation	Per cent of changers changing downward	Total number in category*
0 parity			
No pregnancy	42	53	40
At least 1 pregnancy	54	59	139
Total	51	59	179
Higher parities: Total			
No pregnancy	44	68	458
At least 1 pregnancy	62	44	569
Total	54	52	1027
1st parity			
No pregnancy	58	68	74
At least 1 pregnancy	60	49	271
Total	60	53	345
2nd parity			
No pregnancy	46	66	174
At least 1 pregnancy	57	48	165
Total	51	56	339
4th parity			
No pregnancy	38	69	210
At least 1 pregnancy	74	32	133
Total	52	49	343

\*Cases with indeterminate answers at one or both interviews are excluded from the base of the percentages.

norm, as family building plans were altered for those who did not become pregnant within two years of the last birth.

However, since all zero parity couples reported at the first interview that they expected to have children, the occurrence of pregnancy during the interval should have less impact on the stability of their expectations. They were, in fact, much more likely than women of higher parities, to become pregnant during the interval: 78 per cent had at least one pregnancy and 36 per cent had two pregnancies. Yet Table 5 indicates that at zero parity, as at higher parities, pregnancy is associated with greater instability of expectations, although at zero parity the effect of pregnancy on the direction of change depends on religion. The decline over the interval of average expected family size noted for zero parity nonCatholics in Table 4 seems the resultant of two patterns in Table 6. Zero parity nonCatholics who did not become pregnant during the interval, like those at higher parities, revised markedly downward. In addition, nonCatholics who were pregnant at the time of the first interview (6 months after marriage) also revised their expectations

TABLE 6  
 AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EXPECTED WHEN FAMILY  
 IS COMPLETED AT FIRST AND THIRD INTERVIEWS FOR  
 ZERO PARITY COUPLES, BY WHETHER THERE WAS A  
 PREGNANCY BETWEEN JULY 1, 1961 AND THE THIRD INTERVIEW,  
 BY RELIGION.

Pregnancy experience	Mean number expected		Difference in mean number, first minus third	Number of cases*
	First interview	Third interview		
NonCatholic				
No pregnancies	3.05	2.63	-.42	19
Pregnant at first interview**	3.15	3.00	-.15	26
Pregnant after first interview	3.24	3.24	.00	29
Total	3.16	3.00	-.16	74
Catholic				
No pregnancies	3.07	3.40	+.33	21
Pregnant at first interview**	4.38	4.02	-.36	59
Pregnant after first interview	3.43	3.88	+.45	28
Total	3.88	3.86	-.02	108
Total Zero Parity				
No pregnancies	3.06	3.04	-.02	40
Pregnant at first interview**	4.00	3.70	-.30	85
Pregnant after first interview	3.33	3.55	+.22	57
Total	3.59	3.51	-.08	182

\*Cases for which there was no third interview have also been removed from the first interview calculations in this table.

\*\*Includes those pregnant at the first interview who also had other pregnancies during the interval.

downward. It may be that for these the original expectation was inflated by the fact of early pregnancy, but was subsequently revised downward with experience.

That Catholics who did not become pregnant over the first two years of marriage did not revise their family size expectations downward may be a sampling variation, as the number of zero parity couples experiencing no pregnancies is small. Given their higher family size expectations and later age of marriage, one would expect such downward revision to be most evident for Catholics.

The tendency, seen for nonCatholics, for those pregnant at the first interview to report a high expected family size is even more pronounced for Catholics. Whether this higher expectation precedes

pregnancy, results from accented family values at the time of pregnancy, or reflects insecurity about control of the family building process, for Catholics also it has been revised sharply downward by the third interview.

While one would expect pregnancies after the first interview to have least effect on zero parity subgroups with higher expectations, the opposite is true. Net upward revisions for those who became pregnant after the first interview occur only for Catholic women—73 per cent of these who changed revised upward.

To summarize, the one relationship consistent for both religions is that between early pregnancy and subsequent downward revision. Those pregnant at the first interview constitute 46 per cent of the sample, but 71 per cent of all downward changers.

The effect of the husband's unemployment on the stability of expectations was also considered for zero parity. Zero parity wives whose husbands were unemployed during the time interval of the study were not more likely to change their expectations than those whose husbands were employed. But downward change by the unemployed who made changes can be seen as a rational response to their situation, especially in light of the fact that the unemployed were more likely to be pregnant during the interval and to have had one or more pregnancies sooner than desired. At the higher parities the unemployed were more unstable than the employed, but even

TABLE 7  
CHANGES IN EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD  
INTERVIEWS, BY NUMBER OF WEEKS HUSBAND WAS UNEMPLOYED  
BETWEEN 1960 AND 1963, BY PARITY; AND PERCENT WITH  
AT LEAST ONE PREGNANCY BETWEEN JULY 1, 1961 AND THE  
THIRD INTERVIEW, BY NUMBER OF WEEKS HUSBAND WAS  
UNEMPLOYED, BY PARITY.

Husband's unemployment	Per cent changing expectation	Per cent of changers changing downward	Per cent with at least one pregnancy in period	Number of cases
Zero parity				
No unemployment	52	57	76	124
Some unemployment:				
Total	51	62	83	58
1-9 weeks	53	59	88	33
10 weeks or more	48	67	76	25
Higher parities				
No unemployment	50	55	53	604
Some unemployment:				
Total	61	50	60	423
1-9 weeks	54	46	62	133
10 weeks or more	64	51	58	290

though more likely to be pregnant than the employed, they were not more likely to make downward revisions. That these relationships of change with unemployment are quite different at the higher parities indicates that the dynamics of the family situation early in marriage may differ in ways that need to be further examined.

### Attitudes at First Interview

The importance of other attitudes and values about family size for the stability or change of family size expectations is illustrated in the comparison of "expected" family size to "preferred" family size. Preferences were obtained for zero parity women from responses to the following question: "The number of children people *expect* and *want* aren't always the same. If you could choose and have just the number of children you want by the time your family is completed, how many children would that be"? For zero parity, as well as for higher parity women, when a discrepancy exists between preferences and expectations, changes are more frequent and in the direction of reducing the discrepancy. A wife's expectations tend to move closer to her initial preferences as time passes. The top panel of Table 8 indicates that zero parity women who at the first

TABLE 8  
CHANGES IN EXPECTATIONS BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD  
INTERVIEWS FOR ZERO PARITY, BY COMPARISON OF  
WIFE'S INITIAL EXPECTATION AND HER OWN AND HUSBAND'S  
PREFERENCE; AND BY WIFE'S INITIAL EXPECTATION.

At first interview wife expects number of children:	Per cent changing expectation	Per cent of changers changing downward	Total number in category
more than she prefers	83	90	12*
equal to preference	42	69	115
less than she prefers	65	35	52
more than husband prefers	57	79	42
equal to his preference	40	55	77
less than husband prefers	62	49	60
Number of children wife expects at first interview:			
Less than 3.0	60	12	42
3.0 or 3.5	52	52	48
4.0 or 4.5	40	84	63
5.0 or more	65	100	26

\*Although the number of cases is small the percentages have been included here to illustrate the directional tendency.

interview preferred the same number as they expected were much less likely to change their expectation than those who preferred either more or less than the expected number. In addition, for those who expected a different number than they preferred, changes tended to be in the direction of removing the discrepancy. The percentage with discrepant initial expectations and preferences is somewhat less for zero parity (36 per cent) than for the higher parities (44 per cent). However, among those with discrepancies between initial expectations and preferences, the tendency for the third expectation to be closer to the initial preference than was the initial expectation is greatest at zero parity (48 per cent as compared with 39 per cent at higher parities).

When the husband's initial preference is compared with the wife's expectation (panel 2, Table 8), changes are again more frequent for discrepant cases and in the direction of reducing the discrepancy, as was true also at the higher parities.

In spite of the high correlation of direction of change with size of initial expectation (panel 3, Table 8), two sources of data suggest that the reduction of expectation-preference discrepancies is not simply a statistical artifact. First of all, this reduction remained at the higher parities when size of original expectation was controlled (Freedman, Coombs and Bumpass, 1965). Although sample size does not permit this control with zero parity, it is notable that those who preferred more children than they expected at the first interview were most likely to become pregnant in the subsequent period. In short their behavior confirmed that their initial preference and the upward revision in expectations were meaningful.

A discrepancy between expected and preferred number of children can also be identified in an economic context by the respondent's answer to whether she would have more children than the number she expects if she had "plenty of money for all the things you might possibly want". For zero parity, as for the higher parities, those who answered "yes" were most likely to change their expectations. But at zero parity the effect of this attitude on direction of change is contradictory: those who answered "yes" were more likely to change downward than those who answered "no". Since the first interview was prior to experience with children and the associated economic problems, the "yes" answer may well stem from an idealization of large families also reflected in the initial expectation.

Additional evidence for the relevance of values and attitudes to stability or change of family size expectations is obtained by selecting out those cases whose attitudes may be considered "most" or "least" favorable to stability. Couples were classified as being least likely to have stable expectations if:

. . . Both the husband and the wife preferred more children than the wife expected, and the wife said she would have more children if money were no object, or

. . . Both the husband and the wife preferred fewer children than the wife expected, and the wife said she would not have more children if money were no object.

Couples were classified as most likely to have stable expectations if both the husband and the wife preferred the expected number and if the wife said she would not have more children if money were no object. Of those classified as least likely to have stable expectations, 70 per cent changed their expectations, whereas only 35 per cent changed among those classified as most likely to have stable expectations. Reinforcing fertility attitudes are relevant to the stability of expectations.

At the higher parities, lower status groups tended to be more changeable although the direction of change was not consistent. At zero parity there is no consistent relationship of either stability or direction of change to the status measures of income or occupational class, so these detailed data are not presented here. It is true, however, that the more highly educated at zero parity are more stable and make proportionately more downward changes than the less well educated.

## In Conclusion

In view of the significance of family size expectations for the study of fertility, it is important that we learn more about the stability of these expectations. Several studies have discovered remarkable stability in aggregate expectations, and a longitudinal study of first, second and fourth parity mothers has suggested that while such aggregate stability results from many small counterbalancing changes, it is not simply fortuitous. Rather, changes seem to be made relative to social norms about family size.

Although there are many significant changes in the life situation of a couple during their first two years of marriage, the family size expectations of these young couples were as stable over the interval as were the expectations of mothers of one, two or four children. Differences in the stability of the family size expectations of Catholics and nonCatholics were discussed with particular reference to the effect of pregnancy experience during the interval. The effect of attitudes on stability was considered for cases in which the wife preferred a different number of children than she expected. Although many of the same variables were found relevant to the stability of expectations at zero and at higher parities, somewhat

different patterns of interaction signal differences in the dynamics of the family situation at zero parity. The results of this analysis appear consistent with the view that family size expectations are formed very early in the family life cycle.

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## Modern Values and Fertility Ideals in Brazil and Mexico

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The "demographic transition" has customarily been described by means of relationships between socio-economic and demographic variables, relying primarily on those which can be measured by official national statistics. Thus we are told that the initial stages of economic development produce a drop in mortality, and that this is followed (usually a generation or two later) by a reduction in fertility. The latter is said to be brought about by the combined forces of urbanization and the emergence of a large middle class.

Of course, it is recognized that the decision to have children, or more precisely, to attempt to avoid having children, is a personal one made by married couples, and that a great many factors influence them. "Urban residence" or "middle class status" are merely short-hand phrases that somehow summarize those factors. Implicit are many intervening variables. It is assumed that people who live in cities, and especially those who belong to the urban middle class, adhere to certain values and perceive their life circumstances in certain ways which lead them to restrict fertility.<sup>1</sup> But attempts to measure those values and perceptions

<sup>1</sup>It is now recognized that in the most advanced countries, the urban middle-class way of life begins to diffuse throughout the entire population, annuling (and occasionally even reversing) the earlier class differences in fertility.

directly, rather than leaving them hidden as implied intervening variables, have not been common and have not yet produced important results.<sup>2</sup>

Recent statistics from Latin American countries show that the second part of the demographic transition is not everywhere occurring on schedule. To take a specific example: Mexico is now one-half urban; Mexico City and its environs contain some six million people, many of them belonging to the middle class; yet the national birth rate has not decreased in the past fifty years, and indeed may even be going up (Collver, 1965). Thus we can appreciate the urgency of new studies that measure the intervening variables affecting fertility in a direct manner, rather than leaving them hidden and implied. What makes Mexico different from the United States, or Argentina, or Spain, which all have low birth rates? Why does urbanization have different results in different countries?

Given this context, it seems worthwhile reporting here what is in fact a by-product of a field investigation which was not centrally concerned with fertility. Consequently, although the sampling procedures and research design were far from ideal for the present purpose, it will be useful to take advantage of scarce data: direct measurements of some of the values that are associated with urban middle-class status and appear to influence procreation.<sup>3</sup>

In 1960, a sample of 627 men were interviewed in Brazil. In 1963, an additional 740 men were interviewed in Mexico, using mostly identical questions. The samples in each country were drawn from three groups according to residence: provincials, or men who lived in small towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants; migrants, or men who lived on farms or in small towns as children, but were residents of Rio de Janeiro or Mexico City at the time of the interview; and metropolitans, or men who were life-long residents of the capital city. The samples were also stratified by occupation so as to include substantial numbers of both manual and nonmanual employees of various levels of skill and income. However, the extremes by occupation were deliberately excluded: no men with university degrees, and no men without regular and steady employment. Their ages ranged from 25 to 49 years.

The respondents were collected by entering business firms of various types and interviewing a wide scattering of male employees.

<sup>2</sup>The most famous investigation is the Indianapolis study; see Kiser and Whelpton (1958).

<sup>3</sup>The research will be fully reported in a monograph by Kahl (1968). The present article is taken from Chapter V of the monograph. This article was published in Spanish in *America Latina*, 1966, IX, 22-40.

Thus we have quota samples by residence and by occupation, but not by any means a systematic random sample of a defined national population. Therefore, let us interpret the results as interesting enough to promote further study, especially since we are mainly interested in comparing groups within countries rather than making population estimates.

## Fertility Ideals

Since the samples included men of various ages, it would not be practical to use as the dependent variable the number of children they had in fact produced at the time of the interview, for many had not yet completed their families. It is better to use as a guide the responses to this question: "How many children do you think ideal for a family of our times"?

The modal answer was two children among Brazilians and three among Mexicans; the mean was 2.6 for the former, and 3.9 for the latter. The desire for larger families among Mexicans was consistent among all subgroups by occupational status and by metropolitan versus provincial location, as shown in Table 1.

This difference between countries in desired family size startled us for two reasons: (a) the national birth rates for the two countries are similar, and (b) our other findings showed that the two countries were remarkably parallel on a variety of different values and aspirations.

For instance, we developed scales on a dozen specific values that were all associated with the general pattern of "modernism". Some of them referred to values about family roles; some to more general interpersonal relations, such as individualism or trust in people; some concerned perceptions of the degree to which the local community or career chances were stratified, so that opportunities for advancement were unequally distributed; some to such abstract orientations as activism against fatalism. In every instance, when both socio-economic status and geographic residence were controlled (following the pattern of Table 1), there were no differences between Brazil and Mexico on values.

Furthermore, we made a detailed study of the educational aspirations men had for their children; once again, when status level and residence were controlled, there were no significant differences between the two countries.

Thus, the sharp difference on fertility ideals between our Brazilian men and their Mexican counterparts was a serendipitous finding that became a definite challenge, and we squeezed our data as hard as possible in a search for understanding.

Actually, the data in Table 1 not only show a difference in

TABLE 1  
IDEAL FAMILY SIZE, BY OCCUPATION AND LOCATION

Occupation of Respondent, and his Location:	B R A Z I L		M E X I C O	
	Mean	N	Mean	N
<b>HIGH NON-MANUAL</b>				
Metropolitans	2.4	46	3.5	72
Migrants	—	8	3.6	14
Provincials	2.9	14	3.4	13
All Locations	2.5	68	3.5	99
<b>LOW NON-MANUAL</b>				
Metropolitans	2.2	118	3.6	86
Migrants	*2.7	**18	3.5	24
Provincials	3.2	59	3.8	64
All Locations	2.5	195	**3.6	174
<b>HIGH MANUAL</b>				
Metropolitans	2.1	84	3.7	100
Migrants	**2.6	38	*4.2	**47
Provincials	**3.4	59	4.4	125
All Locations	2.6	181	4.1	272
<b>LOW MANUAL</b>				
Metropolitans	2.3	50	3.8	63
Migrants	2.7	**62	4.2	25
Provincials	*3.3	39	4.1	51
All Locations	2.7	151	4.0	139
<b>GRAND AVERAGE</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>595</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>684</b>

\*Difference significant at .05 level.

\*\*Difference significant at .01 level.

Asterisks for "All Locations" for a given occupational level refer to significance of difference with next lowest occupational level.

average number of children desired among Brazilians as compared to Mexicans, but also a difference in the pattern of impact of independent variables that influence fertility norms. In Mexico there is a small negative relationship between status level and desired number of children, but it is not noticeable in Brazil. And in Brazil, there is a strong negative relationship between metropolitan residence and desired family size, but in Mexico that relationship is weak.

Thus, middle-class status seems to be the main influence toward the small-family norm in Mexico, whereas metropolitan residence seems to be the main factor in Brazil. If these results from inadequate samples were rashly generalized to predict national trends, we would have to surmise that metropolitanization will reduce the national birth rate more in Brazil than in Mexico,

for in the latter country any reduction that occurs in the large cities could be supposed to come more from a redistribution towards the middle class than from metropolitan residence *per se*.

Furthermore, we might guess that the large difference in fertility ideals between countries will soon produce a difference in behavior—that is, we can assume that the Brazilian ideals have already moved toward smaller families, and that before long the actual birth rates should follow suit. However, various circumstances intervene between norms and behavior, so we had best not bet too heavily on that prediction.<sup>4</sup>

Since most demographic studies put their questions to women, one wonders if the answers our men gave would correspond to the ideas of their wives about child bearing. Fortunately, the preliminary results of the comparative study in several nations sponsored by the Centro Latinoamericano de Demografía in Santiago de Chile, and by Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, have been made available through the courtesy of Prof. Sugiyama Iutaka of the CENTRO, Rio de Janeiro, and Prof. Raúl Benítez Zenteno of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Large and representative samples of women were recently studied in Rio de Janeiro and Mexico City. In both countries, the men in our samples preferred slightly smaller families than did the women in the CELADE samples. But other than that, the conclusions were the same as those already reported. Mexican women preferred larger families than Brazilian women; furthermore, social status strongly influenced the desires of women in Mexico City, but had practically no influence on the goals of women in Rio de Janeiro.

Is there any evidence from census data that can be used to compare these ideals to actual behavior? An article by Carmen A. Miró (1964), director of CELADE, summarizes the available evidence. She reports that the national crude birth rates in the two countries are estimated to be similar (between 43 and 47). Estimated urban birth rates, standardized for age, are also very similar (33 to 35), but rural rates are quite different, with the Brazilian one higher (50 compared to 43). She further shows that when age-specific rates are calculated for women who have completed their families (over 45 years old), there is a clear indication that younger Brazilian women in urban areas have had fewer children than did older ones, but the same trend is *not* noticeable in Mexico. (Indeed, among women currently in their thirties, ur-

<sup>4</sup>In Lima, Peru, Stykos (1965) found a positive correlation between status level and fertility norms, but a negative one between status and actual family size. The full complexity of the interrelationships among ideal and actual family size, and associated variables of knowledge and values, is shown in Hill, Stykos and Back (1959).

banites have had more children in Mexico than in Brazil, but ruralites have had fewer.)

In other words, the census data support the general idea that there is now a larger rural-urban differential in Brazil than in Mexico, and suggest that it is fairly recent, reflecting a declining Brazilian urban birth rate and a stationary and very high rural one. In Mexico, both rates appear to be stationary. Now, our own data are for "metropolitans" versus "provincials", and the latter are urban by census definition. But they come from small towns which are partly rural in their cultures. Thus, the census data and our sample data are commensurate with respect to the major trends, though obviously cannot be compared in detail as to absolute levels of fertility desired or achieved.

### The Impact of Values

What about the influence of modern values? The various scales of modernity which were mentioned earlier were positively related both to higher socio-economic status and to metropolitan residence, though more to the former than the latter. Therefore, we can use those scales as direct measures of what are usually left as implied intervening variables: those mental states which are "caused" by urban residence and middle-class status, and in turn lead married couples to restrict fertility.

Since we had a kit full of scales of modernity, we had to choose among them. Experiments showed that several worked equally well as predictors of ideal family size, such as an overall scale of modernism which drew items from many of the specific scales, or else those specific scales that dealt with religion or with family role structure. Probably the most satisfactory choice from a theoretical point of view would have been the scale of modernism in nuclear family roles, but unfortunately we used it only in Mexico and not in Brazil. Therefore, we chose the scale of "low integration with relatives", which consisted of three items that are included later on in this text. They measure a conviction that the individual should *not* be too closely tied to his extended kin.<sup>5</sup>

Since we wish to deal with the relationships among several variables, contingency tables would be cumbersome. Therefore, we present the results in terms of correlation coefficients. The zero-order coefficients are given in Table 2, and show that all of our variables are interrelated, though not very strongly. Since we are concerned with the *relative power* of each one to predict fer-

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<sup>5</sup>For the sources of these items, and their use in previous research, see Kahl (1965).

TABLE 2  
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATION MATRIX

	1. SES	2. Metropolitan Location	3. Low Integration With Relatives
<i>A. BRAZIL</i>			
2. Metropolitan Location	+.28	-	-
3. Low Integration With Relatives	+.30	+.16	-
4. Ideal Family Size	-.16	-.34	-.16
<i>B. MEXICO</i>			
2. Metropolitan Location	+.30	-	-
3. Low Integration With Relatives	+.43	+.25	-
4. Ideal Family Size	-.24	-.18	-.27

- Notes: 1) SES is an index of socioeconomic status based on occupation, education, and selfidentification. Metropolitan residence is a three-point scale consisting of metropolitans, migrants and provincials. The coefficients are product-moment correlations.
- 2) Low integration with relatives had a partial correlation with SES (location controlled) of +.26 in Brazil and +.41 in Mexico; it had a partial correlation with location (SES controlled) of +.11 in Brazil and +.15 in Mexico.

tility goals, we will have to go beyond these zero-order coefficients in order to sort out the probable lines of influence. For example, from the table as it stands we can not rule out the possibility that the influence of values on fertility is a spurious result stemming from the correlations of both with socio-economic status.

The table shows that the correlation between SES (socio-economic status) and ideal family size is -.16 in Brazil and -.24 in Mexico. The index of SES is based on a combination of education, occupation and self-identification. Since there has recently been considerable interest in "status crystallization", or the degree to which the components of SES hang together, and furthermore, the effect on the individual of inconsistencies among them, we might note that education was the best single predictor of ideal family size, to about the same degree as the combined index of SES. Occupation was less powerful as a predictor, as was self-identification. With SES controlled, the partial correlation of income with ideal family size was -.12 in Brazil and -.02 in Mexico. Thus the pattern which holds in some other countries—that *within* broad social strata, income has a positive effect on fertility norms—does not operate here.

Our theoretical perspective suggests that values intervene between position in the social structure and fertility ideals. If that were completely the case, and if our measurements were equally powerful, then the zero-order correlation coefficients between

values and fertility norms would be higher than those between *SES* and fertility norms. But the coefficients are in fact about the same. Therefore, we must modify the perspective, and ask this question: once position in social structure is controlled, do values add something to the prediction of fertility ideals? And we can ask, what are the relative weights of these several variables in each country?

We can use multiple and partial correlations as our tools of analysis. The multiple correlation of all three independent variables with fertility ideals is -.36 in Brazil and -.31 in Mexico. Although these figures are high enough to make useful predictions, they obviously leave much variance unaccounted for.<sup>6</sup>

The partial correlation of each independent variable with ideal family size (controlling for the other two) is as follows:

	BRAZIL	MEXICO
Low Integration with Relatives	-.10	-.17
<i>SES</i>	-.05	-.12
Metropolitan Location	-.31	-.09

Once again we see the contrast between countries that was observed in Table 1: metropolitan residence makes a big difference in Brazil, but much less so in Mexico. And *SES* has a significant influence in Mexico, but not in Brazil. However, now we can add another observation: personal values add to the prediction of ideal family size in both countries once *SES* and location are controlled, but more so in Mexico than in Brazil.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>Partial correlations of less than .09 are not significantly different from zero with samples of this size and a level of significance of .05.

The Beta Weights for the three independent variables (in the same order as printed below are: Brazil, -.10, -.05 and -.31; Mexico, -.19, -.13 and -.09).

In a series of simulation experiments on the computer, my colleague Robert L. Hamblin has found that the usual method of calculating explained variance in multiple-partial correlation has the tendency to underestimate it when there are several independent variables with low correlations with the dependent variable. He has prepared a new method that is more accurate (not yet published). Using the new method, we arrive at the following proportions of explained variance:

	BRAZIL	MEXICO
Low Integration with Relatives	.08	.15
<i>SES</i>	.04	.11
Metropolitan Location	.25	.07
All three	.37	.33

<sup>7</sup>Contingency tables show that values are most importantly related to fertility goals among upper-status manual workers. And even with *SES*, location and values all controlled, Mexicans preferred larger families than Brazilians.

The results indicate that people who share the same position in the social structure (such as urban, middle-class status) do not all think alike about such matters as relationships with extended kin. These variations in values in turn are related to their fertility goals. The possible paths of causation among these variables will be explored at a later point.

### Family Structure in Brazil and Mexico

Why is there a substantial difference between Brazil and Mexico concerning fertility ideals, but practically none at all concerning educational aspirations for sons, or the distribution of modern values among various status and regional strata?

I cannot "explain" this difference with firm data, but I can speculate about it. I have lived for a year in Brazil, and longer than that in Mexico, sometimes as a paying guest in middle-class homes. Therefore, it is possible to offer an impression: the family system in Rio de Janeiro appears to be more "modern" than is the family system in Mexico City. My experience in the provinces is much more superficial, but my impression is that there is less difference between the provinces of the two countries than between their large cities.

When I lived in Rio de Janeiro, I found it easier to make friends than it was in Mexico City, for the contacts I made among professional colleagues quickly led to invitations home to dinner, or for a week-end at the family cottage in the country. Mexicans seem more reserved; with patience, one's professional contacts slowly turn into warm friends, but absorption into the family circle is much less common.

Furthermore, I sensed that women have a more modern role in Rio de Janeiro; the family structure, at least in the middle class, seems more equalitarian, with less male dominance. Brazilian psychoanalysts do not follow the current fashion of their Mexican colleagues, and write books about *machismo* (exaggerated masculinity).

I suspect that these differences are related to some old traditions within the Portuguese and Spanish cultures that were transferred to the new world, and possibly to some differences between the Negro contribution in Brazil and the Indian in Mexico. Interpersonal relations in Brazil of many types seem somewhat more relaxed and less formal than in Mexico; for instance, the use of first-names is much more common. Therefore, despite my feeling that many phases of the world of work are more modern in Mexico than in Brazil, I believe that conjugal roles more

closely approximate the usual urban-industrial mode in Rio de Janeiro than in Mexico City, especially in the middle class.<sup>8</sup>

All of this is to suggest that the family is modernizing more rapidly in Rio de Janeiro than in Mexico City, whereas the provincial zones of the two countries are more alike (although not identical). If so, we would expect a wider difference between provincial and metropolitan fertility norms in Brazil than in Mexico, and that is what the statistics show.

### Supporting Evidence on Family Structure

Can we muster any questionnaire data to support this impression of the difference in family styles? It is useful to look in detail at the items within the scale of low integration with relatives, and note the distribution of agreement and disagreement with each one:<sup>9</sup>

	Agree Very Much	Agree a Little	Disagree a Little	Disagree Very Much	Total
<i>. . . When looking for a job, a person ought to find a position in a place located near his parents, even if that means losing a good opportunity elsewhere.</i>					
BRAZIL	20	11	13	56	100%
MEXICO	15	11	15	59	100%
<i>. . . When you are in trouble, only a relative can be depended upon to help you out.</i>					
BRAZIL	17	15	24	44	100%
MEXICO	13	14	22	51	100%
<i>. . . If you have a chance to hire an assistant in your work, it is always better to hire a relative instead of a stranger.</i>					
BRAZIL	20	14	17	49	100%
MEXICO	33	26	20	21	100%

On the first two items, the distributions are similar. But on the last item we note sharp differences: Mexicans are much more inclined to hire a relative on the job than are Brazilians. Here is

<sup>8</sup>For the world-wide pattern, see Goode (1963). Writing before the turn of the century, Emile Durkheim understood the basic trends; see Durkheim (1965). For aspects of conjugal role structure in the United States that affect fertility, with social status held constant, see Rainwater (1965). Some contrasting Mexican attitudes can be found in Corwin (1963).

<sup>9</sup>The insights of Mrs. Marilyn Merritt have been particularly helpful in preparing this section. Incidentally, in making up the scale of low integration with relatives, the items were scored so that disagreement was counted as contributing positively to the scale score. The items had factor-analytic loadings ranging from .64 to .78, and were weighted accordingly in the scale scores used above in the regression analysis.

some support for the idea of a more traditional family structure in Mexico.<sup>10</sup>

In order to seek the pattern by *SES* and location, we made up a simple Likert sum scale from the above three items. Although Brazilians in the metropolitan zone turned out to be slightly less tied to relatives than their Mexican counterparts, the differences were not great. The big differences showed up among migrants and provincials of medium and low *SES*; in each of these strata, the Brazilians were considerably less tied to relatives than the Mexicans.

That finding is somewhat mixed with respect to our theory. It supports the idea that Brazilians are less tied to relatives, as we expected. But it puts the differences among provincials and migrants, whereas we expected them mainly among metropolitans.

However, a revision of the hypothesis seems possible that would come closer to both the finding on ties to relatives, and also the general trend of the fertility data. In Brazil, metropolitans and migrants are very much alike with respect to their values about relatives, whereas provincials are markedly more traditional and familistic. In Mexico, the migrants are exactly intermediate between metropolitans and provincials. The idea then emerges that Rio de Janeiro may be able to socialize its migrants more readily to city values than does Mexico City. If so, the birth rate would be lower in the former city.

## NonFamily Relationships

My qualitative impressions suggested that some of the difference in family structure in the two countries was related to the over-all quality of interpersonal relations, with the Brazilians being more relaxed and open, and the Mexicans more constrained and even suspicious with strangers (and thus, concomitantly, more confined to the family for emotional support).<sup>11</sup> We can bolster this idea with two pointed items:

<sup>10</sup>One other related item in the questionnaire shows sharp differences between countries, despite the over-all tendency for most items to have similar distributions: "Businessmen have good connections that make it easy for their sons to become successful". Although there is more agreement than disagreement in both countries, acquiescence is much stronger in Mexico than in Brazil.

<sup>11</sup>For a penetrating account by a Mexican of the reserve characteristic of his countrymen, see Paz (1961).

	Agree Very Much	Agree a Little	Disagree a Little	Disagree Very Much	Total
... People help persons who have helped them not so much because it is right but because it is good business.					
BRAZIL	13	08	11	68	100%
MEXICO	41	41	11	07	100%
... People in a big city are cold and impersonal; it is hard to make new friends.					
BRAZIL	30	17	14	39	100%
MEXICO	33	25	19	23	100%

Here we note the extraordinary contrast on the first item, and the somewhat weaker contrast on the second item; in both instances, the Brazilians show up as seeing interpersonal relations with nonfamily members as warmer and safer than do the Mexicans.

To give an extreme example of the distrust of people which is characteristic of some Mexicans, particularly those with traditional values, we can quote a provincial factory worker. He was born a bastard, never knew his father, and was reared by his uncle. His first job was as a shepherd; then he worked in a bakery, and finally entered a textile mill. This man was so suspicious he did not even keep up contacts with his brother—which is unusual, for the distrust of strangers often drives a man closer to his relatives. He had confidence only in his wife. When asked if he visits relatives or friends, he replied:

No, I don't like to visit relatives or friends. I like to go from work to home. For recreation I only go to the movies with my wife and the little boy. My uncle, the one who sent me to school, was the person who taught me that I ought to avoid friends; that they only made trouble in life; the best friend is the one who will be the traitor. The only friendship a man should have is with his wife. It's much better to amuse yourself with your wife than with friends.

## A Theory of Causation

It is necessary to explore somewhat further the possible paths of causation that link modern values to both regional and status position, and in turn link all three to specific attitudes and behavior about fertility.

It is easy to understand a theoretical framework which treats general values as dependent on both location and status, so that people who live in large cities tend to be modern, and also that people in upper levels of socio-economic status tend to be modern, with their modernism following as a direct consequence of their position in physical and social space. We can understand an approach that sees specific attitudes—such as fertility goals—as reflections of general values.

But then we have to get more cautious, and consequently, more complex in our thinking. We note that the correlations between status plus location on the one hand, and values on the other, are significant and important, but certainly not completely decisive in size. Now, since we are using rough-and-ready measurements, we can assume some slippage, and feel confident that the "real" relationships are somewhat higher—but even with perfect measures, much variance would remain unaccounted for.

Further reflection welcomes that finding, for observation of our friends tells us that all people at a given status level in a given location are not completely alike in beliefs, despite the fact that on the average they are more similar to one another than to people in other positions. *What produces the variation?* Here we have to fall back on a multitude of small influences, most of which are difficult to catch in our net of measurements: differences in "background", which mean that people who are now similar in status and location were different some years, or some generations, ago; differences in personal contacts of a wide variety of kinds, including friendships with persons of divergent values; differences in "personality", reflecting idiosyncratic aspects of life histories that may well include influences of a psycho-dynamic sort that demand Freudian styles of explanation; and so on.

Our measures of values are useful precisely because they relate to position in physical and social space in a way which corresponds to common sense observation, but at the same time catch some of the residues of variations in personal experience that go *beyond* such position. They are part of status, and yet something more. They thus should be useful in predicting specific attitudes about fertility in a way that corresponds to, yet goes beyond, status.

And yet, one aspect of parsimony eludes us. It would be convenient to think of values as a perfect intervening variable, such that *SES*, plus location, plus personal life experience, produce general values, and they in turn (in combination with other influences) produce specific attitudes about fertility. If that were the case, values would have a higher correlation with specific attitudes than would status and location. Unfortunately, the symmetry of theory is more elegant than the symmetry of life: in Brazil, metropolitan location has more influence on ideal family size than do values. However, in Mexico the pattern of relationships to fertility ideals approaches the theoretical model.

The explanation for the divergence of the coefficients from the theoretical model may lie in the parenthetical phrase used above, "in combination with other influences". Clearly, values alone, even if they intervened between physical and social position

and behavior, would not be enough. A man with a given set of values is also a man faced with the realities of his environment. He needs money to express his values in action; he needs friends to help him; he needs knowledge, intelligence, will power and discipline in order to act in accordance with his ideals.<sup>12</sup> Now, some of these aspects of reality, if not most of them, are in turn reflections of status and location. Thus, the latter have another influence on behavior that goes beyond their impact on values, and in this way show up in the correlation coefficients for a second time.

Unfortunately, we cannot further untangle this web of influences, since we have no adequate measures of the other factors of life experience which are tied to status and location and to the specific attitudes we are trying to predict, and which operate independently of values. And we do not know how much of the variance is escaping us simply as a consequence of the crudity of our instruments.

## In Conclusion

We have here explored this question: what is the impact of modern values on fertility ideals in Brazil and Mexico? To do so, we had to treat values as part of a complex pattern, sorting out the relative influences on fertility ideals not only of values, but also of objective position in the social structure as measured by socio-economic status and geographic location.

We found a major difference in pattern between Brazil and Mexico, a result contrary to the overall results of a larger research which disclosed very few differences between the two countries. Brazilians prefer smaller families than Mexicans. Furthermore, it is particularly in the metropolitan zone that the small-family ideal is widespread in Brazil. But in Mexico, provincial-metropolitan differences are very small, whereas social status differences are larger. Modern values are of help in predicting ideal family size in both countries (with *SES* and location held constant), but more so in Mexico than in Brazil.

The implications of these findings are quite important. Most studies of fertility have used socio-economic status and location as the sole predictors—indeed, with census data, there are no other alternatives. Those few studies that have attempted to measure values and add them to the basket of predictors have not achieved much success. Here we have demonstrated a way of using

<sup>12</sup>One particular economic fact may make a difference: secondary education is mostly private and expensive in Brazil, and mostly public and free in Mexico.

direct measures of values with profit, and in a cross-cultural perspective.

Socio-economic status is a crude descriptive category. It implies that people with the same status will think, feel and act alike. But that is only true "on the average". Some people at a given objective status level think like the average of another level. Furthermore, it is obviously the thoughts and feelings that produce the actions, not the mere objective position by itself. Therefore, to understand the actual process by which status influences behavior, we must fill in the picture with the intervening variables that are *predicted* by status but that directly *cause* behavior. Thereby we not only increase our understanding of the average situation, but also can begin to find out why some individuals deviate from the average. We have shown that modern values are a useful intervening variable when used in this way. They predict fertility norms in a pattern which is consistent with our knowledge of the stratification system, but goes beyond it.

Some such approach based on the study of values will be necessary to explain the striking differences on fertility ideals we discovered between Brazil and Mexico. These differences cannot be adequately explained through the usual notions of stage of economic development, degree of urbanization, or emergence of a new middle class. The two countries are quite similar on those characteristics. But in our Brazilian sample, urban location is the key predictor of the modern small-family ideal, and *SES* makes no additional difference. In Mexico, however, both location and *SES* have a relatively equal but smaller impact, and values a larger one. And with all these predictors controlled, Mexicans still prefer more children than Brazilians.

Not having designed our study as primarily a research on fertility, we did not gather enough additional data to give a satisfactory explanation of these inter-country differences. But using qualitative impressions, and isolated items of questionnaire material, we advanced an hypothesis: certain general traits of Brazilian culture are more conducive to the small-family system, so that once urbanization sets in, a rapid transition occurs. But these traits are lacking (or weaker) in Mexico, so that city life has less immediate impact.

Specifically, we posit that a more relaxed style of interpersonal relations in Brazil, more confidence in nonfamily ties, less dependence on relatives, and less emphasis on male dominance all lead to a conjugal family structure approximating the modern urban mode. The parents see their lives as participants in the wider society; they wish to give their children an important boost (through education) toward success in that society. They plan their families

as they plan their careers, in both instances depending more upon individualistic efforts than upon nepotistic favors. A small number of children helps them gain success, just as it helps the wife participate more actively in life outside the home.

These are average statements about Brazil and Mexico. Obviously, some Mexicans share the more modern view of family structure, and they should therefore prefer fewer children, whether they live in the capital city or the provinces. The partial correlation between our measures of values and those of fertility norms indicate precisely that fact.

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## Contraception and Catholicism in Latin America

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The extraordinary rates of natural increase in Latin America in the past decade have heightened interest in the possible role of Catholicism in motivating or sustaining high fertility. Catholic resistance to "artificial" means of birth control and a tendency on the part of Church leaders to extol the large family are among the explanations frequently advanced for high rates of fertility, as well as for justifying pessimistic outlooks for the future of fertility in Latin American cultures.<sup>1</sup>

Recent studies in the United States have left little doubt that both religious affiliation and religiosity are important factors in fertility.<sup>2</sup> Summarizing the results of their study of metropolitan mothers, Westoff and his associates write: "Religious preference . . . is the strongest of all major social influences on fertility. Catholic couples want the most and Jewish the fewest children, with Protestants in an intermediary position. . . . Catholics by and large appear to want larger families and they have them. . . ." (Westoff, Potter and Sagi,

<sup>1</sup>The attitudes and behavior of Latin Americans with respect to the family planning issue are also of great importance to the course of Catholicism itself. One of every three Catholics now lives in Latin America, and in another 40 years, every other Catholic may be a Latin American.

<sup>2</sup>The relation between religiosity and fertility variables in the United States is less clear for nonCatholics than for Catholics (See Gordon F. De Jong, 1965).

1964). The "Growth of American Families Study" of the mid-fifties also found strong relations between degree of Catholicism and both attitudes and behavior. For example, "Catholics who seldom or never attend church are more likely to be users (of birth control) than are other Catholics. . . . (Freedman, Whelpton and Campbell, 1959, 107). Catholic wives who attend church regularly expressed unqualified disapproval (of birth control) in just about twice the proportion for those attending seldom or never. . . . (Freedman *et al.*, 1959, 159). Whether they approve of the practice of family limitation or not, Catholic wives still expect more births than Protestant wives" (Freedman *et al.*, 1959, 284).

On the other hand, the relevance of Catholic teaching for fertility has recently been challenged by Day, who maintains it "will be a factor leading to higher fertility among Catholics only when (a) there exists a high level of economic development, and (b) Catholics constitute a numerically and politically important, but not dominant, minority of the population."<sup>3</sup> In most of the countries in Latin America, Catholics satisfy neither of these conditions. An early study in Puerto Rico produced findings consistent with Day's hypothesis in that nonCatholics appear to be no more liberal (with respect to birth control, ideal family size, etc.) than Catholics (Stycos, Back and Hill, 1956, 9). But when the minority hypothesis was specifically tested in Protestant Jamaica (West Indies), about the same results were obtained as in Catholic Puerto Rico (Stycos and Back, 1958).

Nevertheless, the Caribbean studies of Catholicism could not be extrapolated to Latin America, because of the important cultural, historical and economic differences between these islands and the mainland Latin American countries. However, a series of surveys has been conducted in Latin American cities within the past few years, making it possible to duplicate the earlier analyses in a variety of Latin American settings.

The first of these was conducted in 1959 and 1960 in Santiago, Chile and Lima, Peru. Subsequently, the institutions responsible for these studies joined forces. In 1963 and 1964, as a result of collaborative planning by the United Nations Latin American Demographic Center in Chile (*CELADE*) and the Cornell International Population Program, *KAP* surveys (knowledge of, attitudes toward, and practice of family planning) were conducted in seven Latin American cities: Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Mexico City, Panama City, Rio de Janeiro and San Jose.<sup>4</sup> In late 1964, a similar

<sup>3</sup>Day has a useful bibliography of studies of differential Catholic fertility (Day, in press).

<sup>4</sup>For reports of the Peruvian study see Stycos, 1963, 1965a and 1965b. The Santiago survey is reported in Tabah and Samuel, 1962. For a description of the *CELADE* surveys, see Stycos, 1964b and Stycos, 1964a. For preliminary results of these surveys, see Miró, 1966 and Miró and Rath, 1965.

survey was conducted in San Salvador, sponsored by the Salvadoran Economic Planning Committee and the Cornell International Population Program (Gomez, 1965). These surveys had a number of common features: with the exception of the Rio de Janeiro survey, all were conducted in the capital cities of the nations involved, all involved probability samples of roughly 2000 women in the reproductive age group (the Lima study was confined to currently mated women), all contained a common core of *KAP* questions, and all were assisted financially by the Population Council. The remainder of this paper will be based on analyses of data from these surveys.<sup>5</sup>

### The Practice of Catholicism in Latin America

"The Catholicism of Latin America", according to Father J. P. Fitzpatrick, "has characteristics of its own that generally baffle the outsider. . . . It ranges from an intensity of practice and devotion that is heroic, to an indifference that is difficult to conceive" (Gross, 1962). It is the variation in intensity of practice which we shall emphasize in this paper: variation among Latin American cities, and variations among individuals within the same city.

TABLE 1  
POPULATION (IN HUNDREDS) PER ECCLESIASTIC, SELECTED LATIN  
AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1960

Countries	Per priest	Per diocesan priest	Per religious priest	Per nun
Colombia	35	61	81	10
Costa Rica	45	85	97	19
Venezuela	50	118	88	21
Mexico	54	69	246	18
Peru	58	140	99	27
Brazil	64	158	107	23
Panama	64	248	86	32
El Salvador	83	166	166	44
Latin America	53	108	103	20

Source: Yvan Labelle and Adriana Estrada, *Latin America in Maps, Charts, Tables: Socio-Religious Data (Catholicism)*. Mexico, D.F.: Center of Intercultural Formation, 1964, 89 and 161.

<sup>5</sup>In the case of Lima we shall rely primarily on an unpublished term paper by Dario Menanteau, 1964, and for Salvadoran data on the papers by Gomez. In assembling the data on the other six cities, the writer was assisted by several students as part of an informal seminar of the International Population Program: Robert Gochfeld, Elizabeth Johnson, Enrique Perez, Haifaa Shanawany, Alan Simmons, and Robert H. Weller. Data from the Buenos Aires study had not arrived at the time this report was prepared.

According to recent data, there are more than twice as many priests in the United States than in all of Mexico and Central America. Whereas the United States has 2500 Catholics for every priest, South America has 4285, and Central America, 6771.<sup>6</sup> Among the countries which concern us here, the variation in sacerdotal density is considerable, from 3500 inhabitants per priest in Colombia, to 8300 in El Salvador (Lebelle and Estrada, 1964). As shown in Table 1, the country rankings differ somewhat, depending on whether diocesan or "religious" priests are considered. However, whatever the measure, Colombia is at one end of the range and Brazil, Panama and El Salvador are at the other.<sup>7</sup>

Turning to our survey data, we find (Table 2) a rough correspondence between the parishioner-priest ratio and the religious observance of mated Catholic women in the capital cities. Thus, Bogota and San Jose, where two-thirds of the women report they go to Mass every Sunday, are situated in the countries with the lowest parishioner-priest ratio. With respect to the practice of Communion the range is again from Bogota, where half the women take Communion at least twice per year, to Rio where only a quarter do so.<sup>8</sup>

For purposes of this paper we shall distinguish three gradations of religious observance according to frequency of receiving Communion. The first group will be termed "nominal" Catholics, defined as those women who declare themselves to be Catholics but who fail to receive Communion once a year—a minimum requirement of the Catholic Church. Among the six cities in the *CELADE* series, the lowest proportion of "nominals" is found in Bogota (19 per cent), the highest in Rio (56 per cent). Caracas, Mexico City, Panama City and San Jose show 38, 46, 52 and 39 per cent respectively. The second group will be designated as "marginal" Catholics, those who achieve but do not exceed the minimum standard; i.e. they attend Communion only once per year. The third group, here termed "de-

<sup>6</sup>Table 10, *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, 1962. U. S. data apparently refer only to diocesan priests.

<sup>7</sup>By dividing into deciles the range between extreme values for eight religious variables, Alonso creates a five category index for classifying Latin American countries according to their religious structure. Of the countries we are considering, Colombia is in the top decile in seven out of eight measures and is placed in category 1. Costa Rica is in category 2; Brazil, Peru, Mexico and Venezuela in 3; and El Salvador and Panama in category 4. None of the countries discussed here fall in category 5, "least religious structure" (Labelle and Estrada, 1964, 269-282).

<sup>8</sup>Catholic investigators have also noted the nominal nature of Catholicism in Rio de Janeiro. In a study of religious practices in the *favelas*, 84 per cent declared themselves to be Catholics, 46 per cent were classified as "indifferent to the faith", 38 per cent were classified as traditional or folkloric in their practices (practicing only on Christmas, Holy Week, etc.), seven per cent as irregular practitioners, and only nine per cent as regular practitioners of their religion—attending Sunday Mass and observing their Easter duty; cited in Betancur and Garcia de Sousa, 1957.

TABLE 2  
ATTENDANCE AT MASS AND PRACTICE OF COMMUNION BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

City	Number of nated Catholic women	Per cent who attend Mass weekly			Per cent who take Communion more than once per year		
		Total	< Primary school	= Primary school	Total	< Primary school	= Primary school
Bogota	1522	68	62	75	49	45	52
Caracas	1251	34	24	43	29	23	35
Lima	1995	49	39	65	—	—	—
Mexico City	1527	60	56	63	30	27	33
Panama City	1330	41	24	48	32	23	40
Rio de Janeiro	1491	27	22	32	24	22	25
San Jose	1261	67	62	71	24	22	25
San Salvador <sup>(a)</sup>	1647	—	58	67	—	—	—

<sup>(a)</sup>Data include nonCatholic women and refer to monthly attendance at religious services. Educational categories refer to "less than six years of education" and "more than six years of education" (Gomez, in press).

vout", receives Communion twice a year or more frequently. The proportion of "devouts" for each city is given in Table 2. Since there is a tendency for education to be positively related to religious behavior (Table 2) we shall hold education roughly constant by classifying our three religious types according to whether or not they have completed primary school. Such a procedure may on occasion clarify the anomalous findings sometimes reported on the relation of religiosity to fertility related variables.<sup>9</sup>

In seeking to ascertain the relation between religious practices and fertility, we should distinguish between attitudes and behavior. With respect to attitude, we shall distinguish between attitude toward family size and attitude toward contraception; and with respect to behavior we shall distinguish between contraceptive behavior and actual fertility. These distinctions are important since it is possible that religiosity affects one variable or set of variables without affecting others. For example, devout Catholics might want small families but have large ones because they do not wish to practice contraception. On the other hand, they might favor large families and disapprove of contraception because of Church teaching, but practice it out of a sense of economic necessity. Their fertility level might reflect this ambivalence, depending on the intrinsic efficiency of the methods chosen, and the consistency with which they are used.

### *Attitudes Toward Family Size*

"Somehow", says Westoff, as if mystified, "the large family as a value seems to become idealized in the culture of a Catholic College" (1965). Surely both Catholic education and formal religious observances put one more in tune with Catholic teaching. While one increasingly hears disclaimers of a Catholic Church "doctrine" on large families, there is no escaping the fact that the large family has been idealized by the highest Church authorities and an unknown number of parish priests and nuns. In the contemporary period, Pope Pius XII made many statements throughout his long reign which left little doubt that large families should be a goal of the Christian family and accepted joyfully as a gift from God. A few of his pronouncements are illustrated below:

. . . To newly-weds (1940): Look about you, and you see numerous spouses who are full of joy and courage because they are blessed with a charming and abundant flock of children. May you also follow their example. . .

<sup>9</sup>E.g. in a survey of women in a working class area of Santiago, Chile, Requena tabulated the outcome of 2617 pregnancies. "Results of this tabulation were totally unexpected", he writes. "The risk of induced abortion clearly increases with the frequency of Church-going. We have no explanation for this finding" (Requena, 1965).

- . . . To the College of Cardinals (1947): Fidelity to the laws of God brought the blessing of a rich crown of children. . . only true heroism . . . is capable of keeping in the hearts of young married people the desire and joy of having a large family.
- . . . To the Italian Association of Large Families (1958): You represent large families, those most blessed by God and specially loved and prized by the Church as its most precious treasures . . . to accept joyfully and gratefully these priceless gifts of God—their children—in whatever number it may please him to send them. . . Large families are the most splendid flower-beds of the Church (Zimmerman, 1961).

Even Pope John on occasion lauded the large family, cautioning the faithful in 1960 not to

- . . . be afraid of the number of your sons and daughters. On the contrary, ask Divine Providence for them, so that you can educate them for their benefit, for your own honor in later years, for the great welfare of your fatherland, and for the external homeland toward which we are tending.

Surely such widely publicized statements from the leader of the Church must have had their impact on the stance of the parish priest, if not directly on the attitudes of parishioners.

In addition to direct exhortations from the pulpit or confessional, literate Latin Americans are also likely to be exposed to the influence of the secular press, which often extols the virtues of the large family. Three examples appearing in the Mexican press within a recent three month period can be cited.

A feature article against birth control: "Should we destroy the Monument to the Mother? Should we not offer homage to those women who have distinguished themselves by their fertility"? (*El Universal Grafico*, April 8, 1965).

A father of 14, including quadruplets, is extolled for his stand against family planning in a four column story: "I will have all the children God sends", he is quoted as saying. "I would like to have more" (*Novedades*, April 13, 1965).

A feature story, with pictures, of the winners of the "1964 Extraordinary Award for Fertility" (*Premio Extraordinario de Natalidad*, 1964):

The couple, married 15 years and with 15 children . . . believes that when the public sees . . . the advantages of a large number of children, many couples will follow their example. "Are you planning to have more children"? we asked. "All that God wishes"! they replied (*Novedades*, March 5, 1965).

In an effort to ascertain the family size norms of Latin American women the following question (with slight modifications in Lima and San Salvador) was asked in all the cities under discussion: "If you were to start a family now, how many children would you want"? Only small percentages in each city replied that this was

TABLE 3  
MEDIAN IDEAL FAMILY SIZE<sup>(a)</sup> BY EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

City	Total	Less than primary school		Primary school or more		
		Nominal	Marginal	Devout	Nominal	Marginal
Bogota	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.9	3.3	3.7
Caracas	3.6	3.8	3.6	3.8	3.5	3.3
Lima	-	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.6	3.3
Mexico City	4.1	4.5	4.4	4.9	3.7	3.6
Panama City	3.3	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.9
Rio de Janeiro	2.4	2.2	2.6	2.5	2.2	3.6
San Jose	3.8	3.5	4.2	4.4	3.4	2.3
San Salvador <sup>(b)</sup>	3.9	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.7	4.1

<sup>(a)</sup>In computing the median, the class limits for each digit were chosen so that a whole number (2, 3, 4, etc.) would fall at the midpoint of the interval. Open ended categories such as "as many as God sends" were included at the high end of the continuum in calculating medians. The method for computing medians in the San Salvador study is not specified, and the medians of 5.1 and 5.4 for the better educated women probably reflect computational errors, since they are both implausible and inconsistent with other data in the same table from which they were drawn. See C. Gomez, "Religion, Education and Fertility Control . . ." *op cit.*, Table 1.

<sup>(b)</sup>Religiosity categories distinguish between women attending church services once a month or more, and those attending less frequently. See note<sup>(a)</sup>, Table 2.

"up to God" or "as many as God sends", and the overall totals reflect moderate family size goals. There is considerable variation among the cities from a low of 2.4 for mated Catholic women in Rio de Janeiro to a high of 4.1 for the corresponding group in Mexico City. While there is little correspondence between the over-all city rankings on ideal size and general religiosity, in all cities except Panama ideal size rises with degree of religious observance, among the better educated women. The trend is less marked but also apparent among the less educated women in most of the cities.<sup>10</sup> In four of the cities there is also a negative relation between ideal size and education holding religiosity constant.

That these rather general ideals are also reflected in more immediate and specific family size goals can be illustrated by the case of Peru. (Data have not yet been analyzed for the other countries.) Figure 1 summarizes responses of Lima women to the question, "Do you want to have any more children than you now have?"; classified according to the number of living children they have at present. Among the less educated women, after the first child there is a small but consistent tendency for the more religious women to want more children at each parity; among the better educated women, the difference is considerably greater.

In the case of Peru we can refine our measure of religiosity by adding the dimension of marriage, dividing the various groups into those who were married in a church service and those who were not. (Most of the latter women are living in consensual unions.) Addition of this item further emphasizes the large family orientation of the more religious women (Table 4). As before, differences are sharper among the women with some secondary school education, but are also apparent among the less educated. Better educated women who attend services weekly and were married in the church prefer over one

<sup>10</sup> This positive relation between ideal size and religiosity was also observed in the Santiago survey, the mean ideal number of children rising steadily from 3.7 among those who never attend Mass, to 5.0 among those who attend more than once per week (Tabah and Sammuel, 1962). Recent surveys in Madrid also indicate "a positive relation between ideal size of the urban family, socio-economic status and religiosity". Women who practice their religion "with little regularity" express a median ideal of 3.0 children, while those who practice "with great regularity" prefer an average of 3.5. (See Nicolas, 1965). That the relation between religiosity and family norms is stronger among better educated Catholics has been noted in American studies. Freedman states that "the attitude favoring moderately large families among Catholics is more influential among the better educated than among the less educated" (Freedman, Whelpton and Campbell, 1959, 286). In discussing the rather large family norm among Catholics, Westoff and associates conclude that "a Catholic education is one of the social mechanisms supporting such a norm. It seems to operate primarily at the college level, to some extent at the secondary level, and not at all at the elementary school level" (Westoff, Potter and Sagi, 1965, 133).




FIGURE 1.  
PER CENT WHO WANT MORE CHILDREN, BY NUMBER OF  
LIVING CHILDREN, RELIGIOSITY AND EDUCATION, LIMA

child more than women of a similar education who attend services less frequently and who did not marry in the church. Controlling for numbers of children, the more religious women are much more likely to prefer additional children. (Values for the intermediate types, not shown in the table, fall between the extremes.) While secondary school educated women who were neither married in church nor attend services regularly are significant for our analytic purposes, we must keep in mind that they are scarce indeed, representing only about three per cent of the women.

TABLE 4

ATTITUDES TOWARD FAMILY SIZE, BY EDUCATION, ATTENDANCE AT RELIGIOUS SERVICES, AND TYPE OF MARRIAGE, LIMA, 1960 (EXTREMES ONLY)

Family size	Primary school or less		Secondary school	
	Weekly mass and Catholic marriage	Less than weekly mass and no Catholic marriage	Weekly mass and Catholic marriage	Less than weekly mass and no Catholic marriage
Median ideal number of children	4.3	4.0	4.6	3.4
Per cent of women with 0-2 living children who want more children	58	54	74	46
Per cent of women with 3 or more living children who want more children	28	15	45	28
Number	(314)	(327)	(454)	(52)

### Contraception

In the present section we examine the attitude toward and use of birth control methods. The traditional opposition of Catholic leaders to abortion, sterilization and mechanical and chemical means of contraception needs no documentation here. It is also the case that newer methods, such as anovulant drugs, have been condemned: ". . . Pius XII stated September, 1958 that a direct and therefore illicit sterilization is provoked when medicines are used to 'prevent conception by preventing ovulation'" (Fagley, 1965). While certain aspects are under review, the most recent statement of Pope Paul VI at the time of writing this paper reaffirmed that

chemical or mechanical means of contraception vitiate the essence of the conjugal act. Only total continence or limitation of intercourse to the infertile female period 'on sure and sufficient moral motives' is licit, he said (New York Times, 1965).

With respect to attitudes we have selected two items from the questionnaire. The first reflects opinions regarding the acceptability of providing information on birth control. "Does it strike you as good or not that you be given information on birth control"? The second item taps the individual's attitude toward personal use of a relatively simple contraceptive: "There are pills to avoid getting pregnant,

TABLE 5  
ATTITUDE TOWARD BIRTH CONTROL, BY EDUCATION AND RELIGIOSITY.  
INDEX NUMBERS FOR DEVOUT (NOMINALS) = 100

City	A. Per cent who believe birth control information should <i>not</i> be distributed			B. Per cent who would take the contraceptive pill		
	Total	< Primary	≥ Primary	Total	< Primary	≥ Primary
Bogota	27	140	210	51	88	79
Caracas	22	122	210	44	57	73
Mexico City	31	125	190	41	60	53
Panama City	20	111	141	50	74	64
Rio de Janeiro	50	109	119	34	68	71
San José	36	179	260	53	56	67

which are taken daily for 20 days during the month. If you could get them, would you take them"?

Rather than present the full tables, we have used index numbers in Table 5, expressing the percentage difference between the "nominals" and the "devouts" within each educational category. Thus, among better educated Bogota women, over twice as high a proportion of "devout" as "nominal" Catholic women believe birth control information should not be distributed; and 21 per cent fewer of them would take a contraceptive pill. With remarkable consistency we see that the more devout women have less favorable attitudes toward birth control than the "nominals", while "marginal" Catholics fall in between. (The latter data are not shown in the table. In the 24 comparisons possible, "marginal" Catholics fall between the other two groups in 19 instances. In the remaining instances they "exceed" by two or three percentage points the favorable attitudes of the "nominals".) Further, on the information item, in all cities the relation is stronger among the better educated women; but on attitude toward personal use of a pill, this is true among only half of the cities.

Table 6 shows actual experience with contraception. Women from Mexico City and Bogota have had least experience with birth control, but about six of every ten mated women in the other cities have used a method, the most frequently declared contraceptives being douche, condom, withdrawal and rhythm. The only major variations in methods occur with respect to the unusually low incidence of use of condom and withdrawal in Rio, a datum which suggests faulty interviewing.

Of greater interest for our purpose is Table 7, showing experience with the various methods according to degree of religiosity. Differences among the less educated women were minimal, and consequently we have presented differences only for the better edu-

TABLE 6  
PER CENT WHO HAVE EVER USED SPECIFIED METHOD OF BIRTH CONTROL

City	Any method <sup>a</sup>	Douche	Condom	Withdrawal	Rhythm
Bogota	40	13	10	17	19
Caracas	59	25	32	23	19
Mexico City	38	15	9	7	15
Panama City	60	26	17	11	16
Rio de Janeiro	58	24	12	5	17
San José	65	17	37	24	18
San Salvador	-	16	13	11	16

<sup>a</sup> Includes nonCatholic women. Taken from C. A. Miró and F. Rath, "Preliminary Findings. . ." *op. cit.*

cated women. With the exception of San Salvador, mechanical and chemical methods have been used by smaller proportions of "devout" than of "nominal" Catholics in all cities, the differences being the greatest in Bogota. With respect to the rhythm method however, in every city but Bogota, between a quarter and a half more "devout" than "nominal" Catholics have used the method, clear evidence of the relation of religiosity to contraceptive behavior.

### Fertility

While levels of fertility are high in most Latin American countries and show little signs of change, there is good reason to believe that differential fertility by major social categories exists throughout the continent (Carleton, 1965). Within the cities surveyed in this report, major differences by education level have already been reported (Miró, 1966), and can also be observed in Table 8. Thus, by whatever means it is achieved, differential fertility does exist among urban populations. Given this fact and given the pattern of our earlier findings we would then expect religiosity to be positively associated with fertility. Table 8 shows that by and large this is not the case. Indeed, in several instances there is a slight *negative* association,

TABLE 7  
EVER USE OF SPECIFIED METHODS OF BIRTH CONTROL BY "DEVOUT" WOMEN,  
BETTER EDUCATED ONLY. INDEX NUMBERS: PER CENT OF "NOMINALS" WHO  
HAVE EVER USED A METHOD = 100

City	Douche	Condom	Withdrawal	Rhythm
Bogota	40	43	61	80
Caracas	66	78	81	135
Mexico City	50	66	66	122
Panama City	79	54	83	153
Rio de Janeiro	61	71	120	124
San José	50	43	42	133
San Salvador	144	118	96	114

TABLE 8  
MEAN NUMBER OF LIVE BIRTHS, STANDARDIZED FOR AGE,<sup>a</sup> BY EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICE

City	Total	Less than primary school			Primary school and over		
		Nominal	Marginal	Devout	Nominal	Marginal	Devout
Bogota	4.07	4.16	4.36	4.53	3.53	3.85	3.85
Caracas	3.65	4.51	3.92	3.41	3.01	2.88	3.01
Lima <sup>b</sup>	—	4.47	4.41	3.49	3.54	—	2.55
Mexico City	4.21	4.92	4.41	4.67	3.68	3.99	3.48
Panama City	3.34	4.02	3.87	3.48	3.16	2.79	2.73
Rio de Janeiro	2.72	3.35	3.06	3.05	2.23	2.39	2.07
San Jose <sup>c</sup>	3.79	4.56	4.29	4.34	3.32	3.23	3.03
San Salvador <sup>c</sup>	—	3.93	—	4.30	3.73	—	2.55

<sup>a</sup> Standardization by direct method, using total age distribution of the six cities in the CELADE series as the standard population.

<sup>b</sup> Median live births per 1000 years mated.

<sup>c</sup> Mean live births per 1000 years mated. Also see notes in Tables 2 and 3.

TABLE 9  
SELECTED ITEMS RELATING TO FERTILITY, NON CATHOLIC MATED WOMEN INDEX NUMBERS: CATHOLIC MATED WOMEN = 100

Items	Bogota	Caracas	Mexico City	Panama City	Rio de Janeiro	San José
Median ideal family size	96	82	85	109	101	94
Mean live births	73	110	83	89	95	99
Per cent believe birth control information should not be distributed	89	92	52	175	92	72
Per cent would take pill	63	107	88	81	65	81
Per cent ever used douche	146	56	160	96	117	153
Per cent ever used rhythm	153	74	147	112	124	100
Per cent ever used condom	100	69	267	112	125	84
Per cent ever used withdrawal	171	48	214	73	71	96
Number of women	(21)	(64)	(77)	(127)	(252)	(78)

and in the case of Lima and the better educated women of San Salvador, the negative relation is substantial.

One possible explanation for a negative relation is that we have only imperfectly controlled education. The most extreme case is in Panama where among the better educated group of women, "devouts" average almost two years more education than "nominals".

Such a fact cannot of course account for the positive relation of religiosity to family size norms, attitudes to contraception, or to practice of contraception, since the relation of these to education is in the opposite direction. In any event, if we cannot infer a positive relation between religiosity and fertility, the more important conclusion is the absence of a negative relation, despite the negative relation between religiosity and practice of mechanical and chemical contraception. Possibly the more devout marry later or practice contraception more consistently once they initiate family planning, matters beyond the scope of the present paper.

### *Non Catholics*

Since so few nonCatholic women fell in the samples under discussion, we have eliminated them from our analysis thus far. However, Table 9 gives a rapid gross comparison between them and the declared Catholic women in the samples. The comparisons are made without regard to possible demographic or socio-economic differences between Catholics and nonCatholics. It is nevertheless interesting to see that no easy generalizations about fertility-related variables can be made about Catholic versus nonCatholic women in the major cities of Latin America.

In terms of ideal family size only two cities show differences of more than ten per cent, and in actual fertility only three. In these three nonCatholic women have had slightly fewer births. In four cities there is a difference in excess of ten per cent with respect to attitude toward the provision of birth control information, Protestants being more favorably inclined in three of the four cases; but in terms of attitude toward taking an oral contraceptive, Catholic women in all but Caracas are more favorable. In Mexico City nonCatholic women are more likely than Catholic women to have used each of the four main contraceptive methods, but in Caracas the Catholic women were more likely to use contraception. In other cities the situation varies according to contraceptive, but in three of the six, substantially greater proportions of nonCatholic women have practiced the rhythm technique.

## Conclusions

Based on an analysis of national fertility levels Day concludes that

the problem seems *not* to be one of Catholic teaching in predominantly Catholic countries. The frequently voiced hope that the Church will change its position on family planning, and thereby help to solve the population problem in areas like Latin America, appears largely irrelevant . . . (Day, in Press).

Similarly, a leading Latin American demographer states that

. . . the doctrinaire position of the Catholic Church does not constitute an obstacle for family planning. The persistence of a very high birth rate in Latin America cannot be attributed to the predominantly Catholic conditions of the population, but to the social and economic backwardness in which they live (Miró, 1963).

In a general sense our findings support these positions, at least for Catholic women living in the major cities of Latin America, for we found that the average woman wants between three and four children, would favor receiving birth control information, and has practiced or will practice contraception before completion of child-bearing. Further, no consistent differences were found between Catholic and nonCatholic women in attitudes, contraceptive practices or fertility.

We also found that although there is variation in fertility among the different cities and within cities among different educational strata, there is no variation in the expected direction according to religiosity. However, the attitudes and behavior directly relevant to fertility—attitudes toward family size and contraception, and the practice of birth control—showed consistent relationships with degree of religiosity, as measured by frequency of Communion. Thus if Catholicism is having little impact on fertility, it may be partly because the average woman is not very "Catholic" by Church standards, and partly because the attitudes and practices of the less religious woman are not especially effective in the control of fertility.

What will happen as educational levels rise, and the number of priests, now relatively low, increases? Paradoxically, while the groups most affected (in attitudes and practices) by the Church's teaching are the better educated women, the better educated women are precisely those with lower fertility. This suggests that while increases in general education may eventually lower fertility, they may also bring more psychological stresses to Catholic women acutely aware of the discrepancy between the Church's position and their own needs and wishes. Lower fertility levels will be achieved at the cost of personal stress, and, ultimately of stresses on the Church. On

the other hand, there is the possibility that Church teaching will move closer to present day realities in Latin America. As phrased by Father Gustavo Perez, "I share the hopes of many in Latin America who expect a public statement in Schema 13, that there is a need for Responsible Parenthood; that the Church today is not pro-natalist and does not necessarily favor large families in all circumstances" (Perez, 1965).

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## Population Control and the Private Sector

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Existing literature on population control says almost nothing about the private distribution of contraceptives, and yet such private distribution is widespread in many countries.<sup>1</sup> Rather, the bulk of research literature on population control reports (a) surveys of existing attitudes and knowledge of prospective contraceptive users (Hill, *et al.*, 1959; Stycos, *et al.* 1964); (b) action research programs aimed at changing attitudes or increasing knowledge (Population council, 1964); (c) program developments, such as the construction of small networks of medical centers and clinics for dispensing contraceptive advice or supplies (Bronfenbrenner and Buttrick, 1960); (d) demographic studies of rates of population growth, etc. (Petersen, 1961); and (e) studies of the social and familial problems generated by frequent pregnancies (Blake, 1961). Until the last year or so we could find almost nothing about distribution of contraceptives through business systems, nor about such mundane matters as prices, packaging, promotion or availability.

This absence might be trivial except for the fact that most contraceptives in the world are manufactured, distributed and sold in private sector institutions. For example, the American market for condoms alone is estimated at almost \$115,000,000 per year

<sup>1</sup>The authors are indebted to the Ford Foundation for support in the initial phases of this project, although the views expressed are not necessarily those of the Foundation.

(more than 700,000,000 pieces or roughly 10 per adult male) (Steffen and Bushell, 1964). Creams, jellies, diaphragms, etc. add another \$50 million, excluding about \$40 million more in "feminine hygiene" products. Moreover, it appears that most countries have a private contraceptive market of some sort. It seems, then, that serious planning of population control programs would entail not only study of census data and awareness of attitudes and knowledge but also attention to structure and extent of existing contraceptive distribution.

### **Why Hasn't the Private Sector Been Examined?**

We ascribe the absence of such studies to several causes. First, there are certain undertones of seediness associated with the private sale of contraceptives, especially condoms. About half of U. S. condom sales take place in semi-subrosa settings like men's rooms (and ladies rooms) often via vending machines or peddlers (Steffen and Bushell, 1964). They are sold "for the prevention of disease" and many are probably used in illicit acts of intercourse. Even so, they prevent conception.

Second we must remember that organizations like Planned Parenthood evolved from moralistic feminist movements, and that foundations and other quasi-public bodies which have lately developed interest in the population problem often feel on thin ice dealing with problems outside conventional biological or public health spheres.

Third, many social scientists working in the field assume, implicitly or explicitly, a "one way" model of demand for contraceptives and a public-clinic model of supply. The process in such models is assumed to begin with the twin factors of public education and public motivation. Given these, potential consumers will somehow search for contraceptives in the private sector, or else the public sector will provide clients with clinics to fill the demand. Thus contraceptives, in one way or another, will ultimately be manufactured and supplied. However, even this process is often not made explicit by action-oriented social scientists. More often, the supply problem is treated as trivial or ignored altogether on the assumption that it will be handled somehow through clean public or quasi-public clinics.

Fourth, many social scientists seem to feel either uncomfortable with or vaguely hostile to the notion of mass marketing (for profit) of things in general and of contraceptives in particular.

Finally, there is a widespread propensity to perceive contraception either as a medical issue or as a public health issue.

Governments, for example, usually classify contraceptives as pharmaceuticals. While many types are indeed dispensed by physicians or pharmacists, many are available elsewhere as well. Clearly, too, many consumers consider contraceptives personal rather than medical products. In England barber shops are popular sources of supply; in Jamaica rum shops and groceries serve the same purposes, as do peddlers in India, and vending machines and fraternity brothers in this country.


All these factors have dictated against serious work in the private sector. Yet, the private sector is obviously relevant for a host of reasons. The problem of population control is large and needs mechanisms that permit diffusion of materials and information both over wide geographical areas and through great population masses. Private distribution structures are characteristically large, with extensive networks of channels and armies of retailers and wholesalers already positioned and trained. Marketers of consumer products are very likely to be more knowledgeable about local distribution than anyone else. Their knowledge, albeit folk knowledge, is surely worth tapping. They have already developed techniques to disseminate information, and these techniques are not limited to highly-developed economies. Soap, cigarettes and soft drinks have been introduced successfully into low income societies by just such persons through just such structures. At the opposite extreme in terms of economic development, birth control has as yet no significant place in any U. S. public sector institution, even though private practice of birth control and private marketing of contraceptives is widespread.

For these reasons we have started research into the marketing of contraceptives through the private sector. We hope to calibrate the private sector as it relates to population control and also to test some alternatives to the one-way diffusion model mentioned earlier.

### A Model of Acceptance

Our tentative alternative model is not so exclusively social scientific as the one that treats attitude change as the necessary first step in a mass change process. Hopefully, it is also less naive. The model treats diffusion as a joint resultant of psychological acceptance variables (knowledge and motivation) and accessibility variables (availability, price, information provision and variety). A rough

sketch of such a model might look like this:



Notice that many of the effects are two directional (knowledge brings about action and action tends to increase knowledge) and that some of the inputs are presumed to be inter-related. The function of information provision is probably shared by the public and private sectors in many cases, although the latter source of information as well as the other accessibility variables are often disregarded in population research. True, a highly motivated consumer might willingly walk a mile for a contraceptive, but a less highly motivated consumer may willingly walk only across the street. If contraceptives are, however, available across the street, both will buy.

Second, our model assumes interactions between availability on the one hand and knowledge and motivation on the other. In a world full of costless contraceptives, ignorant and unmotivated people will to some extent learn to and proceed to use them. A similar notion has come up often in recent developments in learning theory in connection with simple books and reading. It suggests that the presence of books as well as the presence of teachers teaches people to read, especially if the books have lots of pictures—i.e. if the gap is small between existing knowledge and the knowledge needed for the product. For some contraceptives, existing surveys suggest that the knowledge gap is smaller than many people think and that the knowledge is concentrated in the hands of people most likely to use it and pass it on (The Population Council, 1963–64).

If our model is grossly representative of reality, the role of the retailer becomes quite large because the availability services are exactly the ones he provides. But what outlets stock or might stock contraceptives? At what prices? With what sorts of point of

sale display or other types of promotion? Such issues are relevant and important, not only in a logically supportive sense, but also because of possible causal variables that may influence public attitudes and increase public knowledge.

## The Present State of the Private Sector in the Caribbean: *Some Scraps of Evidence*

Having asserted that contraceptives can be distributed through private channels we can turn now to the current role of the private sector. What are the answers to such questions as these:

. . . Is there currently a "market" in contraceptives in countries with population problems? Whom does it serve? What institutions are involved?

. . . What kinds of impediments, if any, drag against more widespread distribution?

. . . How might the private sector react to by either frustrating or complementing the development of a public sector program?

We have done some pilot work to find out whether it is even worthwhile to research these questions. We have looked at Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, Puerto Rico, and to a lesser extent at the United States and the Dominican Republic.

We have found, first, that there is a contraceptive market in each of these countries. Condoms are the most numerous and widely available contraceptive in all of these countries, and we use them for illustration. Estimates based on interviews with importers and distributors indicate that about 65,000 single condoms were sold in 1964 in Jamaica, and perhaps 15,000 were sold in Barbados. These are trivial quantities when related to the half a million Jamaican women and the 80,000 Barbadan women of child-bearing age; but the geographic extent of the market turned out to be surprisingly wide.

In both of these countries, social scientists and public health people had told us that contraception was largely an upper class phenomenon. We could therefore expect to find contraceptives only in the few urban drug stores serving upper class neighborhoods. Nevertheless, we arranged a simple shopping study in lower middle and lower class neighborhoods, both urban and rural. In Jamaica, our shoppers called on small retail outlets other than drug stores. They found condoms in about 40 per cent of such shops in Kingston, including small local grocery stores, bars, restaurants and even a haberdashery. Although we did not find condoms in the general retail outlets in very small rural communities (Sligoville and Jackson), they were available in similar outlets in larger (but still small) towns like Bog Walk and Linstead. In almost all cases the stock was not visible in the store and in no case was there point

of purchase promotion—explaining to some extent the fact that many people were not aware of the existence of the market. Other contraceptives were, however, more scarce. In a similar study in Barbados, condoms were generally available in many small first aid counters connected with groceries. In both countries, contraceptives were generally available in drug stores and in some supermarkets.

Trinidad, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic are similar to one another but different from Jamaica and Barbados in that distribution of contraceptives appears limited to drug stores. In all cases, however, contraceptives are stocked by drug stores in lower-income as well as upper class neighborhoods.

In general, these markets, though small, are quite widespread both geographically and across the social structure. The existence of such private sector markets in many other less-developed countries is at least partially documented (Jackson and Peers, 1964). Further, these markets are potentially very important. Japan, the one country that has recently succeeded in quickly slowing a very rapid population growth, did so almost completely by private decision and private sector activity (Bronfenbrenner, and Buttrick, 1960).

Despite the relatively wide availability of contraceptives, clear and important impediments to distribution exist. Some are formal and easily understood. Others are institutional and less easy to explain.

Trinidad is at one extreme. A stringent drug law requires that a pharmacist or physician be on the premises for the sale of any drug, and the definition of drug is so strict that it even includes deodorant soaps. All contraceptives are defined as drugs and therefore both condoms and medicated soaps are hard to find outside drug stores. The law did not originate with contraceptives in mind, but rather it emerged out of an effort to control loose distribution of all pharmaceuticals. Our survey showed the law to be effective.

In Jamaica oral contraceptives require prescriptions (and indeed we found no evidence of orals for sale outside drug stores), but most other items do not. In Barbados, we found no institutional barriers. Condoms were available only in drug stores and first aid shops but these tend to blanket the relatively small island, and other shops presumably could carry them. No prescription is needed for orals. In Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, distribution of all kinds of contraceptives is apparently limited to drug stores, although in neither case is there any formal prohibition of the kind that exists in Trinidad.

Religious barriers are difficult to evaluate and there are some apparent anomalies. Jamaica and Barbados both have small Catholic minorities, but the religious issue seems much more im-

portant in Jamaica, perhaps because the Prime Minister was Catholic. Catholics make up almost half the population of Trinidad, and the Catholic Church is quite influential; here religious factors apparently have caused some drug chains to refuse to stock contraceptives. However, although Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic have large Catholic majorities, the religious issue there does not seem to block private distribution. We also were told that the proportion of Catholics visiting some clinics is roughly comparable to the proportion of Catholics in the population. Religious impediments are thus much more complex than one might expect on the basis of popular conception of Church doctrine.

In the public sector, Barbados and Puerto Rico have some form of government program for population control. Jamaica has recognized the population problem with only a brief reference in its economic plan and some pilot research projects. Trinidad has been engaged in active debate but has done nothing, and the Dominican Republic has apparently been inactive. Given relative religious patterns, these differences are much easier to describe than to explain satisfactorily.

In fact, some earlier simple explanations of impedences now seem quite insufficient to us. We need a far clearer idea of the operant influences in the political, religious, social and commercial structures.

Given private markets which already make contraceptives available to a surprising cross-section of these populations, what should we expect when a public sector program is started? The answer to this question is unclear. The private sector may on the one hand complement and aid a public sector program, or the sectors may find themselves in competition.

The complementarity theme is the more hopeful. One possibility is a pump priming effect which assumes that activity in the public sector will encourage people to buy contraceptives privately, once they have started practicing birth control. Another possibility is that the two sectors may simply exist in parallel serving different populations. Such is apparently the hope of some Indian officials, where the Indian clinics' failure to develop a large repeat clientele has led the director of its population program to suggest that private sector distribution should be used to supplement the clinics. No one now seems to know whether such a plan can be made operational, but it is interesting that the private sector is looked to for help (Raina, 1963).

On the other hand, people already practicing birth control may simply transfer their patronage from the private to the public sector outlets, chiefly for the price advantage. (We have some evidence of just such a shift in our pilot studies.) Clinic prices are generally lower than present commercial prices because they may be sub-

sidized privately or publicly, or because clinics may be exempt from import duties, etc. But clinics, of course, are not necessarily more efficient than the private sector on the basis of cost per client served. In India, for example, the cost per client in some public clinics has been estimated at \$40 per visit, even though the price of contraceptives to the client is much lower than in the private market. Incidentally, since clinics tend to categorize any first visitor as a new user, clinical statistics may overstate their impact on contraception practices.

Also, switching may occur from abortion (a very common phenomenon in many parts of the world) as a birth control method to contraception, probably to the general benefit of client health but with no effect on population growth.

Again, a great deal of uncertainty exists here, in part because the private sector remains a great unknown.

### Some Open Issues of Research and Values

These bits of data seem to us consonant with our basic argument: the private sector needs to be known, calibrated and manipulated to support successful population control work in the public sector.

The private sector exists. It is, in almost all societies, the largest, and cheapest existing structure capable of delivering physical goods to large masses of people over a diffuse geographic area. The private distribution system is also viable since it has already demonstrated capacity for mass distribution of other small personal or household products. Failure to treat the private sector seriously can lead to useless duplication of effort and also to double counting and faulty evaluation of public sector results. It may also lead to unforeseen and not necessarily useful competition between private and public institutions.

It is true that some contraceptives need medical control—especially the intrauterine devices. But in most societies many medical services are provided by private practitioners who constitute a kind of distribution structure in their own right. (Notice that paramedical practitioners like midwives are included in this category.) Also, the development of a new product like oral or intrauterine contraceptives is unlikely to kill old ones, except perhaps over the very long run. Radios survive television, safety razors survive electric razors. It would be short-sighted indeed, especially in an expanding market, to abandon old product lines with certain attributes all of which cannot be duplicated in their successors.

To look into the private sector we are treating the problem of contraception as a problem in marketing by comparing contracep-

tive distribution with the distribution of certain other products like shaving cream. We plan to survey retailers, checking the price structure, turnover rates and promotion. We plan to apply a diffusion model to the data, using as our independent variables some local and societal factors like educational level, religious impediments, extent of mass communication and the nature of the competitive structure. Later, we plan manipulative steps—modifications of price, advertising, and distribution. We hope that this type of work can add an important dimension to our understanding of the birth control problem.

If there is a value issue in all this, we would also like to have it aired. There seems to be a widely-shared implicit standard against encouraging private sale of contraceptives for profit, except perhaps through drug stores. Surprisingly, this standard seems to be shared by a composite of some clubwomen, contraceptive manufacturers, physicians, churchmen, public health officials, foundation executives and social scientists. While many favor population control in general and many of these, contraception in particular, they either ignore or abhor broad distribution of contraceptives. Is it immoral, inefficient or just unpleasant? European and American experience over a long period and the briefer Japanese experience indicates that, while private distribution may be any or all of these, it can be effective.

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## **Family Planning, Public Policy and Intervention Strategy**

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The last decade has witnessed a vast transformation in the expressed policies on family planning of public agencies in the United States. It is not uncommon today for government officials, political leaders and health and welfare professionals to discuss birth control publicly in terms which would have been unthinkable in the 1950's when official expressions were characterized by evasion and timidity. Policy statements have poured forth from health and welfare departments in many states and cities; legislatures in 18 states have either removed ancient statutory restrictions or adopted positive legislation; and Congress in 1967 approved several proposals designed to step up Federal leadership in this field.

To a very considerable degree, birth control has been desensitized as a public issue. Given existing knowledge and technology, this achievement could set the stage for rapid expansion of tax-supported programs and thus, for the actual extension of competent birth control services to those Americans who until now have not had effective access to them. Yet the rate of change of public *policy* is often considerably more rapid than the rate of change in public *programming*, and the extent to which positive policy will be translated into adequate programs remains to be seen. It is already clear that the actualization of effective public family planning services is rendered more difficult by factors which have nothing to do with

birth control, particularly by problems relating to the organization and delivery of general medical services for impoverished Americans.

This paper will briefly summarize these changes in public policy<sup>1</sup> and attempt to estimate the adequacy of existing family planning services. Some major emerging problems will be discussed, as will impediments to expanded activity in the public sector. Finally, birth control policy will be weighed in the context of the intervention strategy which guides current efforts to reduce poverty and dependency.

## The Shift in Policy

The integration of birth control services in *all* phases of medical practice, including those publicly financed facilities which serve low-income families, has been a major aim of the family planning movement since its inception. The current phase of the public policy issue, however, can conveniently be said to have begun in 1957-58 in New York City with the campaign to reverse the long-standing ban on contraceptive prescription in the city's municipal hospitals. At that time, birth control was offered in maternal health programs of the Public Health Departments of only seven states (Alabama, Florida, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi and Virginia) and then only in token fashion. The New York campaign has been well described elsewhere (Guttmacher, 1959, 121-9; Rock, 1963, 116-127; Planned Parenthood, 1959); its major significance, apart from freeing hospital physicians to prescribe birth control material, was to demonstrate in unmistakable terms the extent of actual public support for family planning. Virtually all major non-Catholic organizations, with considerable support from the relevant professional groups, united to seek reversal of the ban, leaving only several Catholic organizations and some elements of city officialdom defending the status quo.

### *In New York . . .*

The New York controversy is also noteworthy for the fact that the essential elements of the settlement formula—legitimation of birth control as an integral part of regular medical services, coupled with recognition of the importance of voluntary action and respect

<sup>1</sup>Emphasized here will be the position of tax-supported health and welfare agencies in regard to provision of birth control services for their patients, although the policies of public agencies in medical research and foreign aid will also be touched on. A comprehensive discussion of public policy in this field, of course, would also have to take into account the many varied governmental policies which can be examined for their possible effect on fertility, including policies on taxes, military service, welfare and education.

for varying religious beliefs—have served as the prototype for settlement of similar controversies and near-controversies in many other communities (New York Board of Hospitals, 1958). Today, New York City has birth control clinics operating as part of the post-partum service in 14 municipal hospitals, serving an estimated 28,000 patients a year (Yerby, 1966)—the most extensive network of publicly financed family planning clinics of any city in the country with a patient load far exceeding the numbers served in many states including those which have had public health birth control programs ostensibly in operation for more than two decades. The New York pattern has been replicated, to one degree or another, in public hospitals in the District of Columbia, Denver, San Francisco, Indianapolis, Cleveland, Atlanta and Los Angeles among other cities.

### *Federal Policies . . .*

In 1959, with publication of the report of a Presidential committee (Draper, 1959) urging incorporation into foreign aid of assistance on population control to nations requesting it, discussion of public policy on family planning became intertwined with discussion of the population problem. The ensuing debate was marked by the opposition of the Catholic Bishops of the United States to use of public funds for birth control programs at home or abroad (National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1959) and, President Eisenhower's press conference retort:

"I cannot imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity . . . That's not our business" (1959).<sup>2</sup>

The Kennedy Administration, however, soon made clear that it held considerably different views. Beginning in 1961, a series of addresses by high government officials—the late Ambassador Stevenson, Under Secretary of State Ball, Ambassador Plimpton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Gardner, Secretary Wirtz, among others—elaborated the government's increasing concern with the impact of mushrooming population growth. The National Institutes of Health acknowledged responsibility to finance basic research in reproductive physiology which might lead to improved methods of fertility control, and this area of investigation was assigned to the newly formed National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. In April, 1963, the quasi-official National Academy of Sciences issued its first population report on worldwide dimensions of the problem calling for active government participation in efforts to curb uncontrolled population growth (National Academy

<sup>2</sup>In 1963, Eisenhower conceded publicly that his 1959 opposition was carried "too far" and in 1965, he endorsed Federal action.

of Sciences, 1963), and President Kennedy formally endorsed expansion of reproductive research so that knowledge can "be made available to the world so everyone can make his own decision" (1963).

By the end of 1963, Washington attitudes had changed sufficiently to permit Congress to adopt an amendment to the foreign aid bill authorizing use of assistance funds for "research into problems of population growth".

In its second population report, dealing with U. S. growth, the N.A.S. urged that family planning be made an integral part of domestic public medical programs and suggested that the appointment of an official "at a high national level" might facilitate Federal action (N.A.S., 1965, 25), a step proposed in legislation introduced in 1965 by a distinguished group of Senators and Representatives headed by Senator Ernest Gruening and implemented, in part, by the appointment of a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population and Family Planning in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Beginning with his 1965 State of the Union message, President Johnson has referred on at least 40 occasions to the problems associated with explosive population growth. Addressing the United Nations' 20th Anniversary meeting in San Francisco, he stated (1965):

Let us in all our lands—including this land—face forthrightly the multiplying problems of our multiplying populations and seek the answers to this most profound challenge to the future of the world. Let us act on the fact that less than \$5 invested in population control is worth \$100 invested in economic growth.

And in his 1966 Special Message to Congress on Health and Education, the President singled out family planning as one of four critical health problems requiring special attention, declaring:

We have a growing concern to foster the integrity of the family, and the opportunity for each child. It is essential that all families have access to information and services that will allow freedom to choose the number and spacing of their children within the dictates of individual conscience (1966).

In 1967, Congress authorized earmarked funds for family planning services in both the maternal and child health and foreign aid programs, and made family planning a "special emphasis" program within the war on poverty.

#### *Professional Organizations . . .*

This shift in official thinking was accompanied by the emergence of a clearly expressed consensus among an unusual array of pro-

fessional organizations in health and welfare fields.<sup>3</sup> In this setting, state and local health authorities demonstrated increasing interest in family planning programs. By 1965, the American Public Health Association found that the number of states in which local health departments provided *some* form of publicly financed family-planning programs, either through clinics of their own, where services and supplies are offered, or through educational programs and referral to other agencies, had grown from the seven cited above to 40, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico (Eliot, 1967). Most of these states, of course, were represented by minimal services, often in only one or two counties.<sup>4</sup>

Attention has also been directed to the policies of public welfare agencies which do not normally provide medical services to their clients but refer them to medical facilities and reimburse them for needed care. Positive policies of referral and/or reimbursement for birth control emerged after a protracted controversy in Illinois, less polarized incidents in New York, Maryland and Michigan, and uneventful discussions in Washington, Oregon, Tennessee, North Carolina and at least 25 other states. None of these policies have been in effect long enough to attempt an evaluation of the usefulness of the welfare agency referral as a means of bringing family planning service to the impoverished.

Two recent Federal programs have added impetus to the development of publicly financed family planning services—the war against poverty and the expansion of maternity care programs for high-risk, low-income mothers, financed by the Children's Bureau. The Office of Economic Opportunity supports birth control projects in local community action programs if they "meet the consensus of approval in the community" (Shriver, 1964). As of June 30, 1967, 125 specific birth control projects were funded by OEO, for a total of more than \$4.6 million; the approved projects include programs operated by public agencies, Planned Parenthood groups, or jointly.

The Children's Bureau program, designed primarily to reduce the incidence of mental retardation caused by premature births and

<sup>3</sup>Policy statements urging greater public involvement in family planning programs were issued by the American Public Health Association in 1959 and 1964; the American Public Welfare Association in 1964; the American Medical Association in 1964; the National Association of Social Workers in 1962 and 1967; the National Urban League in 1964; the Family Service Association in 1964; the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists in 1963; the Young Women's Christian Association in 1964; the American Assembly in 1963; the American Society of Zoologists in 1960; as well as numerous state and local groups and many Protestant and Jewish organizations.

<sup>4</sup>The survey disclosed that even these minimal services were being offered by less than one-third of all local health departments in the U. S.

complications associated with childbearing, makes available expanded funds for maternal health services. Most of the state and city health departments which have taken advantage of this program include family planning among the services offered (Oettinger, 1965). To date, 54 projects have been initiated by local health departments under this program in New York City, Baltimore, Detroit, Chicago, Augusta, Ga., Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and other cities for a total estimated expenditure of \$30 million.<sup>5</sup>

Most of these developments relate to *administrative* policies of Federal, state and local governmental agencies, rather than to birth control *legislation*. While some state laws did cast a pall over the field and gave officials a convenient excuse for inaction, there were few actual statutory impediments, except in Connecticut and Massachusetts, to active tax-supported programs since the agencies involved have as much authority to mount research and service in this area of medical care as in any other. In 1965 and 1966, however, the increasingly rapid legitimization of birth control found expression in a series of legislative actions which must be judged remarkable for the relative lack of controversy with which they were enacted. Five states—New York, Ohio, Massachusetts, Minnesota and Missouri—removed from their laws confusing Comstock-era restrictions on dissemination of contraceptive information. Bills authorizing or encouraging public health departments and/or welfare boards to provide family planning services at public expense were adopted in California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon and West Virginia. And of course, the U. S. Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's archaic statute—the only one in the country which prohibited *use* of contraceptives—in a landmark decision establishing the Constitutional right of couples to plan their families free of state interference.

### The Adequacy of Current Programs

Notwithstanding the policy breakthroughs of the last decade, the actual *performance* of public agencies in the family planning field, as in many other areas, leaves much to be desired.

Given the relative abundance of scientific facilities in the U. S. and the commanding position of Federal funds in directing biological research, for example, it could be posited that one of the

<sup>5</sup>There is ample room for confusion and distortion in public discussion of these programs. E.g., the impression has been created that the current Children's Bureau grant of \$1.4 million to New York City is for birth control services in local health centers, where it is in fact for comprehensive maternal health services *including* birth control, and considerably less than 10% of the grant is actually being used in family planning services.

most significant potential contributions of public policy to solution of population problems at home and abroad would be to encourage and finance massive research for improved methods of fertility control suitable for use in diverse cultures and socio-economic groups. As of 1967, the National Institutes of Health supported studies of various aspects of reproduction with funds totaling \$10.7 million per year, only about \$1.5 million of which is being spent for research directly related to fertility control (Corfman, 1967).

That the level of Federal commitment thus far has been less than adequate seems implicit in the recommendations adopted unanimously by the Advisory Council to the National Institute on Child Health and Human Development and accepted by both the Surgeon General and the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (NICHD, 1965):

The role of the NIH in general, and of the NICHD in particular . . . is clear. There is a compelling need for research on the basic phenomena of reproductive biology and of human reproduction on which can be based safe, acceptable and efficient means of family planning . . . The NIH must *openly and forthrightly* express its readiness to explore all the significant scientific questions relating to human reproduction . . . It is the responsibility of the Reproductive Biology Program of NICHD to *initiate, expand and improve* research in reproduction . . . It is *most urgent* that NICHD take steps to *stimulate and support* increased research on problems of human fertility, sterility and family planning. This effort should be appropriate to the magnitude of the problem. [Emphasis added].

This constituted the first acknowledgement by the government's official research establishment of its obligation to take the same kind of *initiative* in this area of research as in cancer, heart disease and other fields. In regard to domestic family planning services under public auspices, similar formal decisions to initiate programs as a matter of policy have not yet been adopted by the Federal agencies involved; in fact, the Congressional actions of 1967 on the poverty, maternal health and public assistance programs can be viewed as a legislative mandate for the expansion of family planning services intended to remedy the lack of initiative by the executive agencies. A review of DHEW family planning activities in 1967 established that none of the Department's operating agencies "presently places high priority on family planning or is certain what precise functions it is expected to carry out in this field" (Harkavy, 1967).

Lacking a meaningful uniform reporting system, governmental statements on current program levels are necessarily the result of what have been described as "sporadic and frenzied exercises" in estimation (Harkavy, 1967). DHEW estimates that \$5 million of its funds were used by public health departments to finance family planning services in Fiscal 1967 to approximately 250,000 patients.

To this may be added the 250,000 low-income patients served by privately financed Planned Parenthood centers and an estimated 200,000 women served in locally financed hospitals and in welfare medical care programs. This still leaves unserved approximately 4.6 million fertile impoverished women who are not pregnant or seeking a pregnancy and who can be regarded as the rock-bottom minimum patient load for subsidized contraceptive services in the U.S.<sup>6</sup>

Utilizing currently available contraceptive techniques, it is estimated that to provide these 4.6 million families with competent birth control services would cost \$90-100 million annually (Guttmacher, 1965; Jaffe, 1966; Harkavy, 1967). Since more than \$10 billion is currently being spent by Federal, state and local governments for health and medical services (Merriam, 1966, 16), it is evident that this program is a relatively inexpensive part of the total public medical care budget. At the same time, the increase from current levels to \$100 million a year must clearly involve a massive expansion of public services in this small area of medical care, as well as a restructuring of the attitudes and practices of the professions involved. Thus the implementation of publicly financed family planning services may prove to be a touchstone of our society's ability to organize and deliver even a relatively simple medical service to impoverished Americans in a comprehensive manner.

### Coercion . . . or Opportunity?

The question of public policy on birth control is, at bottom, a question of equalizing opportunities for the effective practice of family limitation among the various social classes. For decades middle and upper-class Americans have had little difficulty securing competent contraceptive guidance if they desired it; family planning is and has been part of better quality medical care more or less routinely available in the family building years to those who can afford private medical services. This has not been the case for low-income Americans who depend on public or charity institutions for medical services. In carrying out *their* desires in regard to family size, they could, of course, have utilized less reliable and unesthetic family limitation methods which do not require medical guidance, and many have. But they have certainly not had equal access to the best, most effective methods known to science. (Nor, as a result, have they had equal knowledge of successful family planners among their

<sup>6</sup>For an analysis of the size and characteristics of the potential family planning caseload based on a special tabulation of Census data, see Varky (1967). For the average costs of providing the services, see Jaffe (1966).

peers to serve as the models so vital to sustaining interest and practice).

In the context of this traditional denial of family planning services to the poor, the contention that publicly financed birth control programs are "inherently coercive" (Ball, 1965) appears most incongruous. Not only do the opponents of public programs offer no evidence that any parents *anywhere* have been coerced by governmental authority into practicing contraception against their will, but they do not even offer a plausible theory of how this might be accomplished in practice, given current family planning methods which require one or another degree of cooperation by the patient.<sup>7</sup>

Publicly financed *birth control* programs are voluntary medical programs which can only succeed if they are offered with compassion and respect for the dignity of patients, and delivered with energy and skill (Guttmacher, 1963; Gray, 1965a; 1965b). The organized birth control movement has worked closely with public agencies to build safeguards of religious beliefs and private feelings into the policies and administrative procedures guiding these programs; it has proposed that tax-supported programs offer *all* methods so that a couple can choose one consistent with their beliefs and mores, and has urged that staff members of public agencies must be given adequate training and supervision to protect against any possible abuse. Moreover, the Supreme Court's declaration in the Connecticut case of the right of marital privacy in the area of family planning is the most substantial legal bulwark to date against compulsory fertility control; it is entirely consistent with the history of this field that the ruling emerged in a case brought by the voluntary birth control movement. In that case, the Planned Parenthood Federation vigorously argued that the Constitution protects the right of parents to plan their families as a matter of fundamental personal liberty (P.P.F.A., 1965).

The compulsion argument is given some credence, not by the activities of birth control advocates, but by the flurry of punitive proposals throughout the country to "deal" with illegitimacy and mothers receiving Aid-to-Families-with-Dependent-Children. Various states have considered plans to jail or deny public assistance to mothers bearing children out of wedlock, or to take away their children under the theory that they are *ipso facto* "neglected" or living in "unsuitable homes" (Wickenden, 1963; Bell, 1965). Bills for compulsory sterilization of unwed mothers have been seriously

<sup>7</sup>It is perhaps one of those simple truths which must be repeated frequently to avoid total obscurity that "birth control is one of the most private enterprises imaginable. No one is going to use contraceptives who does not want to. No coercion is intended. Indeed it is the lack of free choice to conceive or not that often accounts for unwanted, unmanageable results" (New Republic, 1965).

debated in Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina and Virginia, and advocated in many others (Paul, 1966; Ferster, 1966). Most of these proposals have failed of adoption, but they offer racist politicians and others opportunities for massive fulminations on illegitimacy, AFDC costs and related subjects, which appear to be aimed at intimidating unwed mothers from applying for public assistance.<sup>8</sup> Few of these officials display much zeal for *voluntary birth control* programs under public auspices.

The fascination with sterilization among many political, professional and civic leaders who profess concern about excess fertility among the impoverished, coupled with the paucity of genuine action to make birth control available, deserves closer analysis. Compulsory sterilization is a procedure which is done *to* a person, while contraception must be practiced *by* the person. (Even the new intrauterine devices involve choices by the patient). Compulsory sterilization as a fertility control measure is a logical extension of class and racially-biased stereotypes which conceive of the poor as statically and perversely irresponsible, child-like and animal-like. In contrast, to even think of contraception as a realistic alternative necessarily means to conceive of the poor as capable of *human aspiration, human action, and human growth*—in short, to conceive of them as subject to the same kinds of feelings and choices as persons in one's own social group who practice contraception routinely. This inevitably means something of an equation—conscious or unconscious—between poor women and peer women, an equation which can be profoundly disturbing to the various elites, North and South.

The emerging situation is not without both irony and tragedy. By delaying the implementation of adequate public birth control programs, those who misconstrue birth control as "coercive" out of genuinely spiritual motives contribute unwittingly to exacerbation of the underlying problems and strengthen the position of the real compulsionists. If extended over a long enough period of time, their misguided obstruction will predictably have disastrous consequences for personal freedom in America.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup>For an illuminating account linking the North Carolina sterilization bills and the attack on illegitimacy to the Southern political counteroffensive against the Supreme Court school desegregation decision, see Morrison (1965).

<sup>9</sup>This danger has not been lost on thoughtful Catholic scholars; e.g. Thomas (1964, 55) states: "We must face the fact that unless welfare clients voluntarily employ some form of family limitation there is every possibility that more objectionable and coercive programs will be introduced. Proposals for compulsory sterilization in cases of repeated illegitimacy have been introduced recently in some half-dozen state legislatures; and though rejected, such proposals may indicate the beginning of a popular trend".

## Obstacles to Program Implementation

The conventional explanation for the reluctance of public agencies to provide family planning services is the opposition of the Catholic Church to some methods of birth control. There is, of course, *some* historical and even current validity to this explanation, as well as to its counterpart that attributes the remarkable recent shift in public policy in large part to the searching re-examination of Church doctrine now underway. Certainly if some Catholic spokesmen continue to oppose public funds for birth control services (Ball, 1965) others of equal stature find no necessity in Catholic doctrine for such opposition (Drinan, 1965, 163-170; Fleming, 1965; Hanley, 1965a; 1965b).

Sophisticated Planned Parenthood workers have never accepted the Catholic opposition as a *sufficient* explanation of the timidity of public agencies throughout the country (including sections with relatively small Catholic populations). The feeling persists that the religious problem is sometimes invoked as an excuse, masking other obstacles such as the stereotyped attitudes discussed above.<sup>10</sup> There is little interest in initiating a family planning program if one believes that the poor "do not care how many [children] they have", which is one of the most common explanations offered by upper-class persons in many diverse societies for high lower-class fertility (Stycos, 1963).

Perhaps the most critical factor, however, is the basic inadequacy—in coverage and quality—of publicly financed medical care for the impoverished. While the myth has been created that "the only people who get good medical care in the United States are the very rich and the very poor", a quite different reality is described among knowledgeable health and welfare professionals, but rarely in a manner capable of influencing public opinion for change.<sup>11</sup> Even active practitioners are sometimes taken aback to discover the extent of the inadequacies. A leading pediatrician, after evaluating medical programs under Project Head Start, states: "The real finding in Head Start is the number of communities in this country that do not have *any* medical services whatsoever" (*Medical World News*, 1965). This program, it should be noted,

<sup>10</sup>For an examination of the impact of racial stereotypes on service programs for the Negro poor and a review of current data on nonwhite fertility behavior and attitudes, see Hill and Jaffe (1966).

<sup>11</sup>In his challenging discussion of current medical programs for the poor, Yerby (1965, 1212-6) stresses the earlier tradition of dialogue between the aroused professional and the community. He concludes that "the time is long overdue for this century to raise up a Chadwick or a Shattuck", whose works more than a century ago were "noteworthy attempts to awaken the concern of society for the health of all the people".

comprised such commonplace school health procedures as eye, ear and speech tests, nutrition evaluation, and immunization.

For their medical care, the poor must still depend either on fragmented public services or on the charity of private doctors and medical institutions; in both settings, care is largely delivered under such demeaning conditions as to discourage them from seeking it unless it is absolutely necessary. In the field of maternal and child health which is most relevant to the implementation of family planning, Yankauer (1964, 119) finds that the "very nature" of the present system of tax-supported health programs "contrives that comprehensive pediatric and obstetric care will be delivered least well to the population groups it could benefit most", even though the results are thousands of *preventable deaths* annually.

He describes an understaffed, underfinanced system of unrelated programs, many of which are restricted by policy to screening and promotional efforts and precluded from offering actual medical care:

Maternal and child health services have rarely included definitive treatment. Often the simple administration of aspirin is specifically proscribed in well-baby clinics. These systems of limited service have developed outside the purview of, and with only weak links to, hospitals, private medical practice and professional societies, the major determinants of health care for mothers and children in the United States . . . Although originally conceived as a service to the entire community, their major efforts have, in fact, been restricted to segments of the population unable to afford private health care . . . The combined effects of these general trends are felt most keenly in the understaffed, overcrowded clinics and wards which serve the urban poor and have led to further deterioration in the quality of services they are able to offer.

It seems hardly debatable that this is due in large measure to the determined resistance of organized medicine to the expansion of publicly financed medical care. But public and private agencies which are well aware of the actual state of medical care for the poor have also tacitly accommodated to these shortcomings. As long as the typical health department, for example, meekly accepts confinement to such "safe" activities as health education<sup>12</sup> and issues reports to the community which tend to reassure and not arouse, there seems

<sup>12</sup>The confusion deriving from this submission is often hard to believe. A Health Department in an affluent Northern state, in a county which provides no free public medical care at all, recently submitted a proposal to OEO for funds to deal with medical problems of a very impoverished group composed largely of migrant farm workers. The proposal included the following pledge: "It is not the intent to replace local private physicians and dentists and other local medical care facilities and services. Instead the purpose is, by demonstration, to indoctrinate the recipient of the Health services with the need and desirability of seeking medical care and services from local sources".

little hope of sufficient public support for significant changes—or for the significant budgets that will be needed to finance them.

Birth control is a relatively simple and inexpensive component of a total medical care program. But even to extend this service to the nation's poor will require that many more health and welfare professionals will have to alter long-held estimates of the possible, and effectively demand *structural* changes in the organization and delivery of publicly financed medical care. These changes should have implications for the whole field of maternity care, and perhaps for even a broader range of medical services. Because of the diversity of political, social, religious and civic groups interested in fertility control, it is not impossible that support for these structural changes may be forthcoming from unexpected sources.

### Intervention Strategy and the Readiness for Birth Control

Skill will also be needed to design imaginative administrative and operational innovations in the delivery system. While some innovative mechanisms have already been tried,<sup>13</sup> many significant areas for creative research and evaluation remain in regard even to program implementation alone,<sup>14</sup> not to speak of the virtually untouched field of the personal and social consequences of family planning other than on fertility (Sheppard, 1967). Practitioners and investigators in a variety of disciplines of the social, psychological and medical sciences can thus make a significant contribution in this field not only to basic knowledge but also to meaningful social change.

It would be foolish to expect men and women who for generations have been victims of impoverishment, undereducation and despair to think, feel and behave exactly as do middle-class and upper-class persons. But it would be equally preposterous to disregard the mounting evidence of the readiness of large numbers of impoverished parents, white and nonwhite, for modern birth control. This central fact, which has so often been obscured, is of particular significance in the light of the strategy of intervention which guides the anti-

<sup>13</sup> Before the poverty program was initiated, Planned Parenthood centers, e.g., had tried such innovations as branch clinics in neighborhood centers, churches, settlement houses, beauty parlors; night time clinics; home visiting by both professionals and indigenous non-professionals; neighborhood advisory committees; and mobile clinic service in outlying areas (Gray, 1965b).

<sup>14</sup> For a discussion of some of these areas of needed research, see Polgar (1966). An excellent statement of the crucial need for adequately conceived action-research to inform and guide efforts to induce social change is offered by Freeman and Sherwood (1965, 11-14).

poverty program. In deciding service priorities, the program makes some practical assumptions which appear to be roughly as follows: interventions in the cycle of poverty-related events should aim at demonstrating even a modicum of success which will counter the typical generations-old experience of failure and frustration. They should preferably be at younger than at older ages, but the critical determinant is the interest and willingness of the poor themselves to respond to the intervention. The poor must be involved in these choices. And finally, if relatively successful solutions can be achieved by the poor to *any* of their problems, the opportunity will at least be created for interventions on remaining problems with community resources. In a word, the cycle will have been partly broken.

It is interesting to speculate on the uses of birth control in terms of this strategy. For example, the most common complaint of health agencies is that "they" are not sufficiently motivated to use the agency's services, particularly for preventive and diagnostic, rather than therapeutic, medicine. In the obstetric field, large public hospitals and charity wards of voluntary hospitals have typically operated with rates of return for postpartum examination (which many low-income mothers regard as optional) between 20 and 30 per cent of deliveries. Following the introduction of even modest contraceptive services as part of the postpartum clinic in a number of these hospitals, however, *the rates of return more than double*. This remarkable phenomenon has been observed by clinicians for at least a decade, yet its implications for health programming have barely been pursued.<sup>15</sup> Even in some total maternity programs which include prenatal, delivery and postpartum care, the offer of family planning at postpartum "seems to have a favorable influence in attracting women to *prenatal* clinics early, as word gets around that the services are available" (Oettinger, 1965—emphasis added).

In addition to the evidence that many impoverished parents already practice some form of family limitation (Whelpton, 1966) and that they want on average as few or fewer children than higher-income parents (Browning, 1964; Hill, 1966; Jaffe, 1964), there are now significant evaluations from clinical settings in many sections of the country. The director of the District of Columbia Health

<sup>15</sup>Nor have the implications for other problems of poverty. Because "hospitals and clinics are the agencies that had the most widespread contact with the majority of those in poverty in Detroit", Greenleigh suggests that they could become "primary agents in a broad attack not only on health, but a variety of other problems of those in poverty. For the hospital to assume this new role would require that a more comprehensive range of services be provided from the clinic and hospital setting, and would necessitate reorientation and restructuring of hospital clinics. Nevertheless this is undoubtedly a strategic point to intervene with a broad range of services to break the poverty pattern of many families" (1965, 10).

Department describes birth control to Congress as "one of the most popular programs that we have. . . . Even people in the lowest economic groups we found have been very receptive to this program unlike many other programs in health agencies" (Grant, 1965, 590—emphasis added). The welfare director of a North Carolina county expresses his skepticism, before initiation of a birth control program, as to whether AFDC mothers

would be interested in limiting the size of the family. There was also a question as to whether or not the women could and would follow the necessary medical regimen in order to take the oral contraceptive pill successfully. The first patients . . . were women who were receiving AFDC. Within a few months the Department of Public Welfare began to receive applications from women in very low income families who had learned from their friends that they had discovered a new way to prevent birth. . . . Before the end of the first year it was determined, without question, that women from very poor families did want to limit the number of children and would follow the necessary medical routine to make the program successful (Kuralt, 1965).

### *The Chain Reaction . . .*

Family planning workers believe that this kind of "chain reaction" of successful experience is one of the major factors behind the burgeoning of birth control programs in the last seven years since the introduction of oral pills and more recently, the intrauterine devices.<sup>16</sup> The total number of patients served at U. S. Planned Parenthood-Affiliated clinics nearly tripled between 1960 and 1965, and is still increasing; three-fifths of the patients have incomes below \$74 weekly, nearly half come on patient-to-patient referral and a similar proportion are nonwhite. The impact of the new methods can be seen in a study at the Chicago Planned Parenthood clinic of more than 14,000 patients on oral contraception; 83 per cent of the patients were nonwhite, nearly half had not completed high school, one out of six were welfare recipients. The study found that between 70 and 83 per cent<sup>17</sup> continued to take the pills regularly 30 months after they came to the clinic (Frank, 1965). This is an astonishingly

<sup>16</sup> Conversely the "chain reaction" of failure with conventional techniques may have been a major cause of the traditional lagging interest of many impoverished families. Rainwater (1965, 205 and 212) finds that family planning expectations are significantly influenced by observations of peer group success or failure; based on interviews taken primarily before widespread use of the pills, "the general tone of the lower-lower class assessment of its present knowledge is well expressed by the 39-year-old man who said, 'I've heard about lots of ways but I don't know if they are any good'".

<sup>17</sup> The difference between the two figures is explained by assignment of the small number of patients lost to follow-up, with the lower figure representing the minimum number of continuing users and the larger the maximum.

high retention rate for *any* procedure requiring continuous self-administration of medication and says something about the readiness of the poor to respond to well-conceived, energetically-delivered voluntary programs employing coitus-independent methods.<sup>18</sup>

The place of family planning in the hierarchy of needs of the poor is also suggested in a recent Detroit study, based on interviews with 2,081 very low-income families: two-thirds nonwhite, half had not gone beyond 8th grade, almost one-fourth received public assistance. The interviews indicated that birth control ranked sixth among the myriad services required by these families, following only such obvious needs as financial assistance, job training, help with children's problems and day care facilities (Greenleigh Associates, 1965, 92-3).

No one knows with certainty whether all of the poor<sup>19</sup> would adopt modern birth control. Until an adequate network of effective and energetic clinical services and supportive educational programs is established to make family planning actually and equally available to the poor, it will be difficult even to estimate the extent of the residual group who may be so depressed as to be unable to utilize the service. But we do know, as Berelson (1965) has pointed out in reference to the developing countries, that even after discounting for mere verbal expression, "substantial proportions of the people want family planning now; contrary to the usual belief, sufficient motivation exists to make a demographic difference if it could be implemented". The evidence makes clear that this is true for impoverished Americans; the experience thus far suggests that the residual group of non-contraceptors will comprise only a small fraction of the poor (Jaffe, 1967).

In sum then, to make available modern birth control is an intervention affecting the poor in their younger, family building years which offers considerable prospect of success and which necessarily involves the poor themselves in making the critical choices. Service programs to respond to their readiness for family planning are feasible. The population in need can be identified. The services can be programmed as to optimum (within limits) location, auspices, budget, staffing. Innovative delivery mechanisms already have been tried and systematic evaluation can be expected to yield additional operational guidelines. Costs are modest compared to other social and medical programs. Adequate technology exists and improvements are forth-

<sup>18</sup>For a discussion of the central importance of the type of method (coitus-connected vs. coitus-independent) for understanding family planning behavior of the poor, see Polgar (1965).

<sup>19</sup>Or more precisely, the various *types* of poor people—stable, strained, copers, unstable—to employ the interesting typology suggested by Miller (1965).

coming. Short-run results are likely to be significant and long-run consequences may be even more so.

The question remains whether public agencies—and the relevant professions—will seize the current opportunity and move ahead fast enough with vigorous voluntary services (Jaffe, in press), or whether the field will be abdicated to more strident groups whose solutions for the problems of unwanted fertility bear at least a family resemblance to other “final solutions” of recent memory.

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## **The Research Challenge to Social Scientists in the Developing Family Planning Programs: The Case of Taiwan**

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Social scientists have an important opportunity to study social change, diffusion, small group processes, norm formation and a variety of other important subjects under almost classical experimental conditions in the family planning programs now being organized in many developing countries. The situation is unique, because it offers opportunities for experimental treatments of large social collectivities, where social action is both ethical and practical.

In an increasing number of countries such work has the support of a consensus of the population and of the political leadership on the goal of helping the large number of families that appear to be ready and eager for family planning.

The following article by L. Lu, C. H. Chen and L. P. Chow illustrates in a specific, simple but important experiment the potential for such studies as part of the family planning program in Taiwan. This particular study, like most of those which might be done, had immediate operational purposes, but it also tested some ideas about diffusion and about influences that might move a local population from concern and interest to action. Many social scientists could think of a large variety of additional hypotheses

that might be tested rather simply as part of just such an experiment. Participation in such studies provides the opportunity to serve science and social policy simultaneously in an area in which conflict about policy goals is usually minimal.

Taiwan is an unusually favorable setting for successful programs in this field, although other countries are ready too, and the number of countries providing such opportunities is likely to grow rapidly in the next decade.<sup>1</sup> In Taiwan, there is present both the considerable progress in social and economic development and the low mortality which are probably favorable conditions for successful family planning programs. Taiwan has a favorable position with respect to educational and literacy levels, the circulation of newspapers and the other mass-media influences, economic development, agricultural productivity, shift toward urbanization and industrialization, transportation and communications, development of a market economy and many related indices. In short, there have been a series of developments favorable to an erosion of the dependence on familial and local institutions and to the development of linkages with larger social and economic units of the modern type.

On the basis of these developments one would expect that fertility might begin to decline and that the environment might be favorable for introduction of a family planning program. The fact is that fertility did begin to decline even before any significant organized program in the field of family planning. The birth rate declined from 42 in 1958 to 34 in 1964.

In the period from 1958 to 1964 the age-specific birth rates changed as follows:

	1958	1964	% Change 1958-1964
Crude Birth Rate	42	34	-19
Total Fertility Rate	6080	5096	-16
Age-Specific Birth Rates:			
15-19	43	37	-14
20-24	248	254	+ 2
25-29	336	334	- 1
30-34	281	214	-26
35-39	199	120	-40
40-44	90	52	-42
45-49	14	8	-47

<sup>1</sup>For some general background on the population trends and the fertility patterns in Taiwan see many mimeographed publications of the Taiwan Population Studies Center and also Freedman, Takeshita and Sun (1964). The author has proposed a broad comparative research agenda in Freedman (1965).

This is exactly the pattern of fertility decline found in the early period of Western fertility decline; that is, fertility declined first in the early 30's and then at a greater rate at older ages. This is exactly the pattern to be expected if under conditions of low mortality many mothers find that by age 30 the children they want are all alive. Then under pressure of rising aspirations for family and self, the couples begin to try to do something, even if ineffectively, to limit family size. Low mortality produces increasing pressures on traditional housing, familial, and other arrangements developed over a long period of time as an adjustment to high mortality.

A number of surveys in Taiwan have indicated that under these conditions:

- ... most couples want only a moderate number of children; three or four with at least one son is the modal desire
- ... most women have these children by age 30
- ... many then begin to try to do something about limiting family growth but in ways that often are ineffective or undesirable (In Taiwan, as in almost all countries at this demographic stage, there is a considerable amount of illegal abortion. There is also, before the initiation of formal programs, a considerable attempt to practice contraception, but usually this is ineffective and begun after the desired number of children are born)
- ... A large majority of couples approve of the idea of family planning and are interested in help with it.

Surveys establishing these facts had an important role in Taiwan in helping the provincial health department to come to the conclusion that there was an important health and welfare need felt by the population with important social implications, that such a program would be well received, and that it should concentrate on certain segments of the population.

An initial large scale experiment to bring family planning to the population was conducted in the city of Taichung by the provincial health department.<sup>2</sup> This may be one of the largest social experiments ever conducted under controlled conditions. The experiment was a success both in the practical and the scientific sense. In about 30 months it brought family planning to more than 8,500 women in the clinics of a city of 350,000 people with about 36,000 women in the childbearing years. The birth rate fell in Taichung in the year following the program substantially more than in the other five cities. The program in this one city produced significant operational experience and knowledge which is now being used in an island-wide program. It also is producing

<sup>2</sup> For a description of this experiment see Berelson and Freedman (1965).

significant findings about the process of diffusion in such a program, about acceptance and persistence of the use of innovations in the various strata of a modernizing population, about the role of the extended family in such change, and on many other topics of interest to social scientists.

The success of the experiment in Taichung facilitated the move to a program for the whole island.<sup>3</sup> Although the island-wide program is still not fully staffed and is not operating in all townships as yet, the number of intrauterine contraceptive devices accepted in the program has increased very rapidly as the following figures indicate:

*IUD Acceptance*

1963—3,650

1964—46,600

1965—99,253

1966—111,242

Jan-June, 1961—56,008

This new developing island-wide program has included a whole series of specific studies such as that described in the following article. These studies individually have important operational purposes. Collectively, they should help to provide a scientific basis for understanding immediately the process of fertility change under way and more generally the processes of change and development.

While Taiwan has had unusually favorable conditions for its program and a most promising beginning, it is not unique. The situation is very similar in Korea. In Hong Kong and Singapore important private family planning programs probably are helping to produce significant initial declines in the birth rates there, too. On a much larger scale, family planning programs are under way in India and Pakistan, and in each of these massive programs there is considerable research activity and a need for even more. The Singur project in India probably involved the largest number of small group meetings with successful attendance records ever developed anywhere (Mathen, 1963). Programs of various types and levels are also developing in Tunisia, Turkey, Thailand, Egypt

<sup>3</sup>The programs of work in family planning in Taiwan are immediately the responsibility of Dr. T. C. Hsu, Provincial Health Commissioner. Dr L. P. Chow, Associate Director of the Taiwan Population Studies Center has been in charge of the considerable program for research and evaluation as well as participating in designing and supervising the action program. Dr. S. C. Hsu of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction has given the program continuous general guidance and assistance. The program of research and action have been generously supported in Taiwan by the Population Council.

and in a number of other countries.<sup>4</sup> A number of Latin American countries are likely to move in this direction very soon. It is likely that there will be programs in at least 25 countries within the next few years.

The purpose of this introductory paper is to place the following report in its broader setting. Replication and development of such studies offers an exciting and promising area of research and social service for the world community and social scientists.

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<sup>4</sup>More than 175 experts from 36 countries participated in August, 1965 in an international conference on family planning studies and research in Geneva under the sponsorship of the Population Council. The proceedings of this meeting were published by B. Berelson, et al, *Family Planning and Population Problems*, University of Chicago Press, in 1966 and should provide the most up to date summary of the scope of the work in progress on an international basis.

**An Experimental Study of  
The Effect of Group Meetings on  
The Acceptance of Family Planning in Taiwan<sup>1</sup>**

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A family planning health program, mainly using the Lippes intrauterine loop, has been in the action stage in Taiwan since January 1964.<sup>2</sup> Up to the end of June, 1967, a cumulative total

<sup>1</sup>The authors are members of the staff of the Taiwan Population Studies Center associated with the Provincial Health Department of Taiwan under the leadership of Commissioner T. C. Hsu. They wish to acknowledge the assistance of the staff of the Center. While responsibility for the analysis and report is their own, they wish also to acknowledge the support of several agencies which have over several years given support to the work of the Center: The Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, The Population Council and the University of Michigan Population Studies Center.

<sup>2</sup>For a description of the program see Chow (1965). More detailed information is contained in monthly mimeographed reports on program progress and in annual reports available from the Taiwan Population Studies Center (P. O. Box 112, Taichung, Taiwan).

of 316,753 women have accepted the device. The goal is to insert 600,000 loops in five years to help reduce the rate of natural increase from 3 per cent at present to 1.8 per cent in 1973.

In order to attain the goal, the program calls for community health education methods which will get the most loops inserted at the least cost.

The present study—one of a series—tried to measure the effect of small group meetings on changes in attitudes to, knowledge about, and practice of family planning. More specifically, it tried to assess: (a) The effectiveness of such meetings in motivating people to accept the loops. (b) The efficiency of holding meetings in every other neighborhood instead of in every neighborhood, thus utilizing the power of diffusion.

Two typical townships in the central part of Taiwan chosen as the study area had a total population of 61,171 people, with 7,766 married women 20–44 years old at the end of 1963.

All over Taiwan townships are divided into villages, and a village is again subdivided into lins, which are "neighborhoods" of about 25 households each. There were 37 such villages and 424 lins in the study areas.

Three obstetricians in the area previously had been trained to insert the loops.

## The Experimental Design

Before holding small group meetings, a 10 per cent random sample of 794 of all the married women 20–44 was drawn. They were interviewed by trained public health nurses in August, 1964 to assess attitudes to, knowledge about and practice of family planning.

During the pre-meeting survey, the workers were instructed strictly not to teach people anything about family planning. If any one asked specific questions, the workers were instructed to invite them to attend meetings for information. This was to avoid bias in evaluating the effect of the group meetings.

Immediately after the survey, small group meetings were conducted by the public health nurses in every lin (Treatment 1) of a random half of the villages. In the other half of the villages, group meetings were held only at every other lin (Treatment 2). Altogether, 320 such meetings were held, with a total of 2,816 attendants.

Coupons were issued to every married woman, 20–44, who attended the meeting, regardless of her previous birth control or fertility status. The coupon entitled the holder to a 50 per cent discount toward the cost of an intra-uterine device insertion, which

is fixed by the Maternal and Child Health Association at NT\$ 60 (US \$1.50). Coupons were also available on the same terms at the doctors' clinics for women from non-meeting lins or for those who failed to attend the meetings.

About six months after the meetings, a post-meeting reinterview survey was conducted with the initial probability sample to assess changes.

## Results of the Study . . .

Of the 794 women in the initial sample, 758 or 95.5 per cent responded to the second interview. The other 36 women were temporarily absent or had moved away permanently. The analysis was based only on those who completed both interviews.

### *Attendance at the meetings*

Of the 758 respondents, 523 lived in a "meeting lin" and 235 in a "non-meeting lin". Thirty-four per cent of those living in a "meeting lin" area actually attended a meeting, but even in the non-meeting lins 18 per cent attended the meetings in another neighborhood. Altogether, 29 per cent of the women in the sample attended a meeting.

The rate of attendance was significantly higher<sup>3</sup> (a) among those with at least three children (32%) as compared with those with fewer children (21%); (b) among those with at least a primary education (34%) as compared with those with less education (25%).

The three leading reasons given by respondents for not attending the meeting were: "too busy" (32.5 per cent), "did not know of it" (31.0 per cent), and "not residing in the meeting lin" (26.5 per cent). Three per cent of these respondents said they were not interested in the meetings and 7 per cent gave other reasons.

### *Effects of the meeting*

*Changes in attitudes to family planning.* The percentage approving the idea of family planning increased from 81.7 before the meeting to 90.6 per cent afterward.

*Change in "the ideal number of children".* Those attending the meetings originally had had a slightly larger ideal number of children than the nonattenders. After the meetings the mean was slightly less but neither difference was significant.

<sup>3</sup>The various differences reported in the paper were tested for statistical significance. Unless there is an indication to the contrary all are significant at the 0.01 level. Although no allowance was made for the clustering effect, it is likely that all would be significant at least at the 0.05 level, even with an allowance for clustering.

*Change of knowledge about contraception.* Before the meetings, the "attendants" knew only an average of 0.77 methods of contraception. The figure increased to 3.01 after the meetings. The increase in knowledge was considerably less among the "nonattendants": from 1.25 methods before to 1.75 after the meetings. This lesser but significant increase among the non-attendants may be attributed to diffusion from attendants.

*Change in the status of contraceptive practice.* The number of contraceptive users significantly increased after the meetings, especially among the "attendants", as shown below.

TABLE 1  
USERS OF CONTRACEPTION BEFORE AND AFTER ACTION  
PROGRAM, BY ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS

Attendance	Sample Size	No. of Users			% Change From * Before to After
		Before	After	Change	
Attendants	219	40	80	+40	18.3
Non-Attendents	539	94	133	+39	7.2
Total	758	134	213	+79	10.4

\*Per cent of the initial subsample.

Since the emphasis of the meetings was on the intrauterine loops it is not surprising that the principal effect was an increase from 5 to 49 (880% increase) in the number of women using these loops. The increase in the use of the Ota Ring (an earlier Japanese version of the loops more difficult to insert) was only from 44 to 48 (about 9 per cent). But there was also a significant increase in sterilization from 64 to 84 (31 per cent increase) and an increase from 21 to 32 (52 per cent) in use of other contraceptive methods. These increases in methods other than the loops are much larger than normally would be expected in the 8 month period between the two surveys and indicate that the program had a diffuse effect in increasing the practice of family limitation methods in general.

*What was learned at the meetings.* Three major topics were discussed at the meetings: the general idea of family planning, specific contraceptive methods and reproductive physiology.

Of 219 attendants, 217 persons, or 99 per cent, could recall at least one topic, 211 persons—96 per cent—mentioned something about specific contraceptive methods, 75—34 per cent—something about the general idea of family planning, and 45—20 percent—mentioned something about the "physiology of reproduction".

TABLE 2  
TOPICS REPORTED AS DISCUSSED AT THE MEETINGS  
BY NON-ATTENDERS

Topic Recalled	No. of women	Per Cent	
		A*	B**
Heard something	131	24.3	100.0
Contraceptive methods	123	22.8	93.9
Meaning of family planning	17	3.2	13.0
Physiology of pregnancy	6	1.1	4.6
Heard nothing	408	75.7	—
Total respondents	539	100.0	—

\*\*A = per cent of the total non-attendant respondents (539)

\*\*B = per cent of the total persons who had heard something (131)

One important question about group meetings is whether they have any influence on non-attendants as a result of diffusion. Our data indicate that many non-attendants heard from others about what had been said.

Of the 219 attendants, 91.8 per cent learned of at least one contraceptive method that they didn't know about before. The loop was mentioned by 188 persons, traditional methods by 70, and sterilization by 7. Eighteen persons (8.2 per cent) had attended the meetings but could not recall any method that they did not know about already. Of 539 non-attendants, 123 persons (22.8 per cent) learned from "others"—either attenders or third persons—at least one contraceptive method.

All of the 123 non-attenders who reported that they learned a new method mentioned the loop. This is about 23 per cent of the total non-attenders in the survey sample. Only seven—about one per cent—of non-attenders mentioned learning about other methods or about sterilization. This is rather striking evidence that information about the new loop method diffuses much more extensively than other family planning methods. Among attenders the loops was learned about in a ratio of about 2-1/2 to 1 to other methods. For non-attendants, the ratio was 22 to 1. The fact that the information about the loop diffuses much more than other methods was established very clearly in the previous large scale Taichung study.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The Taichung study is referred to briefly in the preceding introduction by Professor Freedman. In that study more than 50 per cent of all acceptances came from persons not directly contacted by the program and more than 95 per cent of such acceptances were acceptances of intrauterine devices although in that program all methods were described and made available. This new method seems to become known quickly by word-of-mouth diffusion.

*Acceptors of the loop in the official program.* An "acceptor" in the current official family planning program is a married woman who has an intrauterine device inserted by an officially approved doctor. The data in Table 3 below show how the acceptance rate varied with whether a meeting was held in the lin and with whether the area had meetings in all or in only half of the lins.

The total acceptors, excluding those accepting before the study began were equivalent to 4.4 per cent of the married women 20-44 in the study area, or about 12 per cent of the women in this age group eligible in the sense that they were neither currently pregnant, not lactating, nor current users of other contraception methods, nor had either marriage partner been sterilized.

*Acceptors by "Treatment".* Of 341 acceptors, 183 were from the Treatment 1 area (meeting in every lin), and 158 were from the Treatment 2 area (88 from "meeting lins" and 70 from "non-meeting lins"). As the data in Table 3 indicate, holding meetings in every other lin is only slightly less effective than holding meetings in every lin, so far as the acceptances overall are concerned. In those lins in which meetings are held, the response in terms of acceptances is virtually identical for the area in which all lins are covered and for that in which only every other lin was covered. The response rate was slightly lower, to be sure, in the lins in which no meetings were held but which were surrounded by lins in which meetings were held and from which diffusion could take place. But even in those lins without any meetings at all, the acceptance rate was 79 per cent, as high as in the area where every lin had a meeting. In short, diffusion will supplement the direct stimulus almost enough to equal the results when every neighborhood gets the direct stimulus.

*Costs by type of program.* The costs per acceptance are considerably less in Treatment 2 than in Treatment 1. The average cost of the program per acceptance was NT\$65.5 (US\$1.40) in Treatment area 1, but only NT\$38.0 (US\$0.95) in Treatment area 2. In treatment area 1 the acceptance rate was 12% higher than in treatment area 2, but the total cost was 71% higher. Unless resources are unlimited this would appear to be a very expensive way to increase the acceptance rate. Under similar circumstances it is probably usually best to spread the stimulus as in Treatment 2 and to let diffusion do part of the work at no cost.

The total expenditures of the study, including salaries and travel and per diem of workers, were NT\$18,000, (US \$450). This gives an average cost per case at NT\$53 (US \$1.30). By the regular method of approach involving more direct contacts with eligible women, it costs about NT\$200 (US\$5.00) to recruit a case.

TABLE 3  
PERCENTAGE OF ACCEPTORS, BY WHETHER ALL LINS OR  
EVERY OTHER LIN COVERED AND BY WHETHER IN MEETING  
LIN OR NOT

Cases from	Treatment Area 1: Every Lin Covered	Treatment Area 2: Every Other Lin Covered	Total
Meeting Lins	4.8 (3,830)*	4.7 (1,856)	4.8 (5,686)
Non-meeting Lins	—	3.8 (1,856)	3.8 (1,856)
Total	4.8 (3,830)	4.3 (3,712)	4.5 (7,542)

\*The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of married women 20-44, the base for the acceptance rates.

## In Conclusion

This study attempts to measure the effects of small group meetings on changes in attitudes to, knowledge about and practice of family planning. More specifically, it tried to assess (a) the effectiveness of such meetings in motivating women to accept intra-uterine loops and (b) the efficiency of holding meetings in every other neighborhood instead of in every neighborhood, thus utilizing the power of diffusion.

The principle conclusions are as follows:

- ... The meetings were effective in changing the attitudes, knowledge and practice of the women attending the meetings.
- ... Those not attending the meetings also changed in these respects as a result of diffusion or influence from the attenders, although the change was less in these cases of indirect influence.
- ... Holding the meetings in every other neighborhood does not significantly reduce the acceptance rate of contraception in the neighborhoods having meetings.
- ... There is a significant acceptance rate even in the neighborhoods with no meetings at all, providing they are in the area in which half of the neighborhoods did have such meetings. The acceptance rate in the neighborhoods without meetings is about 80% that in the neighborhoods with meetings.
- ... The cost per acceptance is substantially less in the area in which meetings are held in every other neighborhood instead of in every neighborhood. Holding meetings in every neighborhood produced only 12% more acceptances overall at an increase in costs of about 70%.

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## **Can India Reduce its Birth Rate? A Question of Modernization and Governmental Capacity**

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Western doctrines and methods of contraception were first promulgated in India by a few welfare leaders in the 1930's when birth control clinics were established in several cities. In 1952 India became the first nation to adopt a policy of birth rate reduction. Today, India, Pakistan and China are the only major nations whose central governments pursue reduction policies; birth rate reduction. Today, India and China are the only major nations whose central governments pursue reduction policies; policies for which there are no precedents and no models of success to follow, unlike other national development efforts. In as much as the Indian experience which goes back to 1952 has involved technical assistance by Americans and Europeans and is open to observation, it offers a rare opportunity for social scientific study.

A number of social scientists already have described India's rapid population growth, and analyzed its negative influences on economic development; including, among others, Chandrasekar, Chandrasekaran, Coale and Hoover, Davis, Mahalanobis, Sarkar. Figure 1, "Growth of Population in India", comes from a (1966) statistical estimate by the U. S. AID office in New Delhi. With the Malthusian controls of famine and war presumed inoperative, the prospect of a one billion population by the year 2000




FIGURE 1

is bleak enough as a matter of human density alone; not to mention the pressures on natural resources, food supplies, public facilities and institutions. As anxieties over food shortage and population surplus become greater, the more numerous will be the studies and reports of demographers, public health physicians, economists and officials. There is also the mounting miscellany by psychologists and sociologists, subsidized by foundations and governments to make a variety of studies, all presumed useful to "family planners"; attitudes and attitude change, communications, human reproduction, marriage customs and family patterns.

Whatever contributions to science may come out of these demographic, economic and behavioral inquiries, their value to Indian population control can be no greater than the capacity of government planners and administrators selectively to use new knowledge in disciplined and effective programs of action. What is this capacity now? Can it be increased? These are the questions of this paper and they are the major matters of modernization.

Modernization is a process in which human ends are pursued by means of social activities (a) that are dictated increasingly by theories or doctrines of efficiency or productivity (Stinchcombe, 1966); and (b) that are carried out and disciplined increasingly through managed or instrumental organizations. In the developing societies it is the central government that is the principal agent and organization for most development programs. And it is the government's capacity for disciplined activities, guided by instrumental theory or doctrine, that is the prime element in the society's modernization. India's "National Family Planning Programme", that is to say the Center Government's effort through the States to reduce the birth rate, constitutes an instructive case both of the modernization process and the planned control of population; with the effectiveness of the latter being a function of the former.

As Stinchcombe has observed, ". . . imposing the discipline of theories over human activities, is the main political problem of modernization".<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, if activities are to be disciplined by applied theories, some theorists must have authority; and, we would add, their authority must be exerted through managed organizations appropriate to the chosen objectives. Analysis of India's family planning effort, comparing blueprints or plans with actions, shows that these have been the principal problems precisely.

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<sup>1</sup> My definition of modernization is a modification of Stinchcombe's (1966). His elaboration of the concept I accept; particularly the importance he attaches to discipline and authority as the central problems of modernization, and especially in democracies with unsophisticated publics.

Chronologically, the effort has displayed three major phases. These phases serve to organize the analysis which follows.

### Stage One (1956-61)

#### *Blueprint One:*

It was in 1952 that the Central Ministry of Health received its first appropriation for family planning; \$1,300,000 (rupees equivalent) of which only about \$600,000 was expended. But it was not until the second Five-Year Plan period (1956-1960) that the first official planning groups and blue prints for family planning were established on a national scale. Numerous plan and policy boards were created. In 1956 there appeared a Central Family Planning Board, chaired by the Minister of Health, and by 1959 there were state boards in 14 of the 15 states. Top officials were named and by 1959 there were 10 states with Family Planning Officers and, at the Center, a Director of Family Planning responsible to the Director General of Health Services. All of the latter officials and the Health Minister, since 1962, have had medical and public health backgrounds. To plan or to "chalk out" became an ever-greater activity. Two other preliminaries to program action also came to be emphasized, understandably enough: training and research.

There was training in demography, training in family planning methods, and training courses for public health and other community workers. Demographic institutes, medical colleges, schools of nursing, health education agencies were involved in these instructional activities. In addition, special family planning training centers were established at several points, some under the Center and others under the States. Then, travelling teams of trainers were formed, including usually a physician and health educator, or physician and social worker.

Research activities increased. There were demographic studies in government funded centers at Delhi, Calcutta, Trivandrum and Bombay. At medical centers physiological researches were conducted, including investigations of reproduction and of contraceptive techniques and materials. Problems of motivation and communications began to be studied in several small pilot projects.

#### *Action One:*

Though planning, training, and research got most of the attention during the first stage, there was some program accomplishment in rural clinics and in a few towns and cities. By

1961, 1500 clinics were reported in operation. They provided contraceptives, (condoms, diaphragms, jellies, foam tablets) and advisory services either free or at minimal cost, depending on ability to pay. About five million couples were said to have been "contacted", of whom one-fifth were given appliances, materials or contraceptive advice. In a few states sterilization was promoted and hospitals were being utilized for the operations. Also, several mobile surgical teams were doing the operations, several score a day, at sterilization camps. This method was being promoted by mass advertising and small subsidies were being given the sterilizes as compensation, presumably for time lost from work and for costs of transportation. As of July, 1961, about 130,000 sterilizations had been reported, with a preponderence of males over females (Ministry of Health, 1961, 399).

That this action was insufficient, was the central finding of the high level Health Survey and Planning Committee (the Mudaliar Committee) whose report was published in 1961 (Ministry of Health, 1961). The Committee wanted to see the national family planning program become an intensive and broad scale "mass movement". This was prerequisite to success, though the Committee thought government alone could not launch the movement. They urged efforts to enlist more interest and help from voluntary organizations, like the Indian Family Planning Association, with the Central Government providing financial aid. High priority should be given procurement of larger supplies of contraceptive materials, either by Indian production or import. Expansion of informational efforts was strongly recommended, and family planning education efforts should be coordinated with the education work of other national programs, such as community development and social welfare.

Of particular interest is a supplement to this 1961 report. There, a minority of the Mudaliar Committee went on to urge that quite bold and different steps be taken, if by 1966, Indian population growth rate had not clearly turned downward. In effect, they urged that India take up population planning and control—a more comprehensive stratagem than family planning. The minority proposed (a) graded tax penalties (lesser advantages) beginning with the fourth birth; (b) removal of income tax disadvantages for single persons; (c) no maternity benefits for those who refuse to limit their progeny; (d) limiting government services, like free education, to no more than three children in a family; (e) enlisting the help of all government employees in promoting family planning; and (f) permitting abortion when justified for socio-economic reasons (1961, 406-410). There seems to have been little serious consideration given subsequently to many of these ideas. In 1965

the Minister of Finance did announce certain income tax inducements for smaller families; however, the income tax payers and the highly fertile masses are by no means synonymous.

## Stage Two (1962-64)

### *Blueprint Two:*


In April 1963, the Director of Family Planning, as if he were responding to the Mudaliar Committee Report, presented a detailed blueprint for what was termed "the reorganized or extended family planning program". He explained that careful observations by many observers had led him to conclude "the overall progress of the program must be admitted to be remarkable, considering the scope (sic) of the program" (Raina, 84). The progress was documented by tables showing that Center allocations to state governments had risen 200 fold in five years, almost 11 million pieces of "educational materials" had been produced, there were 8,441 service centers. Figures were presented which showed increasing sales of various types of contraceptive supplies between 1956 and 1963.

"To make still further improvements in the programme", the Director reported 25 pages of criticism and then spelled out his reorganization scheme. Heretofore, the key service unit had been mainly a clinic set-up to which women came for rather elaborate medical examination and prescription of contraceptives. Now, a reorganization was needed in the direction of an "extension" approach designed to reach the masses rapidly. Accordingly, the reorganized scheme would emphasize extension education, greater availability of contraceptive supplies, and less dependence on the traditional clinic approach. In addition, there were to be better statistics and evaluation, and a much stronger "ladder" of organization and supervision.

The main program goal was said to be reduction of the nation's birth rate from more than 40 per 1000 to 25 per 1000 population, possibly by 1973. For this purpose, "operational goals" were defined as achieving for 90 per cent of the married adult population of India three basic pre-conditions of family planning, namely: (a) group acceptance of the smaller family size norm, (b) personal knowledge about family planning methods, and (c) easy availability of supplies and services. The blueprint or "set up" for the states is shown in the chart below. The organization and staffing implications were not spelled out for the nation, but some idea of magnitudes can be drawn from the chart bearing in mind these facts: India has 15 states and 4 territories. There are 324 districts. There are 5,000 rural development

blocks, each with about 80,000 people and there are 500,000 villages. Twenty per cent of the estimated 480 million population are in the towns and cities.

## FAMILY PLANNING SET UP IN STATES



At the village and sub-center level, the blueprint provided for female workers (Auxiliary Nurse Midwives), at one per 10,000 population. These ANM's, in addition to performing their routine maternal and child health services, supposedly would educate women for family planning, act as contraceptive "depot holders", refer cases for sterilization and IUCD (Lippes Loop) and then provide follow-up on the cases. One male worker per 20 to 30

thousand population was also blueprinted to do public education, community organization, building and maintaining the contraceptive supply-lines, and organizing camps for sterilization and IUCD's.

The basic unit of operation was to be the Rural Family Planning Unit, coterminous in area with a Community Development Block. This Unit would be attached to the Block Health Unit, where the latter exists; but in absence of a Unit, it could also be set up independently and attached to the Block Development Officer. At block level, a post of Woman Medical Officer was blueprinted. In doing this, the likely acceptance of IUCD as a new family planning method was anticipated. At this level, a full-time Family Planning Extension Educator was planned to join the efforts of leaders and development workers. A Computor was specified to help with vital statistics and program evaluation. Also, a Storekeeper was to be provided to ensure the flow of supplies. At the district level, a consolidated "Family Planning Bureau" was prescribed with enough personnel and supplies to support the total program in all blocks of the district. State and central set ups were left essentially unchanged though their loads, in blueprint, would now be greater under the reorganization. For towns and cities, the reorganized scheme called for "Urban Family Planning Units" (rather than centers or clinics). Presumably, emphasis would go to a mass program to reach all the people in each urban area of 50,000 population. But there was no provision for supporting and coordinating these urban units.

The Government of India (the Center) accepted the blueprint for the reorganized family planning program. In October 1963 there was issued to all state governments a 45 page circular letter with three enclosures. This document specified the basis for financial assistance to the states; dictated line item budgets; spelled out job qualifications and duties at all levels, tables of organization, administrative relations, community relations, training requirements and even specified the bicycle allowances for three positions (Raina, 86-131)!

#### Action Two:

The author of the 1962-63 *Annual Report* and *Blueprint* Two wrote,

Even such a sympathetic observer as the demographer Kingsley Davis, only 12 years ago, wrote that he doubted whether an official program could be launched in the foreseeable future. Not only is it launched but India's Third Five Year Plan states that the Family Planning program is at the very center of planned development (Raina, 63).

Just how national was the program's coverage, how effective its implementation, how real its accomplishment, were to become matters of mounting concern over the next two years.

Inaugurating the seventeenth meeting of the Central Family Planning Board in July, 1965, Asoka Mehta, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission (the Prime Minister is the Chairman), spoke as follows and in a manner accurately described in the reports of the occasion as "impassioned", "spirited", "inspired", "vehement", "raising his voice" (Ministry of Health, 1965, 3). He said,

We should not waste our time on petty worries of scales and salaries and status. These are undoubtedly important. I do not deny them. But I want to know if there is a famine somewhere and we are fighting it, will we be insisting upon saying what are the patterns of assistance, what are the scales of pay you will give us or what are going to be our service conditions before we can fight the famine? Do we, specially those of us who are actually engaged in this task, not realise that this is a life and death struggle for us (Ministry of Health 1965, 2-3)?

Mr. Mehta, a development minded man, clearly thought all was not going well "at the very center of planned development".

That this was the case,—despite the larger figures reported on people trained, materials printed, units manned—was revealed clearly in reports of the evaluation of the family planning program by the Planning Commission's Programme Evaluation Organization. The evaluators had visited the states in 1964 and early 1965; with reports and implementation beginning in the summer of 1965.

The evaluation group had not attempted a full-fledged evaluation of the program's impact. Instead, as they pointed out, they studied "the current and emerging problems in the implementation of the 'Reorganized' family planning program" (Planning Commission, 1965, 64). They observed the gap between plans and instrumental capacity. And the critical importance of the gap was now the greater in view of the clinical and administrative advantages of the IUCD or loop which the Indian Council on Medical Research in early 1965 had endorsed for mass utilization.

The findings of the evaluation report (Planning Commission, 1965) provide facts on the 1964 action outcome of "the reorganized and extended" blueprint. At block and district levels, 3195 family planning service units were reported. Over 80 per cent of these were managed by state governments. Local government bodies (towns and cities) were still under-represented, with less than 2.6 of the total. The average population per unit varied from

48,000 in one state (Kerala) to 715,000 in another (Bihar). Staffing of the units was quite deficient; averaging only 1.1 workers full-time equivalent per unit.

In the service units, workers had not learned what they were supposed to do, and with whom they were to do it. Job descriptions and supervisory methods were not known. Local leaders had not been trained in the ways to promote family planning in their areas; indeed, training of all kinds was weak.

At block and district levels also, there were not enough supervisory positions or people. There was a tendency to economize on supervisory posts. Support from district family planning committees was not what it should be, though this could not generally be expected until full-time district staff were available to inform, stimulate and guide and district committees. Recruitment of the full district staffs, including district family planning medical officers and family planning extension educators, had not been given a very high priority. Family planning workers were not getting the maximum level of salary, allowances and service benefits which other staff with similar qualifications received. As the evaluation team put it, the "shortages" of staff often were really shortages in appealing conditions of work.

The states lacked assurances of long-term financial support for family planning; and in 10 states for which data were available, only 58% of funds allocated were expended. That Blueprint Two, "the reorganized and extended" program, had been launched in the middle of the Third Plan period, had compounded the financial uncertainties. The state financial authorities had no assurance that subsidies from the Center would be continued or increased in the Fourth Plan, starting in 1966. Therefore, they hesitated to create new positions and to think of expansion. There was widespread caution, delay and inaction.

In the state family planning bureaus, presently sanctioned positions were inadequate to carry out required leadership functions. The state Family Planning Officer was commonly an Assistant Director when, to get the resources and cooperation he needed from other officials, he needed the rank of Deputy Director of Health Services, plus imagination and drive. He would then be aided by helpers at the Assistant Director level to supervise the key aspects of the program. It was noted that state family planning boards were not always very effective, and the state family planning officers needed help in activating these bodies.

Another set of findings on "Action Two" came out of my own travels and observations. During the summer of 1965 I observed family planning work in eight states and five of the largest cities. At the same time I observed and participated in various

TABLE 1  
IUCD'S INSERTED MAY 1, 1965 TO MARCH 31, 1966  
(SOURCE: CENTRAL FAMILY PLANNING DIRECTORATE)

Name of State or Territory	Cumulative Totals as of		
	July 31	Nov. 30	Mar. 31
1. Andhra Pradesh	—	4,500	9,222
2. Assam	1,731	8,881	27,705
3. Bihar	2	2,331	15,588
4. Gujarat	20,431	51,316	84,949
5. Jammu & Kashmir	—	733	3,051
6. Kerala	575	12,428	35,717
7. Madhya Pradesh	145	2,170	18,987
8. Madras	338	960	3,491
9. Maharashtra	13,257	31,450	129,887
10. Mysore	3,238	21,246	75,900
11. Orissa	187	1,961	6,004
12. Punjab	7,343	39,239	132,263
13. Rajasthan	3,986	6,245	13,663
14. Uttar Pradesh	1,135	8,788	45,347
15. West Bengal	16,233	68,270	164,387
16. Delhi	2,000	10,000	20,113
17. Other (Territories, etc.)	—	868	18,230
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>70,601</b>	<b>271,386</b>	<b>804,504</b>

developments at the Center in New Delhi. My findings pertained mainly to promotion and accomplishment by means of the IUCD or "Lippes loop", and simply paralleled for the most part those reported by the evaluation panel. The loop was the method that began to be emphasized in 1965, and which then was viewed by enthusiasts as "the answer" to the world population problem. There had been real accomplishment in a few states, some of it quite impressive. But as the table shows, the all-India picture was very spotty indeed. Five states accounted for about 78 per cent of the 271,386 insertions by the end of November 1965: Gujarat, Maharashtra, Mysore, Punjab, West Bengal. The same five states, at the end of March 1966, had inserted a total of about 73 per cent of the 804,504 IUCD which the Ministry of Health reported for the total national effort. These five states show good accomplishment, but they are the ones that might be expected to top the list: they are highly urbanized and industrialized, compared with the rest of India. Only one of the five leaders, Maharashtra, is among the five most populated states of India (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Madras, in order). The cumulative total is barely a beginning toward the figure required for any noticeable effect on the birthrate—at least 5,000,000 insertions made in each of several years, and retained; that is, not removed or extruded. Nor do sterilizations (mainly vasectomies performed

on men) reported by government—about 1,500,000 over the past 10 years—greatly improve the picture since the great majority of those operated are over 45 years old.

### Stage Three (1966 —)

#### *Blueprint Three:*

The Planning Commission's evaluation (1965) concluded with several recommendations that constitute a third blueprint, with a quite different Center set up and changes in Center-State relationships. This evaluation was, in effect, concurred in by two groups of experts sent to India in 1965 by the World Bank and by the United Nations (Technical Assistance); their recommendations in each case resembled closely those of the Planning Commission's panel. A reorganization and enhanced administrative capacity was called for. The states should get more technical help from the Center as well as from other, more successful states. Such assistance is needed they said, not only where progress is slow, but also where some extra help might move a state program "over the edge" to success. A "State Consultant Panel" was urged, to include outstanding state workers with experience in special aspects of the program who could be called upon by other states for limited periods to help with specific tasks.

There should be decentralization of certain powers to the states, particularly powers of grant allocation to local voluntary organizations and other bodies. The Center would make the general policies and guidelines for such grants.

In respect to finance, the evaluators recommended (a) each state should have a "master-plan for building up all the component parts of its total family planning program", and the plan should underlay a schematic budget that would assure any unit, once started, of specified budgetary resources for the next ten years, irrespective of the Five Year Plan period; (b) for better use of funds and greater flexibility of operation, the family planning program should hereafter be handled not as a "centrally sponsored scheme" but as one of the state plan schemes and thus enjoy a specified pattern of central assistance covering the planned and budgeted operations as above; (c) the proportion of Central assistance should be kept at least at 75 per cent of cost, and possibly raised to 100 per cent.

At the Center, the evaluators emphasized the need for much more administrative and financial authority, and a greatly strengthened headquarters staff with sections on planning, contraceptive supplies, administration, training and education and—of

key importance—field operations with six regional officers. (The Director of Family Planning had only two or three professional assistants in his office.) The evaluators urged a "Central Family Planning Organization" be established as a Directorate General in the Health Ministry, but to be the "semi-autonomous" arm of a "semi-autonomous Executive Board". The Director General of Family Planning should be called "Commissioner of Family Planning" and be ranked an ex-officio Additional Secretary to Government. The panel preferred a five member Executive Board composed of secretaries in the key ministries because they could be convened more readily than ministers, and could also take action. The Board should be able to exercise full powers of financial sanction and administrative action, including appointment of staff, within the annual budget allocation for the program.

### *Action Three:*

Except for reorganization, it is too early to appraise Action Three. The findings and recommendations of the Planning Commission's panel, the World Bank and the U. N. teams, were considered by the Cabinet. Steps toward reorganization began in August, 1965. The Family Planning Program did not become a semi-autonomous affair; no Executive Board of Secretaries was created. A Commissioner of Family Planning, a government doctor with managerial experience in the Indian Army, was appointed; but no additional positions were created at the Center for 10 months.

In December of 1965, soon after the new Prime Minister (Mrs. Gandhi) took office, the Health Ministry was redesignated "Ministry of Health and Family Planning" and a full Secretary to government was appointed from the Indian Administrative Service to head a new department of Family Planning. By June 1, 1966 the Secretary, reported to be the personal selection of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Planning, got approval of 30 new supervisory positions in two "wings" of the Department; secretarial and technical. At mid-July, 11 of these jobs had been filled and an Executive Board of the Cabinet Committee was created which, apparently, will work directly with the Secretary.

As with most reorganizations, this one occasioned numerous interpersonal difficulties, factional conflicts, and noncooperation at several levels. And there were those who thought the Family Planning Program should be moved to the Ministry of Planning and Social Welfare (formerly the Planning Commission).

### **Interpretation**

I have described a persistent gap between the plans for family planning and the government's capacity to execute. This I have

done by comparing blueprints and action over the last 14 years, drawing on government documents and my own observations. One may say of family planning what one observer has said of India's community development program, "the emphasis has been on expansion of schematic pattern at a pace faster than the implementing personnel could organize" (Deshmukh, 1965, 17). The massiveness of India's family planning challenge unquestionably calls for big plans. The population is now estimated at about 490 or 500 million, growing at a rate of about 2.5 per cent or 10 to 12 millions annually, whereas growth of national product is barely ahead.<sup>2</sup> Politically it is no wonder that the Minister of Health and Family Planning announced an unlikely target of 6 million IUCD insertions for 1966-67, more than six times the 1965-66 accomplishment. Administratively, though, it is surprising that she did not consult the Secretary or the Commissioner of Family Planning before setting this target. But what is the likelihood that modernization can be induced and government's capacity for disciplined action increased?

There are several favorable factors in the present situation. The creation of a separate Department, appointment of capable men to direct it, the creation of much needed staff positions, the Center's assurance of long-term financial aid to the states, the availability and administrative simplicity of the loop combined with its evident appeal in a ready market requiring only information and service centers to begin with—all these are favorable factors. More important, however, has been the first evidence of consensus in the Cabinet and in the Congress Party that national family planning is not just another health program to be promoted coequally with tuberculosis control, small pox eradication, leprosy control and the like. Instead, it is beginning to get number one priority alongside agriculture, exports and defense; though the politicians probably must have more confidence in the program's capacity before many will commit themselves fully: they need "a winner" in India as elsewhere. Finally, on the favorable side, there are examples now of accomplishment, particularly in the five states, as pointed out earlier.

Of the factors unfavorable to greater government capacity in the foreseeable future, the most basic is the disintegrative or centrifugal tendencies within the nation. India is a new and heterogeneous nation with democratic institutions and a federal

<sup>2</sup>The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East reported (1965) that India's gross national product increase, 1952 to 1963, was at an annual rate of 3.3 per cent. Among 12 Asian countries, only Indonesia was lesser (2.8); Japan (10.) and Thailand (6.0) the leaders. India's agricultural product increase is the same as her population growth rate: 2.5 per cent.

system whose states possess a degree of constitutional autonomy resembling the U. S. A. before the Civil War. The bureaucracy is slowly struggling out of a law and order past into a developmental and problem oriented future. And leaders are riven socially and psychologically in a current of change from particularistic to universalistic standards and stratagems.

Observers of Indian administrative behavior have noted other difficulties which may be more amenable to training and personnel development efforts. There is, for example, the penchant for symbols; plans and paper, meetings and assemblies, talk and print. The problem is often thought corrected once the law is passed or the target is announced. The goal is commonly considered won if everyone on a committee assents, if the funds have been appropriated, if the employees have been posted. Numbers games are often substituted for more threatening assessments; numbers of bodies in place, numbers of rupees earmarked, numbers of anything assembled or processed. Also, cooperative action on the job comes hard, for caste-like practices persist regardless of statutory prohibitions.

Every man is an island; each man to his function, his private contract with God. This is the realization of the Gita's selfless action. This is caste. In the beginning a no-doubt useful division of labor in a rural society, it has now divorced function from social obligation, position from duties. It has led to the Indian passion for speech-making, for gestures and for symbolic action (Naipaul, 1964, 83).

As observers both Indian and western frequently note, organizational behavior generally is characterized by deference to age and seniority, to rank and authority and, more subtly, to caste and to color (Harrison, 1960; Misra, 1962; Naipaul, 1964; Srinivas, 1962). Delegation is difficult to practice and responsibility hard to take. It is easier to distrust than to trust. The power to make decisions, even the smallest decisions, is usually held zealously at the top by means of tight review, and by endless noting up and down the parallel hierarchies of administrative generalists and of experts. Organizational goals are set at the top and too seldom translated or broken down for the involvement or understanding of subordinates.

More leaders who inspire and who catalyze group action and cooperation, as well as many more competent managers, are called for. While it is true that India possesses a larger number of intellectuals and professionals than most other societies in transition, their proportion of the population is low and the ratio of managers and organizational leaders is probably even lower. Thus, shortages of personnel qualified to manage and staff a national family plan-

ning program is a negative factor alongside the difficulties of communication and cooperation in pursuit of common goals.

Already apparent is an overloading of the family planning elite—overloaded by communications, overloaded by matters for decision (Etzioni, 1965, 487). This elite in the states, the regional offices, and Center needs a very large enhancement of its leadership and management capabilities. This could be done by adding experienced managers from business to those from government, orienting them to family planning problems, and giving them expert social science assistance. Brief, practical management training and development courses for health professionals in supervisory positions could also be helpful; but there is no reason why the Indian family planning effort must be a health function, or that physicians must be its major administrators. Whether the family planning program will get enough strong leadership, and whether a sizeable management input will be made, one cannot say, though it is now the most critical factor in India's family planning accomplishment.

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FREDERICK WYATT was born in Vienna, Austria in 1911. He studied at the University of Vienna and received his Ph.D. there in 1936. He held positions at the Harvard Psychological Clinic, in the Department of Social Relations and at the Harvard Medical School. He was Chief Psychologist at McLean Hospital (Waverley, Mass.) and subsequently at the Cushing V. A. Hospital in Framingham, Mass., and Associate Professor of Psychology at Clark University from 1946-52. Since 1952 he has been on the staff of the University of Michigan as Director of the Psychological Clinic and Professor of Psychology.

LARRY BUMPASS, Stability and Change in Family Size Expectations Over the First Two years of Marriage. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 83-98.

Questions about expected family size and related variables were asked in a probability sample of 182 couples selected from marriage records in the Detroit Metropolitan Area. These couples were interviewed shortly after their marriage, and then reinterviewed twice more at one year intervals. Although there are many significant changes in the life situation of a couple during their first two years of marriage, the family size expectations of these young couples were as stable over the interval as were the expectations of women who had already borne one, two, or four children. Differences in the stability of the family size expectations of Catholics and NonCatholics are discussed. The effect of attitudes on stability is considered for cases in which the wife prefers a different number of children than she expects.

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AARON V. CICOUREL, Fertility, Family Planning, and the Social Organization of the Family: Some Methodological Issues. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 57-81.

Based upon recent field research on fertility and family planning in Argentina, problems of entering and sustaining the interview and coding the material are discussed critically. The discussion revolves around two issues: (a) how is social process within the family linked to structural notions about population growth and economic development? and (b) what properties of social interaction must we utilize to explain the dynamics of obtaining the information, coding the data, and the family organization? A description of field research problems and how they were handled in the Argentine study provide a basis for brief remarks about a few families and the social context within which interviews were conducted.

---

NICHOLAS J. DEMERATH, Organization and Management Needs of a National Family Planning Program: The Case of India. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 179-194.

Data concerning India's population control efforts since 1952 from government sources supplemented by the author's own observations show a persistent gap between plans and the instrumental capacity to carry them out. Analytic concepts employed in the paper include overloading the elite, organization as blueprint, organization as action. Whether and when the applied social science and management input will be made is problematic, though this is now the most critical factor in India's family planning accomplishment.

JOHN U. FARLEY AND HAROLD J. LEAVITT, Population Control and the Private Sector. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 135-143.

Despite the existence of private-sector markets for contraceptives in most parts of the world and despite the fact that most contraceptives are sold through such channels, the private sector has been virtually ignored in population study and in formulation of population programs. A model of consumer acceptance is presented and the role that the private sector plays in the model is examined. Some characteristics of private-sector contraceptive markets in the Caribbean are discussed along with some important open issues of social science research on the interaction of public and private sector distribution channels.

---

RONALD FREEDMAN, The Research Challenge to Social Scientists in the Developing Family Planning Programs: The Case of Taiwan. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 165-169.

Taiwan is a favorable setting for population control studies because there have been a series of developments favorable to the development of linkages between the individual and larger social and economic units. A large scale experiment, under controlled conditions, to bring family planning to the population was conducted by the city of Taichung which led to an expanded island-wide program. This paper places the study by Pan Lu, Chen and Chow in this broader setting.

---

FREDERICK S. JAFEE, Family Planning, Public Policy and Intervention Strategy. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 145-163.

Despite important changes in public policy on family planning, public agencies in the U. S. have yet to develop adequate programs. Extension of services to those who need it to effectuate their family size preferences is slowed down to some degree by continued religious opposition but more significantly by stereotyped views of the poor among the serving professions and the generally inadequate state of medical care available. The intervention strategy guiding current poverty programs is discussed. Voluntary family planning is sharply distinguished from coercive, punitive programs, but it is suggested that public voluntary programs must be expanded rapidly to prevent compulsory measures from being attempted.

JOSEPH A. KAHL, Modern Values and Fertility Ideals in Brazil and Mexico.  
*J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 99-114.

Two samples of men were compared, one from Brazil and another from Mexico. The dependent variable was ideal family size, or number of children preferred. The three independent variables were metropolitan versus small-town residence, socio-economic status, and modernism of values as measured by a scale of independence from extended kin ties. Despite basic similarities on most aspects of social structure, the Brazilians preferred fewer children than the Mexicans. An interpretation of these findings was developed using modernism in values as an intervening variable between metropolitan residence and high status, on the one hand, and the small-family ideal, on the other.

---

LAURA PAN LU, H. C. CHEN AND L. P. CHOW, An Experimental Study of the Effect of Group Meetings on the Acceptance of Family Planning in Taiwan. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 171-177.

The Taiwan family planning program offers opportunity to study social change, diffusion, and small group processes in a situation combining social action with experimental design. The present study was directed toward measuring the effect of small group meetings on (a) knowledge of and attitudes toward contraception, (b) acceptance of the loop, and (c) diffusion of information to contiguous areas. Comparisons based on pre- and post-meeting surveys of the effectiveness in areas having meetings in every lin (neighborhood grouping) with areas with meetings in every other lin show that the meetings were significantly and almost equally effective in changing knowledge and acceptance, whether in the saturated or semi-saturated areas.

---

EDWARD PHOLMAN, A Psychologist's Introduction to the Birth Planning Literature. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 13-27.

This review of literature, with 98 references, is divided into (a) major research projects (b) bibliographies and leads to finding material, (c) publications touching on special topics, and (d) sources of funds and information. Special topics include the history of birth planning, religious aspects, legal aspects, population growth, psychological effects of unwanted conceptions, preferences for sex of children, particular contraceptive methods, abortion, sterilization and "psychological" discussions.

**LEE RAINWATER**, Family Planning in Cross-national Perspectives: An Overview. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 1-11.

Social science research and the development of contraceptive techniques has made population control attainable, even in underdeveloped countries with modest resources. Previous research indicates that among the poor in America and the underdeveloped nations the ideal family is, realistically, small, thereby making it much more possible for governments to embark on family planning programs. Constraints and inefficiencies in the institutional sector prevent knowledge of and facilities for birth control from filtering down. Although family planning information and services are available to middle class Americans, their ideal family size is relatively large. Crucial to the development of effective programs is research which will illuminate the reasons for large (4 children instead of 2) family preference in the middle class and make provisions for functional alternatives to gratifications received.

---

**J. MAYONE STYCOS**, Contraception and Catholicism in Latin America. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 115-133.

In 1963 and 1964, KAP surveys were conducted in Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Mexico City, Panama City, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose and San Salvador. Samples of roughly 2,000 women in the reproductive ages were taken in each city. Currently mated Catholic women were classified as to their level of religiosity, as measured by their frequency of attendance at communion. Educational level was controlled by separating those who completed primary school from those who did not. It was found that the average currently mated Catholic woman living in a major city in Latin America wants between three and four children, would favor receiving birth control information, and has practiced contraception before completing childbearing. While there was a relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward family size and birth control, there was no clear relationship between religiosity and actual fertility behavior.

---

**FREDERICK WYATT**, Clinical Notes on the Motives of Reproduction. *J. of Soc. Issues*, XXIII, No. 4, 29-56.

The aim of this paper is to consider the motives of women for having children. Five different approaches to the motives of reproduction exist: (a) the psychological (individual and motive-oriented) approach; (b) the demographic (sociological) approach; (c) the approach of social learning and role-taking; (d) the comparative approach (experimental and observational studies of animals); (e) the physiological and endocrine approach.

The central question of motivation is that of the genesis of the wish for the child. What subjective experiences lead to it, and how are they molded by social learning? Several hypotheses and the concepts used (and implied) to frame them are critically examined.

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